

Endline Evaluation Report: Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) III

NRC, SOMALIA

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Prepared for:



Causal Design partners with international development clients to provide rigorous independent program evaluation, expand cultures of evidence within organizations, and join them in efforts to relieve human suffering and end poverty.

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ACRONYMS

AAP	Area-level Action Plan
ACF	Action Against Hunger
ARC-D	Analysis of the Resilience of Communities to Disasters
BRCiS	Building Resilient Communities in Somalia
CAP	Community Action Plan
CLA	Collaborating, Learning and Adapting
CMU	Consortium Management Unit
CRC	Community Resilience Committee
CWW	Concern Worldwide
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EWEA	Early Warning, Early Action
EWS	Early Warning System
FCDO	UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FIES	Food Insecurity Experience Scale
GESI	Gender Equality and Social Inclusion
GREDO	Gargaar Relief and Development Organisation
HDDS	Household Dietary Diversity Score
ICF	International Climate Finance
ICRAF	World Agroforestry Centre (formerly International Centre for Research in Agroforestry)
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IYCF	Infant and Young Child Feeding
KII	Key Informant Interview
KPI-4	Key Performance Indicator 4 (ICF resilience indicator)
LCSI	Livelihoods-based Coping Strategies Index

MoHAD M	Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NRM	Natural Resource Management
rCSI	Reduced Coping Strategies Index
RSI	Resilience Spectrum Index
SCI	Save the Children (International)
SHG	Self-Help Group
SMS	Short Message Service
SODMA	Somalia Disaster Management Agency
TANGO	TANGO International (resilience-capacities framework)
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USD	United States Dollar
VFM	Value for Money
VSL/VS LA	Village Savings and Loan (Association)
WFP	World Food Programme
WMC	Water Management Committee

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) is a consortium of national and international organisations, led by the Norwegian Refugee Council, that helps marginalised communities across Somalia become more resilient to recurrent shocks and stresses, including the effects of climate change. Initially planned as a five-year project (2023 to 2028) funded by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), BRCiS III works at household, community, and system levels across three interlinked systems: inclusive leadership and governance, ecosystems and natural resources, and inclusive markets and livelihoods. The project concluded early on 31 March 2026 following reductions in UK Overseas Development Assistance. Causal Design carried out the baseline evaluation in 2024 and has now conducted this follow-up round. Although designed as a midline, it serves in practice as the project's final assessment, since reductions in FCDO funding have brought BRCiS III to an early close and no endline will follow. Its findings and recommendations should therefore be read as end-of-project conclusions.

The evaluation has two aims: to measure how resilience changed since the baseline, and to assess how far that change can be attributed to BRCiS III. Because it is not a counterfactual impact study, it pursues the second aim through a contribution analysis. Rather than claiming sole credit for observed change, this approach traces the pathways from the project's activities to outcomes, weighs quantitative and qualitative evidence together, tests each finding against alternative explanations such as drought, the role of other actors, and pre-existing community systems, and rates the strength of each contribution claim as Strong, Moderate, or Limited. The evidence base combines a household survey of a panel of 3,889 households interviewed in both rounds, community focus group discussions across 168 communities in 21 districts, and, for the programme's learning and coordination outcome, interviews with consortium, government, and partner stakeholders. Change is measured against the BRCiS logframe, the ICF KPI-4 capacity measure, and the composite Resilience Spectrum Index. The Index measures resilience at the household, community and ecosystem levels, and it draws on a community-level resilience assessment, the Analysis of the Resilience of Communities to Disasters (ARC-D), which is also reported on its own terms.

One feature of the period shapes every finding in this report. The evaluation coincided with a severe, prolonged drought, and the dominant shock inverted between rounds. At baseline, collected in early 2024 shortly after the country-wide flooding of the 2023 El Niño, the most impactful shock for most households was excessive rains and flooding. By endline, in the middle of a prolonged drought, it was failed rains and drought, with the share of households experiencing drought rising from 15% to 67%. The drought constrained the outcomes the programme was designed to produce while leaving much of its proximate work, the structures, skills, and practices it put in place, largely intact. The findings below should be read in that light.

Key Findings

THE CONTEXT: A SHOCK ENVIRONMENT THAT INVERTED FROM FLOOD TO DROUGHT

The shock profile reversed between the two rounds, and this is the single most important fact for reading the results. At baseline, flooding was the most impactful shock for 48% of households and drought for 7%; by endline, drought was the most impactful shock for 65%. Most baseline-to-endline comparisons are therefore made across two different hazard environments, and the two rounds were also enumerated at different moments relative to their defining shock, the baseline some months after the floods had receded, the endline during the drought itself. Exposure varied by livelihood zone, with riverine communities the most flood-exposed and pastoral and agro-pastoral zones drought-dominated throughout. Early warning reached far more flood-affected households than drought-affected ones (59% against 30% at baseline), consistent with flooding being a sudden-onset hazard served

by established systems while slow-onset drought is harder to anticipate, and access to early-warning information fell over the period as the dominant shock shifted.

MEASURED RESILIENCE ROSE SUBSTANTIALLY AND BROADLY, AND THE WEAKEST AREAS GAINED MOST

The composite Resilience Spectrum Index rose from 3.24 to 3.71 on a 1-to-5 scale, a gain of just under half a point that is sizeable for a single programme cycle and more so given the drought. The increase was broad across households and across the 37 programme clusters, and the gains were larger where resilience started lower, with the correlation between a district's baseline score and its subsequent change at -0.31, so the weaker areas caught up rather than the strongest pulling ahead. Against the ICF KPI-4 benchmark, 64% of households improved on at least one absorptive and one adaptive capacity, clearing the 60% target (71% improved on an absorptive indicator and 88% on an adaptive one); because this counts any improvement however small, it measures the breadth of movement rather than its size. At the impact level of the logframe, the share of households in need of humanitarian assistance fell by eight percentage points, from 57% to 49%, mainly through a fall in poor food consumption.

The three systems rose for different reasons. The market system rose most, from 3.23 to 3.92, on assets, savings, and financial access; the ecosystem system next, from 3.19 to 3.66, on the water and natural-resource management structures the project invested in; and the leadership system least, from 3.29 to 3.57, on stronger formal community structures and the inclusion of women and minority groups. The gains were overwhelmingly rural: agro-pastoral households improved most (+0.81), followed by pastoral (+0.78) and riverine and coastal (+0.65), while urban households were essentially flat (+0.04).

WHAT DROVE THE RISE: ECONOMIC INCLUSION AND COMMUNITY ORGANISATION, MORE THAN INCOME

Behind the headline are three patterns that matter more than the average. First, the gains came through assets and finance, not earned income. The largest single driver was the market system, where the availability of savings groups roughly doubled (from 17% to 33% of households), financial and market access rose, remittances widened in reach, and productive assets more than doubled, while formal wage employment, always a small share, slipped further. Income itself was close to flat, and a third of households saw it fall. Much of the asset-building was resourced from outside earned income, through programme support (about two-thirds of households whose income rose credited BRCiS), remittances, and group savings, and assets were often held as a store of value, with livestock bought as an investment rather than for sale. This is both an achievement and a question for sustainability.

Second, social capital was re-channelled from horizontal to vertical ties. Households leaned a little less on one another and a little more on institutions: membership of community-leadership committees fell from about 86% to 70% and peer-to-peer (bonding and bridging) ties softened, while vertical, linking ties to government officials and to NGO and humanitarian staff rose. The community-level ARC-D evidence shows the same move, from informal arrangements toward formal, often newly seeded committees. This is best read as a re-channelling of social capital rather than a collapse, though it is worth watching, because informal mutual support is what households fall back on when formal structures cannot reach them.

Third, the resilience gains were overwhelmingly rural, and the urban exception shows why. Urban households were flat overall and urban is the only zone where a system fell, with the leadership system dropping more than half a point from the highest baseline of any zone as committee membership fell from about 97% to 49%, informal ties weakened, and the community-governance gains seen in rural areas did not arrive to replace them. Urban resilience needs a different model from the rural one that worked here.

COMMUNITY RESILIENCE ROSE ACROSS ALL FOUR ARC-D AREAS, ALONG ONE CLEAR DIVIDE

The community-level ARC-D assessment, scored by consensus in facilitated focus groups across the 167 communities covered in both rounds, found that every one of its four thematic areas improved significantly, though

from a low base of around 1.5 out of 5. Strengthening governance rose most and reducing vulnerability, the broadest and most infrastructure-dependent area, least. Pooled across the thirty components, about 49% of community scores rose, 44% did not change, and 7% fell. The divide running through the whole assessment is the same one visible in the household index: the components a community can build through its own organisation rose, while those that depend on outside facilities and services lagged. Committees, early-warning systems, savings groups and locally led conflict resolution rose strongly, with the early-warning system posting the single largest gain anywhere (from 1.43 to 2.66); health, education and shelter services, critical infrastructure, and housing moved least and carried most of the declines, because the capital and outside provision they need did not arrive. The household index and the community assessment are built from different data by different methods, and an independently constructed resilience index agrees on direction, yet all three reach the same structural conclusion.

Four threads cut across the resilience evidence and are worth drawing together, because they carry into the contribution analysis and the recommendations. Economic inclusion, savings, financial access and assets, was the main driver of the rise. Social capital shifted from horizontal, peer-to-peer ties toward vertical ties to institutions. The gains were overwhelmingly rural, with urban areas the exception. And, across both the household and the community measures, the capacities a community could organise itself rose while those that depend on outside facilities and services lagged.

WHAT THE RESILIENCE WAS WORTH: IT TRACKS LATER WELLBEING AND PARTLY BUFFERED THE DROUGHT

Because the same households were measured in both rounds, the index could be put to a more demanding test than at baseline: whether a household's resilience predicts its later wellbeing. It does, in part. Looking from baseline capacity forward to endline wellbeing, more-resilient households went on to have clearly better water access, somewhat lower experienced food insecurity, and a higher chance of avoiding damaging coping, while the quality of the diet was not predicted by resilience. The economic system, household assets, savings and financial access, was the strongest and most consistent predictor across outcomes, so economic inclusion is the capacity that most often translates into better wellbeing. The associations are modest in size, which is what the resilience literature would expect of capacity indices of this kind (Barrett et al. 2021; Smith and Frankenberger 2017), so the index is read as informative about wellbeing rather than as a guarantee of it. There is also suggestive evidence of buffering: when the drought struck, experienced food insecurity rose by about 1.3 points for the least-resilient households but only about 0.4 for the most-resilient, a difference that is significant at the ten-per-cent level. The buffering appears for the lived experience of food insecurity in particular and not for the other outcomes.

WELLBEING AND COPING DETERIORATED UNDER THE DROUGHT, AND FELL HARDEST ON THE MOST VULNERABLE

Set against these gains, household wellbeing weakened where the drought pressed hardest. Diet quality and young children's feeding improved, but severe food insecurity rose from 58% of households at baseline to 64% at endline, driven by drought and poverty: the qualitative evidence is consistent that dietary diversity is the practice households most often could not afford, a question of resources rather than knowledge. Households coped more actively than at baseline, with fewer able to do nothing, but largely through distress strategies, above all reducing food consumption and borrowing to buy food, and their ability to recover from the shocks they faced, and their expectations of recovering from future ones, both fell. The same hardship fell unevenly. Households with a member living with a disability recovered notably less than the sample as a whole (a fall of -0.37 against -0.17), and both they and households with an elderly member were the most pessimistic about recovering from future shocks. This points to recovery and food-security support being better targeted toward these households than delivered uniformly.

One project-related comparison stands out in the coping evidence. Programme participants were notably less likely than other households to borrow to cope (20% of their shock responses against 33%, and 17% against 30% for

borrowing specifically to buy food), and their expectations of future recovery held roughly steady while non-participants' fell. These are associational comparisons rather than proof of effect, but they are consistent with participants holding up better as conditions worsened.

BRCiS'S clearest contributions are at the level of structures, skills, and practices

The contribution analysis finds the programme's strongest evidence at the level of its proximate outputs. Community Resilience Committees are recognised by households in about half of communities and trusted by most who know them, and the Community Action Planning process gave communities a credible basis to advocate, with specific counterfactual examples across most districts. Agroecological practices, particularly Perma Gardening, were widely adopted where water was available; feeding, hygiene and nutrition beliefs changed where the campaigns reached; savings groups helped members avoid selling assets during small shocks; and early warnings increasingly came from community committees rather than from mass media. Inclusion broadened on the same evidence, with women, and less consistently minority-group members, reporting greater participation in decision-making, which they credited to the gender and social-inclusion training. That broadened participation has, however, outpaced authority: women became more present in community structures while final decisions still tend to rest with male elders, a distinction between presence and power that focus-group participants drew directly. Reshaping customary authority was not a project objective, and norm change exceeds a single project cycle, so the change is better read as a widening of who takes part.

The translation of those gains into outcomes was conditional on enabling conditions the programme did not control

Across every outcome, the programme reliably delivered the structure, skill, plan or warning it set out to provide, but the conversion of that output into a resilience outcome depended on a complementary input that was often absent. Training raised production where there was water and did little where there was none, a contrast visible within a single district in El Barde; two in five warned households took no action, for want of resources rather than information; nutrition knowledge improved while the diverse diet it recommended remained unaffordable; and savings groups buffered illness and minor setbacks but were strained when the drought hit every member at once. Coverage also varied by design and funding rather than by reach, with community structures, early-warning committees and savings groups reaching most communities while ecosystem restoration reached only 28 of 168 communities, business training about a fifth of households, and the nutrition campaigns fewer than half of communities. Attribution is genuinely shared: where it is complicated, it is mainly through rainfall, through pre-existing customary systems that BRCiS formalised rather than created, through the cash-for-work income that accompanied restoration, and through other actors working in the same areas, while coordination mechanisms kept most activity complementary rather than overlapping.

Sustainability is the central open question

The capacities the project built sit largely at the community level, where they depend on continued community and partner effort, and they are not yet anchored in government. The early-warning system works within communities but is not yet linked to formal structures; by-laws are still enforced largely through customary authority rather than the new committees; and several savings groups dissolved after the programme exited, restoration sites risk reverting once cash-for-work ends, and water points often lack maintenance arrangements. Coordination and adaptive management functioned well during implementation, but government handover is uneven across sectors and the tension between resilience and humanitarian response remains unresolved, made sharper by the project closing during an active drought. Whether the gains recorded here become durable resilience outcomes will be decided largely after the programme ends, by future rainfall, government uptake, and follow-on financing.

Recommendations

The recommendations below draw together the endline participatory workshop with BRCiS implementing partners, in which field teams nominated practices to stop, start, and scale, with the gaps the contribution analysis identified. Because BRCiS III has now closed, they are directed mainly at the design of its successor project, AARAN. Several affirm existing BRCiS practice rather than introduce new requirements, and some gaps reflect activities curtailed by successive FCDO funding reductions rather than design choices.

