

Life after Forcible Transfer: Palestinian Household Conditions, Needs, and Future Outlook in the West Bank

June 2026 | occupied Palestinian territory

Context & Rationale

Since October 2023, Palestinians in the West Bank, especially in Area C, have faced intensified military activity and movement restrictions, accelerated settlement expansion, and a marked increase in settler violence. These dynamics have compounded long-standing restrictions on Palestinian planning and building, access to land, resources, and services which had already heightened protection risks, disrupted livelihoods, and increased risks of forced displacement.

Within this context, the West Bank Protection Consortium (WBPC) - which monitors over 200 communities at risk of forcible transfer - estimates that approximately 3,000 people have been displaced from within these monitored communities since October 2023. Existing monitoring systems enable humanitarian support to households immediately following displacement. However, there remains **limited evidence on the longer-term impacts of forcible transfer**, particularly as it relates to households' **living conditions, evolving needs, and future intentions several months or years after displacement**.

To address this gap, an assessment was conducted to document the post-displacement situation of households originating from communities monitored for risk of forcible transfer. The assessment aims to generate evidence to inform humanitarian planning, advocacy, and more targeted programming in the West Bank.

Key Messages

-  **Among surveyed households, displacement increased more than fourfold after October 2023**, reflecting intensified coercive pressures - particularly settler violence and eviction threats - within an already restrictive protection environment. Nearly half of households (49%) reported being at risk of re-eviction within the next six months, indicating that displacement remains ongoing and many households face continued risk of further displacement.
-  **Displacement has left most households in physically precarious and legally insecure shelter.** Nearly nine in ten households report worse living conditions than in their place of origin, with many living in unsafe temporary shelters and lacking secure tenure.
-  Displacement has structurally weakened livelihoods and deepened economic precarity. **Nearly one-third of households have no income at all**, and rely on community support, borrowing, or asset sales. Among those with income, **most reported it was insufficient to meet basic needs**. Movement restrictions further limit access to livelihoods, with only 21% able to move freely.
-  **Households reported overlapping assistance needs. Livestock support was most frequently requested (76%),** but needs also spanned **shelter, infrastructure, and basic services** - underscoring the multi-dimensional impact of displacement.
-  Return remains largely unviable under current conditions. **Only 6% of households plan to return within the next year**, while most remain due to ongoing **insecurity and loss of land access**. Households identified the same factors - settler presence, insecurity, and land confiscation - as both necessary conditions for return and the main barriers preventing it, indicating that **displacement remains unresolved for most households, with conditions necessary for safe return largely absent**.

Key Findings

49%

of households perceived a risk of re-eviction in the coming 6 months

86%

of households reported worse living conditions than in their place of origin

30%

of households reported no source of income at time of data collection

6%






of households reported planning to return to their place of origin in the coming 12 months

Assessment Overview

This assessment is based on a quantitative household survey conducted with **233 households** displaced within the past five years from **WBPC-monitored communities** classified as fully or partially forcibly transferred. Data were collected between 7–30 December 2025 across seven West Bank governorates: Ramallah, Bethlehem, Hebron, Nablus, Tubas, Jerusalem, and Jericho. Data collection was implemented jointly by WBPC member organizations (Acted, ACF, NRC, WeWorld, and PUI) and PARC Agricultural Development Association.

While this assessment is not representative of the wider displaced population in the West Bank, the sample is representative of households within the WBPC caseload. Findings are therefore generalizable to other households monitored by the Consortium, with estimates reported at a $\pm 3.75\%$ margin of error and 95% level of confidence.

Profile of surveyed households


	Average HH size	7
	HHs with 1+ children (up to age 18)	80%
	HHs with 1+ older persons (60+)	26%
	Female-headed HHs	35%
	HHs with a member with disability	18%

Evolving displacement dynamics before and after October 2023

To understand how displacement patterns have evolved over time, households were asked to recount all displacement events they experienced during the five years preceding data collection. This recall period was intentionally selected to allow comparison between displacement occurring prior to and following October 7, 2023.

Household-reported displacement events increased sharply after October 7, 2023. More than three-quarters (76%) of all reported displacement events occurred after this date.

