This formative evaluation is primarily learning focused, with an emphasis being placed on assessing how NRC can adapt and improve the programme to maximize impact for refugees in Lebanon.
The host community approach was considered highly relevant and innovative when it was designed over two years ago. However, the context has subsequently changed and NRC decided it was time to independently evaluate the results of the programme and to asses whether the initial programme assumptions still hold true. As part of NRC's new focus on promoting organisational learning, NRC's shelter coordinator who works on a similar programme in Jordan acted as the evaluation assistant, increasing the relevance and quality of the evaluation and ensuring that the learning generated is transferred to another country programme.
Main Conclusions and Recommendations
In terms of impact, there are undoubtable positive effects in the population directly benefiting from the NRC intervention. With the rent-free approach, NRC has improved HHs capacity to allocate scarce income for basic expenditures and also avoided HHs assuming much higher debts and compromising household livelihood. There has also been a positive impact on the increase in the number of rental units available in the localities of intervention after the 12-month rent-free period expires. Municipalities and authorities interviewed also offer a generally positive or very positive perception of the approach and work done, especially in those localities where NRC investment (No. of HUs rehabilitated) has been higher and more sustained over time.
With the crisis now protracted after four years of conflict, and considering the Government of Lebanon’s restrictions to new refugee entries and the reduction in international assistance, the overall SSU approach continues to be relevant as a shelter response, but it is insufficient (as a stand-alone sectoral intervention) to adequately respond to the living costs and basic assistance and protection needs of the most vulnerable refugee families, who lack both official refugee status and possibilities of dignified work and life. There is a need to lobby/advocate for a 100 percent free-shelter modality to donors and shelter actors, instead of rent freeze and/or rent reduction approaches (which is the main current implementation mechanism by shelter actors under SSUs approach). Given the restrictive government policy and cuts in assistance to refugees in the country, a stand-alone NRC shelter intervention can only contribute to families not resorting to more aggressive coping mechanisms.
Average NRC 2014 beneficiaries in both T5 and Bekaa have incurred more debt during the period of assistance, showing on one hand the incapacity to generate enough income and, on the other, the insufficient complementary assistance to cover that gap.
The evaluation found that 40 percent of NRC SSUs beneficiaries remain in the HU after the free-rent period expired, but only 65 percent of this 40 percent remain paying rent. For the 60 percent of beneficiaries who could not continue in the NRC HU after the 12-month rent-free period ended, the majority moved to substandard shelters, a clear indication of the insufficient length of the support.
According to the collected information, only NRC has been implementing a purely SSUs rental-free modality, whilst other actors either apply a mix of rental-free, rent freeze or rent reduction, or only rent freeze which, in light of the qualitative research carried out during this evaluation, are inappropriate to assist vulnerable refugee families beyond localized emergencies. Some of those interventions are simply weather-proofing and emergency shelter & WASH, which can be very relevant but should not be called SSUs interventions, as they are not meeting the agreed SSUs minimum standards.
NRC is the only agency that put in place both modalities: “occupied” and “unoccupied” that are considered key for either stabilization of families or for protection contingency purposes. Direct referrals to other actors are the exception rather than the norm, and complementarity between NRC core competencies was insufficient. Protection activities played a marginal role in the response and HH Targeting has mostly been guided by the technical condition of the shelter rather than by a thorough socio-economic-protection family assessment (vulnerability). When comparing the needs (and exposure to threats-vulnerability) of both Lebanese and Syrian refugees, it becomes clear that the NRC decision to prioritize the targeting of refugees coming from Syria was the right one. These populations are not sufficiently assisted and protected and are exposed to an overwhelming and increasing exploitation, which adds to their pre-fleeing vulnerabilities?
As part of the evaluation research and analysis, several vulnerability factors and percentage of negative coping mechanisms practiced were reviewed. Direct correlation was identified with disability, family size, head of household profile, health expenditure and family composition linked to the cost of residence renewal, while no conclusive correlations were identified with dependency ratio, female head of households, date of arrival in Lebanon or previous shelter conditions.
The SSUs strategy and secondary objectives of the modality (to increase the number of Units in the rental market), catalysed implementation of the people-centred approach and the needs-driven orientation that was and should still be the primary focus of any humanitarian intervention. The current implemented “unoccupied” modality feasibility is highly compromised due to its high move out rates and a weak NRC performance in certain aspects of the programme.