CO-LOCATE SOFT INTERVENTIONS WITH THE HARD ASSETS THAT UNLOCK THEM

The central contribution finding is that training, plans and warnings produced outcomes only where a complementary asset, predominantly water, was already present; agroecological training raised production where a water point functioned and did little where it did not, a contrast visible within a single district in El Barde. This affirms existing BRCiS sequencing guidance rather than introducing a new requirement, and the evidence shows where it broke down: Water committees formed without a water source, and training was delivered without the inputs to act on it. Under the budget reductions that shortened the project, protecting this sequencing should take priority over breadth of coverage.

CLOSE THE GAP BETWEEN EARLY WARNING AND ACTION THROUGH GOVERNMENT, NOT A STANDALONE EXTERNAL TRANSFER

The early-warning system reaches households and is one of the project's strongest contributions, but two in five warned households took no action, mainly for lack of resources. Rather than a new, perpetual external cash facility, which would be difficult to sustain in the current funding environment, the link to action should run through government contingency planning, the existing BRCiS crisis modifier, and SODMA and MoHADM channels, and through returning early-warning analysis to the communities that supply the data so that warnings prompt local action.

SUPPORT SAVINGS GROUPS AS MULTI-PURPOSE PLATFORMS, AND MANAGE THEIR FRAGILITY TO REPEATED SHOCKS

When drought hit all members at once, groups drew down their pooled savings and paused lending. In the short term this is the model working as intended, since the fund existed to be used in a shock and most groups reconstituted afterwards, but it should not be mistaken for resilience to a prolonged crisis: if members cannot repay outstanding loans the group can collapse, and where shocks are repeated or prolonged, groups may be unable to re-form. The resilience measure for AARAN is therefore whether groups reform and rebuild after a covariate shock, not whether the fund survives it intact, and savings groups should keep their social-capital and early-warning functions rather than being reduced to a single financial output. Support stronger groups to graduate into enterprises with mentorship and financial-institution linkages, rather than building in external recapitalisation.

TARGET INCLUSION AT THE SPECIFIC DECISION-MAKING SPACES WHERE WOMEN AND MINORITIES REMAIN EXCLUDED

The GESI training broadened women's, and less consistently minority members', participation, and these groups became more present in community structures. The evidence suggests, however, that presence has not translated evenly into a place in the specific spaces where decisions are made. Changing the locus of customary authority was not a project objective, and norm change exceeds a single project cycle, so success should be assessed against whether the groups the project supports report greater voice rather than against an external definition of inclusion. The practical implication for AARAN is to identify the decision-making structures from which women and minorities are still excluded, and to target inclusion where it would be most consequential over the long term.

DIFFERENTIATE SUSTAINABILITY AND HANDOVER PLANNING BY ASSET TYPE

Durability varied sharply by asset, so a uniform handover will not work. The transfer of water infrastructure to the Ministry of Water and Energy is a working model to repeat, whereas ecosystem-management groups are the most fragile and some savings groups dissolved before others reconstituted. Each asset class needs a named successor and a maintenance-financing plan, preceded by a short sustainability and ownership assessment conducted before infrastructure is built, with an action plan drawn from it; water points in particular need a community contribution or cost-recovery arrangement to counter the perception that they belong to the implementing partner. Given the early close, these arrangements should be put in place now.

INSTITUTIONALISE THE EARLY-WARNING SYSTEM INTO GOVERNMENT BEFORE EXIT

Communities were clear that the system, though functioning, will not last without a formal government link, which Activity 5.4 was meant to build but had not yet delivered, and in places the system still depends on the implementing partner for core tasks. Before AARAN's design is finalised, the real-time risk-monitoring data flow should be transferred to MoHADM and SODMA under a formal agreement, with recurrent funding secured for committee airtime, equipment and transport, and with the partner removed from routine reporting so the system runs on its own.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Causal Design (referred to as the Evaluation Team in this document) was engaged by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), on behalf of the Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) Consortium, to conduct the endline evaluation of the BRCiS III programme. This evaluation builds directly on the baseline study conducted in early 2024, which established the methodological framework, the data-collection instruments, and the baseline values for the key indicators across the Resilience Spectrum, the BRCiS logframe, and the KPI-4 framework.

The endline tracks how resilience has changed since baseline and, in parallel, refines the measurement tools to reflect the programme's evolution, its implementation progress, and a shifting context. It provides evidence on how resilience capacities at the household and community levels have moved over time, and weighs the plausible contribution of BRCiS III interventions to those changes. The report is intended to support accountability to donors and communities, to inform programme adaptation, and to contribute to wider learning on resilience-building in fragile, climate-vulnerable settings such as Somalia.

1.1 Background and Program Description

The Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) Consortium is a multi-partner initiative led by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), with implementing partners including Action Against Hunger (ACF), Concern Worldwide (CWW), Gargaar Relief and Development Organisation (GREDO), International Rescue Committee (IRC), KAALO Aid and Development, and Save the Children. Since its establishment in 2013, BRCiS has worked to strengthen resilience in vulnerable communities across Somalia, integrating humanitarian response with longer-term development efforts.

The current phase, BRCiS III, was launched in 2023 as a five-year programme (2023 - 2028) funded by the Foreign Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) with a total value of £ 57 million. The programme aims to reduce humanitarian need and displacement by enabling households and communities to withstand and adapt to recurrent shocks, stresses, and the impacts of climate change.

BRCiS III interventions are organised around three interlinked systems:

- **Leadership and governance systems** that plan and respond to crises;
- **Ecosystems** that provide sustainable access to land, water, and natural resources; and
- **Market systems** that support inclusive access to financial assets, livelihoods, and services.

By working at the household, community, and system levels, the programme seeks to strengthen absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities in a layered and sequenced way.

1.1.1 Changes Since Baseline

When Causal Design conducted the baseline in early 2024, BRCiS III was in its inception phase — finalising measurement frameworks, initiating Community Action Planning, and establishing structures such as Community Resilience Committees (CRCs). Since then the programme has moved to full-scale implementation across 172 communities in 20 districts, reaching more than one million people. The most consequential developments since baseline are:

- Community governance structures are now fully operational, with Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI) training integrated into CRC activities.

- Core interventions have accelerated, including investments in water infrastructure, ecosystem management, and livelihoods support.
- Adaptive management has been institutionalised, through pause-and-reflect sessions and feedback-driven adjustments (for example, shifting ecosystem restoration to cash-for-work modalities to sustain participation).

Taken together, these mark the programme's shift from design and planning to active delivery and adaptive management by Year 2, while holding a consistent strategic focus on strengthening resilience.

The period was also defined by a sharp contraction in funding. From Year 2 onwards the programme faced substantial reductions to its FCDO budget — well below its original five-year, £57 million design — which led the consortium to reforecast, simplify the delivery model, and ultimately bring the programme to a close around two years earlier than planned. Originally planned as a mid-point assessment, this evaluation therefore serves in practice as the programme's endline. Working within the reduced budget, the consortium protected the interventions most central to its theory of change — water-infrastructure rehabilitation, ecosystem restoration and management, livelihood and food-security support (notably producer cooperatives and agricultural inputs), financial inclusion through village savings and loan associations (VSLAs), CRCs with embedded GESI principles, and health and nutrition services — while scaling back or deferring others. This funding constraint, together with the drought that dominated the period, forms the backdrop against which the findings throughout this report should be read.

The table below summarises the main activities and how each evolved since baseline.

Table 1. Overview of Programme Activities

Activity	Target Recipients	Changes Since Baseline (as of Year 2 Review)
Establishment/strengthening of Community Resilience Committees (CRCs)	Community members, with emphasis on inclusive governance	CRCs established or reactivated in 172 communities; strengthened with dedicated Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI) training
Development and implementation of Community Action Plans (CAPs)	Entire community, facilitated by CRCs	Transitioned from planning stage at baseline to active implementation across all programme sites
Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI) mainstreaming	Women, youth, marginalised groups, persons with disabilities	Became a stronger programme focus in Year 2, with CRCs trained and GESI principles embedded across activities
Rehabilitation of climate-resilient multi-use water systems	Households, farmers, pastoralists	Overachieved against Year 2 targets; scaled up investment in water infrastructure
Community-based ecosystem restoration and management (soil conservation, reforestation, sustainable land use)	Communities reliant on land and water resources	Uptake of voluntary restoration was low - shifted in Year 2 to cash-for-work modalities to sustain participation
Support for producer	Farmer and producer	Expanded in Year 2 with stronger emphasis on

cooperatives	groups	cooperative structures and collective marketing
Establishment and scaling of savings groups and federations (including VSLAs)	Primarily women and vulnerable households	Substantially expanded in Year 2, became a cornerstone of resilience-building
Health and nutrition services	Households, especially women and children	Maintained as part of community shock preparedness (prioritised despite financial constraints)
Ecosystem health assessment (conducted with ICRAF)	Program-wide, informing community-level planning	Introduced in Year 2 as the most comprehensive ecosystem health assessment in Somalia to date
Disaster risk reduction and preparedness measures (including Early Warning Systems)	Communities exposed to climate shocks and conflict	Strengthened through CRC-led Community Action Plans; Increasingly institutionalised
Cash-for-work schemes linked to ecosystem restoration	Vulnerable households facing food insecurity	Introduced in Year 2 as an adaptation to strengthen participation and community ownership
Pause-and-reflect sessions and adaptive learning mechanisms	Consortium partners, CRCs, programme teams	Institutionalised in Year 2 as a key part of adaptive management and real-time course correction

1.2 Endline Evaluation Purpose

1.2.1 Evaluation Questions

The endline evaluation is guided by a set of questions that focus on understanding changes in resilience since baseline, how households and communities are responding to shocks and stresses, and the extent to which BRCiS activities have contributed to these outcomes. Whereas the baseline concentrated on establishing a profile of resilience capacities, the endline shifts emphasis toward tracking progress over time and identifying the most influential drivers of resilience. To balance depth and focus, the evaluation questions have been streamlined into five core lines of inquiry. Together, these capture the most critical dimensions of resilience (household capacities, community governance, livelihoods and adaptive strategies, exposure to shocks, and programme contribution) while ensuring alignment with the project logframe and KPI-4 reporting requirements.

1.

What shocks or stresses have target communities experienced since baseline? What is the frequency, duration, and severity (for recurrent or more impactful shocks) of these shocks and stresses?

2.	<i>How do shocks and stresses differentially affect vulnerable groups and households within communities (particularly women, the elderly, and persons with disabilities)? In what ways should resilience-building interventions be tailored to them?</i>
3.	<i>What are the primary coping strategies households in target communities currently use to prepare for, respond to, and recover from shocks? How have these changed since baseline?</i>
4.	<i>How has the overall resilience capacity of households within target communities shifted between baseline and endline? What factors (project-related and external) contributed to shifts in resilience between baseline and endline?</i>
5.	<i>What resilience pathways are emerging at endline for improving community resilience levels? Which capacities are proving most critical to mitigating the negative effects of shocks on well-being? How do these vary across different livelihood zones?</i>
6.	<i>In what ways do BRCiS III activities appear to have contributed to increased resilience in target communities since baseline?</i>
7.	<i>Which BRCiS III activities are emerging as having the most positive and lasting impact on resilience at this stage of the programme? How should these inform the design of future resilience-building interventions?</i>

1.2.2 Resilience Measurement Overview

The BRCiS programme measures resilience at three interrelated levels - household, community, and ecosystem - recognising that capacities at these levels reinforce one another. The endline builds directly on the baseline design to ensure comparability over time, while also adapting to shifts in programme focus and evaluation scope.

- **Household.** A quantitative household survey captures dimensions such as livelihood diversification, asset ownership, coping strategies, and human and social capital, and generates the data for the food-security and resilience indices (for example the Food Consumption Score and the KPI-4 measures). For the endline the instrument was reviewed to improve conciseness and to dig deeper in areas tied to programme implementation; where a revision changed how an indicator is calculated, the baseline value was recomputed on the new basis to preserve comparability.
- **Community.** The Assessment of Resilience of Communities to Disaster (ARC-D), a participatory tool, captures collective capacities such as governance, inclusion, conflict management, infrastructure, and service delivery. Its core structure is unchanged from baseline to allow direct comparison, with a light review to sharpen the focus on programme priorities such as CRC functionality and early warning.
- **Ecosystem.** At baseline, BRCiS partnered with the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) to assess ecosystem-level conditions. Because ecosystem change unfolds over a longer horizon, the endline does not repeat this survey; the baseline data serve as a fixed reference for interpreting household- and community-level findings.

Together these instruments form the evidence base for the Resilience Spectrum Index, a composite that integrates the household and community surveys while retaining the baseline ecosystem information — allowing BRCiS to track resilience consistently over time.

1.2.3 How this report is organised

The methodology that follows explains, in non-technical terms, how resilience was measured and how change was analysed; the full technical detail — index construction, estimation, and the attrition analysis — is placed in the annexes so the main text stays readable. The findings then open by profiling the study sample and summarising programme results against the logframe and KPI-4, before following the evaluation's five lines of inquiry in turn: the context of shocks and stresses and how they fell on different groups; how households coped; how household and community resilience capacities shifted and what drove the change; the resilience pathways linking those capacities to well-being and to the buffering of shocks, and how they vary across livelihood zones; and the contribution of BRCiS activities to the changes observed. Throughout, results are disaggregated where it matters by livelihood zone and by programme participation, so that headline findings are read alongside how they are distributed. The report closes with a discussion, recommendations, and the annexes.

2.0 METHODOLOGY

This evaluation uses a mixed-methods, pre–post design: it compares the same programme areas at baseline (2024) and at endline to assess how resilience has changed and how far BRCiS III has plausibly contributed to that change. It draws on both quantitative and qualitative evidence.

The quantitative evidence is a household panel survey: the endline re-interviewed the same households surveyed at baseline, so that change is measured within the same households rather than across two different samples. The survey instrument — including how it was revised from baseline — and the panel sample and its attrition are described in Section 2.2.1.

The qualitative evidence comes from two participatory exercises with communities. The first is the ARC-D community resilience assessment, a structured group exercise that scores each community against a set of resilience components and records the reasoning behind each score. The second is a set of focus group discussions for the contribution analysis, structured around the programme's Theory of Change to examine how and why change occurred and what part BRCiS played. These are complemented by key informant interviews with the implementing partners. The qualitative approach is described in Section 2.1.3 and the qualitative samples in Section 2.2.2.

A central aim of the endline, beyond tracking change, is the contribution analysis: assessing how far the changes observed can plausibly be linked to BRCiS III rather than to other actors or to external conditions such as the drought. This is not a causal impact evaluation; it weighs the quantitative and qualitative evidence together against alternative explanations. The approach is described in Section 2.1.3 and applied throughout Section 3.5.

The frameworks used to measure resilience, and the analytical methods, are set out in Section 2.1 below.