Reported displacement events by quarter (based on household recall)




Prior to October 2023, displacement occurred intermittently and at relatively low levels, averaging 7.6 reported displacement events per quarter. Following October 7, **the quarterly average increased more than fourfold**, rising to 32 reported displacement events per quarter, and remained elevated across multiple consecutive quarters through 2024 and 2025.

This sustained increase indicates that recent displacement reflects **prolonged escalation rather than isolated spikes**. Although not directly comparable, this concentration of household-reported displacement events aligns temporally with broader system-level trends documented by OCHA, including a sustained and marked rise in settler attacks resulting in casualties and/or property damage from late 2023 onwards. OCHA reporting further indicates elevated levels of Palestinian fatalities and injuries, alongside increased demolitions and property destruction during this period.¹ Taken together, these trends suggest that the displacement trajectories reported by households are unfolding within a wider context of intensified and sustained insecurity across the West Bank.

Comparison of reported drivers before and after October 7 further underscores this escalation. Settler violence remained the primary driver of displacement across both periods, reported in approximately 95% of displacement events both before and after October 7, indicating that it has been a persistent and central driver over time.

Reported drivers of displacement before and after October 7, 2023 (% of displacement events)



However, displacement after October 7 increasingly occurred in the context of eviction threats. The share of displacement events involving eviction threats rose from 22% prior to October 7 to 29% afterward. Other coercive drivers, including demolitions, movement restrictions, and military operations, were also consistently reported across both periods.

¹ OCHA, [West Bank Monthly Snapshot](#), December 2025.

Taken together, these findings suggest that recent displacement reflects an **intensification within an already coercive environment**, rather than the emergence of entirely new drivers. Displacement continues to be shaped by overlapping and persistent pressures, but is occurring more frequently and with greater intensity following October 7, 2023.

Importantly, displacement dynamics were not experienced as isolated household-level events. In 89% of reported displacement events, respondents indicated that whole communities were displaced at the same time. At the household level, displacement was similarly experienced as a unified process, with 97% of movements involving all household members relocating together. This indicates that recent displacement is occurring at scale and at the community level, reinforcing the interpretation of escalation as collective and structural rather than sporadic or individual in nature.

Sustained nature of displacement highlights need for continued support

Since their most recent displacement, a majority of surveyed households reported receiving some form of assistance from across the humanitarian response. Overall, 71% of households reported receiving assistance, while 28% reported receiving none, **highlighting differences in access to support across displaced households**. A very small share of households (1%) were unsure or did not report whether they had received assistance.

Among households that reported receiving assistance, support was concentrated in a small number of core modalities, primarily cash, shelter, fodder, food, and sanitation assistance. Cash- or voucher-based assistance was the most commonly reported form of support, received by 57% of recipient households, followed by shelter or housing repair materials (48%). Livelihood-related support, including fodder or other livestock assistance, was reported by 26% of households, indicating that a substantial share of displaced households received assistance linked to the protection of productive assets. In addition, food assistance (13%) and sanitation support (12%) were reported by notable proportions of recipient households, while water-related assistance (8%) was less commonly reported.

Most commonly reported types of assistance among recipient households


\$	Cash- or voucher-based assistance	57%
🏠	Shelter or housing repair materials	48%
🐄	Fodder or other support for livestock	26%
🍲	Food assistance	13%
🚽	Sanitation support	12%

Where cash-based assistance was provided, multipurpose cash was the predominant modality, reflecting an emphasis on flexible support that allows households to prioritise urgent needs following displacement. Other forms of assistance - such as hygiene items, health services, electricity support, or legal and protection assistance - were reported by relatively limited shares of households.

WBPC partner organizations were the most commonly reported providers of assistance, cited by 49% of recipient households.² Additional households reported receiving support from other international NGOs (33%) and UN agencies such as UNRWA (16%), while smaller proportions cited the Red Cross, public authorities, local NGOs, or community members.

Assistance was often received well before the time of data collection (December 2025). Nearly one-third of households (32%) reported that they last received assistance more than one year prior to the assessment, while 39% reported receiving support within the previous 12 months. Only 1% of households reported receiving assistance within the month preceding data collection, indicating limited recent assistance at the time of the survey.³

Extent to which received assistance met households' most urgent needs (% of HHs reporting assistance)



When asked how well the assistance they received met their household's most urgent needs, the **majority of recipient households reported that support met needs only partially or to a limited extent**. While 18% of households indicated that assistance mostly or fully met their needs, most reported that support only partly met needs (40%), barely met needs (23%), or did not meet their needs at all (19%).