2.1 Evaluation Methodology

This section describes the frameworks used to measure resilience and track its change (Section 2.1.1), the methods used to analyse the quantitative survey data (Section 2.1.2), and the contribution-analysis framework that brings the quantitative and qualitative evidence together to assess BRCiS's role in the changes observed (Section 2.1.3).

2.1.1 Resilience Measurement Frameworks

The endline tracks resilience against four harmonised frameworks, all established at baseline and updated on the same households at endline. Two are adopted from the programme and its donor — the BRCiS logframe indicators and the ICF KPI-4 composite. The evaluation followed the definitions set at baseline, but made a number of adjustments agreed with the BRCiS Consortium Management Unit (CMU): a few indicators were dropped, and others were reformulated where the baseline data proved unreliable (each adjustment is noted under the relevant framework below, and the survey-side changes are described in Section 2.2.1). Two of the frameworks are composite indices the evaluation constructs from the survey data — the Resilience Spectrum Index and the TANGO resilience-capacity index. A guiding principle throughout is comparability across rounds: every measure is built on the same definitions at baseline and endline, and where a definition was revised for the endline, the baseline value was recomputed on the revised basis so that the baseline-to-endline change is like-for-like.

THE BRCiS LOGFRAME

The programme's official logframe defines the impact- and outcome-level indicators against which BRCiS III reports to its donor. The evaluation did not redesign these indicators; it computed each one to its agreed definition on the panel and reports the baseline-to-endline change (Section 3.3.1). Two adjustments were made in consultation with the BRCiS CMU:

- **Dropped — the Reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI).** Its information was judged to be already captured by other indicators, and removing it helped shorten the survey and reduce respondent fatigue.
- **Reformulated — several production, income, and expenditure indicators.** Average total agricultural production and yield, average weekly milk production for each type of livestock, and average monthly income and expenditure all relied on baseline data that proved very noisy and unreliable. They were replaced with questions asking households how each had *changed* relative to a typical year before BRCiS III, which households can report more dependably than absolute levels.

KPI-4

KPI-4 is the International Climate Finance (ICF) composite resilience indicator — a standardised measure of the share of people whose resilience has improved, built from household absorptive- and adaptive-capacity components. As with the logframe, the evaluation computes KPI-4 to its standard definition (the same one used at baseline) and reports the change (Section 3.3.2). Three adjustments apply:

- **Dropped — average perceived severity of shock impact on assets.** This indicator was highly correlated with the other four shock-impact indicators and was judged redundant.
- **Dropped — the Reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI),** for the same reasons as in the logframe.
- **Not strictly comparable — the share of households that increased savings as a coping mechanism.** At baseline this was asked as a single-choice question; at endline it was judged more appropriate to ask it as a multiple-choice question. The baseline and endline values are both shown, but the two are not directly comparable.

(The exact wording of the KPI-4 definition is to be confirmed against the donor's reporting template.)

RESILIENCE SPECTRUM INDEX (RSI)

The Resilience Spectrum Index is a composite that summarises resilience across three **systems**, each capturing a distinct dimension of resilience (summarised below). It is one of the few measures in the report that draws on all

three of the evaluation's data streams — the household survey, the ARC-D community assessment, and the ICRAF ecosystem survey — with each system relying on a different combination of them.

Table 2. The Resilience Spectrum Index — systems, components, and weights

System	What it captures	Data source	Weight
Leadership	Community governance, leadership, and the social fabric that helps communities organise and resolve disputes	Household survey + ARC-D	0.32
Ecosystem	The condition of and access to the natural resource base households depend on	ICRAF ecosystem survey + household survey	0.38
Market	Economic resilience through markets, finance, and diversified livelihoods	Household survey	0.30

The index is built so that every parameter — the standardisation anchors, the weights, and the rescaling range — is fixed at baseline and reused unchanged at endline, so that a given score means the same thing in both rounds. In outline, each indicator is first put on a common footing, the indicators are combined within each system so that those carrying more independent information count for more, the three system scores are placed on a shared 1–5 scale, and they are combined into the overall index using the participatory weights above (Leadership 0.32, Ecosystem 0.38, Market 0.30). Those weights were set at baseline through a consultative exercise in which around 25 BRCiS consortium members and resilience experts each allocated a fixed budget of 100 “coins” across the three systems. The full construction — the component indicators that make up each system, the standardisation, Anderson’s (2008) inverse-covariance weighting, and the 1–5 rescaling — is set out in the annex.

Holding the baseline reference fixed is what makes the index comparable over time: any movement reflects genuine change in the underlying indicators rather than a shifting measurement scale. By construction the baseline sample averages 3 on the 1–5 ruler, but the endline is not re-anchored to 3 — scores move up or down to reflect real change, since re-anchoring at endline would mechanically erase the very change the index is meant to capture.

One coverage note: because part of the index draws on the ARC-D community assessment, the endline RSI can only be computed for households in communities with a usable endline ARC-D. Four communities lack one — three were not assessed at endline (DegAdey, Ceeldhiinle, Dhugile) and a fourth (Bay Gaal) was assessed incompletely — so, because ARC-D is a community-level measure, the gap falls on whole communities (97 households in all) rather than scattered individuals. These households have a baseline RSI but no endline one and therefore fall out of the RSI comparison, which is computed on the 3,792 households with an RSI in both rounds; they remain in every other part of the analysis.

TANGO RESILIENCE CAPACITIES

The TANGO index measures three **resilience capacities** (Frankenberger et al. 2012) — the different ways a household can draw on its resources when a shock hits. The table below describes what each capacity represents.

Table 3. The TANGO index — capacities and their components

Capacity	What it captures
Absorptive	The ability to cope with a shock without major changes to existing livelihoods

Adaptive	The ability to make incremental adjustments to livelihoods in response to shocks
Transformative	The enabling environment of institutions and services that supports longer-term, structural change

Like the RSI, the TANGO index is anchored at baseline. Each capacity is derived from its indicators by factor analysis — a method that extracts the common signal the indicators share (a household with strong absorptive capacity, say, tends to score highly on savings, safety nets, and asset buffers together) — and the three capacities are then combined into an overall index on a 0–100 scale. The loadings and rescaling parameters are estimated at baseline and reused at endline, so the indicators are combined the same way in both rounds; the full construction, including each capacity’s component indicators, is in the annex. TANGO is reported as a complementary cross-check on the RSI rather than as a second headline figure.

2.1.2 Analysis Approach for the Quantitative Data

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF MIDLINE RESULTS

Tracking change is the focus of this evaluation, so most results are reported as a baseline-to-endline comparison. For some questions no comparable baseline value exists — either because the question was new at endline (in particular the retrospective and contribution-analysis questions) or because the baseline indicator was dropped or redefined (Section 2.2.1). For these, the report gives the endline figure on its own — the survey-weighted mean or proportion with a 95% confidence interval — presented alongside the related findings where it helps interpretation. A fuller set of these endline-only estimates is collected in the annex.

PRE-POST ANALYSIS

The core design is a pre–post comparison on the matched panel. Two estimators are used, chosen by the structure of the indicator.

For indicators measured on the same households in both rounds, the report uses the paired change: for each household, the difference between its endline and baseline value, averaged across the panel using the survey weights and reported with standard errors that account for the clustered sample design (the formula is in the annex). Comparing each household with itself removes differences in who was surveyed and holds constant the household’s fixed characteristics — its size, location, and standing circumstances — so that what remains is genuine change. This is the default for indicators present in both rounds.

Where households cannot be sensibly paired, the report instead compares the two rounds as independent samples — a survey-weighted comparison of the baseline average against the endline average. In some cases no pairing is possible at all: when the unit of analysis is a shock event rather than a household, the shock mix inverted between rounds, so almost no household faced the same shock twice. More commonly, a paired subset does exist but is too small to be reliable. When group membership is specific to one round — for example, the members of a savings group differ across rounds — or when a question’s skip logic leaves only a handful of households answering in both rounds, a within-household estimate would rest on so few observations that it would be too imprecise to be informative. Comparing the full baseline and endline groups instead draws on every available respondent and gives a more stable estimate of the difference between rounds. The trade-off is that this comparison captures both genuine change and any difference in the composition of who answered in each round, which it cannot separate; we flag the cases where that distinction matters.

Both estimators are descriptive. The report describes a change as “the change between baseline and endline on the panel,” not as a programme effect: reading it as causal would require assuming that, in the absence of the programme, the outcome would not have moved — an assumption we do not make. The contribution of BRCiS to observed changes is assessed separately, through the contribution-analysis approach applied in Section 3.5.

DISAGGREGATION

Headline results describe the average household, but resilience is unevenly distributed, so the findings are disaggregated where it adds insight. Two breakdowns run through the main report. The first is by livelihood zone — riverine, agro-pastoral, pastoral, and urban — because exposure to shocks, the livelihood mix, and the service environment differ sharply across zones, and the programme’s pathways are expected to play out differently in each. The second is by programme participation — households that were direct beneficiaries of BRCiS activities compared with those that were not — which shows where change concentrated among the households the programme reached directly.

Both are descriptive comparisons. The groups are not randomly assigned and differ in many ways beyond their zone or participation status, so a gap between them shows where change was concentrated, not what caused it. For the indices present in both rounds, the report compares the within-household change between groups: measuring change within each group first and then taking the difference nets out influences that moved all groups equally over the period — the drought, region-wide price shifts, the passage of time — and isolates the part on which the groups diverged. That difference still reflects any pre-existing divergence between the groups (for example their differing exposure to the drought), so it is read as a description of where change fell, not as a programme effect; the estimator is given in the annex.

A further subgroup analysis carried out at the consortium’s request — comparing farming with non-farming households and urban with rural households, with each group defined by its baseline status to avoid selecting on a post-period outcome — is reported in full in the annex.

2.1.3 Contribution Analysis Framework and methodology

The methods above describe what changed. A second, equally central question is why — and in particular how far BRCiS contributed. A causal impact evaluation would require a comparison group of similar communities outside the programme, which its design does not provide. The evaluation therefore applies contribution analysis (Mayne 2008), a theory-based approach that asks a more answerable question: how plausible is it that BRCiS contributed to a given change, and what else could explain it? In practice this means setting out the programme’s intended pathways of change, gathering evidence on whether each link in those pathways held, and weighing that evidence — including competing explanations such as the drought or the activities of other actors — to reach a reasoned judgement.

That judgement draws on four complementary sources, none decisive on its own: the household survey, which carries retrospective, direct-attribution, and external-factor questions (Section 2.2.1) that separate change respondents credit to BRCiS from change they attribute elsewhere; engagement with the implementing partners (ACF, NRC, KAALO, IRC, GREDO, and SCI), through a structured activity-by-activity review template and key informant interviews; a review of programme documentation, principally the Year-2 annual review; and the community focus group discussions (Section 2.2.2), which give communities’ own account of how and why change happened and what helped or held it back.

The Theory of Change ties these sources together — the programme’s own map of how activities lead through outputs to outcomes, and the assumptions each step depends on. The community focus-group questions were written against that map, each targeting a specific link in a pathway and asking not only whether a change occurred but how, for whom, and under what conditions. Importantly, the focus groups were not designed to cover every activity. The guide concentrated on selected areas within each of the five community-facing outputs (the sixth output concerns programme management), prioritising the changes judged most important or where the programme was expected to matter most, and where delivery had progressed far enough for communities to speak to it from experience. The contribution evidence is therefore deliberately selective rather than a comprehensive audit, and the findings should be read with that scope in mind.

The focus-group responses were compiled question by question across all communities, checked against the original source files, and synthesised against the theory-of-change pathways, with human review at each stage; communities that diverged from the overall pattern were recorded, and questions with high “no response” or “no implementation” rates were set aside so that findings rest on communities the activity actually reached. Read as a whole, the evidence yields — throughout Section 3.5 — a reasoned account of where BRCiS’s contribution is well supported, where it is conditional, and where it is thin, rather than a single attributable effect.

2.2 Surveys

2.2.1 Quantitative

REVIEW AND ADJUSTMENT OF BASELINE INDICATORS

The endline household survey was built directly on the baseline instrument, so that the two rounds would measure the same things in the same way. It was not, however, simply repeated. The instrument was deliberately revised with three goals in mind: to shorten the survey and reduce respondent fatigue; to improve the reliability of questions that had produced noisy data at baseline; and to go deeper in the areas most directly tied to the programme, by adding questions designed specifically for the contribution analysis. Wherever a revision changed how an indicator is calculated, the baseline value was recomputed on the new basis, so that the baseline-to-endline comparison remains like-for-like.

Deciding what to keep and what to trim was a structured exercise carried out with the BRCiS Consortium Management Unit (CMU). We first mapped every indicator across the three measurement frameworks — the Resilience Spectrum Index, the BRCiS logframe, and KPI-4 — to see where the same information was being collected more than once. We then examined how strongly the indicators were correlated, both within each framework and across them, and where two indicators were largely capturing the same thing, we kept the one that contributed to the most frameworks. Finally, every candidate was checked against the programme’s Theory of Change and the donor’s reporting requirements, so that the questions retained were those most relevant to the programme’s pathways of change and its accountability obligations.

This review led us, in consultation with the CMU, to drop a small number of indicators. The most notable are the Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS) and the reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI), whose information was already captured by other food-security measures, and the perceived severity of shocks on assets, which was highly correlated with the other shock-impact questions and added little. Beyond these, a number of individual questions were trimmed across the instrument to shorten it.

A second group of questions was kept in concept but reformulated, because the baseline versions had produced unreliable data. Households had struggled to report precise figures for total agricultural production and yield, weekly milk production for each type of livestock, and monthly income and expenditure, and the resulting baseline values

were very noisy. At endline we asked instead how each of these had changed relative to a typical year before BRCiS III — a comparison households can make far more reliably than an absolute amount. For the same reason, income and expenditure were collected as bands rather than exact figures, and the shock module (the set of questions asked once for each shock a household faced) was focused on the most important shocks rather than on every shock reported, which also shortened the interview.

The most substantial change was an addition: four new modules of questions designed specifically for the contribution analysis (summarised below). Together, these ask households to look back over the life of the programme — whether they were reached by a given BRCiS activity, whether it produced the intended benefit, how much of any change they attribute to BRCiS rather than to other actors or to outside conditions, and how inclusive the process was. It is these retrospective, attribution, and external-factor questions that allow Section 3.5 to weigh BRCiS's plausible contribution against alternative explanations. They were designed off the consultations with implementing partners and the review of programme documents described in Section 2.1.3.

Table 4. The four contribution-analysis modules added at endline

Module	Focus	Examples of what it asks
Ecosystems & Water	The water and natural-resource activities (Outcome 2)	Whether a BRCiS water point was built or repaired and used; participation in tree-planting and soil-erosion bunds and their effect on soil moisture and grass; access to community fodder plots and whether it kept breeding animals alive during drought; and changes in water-collection time, productive-water access, and water quality
Economic Diversification & Finance	The livelihoods and financial-inclusion activities (Outcome 4)	Membership of a savings group and use of its loans; whether a BRCiS cash grant helped avoid distress sales; business training and whether the business still earns; producer-cooperative membership and fairer prices; and households' confidence to face the next shock
Follow-up: Leadership & Governance	The governance structures (Outcome 1)	Awareness of and trust in the Community Resilience Committee; how it helped in the last crisis; the change in minority-clan inclusion and how much is attributed to BRCiS; and the referral pathway — including whether households would have reached the service without the referral
Shock Response & Ranking	Overall resilience, external factors, and displacement	How households rate their overall ability to bounce back compared with two years ago; which actors (BRCiS versus WFP, government, or relatives) mattered most for staying in place; whether project support helped them avoid displacement; and the arrival of new or displaced households

QUANTITATIVE SAMPLE

The baseline interviewed households selected through a random-walk procedure within each community — necessary because no household register existed — and applied sampling weights so that each household represents its share of the community's population; the procedure is described in full in the baseline report. The endline re-interviewed those same households. Because the baseline minority-group oversample was not re-surveyed, the figures here are measured against the baseline random-walk sample, and all counts are unweighted.

Most estimates use the matched panel — the 3,889 households interviewed in both rounds — so that change is measured within the same households; where too few households can be matched for that to be reliable, the two rounds are compared as independent samples instead (Section 2.1.2). Panel attrition was 9.7% of the baseline

random-walk households. Whether those that dropped out differ systematically from those retained — which would mean the panel describes the households that remained rather than the full baseline population — is examined in the annex.

Table 5. Sample attrition from baseline (Random Walk) to the endline panel

Level	Baseline (RW)	Endline	Panel (matched)	Attrition rate
Districts	19	19	19	0.0%
Communities	172	171	171	0.6%
Households	4,309	3,921	3,889	9.7%

Counts are unweighted. Baseline is restricted to Random-Walk households (the endline excluded the minority-group sample). The endline column shows all 3,921 endline interviews, which include replacement households newly sampled at endline; the matched panel (3,889) is the subset interviewed in both rounds and is the basis for all analysis. Attrition = 1 – panel/baseline (RW).

Household attrition over the panel was 9.7% (4,309 baseline random-walk households → 3,889 paired). One community surveyed at baseline — Afweyne Banan (Dhuusamareeb district) — was not reached at endline. Most communities retain somewhat fewer than the baseline target of about 25 panel households; the per-community distribution and the most under-sampled communities are shown in the annex.

Finally, community-level resilience analysis draws on the ARC-D community assessment, which was not completed in every surveyed community: 3 endline communities — DegAdey, Ceeldhiinle, Dhugile — have no endline ARC-D score and are therefore excluded from the ARC-D-based components of the community-level analysis. Note that the qualitative and community components cover a slightly different footprint from the household panel: the matched household panel spans 171 communities across 19 districts, while the ARC-D community assessment and the contribution-analysis focus group discussions cover 168 communities across 21 districts.

2.2.2 Qualitative

The evaluation draws on two qualitative exercises, both carried out with communities alongside the household survey and covering 168 communities across 21 districts (a slightly wider footprint than the household panel of 171 communities in 19 districts).

The first is the ARC-D community resilience assessment — a participatory group exercise in which community members score their community against a set of resilience components and explain the reasoning behind each score. It gives a community-level reading of resilience that complements the household survey, and its narrative responses are used to interpret the scores. The assessment and its component structure are described in the annex.

The second is a set of focus group discussions for the contribution analysis. The guide, designed by Causal Design with the consortium, is organised around the five community-facing outputs (the sixth output concerns programme management). Its 15 questions probe how and why change occurred and what helped or constrained it, each testing a specific link in the programme's Theory of Change rather than eliciting general opinion — which is what makes the responses usable for the contribution analysis (Section 2.1.3). Their focus is summarised below; the full wording is in the annex.

Table 6. Focus of the qualitative question guide, by output

Output	What the focus-group questions probe
1 — Inclusive, community-led governance	Whether the Community Action Plans / Area-level Action Plans helped communities advocate for and coordinate a response, and through what mechanism; and whether the GESI (gender-equality and social-inclusion) training changed <i>who</i> makes decisions about resources such as water and land
2 — Ecosystem restoration & natural-resource management	The single most important change — and the biggest sustainability risk — from restoration efforts; community <i>ownership</i> of restored land once cash-for-work ends; how natural-resource by-laws were enforced and accepted; and the time and distance saved by improved water systems, especially for women and girls
3 — Food production & nutrition	Which agroecological practices were easiest or hardest to adopt and why; the biggest <i>external</i> factor preventing households from sustaining them; how nutrition and hygiene education changed actual household practices; and which taught practices could not be adopted, and whether resources or tradition was the barrier
4 — Market-based livelihoods & financial inclusion	How Self-Help Group membership affected social cohesion and helped households cope with shocks without resorting to harmful coping; and how business-development support changed how businesses are run, alongside the main external factor limiting their success
5 — Early warning & early action	A concrete example of an early-warning message leading to anticipatory action <i>before</i> a shock, and how it was tied into the community's action plan; and the main risks to the early-warning system's functioning and its sustainability after BRCiS support ends

3.0 FINDINGS

This chapter presents the findings of the endline phase, organised around the evaluation questions. It opens by describing the sample the findings rest on (Section 3.1) and summarising the programme's results against its logframe and KPI-4 targets (Section 3.2). It then turns to the context of the period, the shocks and stresses households faced and how they fell on different groups (Section 3.3, evaluation questions 1 and 2), and to how households coped with and recovered from those shocks (Section 3.4, evaluation question 3). Later sections examine how household and community resilience capacities changed, through the household Resilience Spectrum Index and the community ARC-D assessment, and the chapter closes with the contribution analysis, which weighs how far the changes observed can be attributed to BRCiS rather than to other factors.

Throughout, the analysis is a within-household comparison: the same households were interviewed at baseline and at endline, so each change is measured inside the same households over time rather than across two different samples. The chapter focuses first on describing how things changed; the question of how far those changes can be attributed to BRCiS is addressed in the contribution analysis, the chapter's final section.

Two features of the period frame how the changes should be read. The endline data were collected during a drought, while the baseline data were collected a few months after the El Niño floods of late 2023 had receded. The programme also operated under successive reductions in donor funding and was ultimately cut short. A shift in the dominant hazard between the two rounds, and a programme delivered under a contracting budget, sit behind many of the changes that follow, and we return to them where they bear directly on a result.

How to read the tables and figures

Most results in this chapter compare a baseline value with an endline value for the same households. The standard comparison table has five columns: the indicator, its baseline mean (with the standard error in brackets), its endline mean (likewise), the change Δ (shown with a 95% confidence interval in brackets), and the number of households the comparison rests on, given as the baseline, endline, and matched-panel counts. The change figures show the same information visually, with a baseline value and an endline value for each item and the difference between them.

Two conventions are worth keeping in mind. Statistical significance is marked with stars on the change: *** means the change is very unlikely to be due to chance ($p < 0.01$), while ** and * denote progressively weaker evidence ($p < 0.05$ and $p < 0.10$). No stars means the change is within the margin of error and should be read as essentially flat. The number of households (N) is reported for each exhibit because not every question was put to every household. Questions asked only of those who experienced a particular shock, or who took a particular action, rest on a smaller base, and the figure or table states that base rather than implying the full panel answered.¹ Where a result differs meaningfully across livelihood zones, or between programme participants and other households, that breakdown is shown alongside the headline rather than in a separate section.

3.1 The sample

This section profiles the sample that underlies the rest of the chapter: the panel of 3,889 households interviewed at both baseline and endline. Section 2.2.1 set out how that panel was constructed, including the baseline random-walk procedure, the attrition between rounds, and the spread of households across communities; the purpose here is narrower, to describe who these households are. All values are survey-weighted with the panel weights, so they characterise the population the panel represents rather than the raw sample, and because the same households are observed twice, the change column reports the within-household difference between rounds. The table below summarises seven core characteristics, read together in the paragraphs that follow.

Table 7. Sample characteristics — baseline to endline (panel households)

Indicator	BL mean (SE)	EL mean (SE)	Δ [95% CI]	N (BL, EL, pair)
Average household size	7.92 (0.16)	8.33 (0.19)	+0.41 [+0.11, +0.72]***	3889, 3889, 3889
Average number of female members	3.97 (0.08)	4.08 (0.11)	+0.11 [-0.07, +0.30]	3889, 3889, 3889
Average number of children under 5	1.85 (0.07)	1.79 (0.07)	-0.06 [-0.17, +0.05]	3889, 3889, 3889
% female-headed households	61.5% (2.42)	61.0% (2.41)	-0.5pp [-3.7, +2.7]	3889, 3889, 3889
% households with a farmer	37.1% (1.69)	46.7% (1.98)	+9.7pp [+4.8, +14.6]***	3875, 3882, 3868

¹ The recall period varies by question. Some ask about the last twelve months, others about the most recent shock or the current situation; where it matters for interpretation it is noted alongside the exhibit.

% households with a member with a disability	19.2% (2.05)	26.7% (2.35)	+7.7pp [+2.3, +13.0]***	3858, 3868, 3837
% households receiving BRCiS assistance	15.6% (1.41)	52.5% (2.27)	+36.4pp [+31.7, +41.1]***	3796, 3742, 3649

Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Survey-weighted means via `svymean()`; Δ is the within-household change on the BLnEL panel (Taylor-linearized SE).

The panel is made up of large, predominantly female-headed households living in poor, shock-exposed communities. The average household holds about eight members, of whom roughly four are female and close to two are children under the age of five, and around three in five households are headed by a woman, a high share that reflects the prevalence of male absence and migration in the study areas. These core features of household size and composition were essentially unchanged between rounds: the number of female members, the number of young children, and the share of female-headed households all moved within the margin of error. That stability is what we would expect from a panel that follows the same households, and it is a useful reassurance that the demographic picture is driven by the same households over time rather than by changes in who was interviewed.

Three characteristics changed more than the rest. Average household size edged up slightly, from 7.9 to 8.3 members; because the number of young children was flat, this reflects growth among older members rather than new births. More substantially, the share of households with at least one member engaged in farming rose by almost ten percentage points, from 37% to 47%, a sizeable increase in a drought year that is consistent with the movement into and out of farming taken up later in this chapter. The share of households reporting a member with a disability also rose, from 19% to 27%; part of this may reflect more complete reporting at endline, though it is also consistent with the health toll of a prolonged drought. The largest change is in programme reach: the share of households receiving BRCiS assistance more than tripled, from 16% at baseline to 53% at endline. This is the direct imprint of the programme's roll-out across these communities between the two rounds, and it is the backdrop against which every change reported in the rest of this chapter should be read. The two vulnerability markers noted here, the share of female-headed households and the share with a member with a disability, are taken up in Section 3.3, which asks whether the shocks of this period fell more heavily on these and other vulnerable households.

3.2 Programme results at a glance

Before turning to the evaluation questions, this section summarises how the programme performed against the two frameworks it is formally accountable for: the BRCiS logframe and the ICF KPI-4 composite. The aim here is a scorecard, the headline movement on each indicator, rather than a full interpretation. The capacities behind these numbers, and what drove them, are taken apart in the resilience-capacities chapter, and the coping and food-security strains they reflect are examined in the sections that follow. The full indicator-by-indicator detail, and the breakdowns by livelihood zone and district, are placed in the annex. Throughout, the shift from flood to drought conditions between rounds (Section 3.3) is the backdrop, with several measures rising on average even as the same drought presses on water, livestock, and food security.

BRCiS LOGFRAME

The logframe groups the programme's accountability indicators into three levels, impact, outcome, and intermediate outcome, each reported below as a baseline-to-endline change.

At the impact level, the share of households in need of humanitarian assistance fell by eight percentage points, from 57% to 49%. This decline mainly reflects a fall in the share of households with a poor Food Consumption Score, from 38% to 26%, which is discussed under food security later in the chapter. The logframe's second impact indicator concerns displacement from BRCiS communities. The original measure — the share of community households internally displaced by shocks — was not collected consistently across rounds, so the table reports the endline question that comes closest: whether a household personally knows of others in its community forced to leave their homes in the past twelve months. About 7% of households did, reported in 126 of the 171 communities — displacement was widespread across communities but thinly reported within them. Two further endline-only proxies from the contribution module round out the picture: roughly three in ten households said the project's support had helped them avoid moving to another city or an IDP camp, and about one in six lived in a community that had received new arrivals over the previous six months.

Table 8. BRCiS Logframe — Impact indicators

Indicator	BL mean (SE)	EL mean (SE)	Δ [95% CI]	N (BL, EL, pair)
% Households in need of humanitarian assistance according to IPC levels 3+ (corresponds to households with "poor" or "borderline" FCS)	56.8% (2.39)	48.7% (2.12)	-8.1pp [-14.6, -1.7]**	3889, 3889, 3889
% Households who personally know of households displaced from their community (last 12 months)	—	6.9% (0.67)	—	—, 3,889, —
% Households who avoided moving to another city or IDP camp thanks to project support	—	30.0% (2.04)	—	—, 3,624, —
% Households in communities that received new arrivals (last 6 months)	—	15.8% (1.85)	—	—, 3,889, —

Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Survey-weighted means via `svymean()`; Δ is the within-household change on the BLnEL panel (Taylor-linearized SE).

The official impact indicator on households internally displaced by shocks was not collected consistently and cannot be constructed; the three endline-only rows are the closest available proxies, and should be read as indicative.

The outcome indicators, in the table below, tell a more divided story. The table opens with the logframe's community-level outcome: the share of communities that have achieved at least "Medium Resilience" on the ARC-D scale rose from 0.6% at baseline (1 of 167 communities) to 30.5% at endline (51 communities). This indicator comes from the community FGD consensus scores rather than the household survey, so it is an unweighted count of communities and carries no significance test; its construction and the disaggregation by shock follow the table. Among the household indicators, the clearest gain is in water: the share of households with a consistently available source delivering at least 15 litres per person per day rose nine percentage points, from 23% to 33%. Social capital moved in different directions by type. Linking social capital, a household's vertical ties to institutions and external actors, rose from 0.44 to 0.67, while the horizontal forms changed much less: bonding (ties within one's own group) edged down by a small amount that is not statistically significant, and bridging (ties across groups) fell modestly. What movement there was in the horizontal measures was concentrated among male-headed households. This pattern, with vertical ties strengthening while peer-to-peer ties weakened somewhat, is examined in the resilience-capacities chapter.