Among households reporting that assistance only partly, barely, or not at all met their needs, respondents most commonly cited the **insufficient scale or duration of assistance**, reported by 96% of households in this group, indicating that support was not sufficient on its own to address the extent and persistence of household needs. Far smaller proportions pointed to quality-related considerations (15%), delays in delivery (4%), or assistance that did not align with household priorities (6%), while access- and safety-related barriers were rarely reported. Taken together, these findings suggest that **perceived gaps in assistance were primarily related to the scale and duration of support, rather than to delivery mechanisms or accessibility constraints**.


² This reflects the assessment's focus on households originating from WBPC-monitored communities, within which Consortium members constitute the primary actors delivering assistance. ³ This pattern is influenced in part by the assessment design, which excluded households displaced very recently in order to better capture the longer-term impacts of forcible transfer on household living conditions, stability, and access to support.

Shelter conditions and tenure following forcible transfer

Displacement has resulted in a marked deterioration in living conditions for most households. Compared with their place of origin, **86% of households reported worse living conditions at their current location**, including 73% who described conditions as much worse. At the same time, many households are living in temporary and insecure shelter arrangements, with nearly three in five residing in tents, makeshift shelters, or caravans.

While many households reported owning their shelter, ownership does not translate into secure tenure, as most remain on land they do not own and rely on informal or non-existent occupancy agreements. These arrangements expose households to heightened risks: temporary shelters frequently suffer from structural damage, including risk of collapse, and are associated with extreme temperature exposure, leaks during rainfall, and loss of privacy. Overall, **shelter outcomes following forcible transfer remain both physically precarious and legally insecure.**


Perceived change in living condition compared with place of origin (% of HHs)



Shelter types

Displaced households are predominantly living in temporary shelter arrangements, with constrained access to adequate housing. Nearly three in five households reported living in makeshift shelters, caravans or prefabricated units, or humanitarian tents, while only one in three were residing in brick or cement housing. Apartment living was rare. These patterns indicate that displacement has largely translated into temporary and precarious shelter arrangement, rather than a transition to stable housing.

Current shelter type (by % of HHs)




Tenure security & informal occupancy arrangements


Although most households reported owning their shelter (71%), tenure security remains limited because ownership often does not include the land on which the shelter is

located. Many households own only the physical structure itself while residing on land owned by others. Overall, 57% of households reported living on land they did not own, most commonly land owned by private landlords (26%), family or community members (16%), or public authorities such as municipalities or the Palestinian Authority (9%). This may contribute to continued tenure insecurity despite reported shelter ownership.

Household occupancy arrangement for current shelter



Reported ownership of land on which shelters are located (% of HHs)



At the same time, a substantial share of households were residing in shelters they did not own, either through hosting arrangements (16%) or rental agreements (12%). Among these households, formal occupancy arrangements were uncommon: only 3% reported having a written agreement, while most relied on verbal agreements or reported having no agreement at all. Notably, this informality persisted despite the fact that most renting and hosted households reported paying rent or another contribution, typically on a monthly basis. Taken together, these patterns highlight a key tenure gap, whereby neither shelter ownership nor financial contribution translates into secure occupancy, increasing households' exposure to eviction and onward displacement.

Type of occupancy agreement among renting or hosted HHs (n=66)




Shelter condition, safety, habitability

The vast majority of households (79%) reported at least one structural problem or damage in their current shelter, while 85% reported at least one additional shelter-related issue. Shelter conditions varied markedly by shelter type, with households living in temporary shelters consistently reporting higher levels of structural damage and safety concerns. Roof or ceiling damage was particularly widespread in makeshift shelters and caravans,


while reports that shelters were unsafe or at risk of collapse were concentrated almost exclusively among these shelter types.