Table 9. BRCiS Logframe — Outcome indicators

Indicator	BL mean (SE)	EL mean (SE)	Δ [95% CI]	N (BL, EL, pair)
% Communities that have achieved at least “Medium Resilience” on the ARC-D scale	0.6% (1/167)	30.5% (51/167)	+29.9 pp	167, 167, 167
% Households with consistently available and accessible water source that produces 15 liters per day per person	23.3% (2.09)	32.7% (2.49)	+8.9pp [+3.4, +14.4]***	3822, 3804, 3737
TANGO Bonding Social Capital Index	2.26 (0.06)	2.17 (0.05)	-0.09 [-0.25, +0.06]	3889, 3889, 3889
TANGO Bridging Social Capital Index	1.97 (0.06)	1.82 (0.06)	-0.15 [-0.31, -0.00]**	3889, 3889, 3889
TANGO Linking Social Capital Index	0.44 (0.04)	0.67 (0.05)	+0.24 [+0.14, +0.33]***	3889, 3889, 3889
Female headed: TANGO Bonding Social Capital Index (0-6)	2.21 (0.09)	2.17 (0.08)	+0.03 [-0.19, +0.25]	2263, 2158, 2092
Female headed: TANGO Bridging Social Capital Index (0-6)	1.92 (0.08)	1.86 (0.08)	+0.00 [-0.20, +0.21]	2263, 2158, 2092
Female headed: TANGO Linking Social Capital Index (0-5)	0.38 (0.04)	0.60 (0.04)	+0.24 [+0.14, +0.35]***	2263, 2158, 2092
Male headed: TANGO Bonding Social Capital Index (0-6)	2.35 (0.07)	2.16 (0.09)	-0.21 [-0.39, -0.02]**	1626, 1731, 1560
Male headed: TANGO Bridging Social Capital Index (0-6)	2.05 (0.08)	1.74 (0.09)	-0.33 [-0.55, -0.11]***	1626, 1731, 1560
Male headed: TANGO Linking Social Capital Index (0-5)	0.53 (0.08)	0.79 (0.12)	+0.25 [+0.03, +0.46]**	1626, 1731, 1560

Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Survey-weighted means via `svymean()`; Δ is the within-household change on the BLnEL panel (Taylor-linearized SE).

The community resilience indicator can be taken one step further. Each community scored the thirty ARC-D components against its main hazard, so the endline distribution of resilience categories can be disaggregated by the shock the community faced. The table below shows that distribution. Drought dominates the picture: 150 of the 167 communities scored against drought, and 49 of them (33%) reached at least medium resilience. The smaller group of flood-facing communities lagged behind, with 1 of 14 at medium resilience. At baseline nearly every community sat in the minimal or low band; at endline most had moved to low or medium, and no community reached the two highest categories.

Table 9a. ARC-D resilience categories at endline, by shock type

Shock	Minimal	Low	Medium	Approachable	Resilience	Communities (N)
Drought	10.0% (15)	57.3% (86)	30.7% (46)	2.0% (3)	0.0% (0)	150
Flood	7.1% (1)	85.7% (12)	7.1% (1)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	14
Human Disease Epidemic	50.0% (1)	0.0% (0)	50.0% (1)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	2
Landslide	0.0% (0)	100.0% (1)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	1
All shocks	10.2% (17)	59.3% (99)	28.7% (48)	1.8% (3)	0.0% (0)	167

ARC-D resilience score: sum of the 30 community-FGD component scores (1–5) as a percent of the 150 maximum. Categories: 0–30% minimal, 31–50% low, 51–70% medium, 71–90% approachable, 91–100% resilience; “at least Medium” = score above 50%. Unweighted shares of the matched communities (baseline scenario hazard-matched to the endline shock); FGD consensus scores carry no significance test.

The intermediate-outcome indicators span water, food security, agriculture, livestock, income, and financial inclusion; several were collected in only one round, so the table reports a single-round value for those. Among the comparable indicators, access to water for productive use rose nine points, from 35% to 43%. Food security splits three ways: the share with an *acceptable* Food Consumption Score rose eight points, from 43% to 51%, as diet diversity held up; the experience-based measure of moderate-or-severe food insecurity (FIES) was essentially flat at around 78%; but the share *avoiding* severe livelihood coping strategies fell, from 16% to 10%. Diet quality improving while lived food stress and damaging coping worsened is the central food-security tension of this report, examined in the resilience-capacities chapter. The agriculture, livestock, and income indicators are mostly endline-only retrospective questions, asking households to compare their situation with about two years earlier, and the picture is mixed. About half of farmers said their crops produced more than before the project, three-quarters of those selling crops earned more, and roughly a third of all households said their income had risen. The movements in the other direction were tied closely to the drought: among the roughly one-third of households whose income had fallen, almost all (94%) attributed the fall to drought or irregular rains. How far the gains can be linked to BRCiS, including the production households credited to better inputs and training, is examined in the contribution analysis.

Table 10. BRCiS Logframe — Intermediate outcome indicators

Indicator	BL mean (SE)	EL mean (SE)	Δ [95% CI]	N (BL, EL, pair)
% Household have access to water for productive use in a normal year	35.4% (2.75)	43.1% (2.65)	+8.9pp [+1.2, +16.7]**	2107, 2689, 1851
% Household with "acceptable" Food Consumption scores (FCS)	43.2% (2.39)	51.3% (2.12)	+8.1pp [+1.7, +14.6]**	3889, 3889, 3889
% Households with moderate or severe hunger (Food Insecurity experience - FIES)	77.4% (2.06)	78.8% (1.33)	+1.2pp [-3.8, +6.2]	3661, 3506, 3312
Reduced Coping Strategies Index	17.68 (0.53)	—	—	3889, —, —
% Households not using any "severe", "crisis" or "emergency" coping strategies in the Livelihoods Coping Strategies Index (LCSI)	16.3% (2.05)	9.7% (1.52)	-6.5pp [-11.7, -1.4]**	3889, 3889, 3889
% Households use of soap or ash for cleaning hands	61.1% (2.47)	56.0% (2.26)	-5.5pp [-12.4, +1.5]	2200, 2487, 1473
Average total agricultural production in last 12 months (kg)	112.63 (8.09)	—	—	559, —, —
% Farmers' crops with increased production over the last 12 months compared to 2 years ago	—	51.5% (2.15)	—	—, 1336, —
Average total yield (kg per hectare)	49.56 (4.45)	—	—	483, —, —
% Farmers' crops with increased sales income over the last 12 months compared to 2 years ago	—	74.8% (3.66)	—	—, 417, —
Average goats weekly milk production per goat	1.76 (0.22)	—	—	987, —, —

% Farmers that saw an increase in goats' milk production over the last 12 months to a typical year before the project started	—	25.1% (2.61)	—	—, 1856, —
Average monthly income in the last year per income earner (USD)	134.99 (7.16)	—	—	2270, —, —
% Households who saw an increase in their income over the last 12 months compared to your income before this project started (2 years ago)	—	31.8% (2.19)	—	—, 3889, —
% Households with more than 1 income source	12.5% (1.60)	12.8% (1.32)	+0.3pp [-3.9, +4.5]	3889, 3889, 3889
Self-reliance index	1.85 (0.02)	1.92 (0.02)	+0.07 [-0.00, +0.14]*	3889, 3889, 3889
% Households that regularly save cash	1.99 (0.00)	1.96 (0.00)	-0.03 [-0.04, -0.02]***	3829, 3773, 3714
% Female households involved in economic decision-making	93.8% (0.96)	91.3% (0.95)	-3.0pp [-5.8, -0.2]**	2153, 2030, 1880
% Clients/households using formal financial services	0.3% (0.08)	—	—	3829, —, —

Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Survey-weighted means via `svymean()`; Δ is the within-household change on the BLnEL panel (Taylor-linearized SE).

KPI-4

KPI-4 is the International Climate Finance indicator on the number of people whose resilience has improved as a result of ICF funding. BRCiS measures it through two sets of household-level components: absorptive capacity, the ability to withstand and cope with a shock as it hits, and adaptive capacity, the ability to adjust livelihoods and prepare for future risk. The level tables below summarise each, and the count of how many households improved follows.

On absorptive capacity, the results are mixed. The perceived severity of shock impacts fell across all four dimensions (food, income, water, and health), so households experienced the shocks they faced as less severe than at baseline, a pattern examined more closely in the discussion of shocks in Section 3.3. Preparedness behaviour, such as increasing savings or setting aside grains and fodder, more than doubled, from 6% to 13%, and participation in protective activities such as soil conservation and flood-diversion structures rose from 5% to 10%. Two components moved the other way. Access to early-warning information declined, from 53% to 44%, which is consistent with the shift from flooding, where warning systems are well established, to slow-onset drought, where they are less developed; we return to this in the coping section. Households' own perceived ability to recover from shocks also fell, a decline taken up in Section 3.4.

Table 11. KPI-4 — Absorptive capacity

Indicator	BL mean (SE)	EL mean (SE)	Δ [95% CI]	N (BL, EL, pair)
% Households Utilizing coping strategies of either increasing savings or putting aside grains/fodder	5.6% (1.02)	13.1% (1.61)	+7.1pp [+3.4, +10.7]***	3758, 3889, 3758
Average perceived severity of impact on food consumption from shocks experienced (1-4)	3.52 (0.03)	3.39 (0.03)	-0.16 [-0.26, -0.07]***	3514, 3520, 3176

Average perceived severity of impact on income from shocks experienced (1-4)	3.55 (0.03)	3.41 (0.03)	-0.17 [-0.26, -0.09]***	3517, 3514, 3172
Average perceived severity of impact on water from shocks experienced (1-4)	3.40 (0.06)	3.15 (0.04)	-0.22 [-0.46, +0.03]*	729, 2665, 511
Average perceived severity of impact on health from shocks experienced (1-4)	3.38 (0.03)	3.15 (0.03)	-0.21 [-0.31, -0.12]***	3513, 3516, 3173
% Households with access to early warning information for natural hazards	53.1% (2.39)	44.2% (2.21)	-8.9pp [-16.0, -1.7]**	3889, 3889, 3889
Perceived Ability of household to recover from shocks (1-5)	1.94 (0.04)	1.75 (0.03)	-0.19 [-0.30, -0.09]***	3786, 3785, 3691
% Household participating in any of the following activities: soil conservation activities, flood diversion structures (i.e., protection of land/infrastructure from flooding), planting trees on communal land, or improving access to health services	5.4% (1.01)	10.1% (1.22)	+4.7pp [+1.6, +7.8]***	3889, 3889, 3889

Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Survey-weighted means via `svymean()`; Δ is the within-household change on the BLnEL panel (Taylor-linearized SE).

Adaptive capacity improved across most of its components. The clearest gain was in assets: the number of asset categories a household owned rose from about 13 to 16, which points to households rebuilding their asset base over the period and is examined more closely in the resilience-capacities chapter. Households also had more members contributing to income (from 1.25 to 1.64) and slightly more income sources, and water access rose by the same nine points recorded in the logframe. Learning a new skill to respond to shocks became more common (from 6% to 21%). Social capital again moved in different directions, with linking capital rising while bridging fell and bonding held roughly flat.

Table 12. KPI-4 — Adaptive capacity

Indicator	BL mean (SE)	EL mean (SE)	Δ [95% CI]	N (BL, EL, pair)
TANGO Bonding Social Capital Index	2.26 (0.06)	2.17 (0.05)	-0.09 [-0.25, +0.06]	3889, 3889, 3889
TANGO Bridging Social Capital Index	1.97 (0.06)	1.82 (0.06)	-0.15 [-0.31, -0.00]**	3889, 3889, 3889
TANGO Linking Social Capital Index	0.44 (0.04)	0.67 (0.05)	+0.24 [+0.14, +0.33]***	3889, 3889, 3889
% Households with consistently available and accessible water source that produces 15 liters per day per person	23.3% (2.09)	32.7% (2.49)	+8.9pp [+3.4, +14.4]***	3822, 3804, 3737
Number of income sources	1.07 (0.02)	1.13 (0.02)	+0.05 [+0.00, +0.11]**	3889, 3889, 3889
Number of categories of assets household owns	13.18 (0.46)	16.48 (0.51)	+3.38 [+2.11, +4.66]***	3751, 3745, 3615
Number of household members contributing to income	1.25 (0.03)	1.64 (0.06)	+0.40 [+0.27, +0.54]***	3596, 3841, 3550
Reduced Coping Strategies Index	17.68 (0.53)	—	—	3889, —, —

% Households that have learned in the past year a new skill to respond to shocks	1.94 (0.01)	1.79 (0.02)	-0.14 [-0.18, -0.10]***	3889, 3889, 3889
% Households that have increased savings as a coping mechanism (BL: cope_past == 1; EL: cope_past1 == 1)	4.1% (0.99)	10.1% (1.59)	—	3758, 3889, —

Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Survey-weighted means via `svymean()`; Δ is the within-household change on the BLnEL panel (Taylor-linearized SE).

The level tables above report average change. KPI-4 is ultimately concerned with how many households improve. At baseline, BRCiS set a programme-level target of 60% of households improving in at least one absorptive and one adaptive capacity. This report applies that benchmark, which will be revisited with the consortium for the final report. Counting any improvement on a household's own baseline value, 71% of households improved on at least one absorptive indicator and 88% on at least one adaptive indicator. Combining the two, 64% of households improved in at least one absorptive and at least one adaptive capacity, clearing the 60% benchmark. Because this counts any improvement however small, it is a broad measure of movement in the right direction rather than of large gains; the size of those changes is what the level comparisons above, and the contribution analysis, are designed to capture. The per-indicator improvement tables are in the annex.


3.3 Context: shocks and how they fell on different groups

This section addresses the first two evaluation questions, which set the context for everything that follows. Section 3.3.1 answers evaluation question 1, the shocks and stresses households faced between baseline and endline and how their frequency and severity changed. Section 3.3.2 answers evaluation question 2, how those shocks fell differently on vulnerable households, particularly female-headed households, the elderly, and households living with disability. The evidence draws on the shock module of the household survey, with one record per household and shock, restricted to the panel and survey-weighted with the panel weights. The dominant fact of this period, and the lens for reading the whole section, is that the shock environment inverted between rounds: the baseline followed the El Niño floods, while the endline fell in the middle of a prolonged drought.

3.3.1 SHOCKS AND STRESSES

The shock profile inverted between rounds. At baseline, households were dominated by excessive rains and flooding, the legacy of the late-2023 El Niño; by endline, the overwhelming shock was failed rains and drought. This inversion is the single most important fact for reading the rest of the chapter, because it means most baseline-to-endline comparisons are made across two different hazard environments. The two rounds were also enumerated at different points relative to their defining shock: the baseline was collected some months after the floods had receded, while the endline was collected during the drought itself. Exposure also varied across livelihood zones, with riverine communities the most flood-exposed and pastoral and agro-pastoral zones drought-dominated throughout; the zone detail is reported in the annex and revisited with the community-resilience evidence. The figure below shows the share of panel households experiencing each shock.


Figure 1. Shocks experienced by panel households — baseline to endline



Households were also asked which single shock affected them most, and the shift here was sharper still. At baseline, flooding was the most impactful shock for 48% of households, against 7% for drought. By endline this had inverted: drought was the most impactful shock for 65% of households, far more than any other.

The survey also records how severely each shock was felt, across four dimensions of household life, income, food, water, and health, each rated from 1 (no impact) to 4 (strong impact). The figure below summarises how that perceived severity changed between rounds. Each value is the endline rating minus the baseline rating for a given shock and dimension, shown in a box with a vertical line for its 95% confidence interval; a value below zero means the shock was experienced as less severe at endline than at baseline, and a value above zero means more severe. The clear pattern is that most values sit below zero: across nearly every shock and dimension, households rated the impacts they faced as less severe at endline than at baseline. This does not mean conditions had eased, since the endline fell in a drought. It reflects partly the change in which households were answering and about which shock, and partly a population that had absorbed and adjusted to a hazard it had been living with for months. It should be read alongside the food-security and coping evidence later in this chapter, which shows lived hardship holding steady or worsening even as rated shock severity fell.

Figure 2. Change in perceived severity of impact, by shock and dimension (endline – baseline)



Severity scale: 1 = no impact, 2 = slight, 3 = moderate, 4 = strong. Water severity is asked for fewer shock types, so its intervals are wider. Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

RECONCILING COMMUNITY AND HOUSEHOLD SHOCK REPORTING

A note of caution is needed before the community-level resilience evidence is introduced later in this report. The community ARC-D assessment and the household survey appear, at first glance, to disagree about the baseline shock environment. At the community level, the ARC-D exercise recorded drought as the primary hazard in roughly four-fifths of communities and flooding in under a fifth. At the household level, by contrast, 48% of panel households named flooding as their single most impactful shock at baseline, against only 7% for drought. The contradiction is more apparent than real, and two things resolve it. The first is timing. The El Niño flooding was a sudden, recent event at the moment of baseline enumeration, a few months earlier, so it was top of mind for the households it had hit, whereas drought is a slow condition that many communities had already been living with and named as their underlying hazard. The second, and more important, is geography. The El Niño flooding was severe but concentrated in riverine areas and a handful of other locations, while the majority of communities, particularly pastoral and agro-pastoral ones, remained drought-affected throughout. The household figure is dominated by the concentrated flood-hit population, while the community figure reflects the broader, drought-prone majority. A disaggregation by livelihood zone, which makes this explicit, is presented with the community-resilience (ARC-D) evidence later in the report. The practical implication carried forward here is that any baseline-to-endline comparison of community shock exposure must account for where the floods actually fell.

EARLY WARNING

Finally, the survey records whether households were warned ahead of a shock. The table below reports the share of affected households that received an early warning for the period's two defining shocks, flooding and drought. The contrast is the substantive point: warnings reached far more flood-affected households than drought-affected ones. This is consistent with flooding being a sudden-onset hazard with established warning channels, while slow-onset drought is harder to anticipate and is served by weaker systems, and it is part of why access to early-warning information fell between rounds, as noted under the logframe and KPI-4 above. The fuller breakdown, of who issued the warnings, what action households took, and what emergency assistance followed, is reported in the annex. It

shows that even among households that did receive a warning, about two in five took no action in response, a sign that a warning on its own was often not enough to prompt one.

Table 13. Households receiving an early warning, by shock — baseline to endline

Shock	BL % warned (SE)	EL % warned (SE)	Change in pp [95% CI]	N
Excessive rains / flooding	58.8% (4.0)	31.3% (3.8)	-27.4 [-38.3, -16.6]***	2290 / 176
Failed rains / drought	30.1% (4.5)	28.9% (2.9)	-1.2 [-11.7, 9.3]	730 / 2673

Share of households experiencing each shock who received an early warning, survey-weighted. Independent two-sample comparison (the warned base differs by shock and round). N is the unweighted record count (BL / EL).


*Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.*

3.3.2 DIFFERENTIAL VULNERABILITY

The second evaluation question asks how the shocks of this period fell differently on vulnerable households, and what that implies for how resilience-building should be tailored to them. The household survey lets us identify three groups whose vulnerability is well established in the literature and visible in the sample profile of Section 3.1: female-headed households with no male income earner, households with a member living with a disability, and households with an elderly member aged 70 or over. For each, the exhibits below compare the baseline-to-endline change in how severely shocks were felt, and in households’ ability to recover, against the change for the whole sample. The groups are defined at endline and overlap, since a household can fall in more than one, so each is read on its own terms rather than as a partition. Two cautions apply throughout. The groups are smaller than the full panel, so the estimates are less precise. And the question here is narrow, whether the change over this period differed for these households, not whether they are more vulnerable overall, which the sample profile already shows they are.

The first exhibit shows how the severity of shock impacts changed for each group, across the four dimensions used in Section 3.3.1, on the same 1 to 4 scale. The layout matches the severity figure in Section 3.3.1: each panel is one group, the four dimensions sit on the horizontal axis, and the change between rounds is on the vertical axis, with values below zero meaning shocks were felt as less severe at endline than at baseline.

Figure 3. Change in perceived shock severity, by dimension and vulnerable group (endline – baseline)



Severity scale: 1 = no impact ... 4 = strong impact. Pooled across the relevant shocks; independent two-sample change (the affected set differs by round). Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

The broad pattern of Section 3.3.1 holds for all three groups: severity fell, in every dimension. The differences between the vulnerable groups and the whole sample are ones of degree. For female-headed and disability-affected households the reductions were generally smaller, and mostly not statistically significant, with the severity of the food impact barely moving. For households with an elderly member, severity fell about as much as, or more than, for the whole sample. No group experienced shocks as more severe, and given the smaller group sizes several of these differences sit within the margin of error.

The second exhibit summarises the change, by group, in three measures of how shocks landed and how far households could recover: their ability to recover from the shock they actually experienced, their expectations of recovering from future shocks (both on a 1 to 5 scale, higher being better), and the share in moderate-or-severe food insecurity.

Table 14. Change in recovery and food insecurity, by vulnerable group (baseline to endline)

Change in...	Whole sample	Female-headed	With disability	With elderly
Ability to recover from the shock experienced (1–5)	-0.17***	-0.11	-0.37***	-0.18
Expected ability to recover from future shocks (1–5)	-0.29***	-0.33*	-0.54**	-0.47***
Moderate-or-severe food insecurity (FIES ≥ 4)	+1.2 pp	+8.0 pp	+5.9 pp	+2.7 pp

Baseline-to-endline change within each group (the whole-sample change is the reference). Recovery scores are on a 1–5 scale (higher = better); food insecurity is the share with a FIES score of 4 or more, shown in percentage points. Recovery-from-shock is an independent two-sample change at the shock level; the other two are within-household paired changes.

Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

The recovery measures show a clearer differential. Households with a member living with a disability recovered notably less from the shocks they faced: their ability-to-recover score fell more than twice as far as the whole sample's (-0.37 against -0.17), and both they and households with an elderly member saw the steepest declines in how well they expect to recover from future shocks (-0.54 and -0.47 , against -0.29 for the sample as a whole). Food insecurity tells a softer version of the same story. Against an essentially flat whole-sample change, the share in moderate-or-severe food insecurity rose by around eight percentage points among female-headed households and six among disability-affected households, though neither of these food-insecurity differences is statistically significant. Read cautiously, given the group sizes, the evidence points in one direction: the drought left households living with a disability, and to a lesser extent those with an elderly member, less able to recover and more pessimistic about recovering. That suggests recovery and food-security support is better targeted toward these households than delivered uniformly.


3.4 Coping with shocks

This section answers the third evaluation question: what households did to cope with shocks, how far they recovered, and how they prepare for the next shock, and how all of this changed since baseline. It first looks at coping during a shock (Section 3.4.1), then at recovering afterwards and preparing for the future (Section 3.4.2). Two things run through it. The first is the inversion from flood to drought between rounds, which means a given coping behaviour can carry a different meaning in a flood than in a drought. The second is a comparison between programme participants and other households, which we draw where the two groups differ, in the recovery measures of Section 3.4.2. Most coping questions sit inside the shock module, asked once per shock, so the figures pool shock-events across the ten shocks the questionnaire followed in depth, and the baseline-to-endline change is an independent comparison of events rather than a within-household one.

3.4.1 COPING DURING SHOCKS

At the highest level, households were asked whether, in response to a shock, they reduced spending, tried to raise income, sought help, or could do nothing at all. The figure below shows how those responses changed. The share that could do nothing fell, while reducing expenditure, already the most common response at baseline, became more common still. That households moved from doing nothing toward active coping is a positive sign. At the same time, the dominant response was to cut back, which is itself a sign of strain: in a drought most coping options carry a cost, so the question is less whether households coped than at what cost.

Figure 4. High-level coping strategies in response to shocks — baseline to endline




*Shares are over shock-events pooled across the ten relevant shocks, survey-weighted with the panel weights; baseline vs endline is an independent two-sample comparison. Significance: ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.*

How households cut back, and how they tried to raise income, are shown side by side below. Each is computed among the events where the household used that strategy, so the shares are conditional and comparable across rounds. On the expenditure side, the most common move was reducing food consumption, that is, eating less or less well. This is where the change in shock type matters most: cutting food consumption during a brief flood, when recovery is measured in weeks, is not the same as cutting it through a prolonged drought, when the horizon is open-ended. The same behaviour, set against the endline drought, points to deeper hardship than it did at baseline.

On the income side, the clearest movements are in borrowing and migration. Borrowing money, especially borrowing to buy food, rose, while migrating to access aid fell. The rise in borrowing sits alongside the social-capital finding reported later in this report, that households' horizontal, peer-to-peer ties weakened over the same period; households appear to have leaned more on credit as informal support became harder to draw on. The fall in migration to access aid is harder to read from the survey alone: it may reflect better access to assistance closer to home, or simply that drought does not displace households in the way a flood does. Where households did receive outside assistance, reliance on NGO support rose between rounds, from about 7% to 13% of events; given that BRCiS rolled out across these communities between the two rounds, part of this shift plausibly reflects the programme's own delivery.

Figure 5. How households reduced expenditure and tried to raise income — baseline to endline



Shares are over shock-events where the household used the relevant high-level strategy, pooled across the ten relevant shocks and survey-weighted; baseline vs endline is an independent two-sample comparison. Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

The comparison between programme participants and other households points to one clear difference in how they coped, in borrowing. Pooled across shocks at endline, participants were notably less likely than other households to borrow money to cope (20% of their shock responses against 33%), and the gap was just as wide for borrowing specifically to buy food (17% against 30%). This is consistent with programme support cushioning participants from debt-based coping, though it is a descriptive comparison and participants differ from other households in other respects; on most other coping behaviours the two groups were similar.

ANTICIPATING AND PREPARING FOR THE DEFINING SHOCK

The shocks themselves were described earlier in this section. What the household data add is how far households saw the defining shock coming and prepared for it. The table below compares anticipation of flooding at baseline with anticipation of drought at endline, among the households each shock most affected.

Table 15. Anticipation of the defining shock: flooding (baseline) and drought (endline)

Anticipation	Floodin g (baselin e)	Drought (endlin e)	Difference [95% CI]	N (flood / drought)
Expected the shock was coming	28.1% (3.8)	26.5% (3.2)	-1.6 [-11.3, 8.1]	1676 / 2201
Had a strategy in place ahead of time (among those who expected it)	30.3% (5.1)	36.0% (7.2)	+5.7 [-11.6, 22.9]	544 / 560

Survey-weighted shares, with the Taylor-linearized standard error in parentheses (percentage points). The flooding column is among households whose most impactful shock was flooding at baseline; the drought column is among those whose most impactful shock was drought at endline. The second


row is restricted to households that expected the shock. The difference is an independent two-sample comparison across the two shocks. Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Both defining shocks were anticipated by only a minority of the households they most affected, and to a similar degree: about 28% of flood-affected households at baseline said they had seen the flooding coming, against about 27% of drought-affected households at endline. Of the 2,490 households for whom drought was the main shock, 26.5% expected it, and of those, 36.0% had a strategy in place ahead of time, somewhat more than the equivalent share for flooding at baseline. Among the strategies drought-affected households used, one stands out: drawing on cash savings, named far more often than any other, with no other single strategy used by more than a small minority. Most households that used a strategy found it at least moderately helpful (80.0%).

3.4.2 RECOVERING AND PREPARING

Households were asked, for each shock they faced, how fully they recovered, on a 1 (did not recover) to 5 (was not affected) scale, so higher is better. The figure below shows the average for the round's most common shocks and pooled across all of them. Recovery fell between rounds, and the timing is central to reading this. The endline was enumerated during the drought, when households were still in the middle of the shock, whereas the baseline was collected some months after the floods had passed and recovery was already under way. Part of the decline therefore reflects when households were asked relative to their defining shock, not only how resilient they were. The drought's slow nature, with no clear end in sight, is itself a further reason recovery was harder.


Figure 6. Average ability to recover from the shock experienced, by shock — baseline to endline



Average recovery score (1 = did not recover ... 5 = not affected; higher is better), among households that experienced each shock, survey-weighted. Baseline and endline are independent samples. Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Looking forward, households were asked how well they expect to recover from future shocks. Expectations also fell: more households at endline said they would not recover, or would recover only to a worse position than before.

Figure 7. How well households expect to recover from future shocks — baseline to endline




This pessimism sits beside a real gain in capability: the share of households reporting they had learned a new skill to better cope with future shocks more than tripled, from 6.3% at baseline to 20.6% at endline. That households felt less able to recover even as more of them acquired new skills is best read as a reflection of the drought rather than a contradiction. Skills raise what a household is able to do, but confidence about recovery is shaped by present conditions, and at endline those conditions were an active drought with no end in sight. The expectation question captures the mood of the moment more than the underlying stock of capability.

The recovery measures are also where programme participants and other households differ most clearly. The comparison below is associational rather than causal, since participation was not randomly assigned, so a gap reflects the programme together with whatever led some households to take part.

Over this period, participants' expectations of future recovery held roughly steady, a change of +0.07 on the 1 to 5 scale, while non-participants' fell appreciably (-0.34). Participants were also somewhat more likely to have taken up a plan to prepare. The gap on recovery expectations is not statistically significant, so it is best read as suggestive, but it points in the direction one would hope, with participants holding up better as conditions worsened. A fuller and properly caveated participant comparison, on the resilience indices, is presented in the resilience-capacities chapter.

Finally, households were asked whether they had any plans to prepare for future shocks. Plans became more concrete and more focused on saving, with saving money the most common plan named. Among households without plans, the most cited constraint was lack of savings / wealth. Preparedness and its main obstacle thus run through the same financial channel, saving, which is also where the programme's savings-group activities are focused.

Figure 8. Plans to prepare for future shocks — baseline to endline



Survey-weighted shares of all households, baseline to endline. “No plans to prepare” is the share answering they have no plans; the other bars are specific plans named. Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

3.5 Resilience capacities

This section answers the fourth evaluation question: how the resilience capacity of households and their communities shifted between baseline and endline, and what project-related and external factors contributed to that shift. Resilience is measured at three levels, the household, the community and the ecosystem, and the report’s headline measure, the Resilience Spectrum Index, brings them into a single score.