Most commonly reported structural problems & safety concerns, by shelter type



Beyond structural risks, **daily living conditions were substantially worse in temporary shelters.** Households residing in makeshift shelters, caravans, and humanitarian tents frequently reported exposure to extreme temperatures, leaks during rainfall, lack of privacy, and the presence of vectors. While reported conditions were comparatively better among households living in brick or cement housing, structural damage remained common, indicating that **access to more permanent shelter types did not consistently translate into safe or adequate living conditions for displaced households.**

Most commonly reported shelter habitability issues, by shelter type




Stability of stay under expanding coercive pressures

Overall, short-term confidence to remain in place was uneven and linked to the classification of the area of households' most recent displacement under the Oslo accords.⁴ Households' confidence that they could remain in their current location for the next six months varied by the area of their most recent displacement.

Confidence was lowest among households whose latest displacement was to Area C (n=71), while those most recently displaced to Area A (n=39) expressed the highest confidence.

Households displaced most recently to Area B (n=123) fell between these two, displaying a more mixed profile of confidence. These differences mirror broader trends in the West Bank, where ongoing settlement expansion, demolitions, and land-use restrictions in Area C have increasingly constrained Palestinian presence and tenure

Confidence to remain, by area of HH's most recent displacement



Despite these differences in short-term confidence, **perceived eviction risk was widespread and not limited to households most recently displaced to Area C.** Nearly half of all households (49%) reported that they believed they were at risk of eviction within the next six months. Notably, a majority of those who perceived such a risk had most recently been displaced to Area B (53%), rather than Area C (34%), with a smaller share from Area A (14%). **This suggests that short-term confidence to remain does not fully capture households' sense of insecurity, and that perceived eviction risk reflects pressures that cut across Areas A, B, and C rather than being confined to Area C alone**


Direct threats were the primary driver of households' perceived risk of eviction. Among households who reported being at risk of eviction within the next six months (49%; n=115), nearly two thirds (63%; n=73) cited having received informal threats as a reason for this perceived risk, while an additional 16% (n=18) reported having been threatened with a formal eviction or demolition order. Beyond direct threats, 21% (n=24) indicated that recent evictions affecting neighbouring households contributed to their perception of risk.

Follow-up questions on the sources of these threats indicate that **settlers were the primary actors contributing to households' perceived eviction risk.** Among households who reported having received threats or eviction notices, settlers were most frequently identified as the source (n=57), followed by Israeli authorities (n=15),

⁴The Oslo Accords (1993–1995) divided the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C. Area A is under Palestinian civil and security control; Area B is under Palestinian civil control and Israeli security control; and Area C remains under full Israeli civil and security control. East Jerusalem is administered separately under Israeli law and is not included within the Oslo area classifications.

while relatively few households reported threats from other actors. This highlights the central role of settler-related coercive pressures in shaping households' perceptions of ongoing eviction risk.


Top three reasons for perceived eviction risk (among households reporting risk)



Protection and perceptions of safety

Perceptions of safety over the past six months were low overall. While 39% of households reported feeling somewhat safe, a majority (56%) reported feeling unsafe in their current location. Safety perceptions varied by the area of households' most recent displacement. Households most recently displaced to Area B reported the lowest perceived safety, while those in Area A reported comparatively higher perceptions of safety, with Area C falling in between. These findings suggest that perceived safety is shaped in part by the governance and protection environment of the area of displacement. However, across all areas, a substantial share of households reported ongoing insecurity.

Perception of safety, by HHS' area of most recent displacement



Households' security concerns over the past six months were dominated by fears of settler-related violence and intimidation, suggesting that displacement has not removed households from settler-related risks. Settler violence/physical intimidation was reported far more frequently than any other concern, while theft or vandalism, harassment or verbal abuse, and military incursions were also commonly reported - indicating that households face multiple, overlapping forms of insecurity rather than a single isolated threat. More severe protection incidents, including arrest/detention, property or land destruction/confiscation, and forced eviction/demolition, were reported less often but remain highly consequential for household safety and tenure security.

Top security concerns in the last 6 months, % of HHS

1	Violence or physical intimidation from settlers	65%
2	Theft or vandalism	27%
3	Harassment or verbal abuse	26%
4	Military incursions or raids	24%
5	Arrest or detention of HH members	16%
6	Confiscation or destruction of property or land	16%
7	Forced eviction or demolition	9%
8	Gender-based violence	4%


Livelihoods and income sufficiency

Most households reported being unable to meet basic needs through their income, signalling deep and structural livelihood stress. At the time of survey, **30% of households reported having no access to any income source,** indicating that a substantial share are effectively excluded from economic activity. To meet basic needs, these households most commonly relied on support from relatives or their community (n=25), followed by borrowing or debt (n=17), and selling assets (n=16). While reliance on relatives and community support can reflect enduring community ties, the simultaneous resort to debt and asset sales indicates that some households are employing negative coping strategies, which can deepen economic vulnerability.