The section first follows the Resilience Spectrum Index, its movement and what drove it (Section 3.5.1). It then examines the community level on its own terms, through the ARC-D community assessment (Section 3.5.2), and finally draws the two together (Section 3.5.3). Throughout, the period was dominated by a drought, and the programme operated under a contracting and ultimately curtailed budget. The next section, on resilience pathways (Section 3.6), then asks what this resilience was worth for household wellbeing.

3.5.1 THE HOUSEHOLD RESILIENCE SHIFT — THE RESILIENCE SPECTRUM INDEX

The Resilience Spectrum Index (RSI) is a household-level score from 1 (least resilient) to 5 (most), built from three systems: inclusive leadership and governance, ecosystems and natural-resource management, and economic inclusion and markets. It draws on both the household survey and the community ARC-D assessment, and its weights and scaling are frozen at baseline, so any baseline-to-endline movement reflects real change in households rather than a re-scaling of the index. The full construction is in the methodology annex. The section follows a simple arc: the national shift, where the change happened, and what drove it.

THE NATIONAL SHIFT

The composite rose from 3.24 to 3.71, a gain of just under half a point on the five-point scale and a highly significant increase, sizeable for a single programme cycle and more so given that the period was dominated by drought. All three systems improved, but by different amounts: the market system rose most (3.23 to 3.92), the ecosystem system next (3.19 to 3.66), and the leadership system least (3.29 to 3.57).

Table 16. Resilience Spectrum Score and system sub-indices — baseline to endline

Indicator	BL mean (SE)	EL mean (SE)	Δ [95% CI]	N (BL, EL, pair)
RSI — composite (pnorm, 1–5)	3.24 (0.02)	3.71 (0.03)	+0.47 [+0.40, +0.54]***	3889, 3792, 3792
RSI sub-index — Leadership (pnorm, 1–5)	3.29 (0.05)	3.57 (0.05)	+0.28 [+0.13, +0.43]***	3889, 3792, 3792
RSI sub-index — Ecosystem (pnorm, 1–5)	3.19 (0.02)	3.66 (0.03)	+0.46 [+0.39, +0.53]***	3889, 3792, 3792
RSI sub-index — Market (pnorm, 1–5)	3.23 (0.03)	3.92 (0.03)	+0.69 [+0.59, +0.79]***	3889, 3792, 3792

Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Survey-weighted means via `svymean()`; Δ is the within-household change on the BLnEL panel (Taylor-linearized SE).

The gain was broad-based rather than the work of a few high scorers: the full distribution of household scores shifted upward between rounds, with fewer households at the low end and more toward the top (the distribution is shown in the annex).

A first reason to trust the finding is that it does not depend on how the index is built. The evaluation also computed the TANGO capacity index, a widely used resilience measure, from an overlapping but separately organised set of indicators and by a different method (factor analysis over absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities). It rose too, on every capacity, as the table below shows. At the household level the two scores move together (their correlation is about 0.45 at endline), so the conclusion is unlikely to be an artefact of either construction. This convergence is one of robustness, that both measures improved, not proof that the resilience was fully realised; the capacity-by-system correlations are in the annex.

Table 17. The RSI and the TANGO capacity index both rose (baseline to endline)

Indicator	Baseline	Endline	Change
Resilience Spectrum Score (1–5)	3.24	3.71	+0.47***
TANGO composite (0–100)	11.3	15.9	+4.7***
absorptive capacity (0–100)	4.5	7.6	+3.1***
adaptive capacity (0–100)	27.9	29.5	+1.6**
transformative capacity (0–100)	9.5	14.2	+4.7***

Survey-weighted means. The RSI is on a 1–5 scale; the TANGO index and its capacities are on a 0–100 scale, so compare the direction of change, not the levels. The two indices are built from different inputs by different methods. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.


WHERE THE CHANGE HAPPENED

The national gain was broad but uneven, and the variation previews the zone-level pathways of Section 3.6.

By livelihood zone, the figure below shows the change in the overall score and in each system across four zones (the small Riverine and Coastal-fishery samples are bundled into a single category). The rural zones gained substantially and significantly, agro-pastoral households most of all (+0.81), followed by pastoral (+0.78) and

Riverine and Coastal (+0.65), while the urban zone was essentially flat (+0.04, not significant) and started from the highest baseline. Across the rural zones all three systems rose, with the market system showing the largest gains; the urban stasis is the first sign that the resilience story is a predominantly rural one, taken up in the urban deep-dive below.


Figure 9. Change in the RSI and its sub-indices, by livelihood zone



The gains were also largest where resilience started lowest. Baseline resilience varied widely across the 37 programme clusters, yet scores rose in the great majority of them, and the increases were systematically larger from a lower base. At the district level the correlation between a district’s baseline RSI and its subsequent change is - 0.31 (across 19 districts), the signature of convergence, with the weakest areas catching up rather than the strongest pulling further ahead. The full cluster and district detail, and the maps, are in the annex.

A natural project-related cut compares the resilience change of programme participants with that of other households on the panel. The comparison is associational rather than causal: participants were not randomly assigned, so the gap reflects the programme together with whatever made some households participants in the first place. Read in that light, participants improved more than non-participants on the overall score and on every system, and the gap is clearest for the ecosystem system (about +0.30, significant), consistent with a programme that invested heavily in water and natural-resource management. Within the ecosystem system the standout is membership of water-management committees, which rose far more for participants than for others (the component detail is in the annex).

Figure 10. Resilience change by participant status — the RSI and its systems (associational)




Associational, not causal. Δ is each group's survey-weighted change; the difference-in-differences (participant – non-participant) and its significance are from a regression of the within-household change on the participant indicator, panel-weighted with community-clustered SEs.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

WHAT DROVE THE CHANGE

The variation shows where resilience moved; this part asks what moved it. Because the RSI is a weighted sum of standardised components with weights frozen at baseline, its change can be decomposed into the contribution of each component. At the level of whole systems, the figure below confirms the ordering already visible in the table: of the half-point rise, the market system contributed most, the ecosystem system next, and the leadership system least. Below it, each system is opened into its largest movers; the full component-by-component decomposition, for the national, livelihood-zone and district levels, is in the annex.

Figure 11. Each system's contribution to the overall RSI change (points on the 1–5 scale)



LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE (+0.28)

Leadership rose the least of the three systems, and its modest net gain hides a single clear theme: a broad strengthening of formal, institutional governance set against an erosion of the informal, membership-based ties that used to carry it. The governance gains are wide and overwhelmingly community-assessed. Communities became better at reaching decisions inclusively, with collective decision-making rising from 2.34 to 2.92 on the ARC-D scale; better at drawing their most vulnerable members into those decisions (2.04 to 2.74); better at preventing and

resolving conflict (2.75 to 3.23); and more aware of their rights (1.91 to 2.49). The same movement appears at the household level as stronger vertical ties: participation in collective action more than doubled, from 12% to 29% of households, linking social capital rose from a low base, and households’ contact with local authorities and community representatives edged up. These are not separate findings so much as one connected shift, communities engaging more, and more formally, with institutions and external actors.

The other side of the same shift is the weakening of the informal ties that institutions are replacing. The single largest drag in the whole decomposition is the fall in membership of active community-leadership bodies, the village, resilience and relief committees, from about 86% to 70% of households, and the horizontal, peer-to-peer forms of social capital softened from already low bases, with bridging easing and bonding roughly flat. Taken with the governance gains, this reads not as a collapse of social capital but as a re-channelling of it: households leaning a little less on one another and a little more on institutions. The two forces nearly cancel, which is why the system posts a real but modest net gain, and it is worth watching, because informal mutual support is what households fall back on when formal structures cannot reach them.

One clarification matters, because inclusion appears on both sides of this story. The inclusiveness that rose is the community-assessed measure of how inclusively decisions are reached, a gain in participation rather than in who holds final authority; any flatter household-level reading, such as women’s involvement in economic decisions, is a different construct, taken up in the pathways and the contribution analysis.


Table 18. Leadership system — largest contributors and the main drag (baseline to endline)

Component	Baseline	Endline	Change
ARC-D 7: Community decision-making	2.34	2.92	+0.58***
Number of activities done to benefit the community	0.12	0.29	+0.17***
ARC-D 21: Peace and conflict prevention	2.75	3.23	+0.48***
Support Network	2.76	2.97	+0.21**
ARC-D 5: DRR in development planning	1.52	1.85	+0.33***
Active group - Community leaders	0.86	0.70	-0.16***

*Survey-weighted component means on each indicator’s own scale (ARC-D components 1–5; household shares as proportions). The largest positive contributors to the system’s change plus the main negative one. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

That shift shows too in *who* organises community action, which broadened away from traditional leaders toward NGOs, local government, savings groups and religious leaders, as the figure below shows.

Figure 11. Who organises collective action — baseline to endline



ECOSYSTEM (+0.46)

The ecosystem gain tells a coherent story: it is a story of governance and access improving over a physical base that was, and remains, under drought stress. The gains are institutional and behavioural rather than a change in the environment itself. The largest contributors are community-assessed and all point the same way, toward more organised management of the environment and its resources: a more secure and sufficient food supply (1.56 to 1.89 on the ARC-D scale), more sustainable environmental management (1.57 to 2.13), and stronger water security. The household-level movements fit underneath them, as the practical, household side of that same organisation: membership of water-management committees rose from about 40% to 52%, year-round access to ecosystem resources improved, and protective practices such as conserving soil, protecting crop land, improving access to drinking water and holding an emergency livestock-offtake plan rose several-fold from low bases. The thread running through all of these is that communities and households built better governance of, and access to, the natural resources their livelihoods depend on.

What held the system back belongs to the same theme, seen from the other side: the physical base did not improve, and under the drought it deteriorated. Households rated emergency infrastructure lower (the largest single drag here), and a growing share named a shortage of water as a barrier to preparing for the next shock. The net rise therefore reflects better water and resource governance laid over an environment still under stress, a tension that resurfaces in the water-access results of the next section. The slow-moving geospatial soil measures (soil organic carbon, freedom from erosion, acidity and proximity to water) were not expected to change over a two-year period and so were not re-measured at endline; their baseline values were carried forward, so they contribute no change to the decomposition and are omitted from it.

Table 19. Ecosystem system — largest contributors and the main drag (baseline to endline)

Component	Baseline	Endline	Change
ARC-D 15: Secure and sufficient food supply	1.56	1.89	+0.33***
ARC-D 12: Sustainable Environmental Management	1.57	2.13	+0.56***
Constant access to ecosystems	0.11	0.18	+0.07***
Water management Committee	0.40	0.52	+0.12***
ARC-D 29: Emergency infrastructure	1.59	1.39	-0.20***

Component	Baseline	Endline	Change
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Survey-weighted component means on each indicator's own scale. Carried-forward geospatial soil inputs (mechanical zero change) are excluded. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

MARKET (+0.69 — THE SINGLE BIGGEST ENGINE)

The market system was the largest engine of the overall rise, and its gains share a single thread: they came from what households could access and own, not from the cash they earned. Financial inclusion leads the system. The availability of saving groups roughly doubled, from 17% to 33% of households, the largest single positive contributor in the whole decomposition, while community-assessed access to financial services rose from 1.31 to 1.88 and access to markets from 1.54 to 2.20, regular cash saving climbed from a very low base (about 1% to 4%), and remittance access roughly tripled in reach (2% to 6%). The spread of saving groups and the deepening of household financial access are two sides of one shift, a community offering more financial services alongside households taking them up. Assets moved with finance rather than separately from it: productive assets more than doubled, and household goods and livestock holdings each grew, financed in good part through the same savings, remittances and programme support.

The small drags tell the same story from the other side. Formal wage employment, never more than a sliver of income, slipped further (about 2.5% to 1.1%), and year-round physical market access was flat. What rose was access, ownership and finance; what did not rise was earned income. That gap is the puzzle the system raises, since cash income barely moved even as assets and financial access surged, and the box below takes it up.

Table 20. Market system — largest contributors and the main drag (baseline to endline)

Component	Baseline	Endline	Change
Saving Groups or VSL	0.17	0.33	+0.16***
ARC-D 18: Access to financial services	1.31	1.88	+0.57***
ARC-D 19: Income and asset protection	1.54	1.90	+0.36***
ARC-D 17: Access to markets	1.54	2.20	+0.66***
Access to remittances	0.02	0.06	+0.04***
Source of income: formal employment	0.02	0.01	-0.01**

Survey-weighted component means on each indicator's own scale (household shares as proportions; ARC-D components 1–5). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

The “assets up, income flat” puzzle. Households accumulated assets while income growth was flat and a third of households saw their income fall. Several things resolve this. The gains were resourced largely from outside earned income: of households whose income rose, about two-thirds credited BRCiS support, and the programme injected assets and finance directly. Much of the asset growth was non-liquid and held as a store of value: asked why they had started rearing livestock, households most often answered that they bought the animals as an investment for the future rather than for income, so livestock functions here as a savings mechanism. Remittances roughly tripled in reach, and saving-group access let households finance purchases through group savings and loans without income growth. The drought, meanwhile, suppressed the most income-elastic livelihoods. Finally, income is measured noisily and only as a self-reported direction of change at endline, so the “flat” reading is itself uncertain. The detail behind each strand is in the annex and the contribution analysis.

THE URBAN EXCEPTION

The zone figure flagged one group that breaks the pattern: urban households were essentially flat overall, and urban is the only zone where a system actually fell. The market and ecosystem systems did still rise in urban areas, only at about half the pace of the other zones. The whole urban exception is the leadership system, which fell by more than half a point from the highest leadership baseline of any zone. The table below sets the salient leadership components against the other zones pooled.

Table 21. Salient leadership components — urban vs other zones (baseline to endline)

Component	Other (BL -> EL, Δ)	Urban (BL -> EL, Δ)
Community-leadership committee membership	0.78 -> 0.86 (+0.08***)	0.97 -> 0.49 (-0.48***)
Bonding social capital	2.24 -> 2.35 (+0.11)	2.29 -> 1.91 (-0.37**)
Bridging social capital	1.93 -> 1.98 (+0.05)	2.02 -> 1.58 (-0.43***)
Proximity to local authorities	2.00 -> 2.31 (+0.31***)	2.10 -> 2.05 (-0.05)
Dissemination of risk information	1.72 -> 2.09 (+0.37***)	1.95 -> 1.78 (-0.17***)

*Survey-weighted within-household change, each on its own scale (household shares as proportions; ARC-D components 1–5). 'Other zones' pools agro-pastoral, pastoral, Riverine and Coastal. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.*

Three things, working together, explain the urban reversal. Membership of community-leadership committees collapsed in urban areas, from about 97% to 49% of households, while it edged up elsewhere. Informal social ties eroded more sharply, with bonding and bridging both falling where across the rural zones they were close to stable. And the community-governance gains that lifted rural leadership did not reach urban areas, with proximity to local authorities flat and the dissemination of risk information actually falling. Urban communities neither held their committee and peer base nor picked up the institutional governance gains seen elsewhere. The full urban component detail, for all three systems, is in the annex.