Access to income varied somewhat by time elapsed since households' most recent displacement. Households displaced 7–18 months prior to the survey were more likely to report having no income source (48%) compared to those displaced within the past six months (27%) or 19–36 months earlier (27%). While this pattern does not suggest a linear deterioration over time, it indicates that **some households may face heightened vulnerability in the medium term following displacement, potentially as initial coping or support mechanisms weaken.**

Even among households reporting some income, adequacy remains rare. **A clear majority indicated that their income is rarely or never sufficient to cover basic needs,** with only a very small share able to meet needs consistently. This suggests that economic strain is not merely a temporary shock, but a persistent condition for many displaced households.


Household income sufficiency to meet basic needs




This pattern was consistent regardless of how much time had passed since households' most recent displacement. Whether displaced recently or up to three years prior, a majority reported that their income was rarely or never sufficient to meet basic needs. This suggests that while access to income may shift over time, economic precarity remains structural rather than temporary.

This widespread insufficiency reflects the disruption of households' pre-displacement livelihood base. Prior to displacement, livelihoods were overwhelmingly land-based: 96% of households relied on agriculture or herding, with a smaller share also engaged in daily or occasional labour (9%). **Following displacement, 68% of households reported that at least one income earner had lost their livelihood**, and in the vast majority of cases (91%) this was due to loss of access to land or grazing. Displacement has therefore severed households from the productive assets on which their livelihoods depended, rather than merely reducing wages or limiting market access.

Households reporting loss of income due to displacement



Main reason for loss of income (among households reporting income loss)



Where income remains available, households continue to rely primarily on insecure and land-dependent sources. Agriculture or herding remained the main income source for 58% of households overall, while 13% relied primarily on daily or occasional labour. This limited diversification suggests that many households remain exposed to the same structural risks, including restricted land access and insecure or informal labour conditions, that contributed to their initial livelihood losses.

Livelihood recovery is further constrained by mobility limitations. Only 21% of households reported that they could move freely to reach services, markets, or workplaces without restriction, while 32% said they could not move freely at all and 47% could move only with minor restrictions. Among households facing movement limitations, the most commonly cited barriers were fear of settler violence (75%), unavailable or unaffordable transportation (45%), and checkpoints or roadblocks (36%).

These constraints compound displacement-related livelihood losses by limiting access to work, markets, and services, deepening households' economic precarity.

Uneven access to basic services

Households reported significant gaps in access to basic services, with several essential services characterized by frequent interruptions or only occasional availability.

Sanitation and electricity emerged as the most constrained services, with many households reporting either no access or only irregular access, while **health services also showed notable limitations**.

By contrast, access to safe drinking water, cooking fuel and schooling for children was more consistent overall, although interruptions and barriers remained for some households. Overall, these patterns suggest that **infrastructure-dependent services face the most severe constraints, while social services - particularly education - remain comparatively more accessible where applicable**.

Household access to basic services

	No, not at all	Rarely	Yes, but irregularly	Yes, always
Sanitation (latrine / toilet)	18%	6%	24%	52%
Electricity / light	7%	24%	33%	34%
Health services	9%	15%	42%	33%
Cooking fuel	6%	10%	34%	49%
Safe drinking water	2%	11%	50%	37%
School access for children*	4%	4%	7%	76%

* out of households with children in them (n=188)

Households reported multiple, overlapping barriers to accessing basic services, with cost and affordability cited most frequently (80%), followed by distance or access restrictions (65%). Nearly half of households (44%) also identified insecurity or settler presence as a barrier to accessing services, while smaller proportions cited lack of infrastructure (12%) or service disruptions (9%).

Community impacts of forcible transfer

Displacement has reshaped households' relationships to their communities of origin while fundamentally undermining their material resources. Reported changes in community participation reveal a polarized effect: while 31% of households reported participating less actively in community activities (22% much less; 9% somewhat less), an almost equivalent share (42%) reported increased engagement (31% much more; 11% somewhat more), suggesting that **displacement has disrupted social ties for some households while intensifying them for others**.


At the same time, access to pre-displacement sources of income has been severely restricted. A large majority of households (84%) reported losing access entirely to the land, pasture, or livelihood resources on which they previously depended, with a further 11% reporting reduced access. This indicator specifically captures loss of access to households' original, pre-displacement productive base. Given the centrality of agriculture and herding to pre-displacement income sources, this reflects the direct severing of households' access to the land and livestock that previously generated income and sustained household livelihoods.

Consistent with this, most households described profound changes in their way of life: **76% reported that their lives were very different since displacement** and 18% somewhat different, indicating that displacement has altered daily routines, mobility patterns, and livelihood strategies for nearly all households.

Households also reported widespread, multi-dimensional impacts. Nearly nine in ten (88%) identified loss or reduced access to land or pasture as a consequence of displacement, while majorities reported impacts on productive assets (59%) and income or livelihoods (54%). Significant shares also cited impacts on housing (39%), WASH services (14%), electricity (10%), and social or cultural life, including disrupted traditions (17%) and weakened access to relatives or community support (15%). Unlike the previous indicator, this broader measure reflects households' overall assessment of displacement-related impacts and may capture both the initial loss of pre-displacement land and assets as well as ongoing constraints affecting access in their current location.

Taken together, these findings indicate that displacement has **structurally undermined the productive assets underpinning household livelihoods**, contributing to **sustained economic precarity and long-term shifts in household wellbeing**.

Reported impacts (loss or reduced access) following displacement, % of HHS



Household priorities for future assistance

Households' stated priorities for future assistance reflect an urgent need to rebuild livelihoods and basic living conditions following displacement. The most frequently requested support was fodder or other assistance for livestock (76%), underscoring the centrality of herding and animal assets to household livelihoods. Large shares also prioritized shelter or housing repair materials (53%), electricity support (33%), and water support (30%), indicating that many households remain unable to secure adequate housing and essential services without external assistance. Requests for food assistance (24%) and livelihood or income-generating support (24%) further signal ongoing economic strain and limited access to stable income.

While livestock support was the top priority across respondents, some variation emerged in secondary requests. Female respondents more frequently prioritized electricity and water support, whereas male respondents more often identified shelter repair materials. However, overall assistance priorities remained broadly similar across respondents, with livestock support consistently ranking highest.

Most preferred types of support in the coming months, % of HHS

Fodder or other support for livestock	76%
Shelter or housing repair materials	53%
Electricity support	33%
Water support	30%
Food assistance	24%
Livelihood or income-generating support	24%
Sanitation support	12%
Household or winter items	6%
Health assistance	5%
Infrastructure or community-level support	5%


At the same time, households identified structural constraints that hinder their ability to meet their most urgent needs. Almost all households (91%) cited lack of income or cash as a key barrier, alongside loss of access to livelihood opportunities (45%) and high prices/inflation (43%), suggesting that market participation remains largely out of reach for many displaced households. Security-related obstacles were also significant, with 28% reporting insecurity or fear of attacks and 11% citing movement restrictions or checkpoints, highlighting how protection conditions continue to limit access to work, services, and assistance. Together, these findings indicate that **while households prioritize material support, their needs are shaped by economic precarity and structural constraints linked to displacement.**

Future intentions

Return intentions

Households' plans for the next 12 months point to very limited prospects for near-term return. Only a small minority (6%) expect to return to their area of origin in the next 12 months, while three-quarters (75%) intend to remain in their current location. Even among households originating from communities with court orders to return (49 households), 78% plan to stay where they are - indicating that legal rulings alone have not translated into short-term return plans.

Households' intentions for the next 12 months



For the minority anticipating movement in the coming year (34 households), expected moves were driven mainly by structural constraints rather than preference: insecurity or settler violence (17 households) and lack of access to land or livelihoods (17) were the most common drivers, followed by eviction or demolition risk (10), affordability (7), and lack of services (7).

Among the much larger group planning to stay (174 households), decisions were primarily shaped by protection concerns. Half (50%) said they feel safer where they are, and nearly as many (48%) cited fear or insecurity in their area of origin or other areas. Many were also uncertain about future conditions elsewhere (28%), while 20% noted that their home or land in the area of origin is destroyed or inaccessible. Access to services (12%) and livelihoods (10%) were secondary considerations.


Conditions for return and current barriers

When asked what would make return possible in principle, households overwhelmingly emphasized fundamental changes in security and access. Nearly eight in ten (79%) said return would require improved security and an end to violence or harassment, and the same share (79%) cited the removal of settler outposts and presence in areas of origin. A majority (58%) also required restored access to land or property, while around one-third pointed to the need for lifting access restrictions (36%) and repaired or available housing (34%). Fewer households prioritized services (15%), livelihood opportunities (23%), or legal guarantees and compensation (13% each), suggesting that material or administrative changes alone are insufficient without meaningful security and access guarantees.

While households outlined the structural conditions required for return in principle, their descriptions of current barriers highlight the immediate and ongoing constraints that prevent return at present. Almost all households (94%) cited the presence or violence of settlers and settler outposts as a current barrier. Majorities also pointed to land

being confiscated or inaccessible (56%) and the presence or actions of military or security forces (48%). Many reported that their homes are destroyed, damaged, or uninhabitable (42%), reinforcing that both safety and physical habitability presently impede return. Material constraints - including lack of livelihoods (19%), lack of basic services (15%), and insufficient resources to move back (12%) - compound these barriers but are not their primary cause.

Most frequently reported barriers to return, % of HHs



Overall, households' responses highlight a persistent gap between what return would require and what exists on the ground today. While many would consider returning under different security and access conditions, return remains largely untenable for most households under current circumstances.

Conclusion

This assessment demonstrates that for households displaced from WBPC-monitored communities, forcible transfer has produced **enduring** and **multi-dimensional impacts** that extend far beyond the moment of displacement. Most households are living in precarious, temporary shelter with weak tenure, have lost access to the land and resources that sustained their livelihoods, and face chronic income shortfalls compounded by movement restrictions and insecurity. At the same time, displacement is occurring within an increasingly coercive environment marked by overlapping pressures rather than isolated incidents, generating widespread perceptions of eviction risk across Areas A, B, and C. Households' stated priorities for assistance - led overwhelmingly by livestock support - reflect both the centrality of land-based livelihoods and the depth of their economic vulnerability. Looking ahead, households' intentions reveal very limited prospects for near-term return: while many would consider going back under different conditions, return is currently constrained by pervasive security, access, and housing barriers on the ground. Together, these findings underscore that displacement from communities at risk of forcible transfer is not a short-term disruption but a protracted condition requiring responses that address both immediate needs and the structural drivers that make safe, dignified living possible.

Methodology Overview

This assessment is based on a structured quantitative household survey conducted with 233 households displaced within the five years preceding data collection from communities monitored by the West Bank Protection Consortium (WBPC) and classified as fully or partially at risk of forcible transfer. “Fully forcibly transferred” refers to communities where the entire community has been displaced, while “partially forcibly transferred” refers to communities where only part of the community has been displaced. The sample was designed to be representative of the WBPC-monitored displaced caseload ($\pm 3.75\%$ margin of error at the 95% confidence level), though it is not representative of all displaced households across the West Bank.

To ensure balanced coverage across displacement contexts, the sample was stratified by two criteria: (1) whether the household’s community of origin was fully or partially forcibly transferred, and (2) whether that community had received a court order to return. This produced four strata combining these characteristics, with households selected

proportionally to the WBPC displaced caseload within each stratum.

Data were collected between 7–30 December 2025 across seven governorates (Ramallah, Bethlehem, Hebron, Nablus, Tubas, Jerusalem, and Jericho). Fieldwork was implemented jointly by WBPC member organizations and PARC Agricultural Development Association, drawing on local knowledge and existing community relationships to reach displaced households.

Limitations: Displacement history data are based on self-reported recall and capture only displacement events; they do not record voluntary or economic movements between episodes, nor do they document households’ housing or mobility conditions during interim periods. Displacement duration was collected in broad categories, limiting the precision of reconstructed timelines. As information relies on five-year recall, earlier events may be subject to memory bias.