3.5.2 COMMUNITY RESILIENCE — THE ARC-D ASSESSMENT

The RSI folds community capacities into the household score. This section examines the community level on its own terms, through the Analysis of the Resilience of Communities to Disasters (ARC-D). ARC-D scores a *community*, not a household, on thirty resilient components grouped into four thematic areas, each from 1 (least resilient) to 5 (most). The scores do not come from the household survey: they are agreed in facilitated focus-group discussions in every community, and this analysis uses the community-group consensus score for the 167 communities assessed in both rounds. The assessment is made against the hazard a community actually faces, so for each community we compare the endline score with the baseline score for the matching hazard. Two cautions frame the results. Baseline scores were very low, around 1.5 out of 5 on average, so there was a great deal of room to improve and little room to fall. And the baseline assessments were not all carried out at the same point relative to the El Niño floods: most were completed before the flooding and some after it. For communities assessed before the floods, the baseline score may reflect a calmer moment than the one the household survey captured, so part of the measured change at the community level should be read as a limitation of the comparison rather than as resilience gained. This is most relevant for the flood-exposed riverine and coastal communities, and it is noted again where their results appear.

COMMUNITY RESILIENCE ROSE ACROSS ALL FOUR AREAS, UNEVENLY

Every thematic area improved, and every increase is statistically significant, though from a low base. The figure below shows the average community score in each area. Strengthening governance rose the most, followed by preparedness and understanding disaster risk, with reducing vulnerability, the broadest and most infrastructure-dependent area, rising least but still significantly. Even after rising, most areas sit only around 2 to 2.5, so communities moved from very low to low-to-moderate, not to fully resilient.

Figure 12. Average ARC-D score by thematic area, baseline to endline



The gains varied across livelihood zones, and the picture is more nuanced than a simple ranking. Agro-pastoral communities improved the most, across every area, with pastoral communities close behind, so the gains were mainly rural. Urban communities came out lowest on average and were weakest in governance and preparedness. The few Riverine and Coastal communities are a lopsided case: they posted the strongest governance gain of any zone yet barely moved on understanding their risks or on reducing vulnerability. With only about eleven such communities this reading is tentative, and the zone detail is in the annex.

A rising average can hide very different patterns, so for each component we counted how many communities rose, stayed the same, or fell. Pooled across all thirty components, about **49% of community scores rose, 44% did not change, and 7% fell**. Much of the no-change reflects communities that began at the floor and were not reached; the declines, about one assessment in fourteen, are the more surprising movements and are concentrated in the externally dependent components.


WHAT LIES BEHIND THE AVERAGE

Read area by area, the focus-group narratives tell one story: the components a community can build through its own organisation rose, while those that depend on outside facilities and services lagged. Each area is taken in turn below. The figures show, for every component, how many communities recorded each size of change, with improvements to the right of zero, no change at zero, and declines to the left, and the figure at the top of each panel is the average community score at baseline and at endline. The accounts read the distributions together with the written explanations the focus groups gave for every community and component.

UNDERSTANDING DISASTER RISK

This smallest area, with four components, asks whether a community recognises the hazards it faces and shares that knowledge among its members.

Figure 13. Understanding disaster risk — distribution of community-level change




Awareness improved faster than analysis. The clearest gain was in spreading risk information, which rose from 1.46 to 2.31 as about two-thirds of communities improved. Behind it was a mechanism that recurs throughout the assessment: the formation of a committee. Where communities set up early-warning or community-resilience committees, often with partner support, those committees became the first organised channel for passing risk information to households, and from there it travelled through everyday channels, local radio, announcements at the mosque, and the regular meetings of savings groups. Carrying out community risk assessments improved on the same footing, but with an added element the focus groups stressed: much of the gain came from formalising knowledge communities already held, turning elders' reading of the land, seasonal signs and oral accounts of past disasters from scattered individual judgement into a deliberate, shared exercise.

Two components did not move, and both needed something a community cannot generate on its own. Scientific risk assessment barely rose (1.32 to 1.72), with eighty communities still at the floor, because integrating scientific data depends on tools, technical capacity and outside information. Teaching children about disaster risk was held back by the absence of a functioning school or trained teachers, leaving nearly half of communities unchanged. The focus groups also named two quieter brakes on the whole area: widespread illiteracy, which limited how far written risk information could travel, and the frequent exclusion of women from the meetings and channels through which that information moved.

STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE

This area, with seven components, asks whether the community is organised to act on the risks it faces, through inclusive leadership, planning and partnerships.

Figure 14. Strengthening governance — distribution of community-level change



Based on 167 communities

The largest gains in the whole assessment are in governance, and they have a clear shape: the parts that turn on how a community organises itself rose strongly and broadly, while the parts that depend on an outside partner or a functioning state lagged. Three components carried the gains, each rising by about a full point with roughly two-thirds of communities improving: community decision-making (2.18 to 3.20), the participation of women (2.00 to 3.01), and the inclusion of vulnerable groups (1.91 to 2.89). Behind all three lay the same engine. Where communities set up or reactivated formal bodies, community-resilience committees, early-warning sub-committees, water-management committees, they created an entry point into decision-making that had not existed before, replacing processes that ran through clan elders alone. The catalyst communities named most often was the gender and social-inclusion training delivered by partner agencies, which shifted attitudes about who belonged in those meetings, so that women, youth and minority households moved from being absent to attending, voting, and in a growing number of cases holding committee seats.


The other four components moved least, and the declines concentrated among them. For each, the ceiling was something a community cannot supply on its own. Building disaster risk into development and land-use planning stalled wherever no local plan existed to attach it to. Partnerships for disaster risk tracked the presence of outside actors, rising when a consortium NGO arrived and falling when one withdrew. Rights awareness grew but ran up against unresponsive or absent government institutions that kept awareness from turning into advocacy.

One qualification runs through the focus-group accounts and is the area's central unresolved point: formal inclusion repeatedly ran ahead of real influence. Women and vulnerable groups gained presence and a voice, but final decisions still tended to rest with clan elders and committee chairs, and plans were written down without being put into practice. The score gains are real, but they are better read as necessary first steps, more people in the room and documents on the table, than as resilience already consolidated. Reshaping customary authority was never the programme's aim; the right reading is a genuine widening of who takes part.

REDUCING VULNERABILITY

This is the broadest and most structurally constrained area, with twelve components, covering the practical foundations of daily life that decide how much a hazard hurts: water, food, livelihoods, finance, health, infrastructure and housing.

Figure 15. Reducing vulnerability — distribution of community-level change



The same divide runs through here, but the breadth of the area exposes a further point: even some components a community can organise ran into material limits. Two were clear, genuinely self-organised successes. Peace and conflict prevention rose the most (2.53 to 3.28), from the highest baseline in the assessment, as communities formalised elder- and religious-leader-led dispute resolution from ad hoc mediation into standing committees, with training building practical capacity. Access to financial services rose on a single near-universal template, the savings and credit group, the village savings association, the self-help group, the rotating *ayuuto* circle, often alongside mobile money, which together gave members a buffer where no bank reached.

A middle group improved only as far as concrete inputs allowed. Water security and environmental management rose for many communities (water from 1.59 to 2.56), but almost always where an external programme delivered the input that made organisation possible, a borehole, a *berkad*, a soil-and-water-conservation structure. The gains thinned wherever that input was not anchored in durable governance: the focus groups described water-management and natural-resource committees set up but never properly resourced, slipping back into name only once the support ended. Food security, livelihoods, market access and income protection followed a weaker version


of the same story, in which communities named the problem for the first time but the awareness rarely converted into durable practice without assets, capital or working markets, while recurrent drought kept eroding the base.

The hardest floor was in the components that rest on capital and outside provision. Critical infrastructure, housing and health access moved least and carried some of the most frequent declines, because no external construction or health programme arrived to shift them. Social protection sits with this group but moved for a different reason: where it rose, the focus groups credited informal kinship and clan mutual-aid networks standing in as a first safety net, sometimes topped up by NGO cash transfers and almost never by the state; where it fell, those same networks had been exhausted once every household faced the drought at once and no one had a surplus left to share.

DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND RECOVERY

This area, with seven components, asks whether the community is ready to act when a disaster strikes: a contingency plan, an early-warning system, trained responders, and access to emergency health, education and shelter.

Figure 16. Disaster preparedness and recovery — distribution of community-level change



Preparedness shows the divide at its cleanest. The single largest gain anywhere in the assessment is here, the early-warning system rising from 1.43 to 2.66 with three communities in four improving, and it sits directly beside near-total stagnation. The components that rose are the ones a community organises: alongside early warning, local leadership in response (1.60 to 2.65), trained response capacity and contingency planning all improved. Behind them was the familiar engine, the partner-facilitated formation of early-warning sub-committees and resilience committees, member training, the provision of phones and focal points, and the activation of traditional knowledge such as elders reading seasonal signs.

But the focus groups flag a recurring trap: a committee formed or a plan written down is not the same as a plan that works. Across contingency planning, early warning and response capacity, communities set up the structure but it


often went no further, with plans unknown to most members, committees untrained and unfunded, and phones without airtime, so the score did not move even where a committee technically existed. The few communities that reached the top of the scale were the ones that had tied their committee to local government and run an actual response drill.

The emergency services moved hardly at all. Health, education and shelter during a disaster stayed the lowest-scoring components at endline, because each needs capital and outside provision that did not arrive, and they carried some of the area’s clearest declines, with sixteen communities falling back on emergency education. What the focus groups describe there is telling: the informal fallbacks that had propped up baseline scores, a volunteer teacher or a kinship shelter network, collapsed under the drought at the same time as the formal services stayed absent, leaving nothing on either side.

THE COMMON PATTERN

The figure below sets out the divide directly: each component’s average change, with the components a community can organise itself in one colour and those that depend on outside facilities and services in the other. The second group occupies almost the entire low-change end of the range. The full thirty-component table, and the change distributions broken down by livelihood zone and district, are in the annex.

Figure 17. ARC-D component change, by whether the component depends on community organisation or on external facilities and services




3.5.3 WHAT BOTH MEASURES SHOW

The household index and the community assessment are built from different data by different methods, yet they reach the same structural conclusion: resilience rose where households and communities could organise it themselves, and lagged where it depended on outside facilities and services. In the RSI decomposition the gains are in inclusive governance, savings groups and financial access, while emergency infrastructure, formal income and services drag; in the ARC-D assessment the self-organised components (committees, early warning, savings, peace-making) rose while the externally dependent ones (health, infrastructure, housing, social protection) stalled. The independently built TANGO index agrees on direction. Three threads run across both measures.

The gains came through assets and finance, not income. The largest engine of the household rise was economic inclusion, the spread of saving groups, financial access and a real accumulation of assets, and this is also the system most consistently linked to better wellbeing (Section 3.6). But it was an assets-and-finance story rather than an earned-income one: income was flat, much of the asset-building was resourced through programme support, remittances and group savings, and assets were often held as a store of value rather than as a source of income. That is both a genuine achievement and a sustainability question.

Social capital was re-channelled from horizontal to vertical ties. Households came to rely a little less on one another and more on institutions: their committee membership and peer-to-peer (bonding and bridging) ties softened, while their vertical, linking ties to external actors rose. The figure below shows where that vertical rise came from, and it is consistent across the linking items: households' connections to government officials and to NGO and humanitarian staff strengthened most. This is the household-side reading of the same shift the ARC-D assessment captures at the community level, where governance and inclusive decision-making rose through new, often externally seeded committees; the community focus groups describe the same move from informal arrangements toward formal structures. The honest reading is a re-channelling of social capital, not a collapse, though it is worth watching, because informal mutual support is what households fall back on when formal support stops.

Figure 18. Linking (vertical) social capital, by type of tie — baseline to endline



The gains were overwhelmingly rural. The rural zones improved strongly across every system and area, while urban communities were the exception, flat overall and the only place a system fell. The same dynamic, informal ties easing as formal engagement rose, produced a healthy rebalancing in rural areas but a genuine loss in urban ones, where

the informal base thinned and the formal gains did not arrive to replace it. Urban resilience needs a different model from the rural one that worked here.

Together these threads set up the contribution analysis and the recommendations: the programme moved the levers it could reach, community organisation and economic inclusion, effectively, while the components that need infrastructure, services and durable income moved least, which is also where the gains are most fragile.

3.6 Resilience pathways and wellbeing

The previous section showed that resilience rose and what drove it. This section answers the fifth evaluation question: what that resilience was worth. It asks which capacities are most closely linked to household wellbeing, and whether more-resilient households were better protected when the drought hit. This analysis also serves as a final validation of the Resilience Spectrum Index. Where Section 3.5 establishes that the index moves and is internally credible, this section tests whether it is informative about realised wellbeing. With comparable data on the same households at baseline and endline, the index can be put to a more demanding test than was possible at baseline alone, namely whether a household's resilience score predicts its later wellbeing. A caution frames both: the RSI measures the assets, behaviours and connections that should help a household cope; it is not itself a measure of wellbeing. A consistent finding in the resilience literature is that capacity indices of this kind predict realised outcomes only moderately, and that any link is a correlation rather than proof of cause (Barrett et al. 2021; Smith and Frankenberger 2017). The results below are read as evidence that the index is informative, not that raising the score directly causes better outcomes.

THE WELLBEING MEASURES

The analysis uses four wellbeing outcomes measured in both rounds. Two concern food: the Food Consumption Score, which captures the quality and diversity of the diet, and the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES), which captures the lived experience of going without, such as skipping meals or running out of food. The other two are access to a basic drinking-water service and whether the household avoided all damaging coping strategies. The four are described more fully in the annex. The table below shows how each changed.

Table 22. Wellbeing outcomes, baseline to endline

Indicator	BL mean (SE)	EL mean (SE)	Δ [95% CI]	N (BL, EL, pair)
Food Consumption Score (0-112; higher = better diet)	34.38 (1.35)	41.30 (1.08)	+6.92 [+3.59, +10.25]***	3889, 3889, 3889
Food Insecurity Experience (0-8; higher = more food-insecure)	5.73 (0.14)	5.90 (0.09)	+0.17 [-0.16, +0.51]	3661, 3506, 3312
Basic drinking-water service (% of households)	23.3% (2.09)	32.7% (2.49)	+8.9pp [+3.4, +14.4]***	3822, 3804, 3737
Used no damaging coping strategy (% of households)	16.3% (2.05)	9.7% (1.52)	-6.5pp [-11.7, -1.4]**	3889, 3889, 3889


Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Survey-weighted means via `svymean()`; Δ is the within-household change on the BLnEL panel (Taylor-linearized SE).

The four outcomes did not move together. The food consumption score improved and access to a basic drinking-water service rose by about nine percentage points. Experienced food insecurity (FIES) did not change on average. The share of households that avoided all damaging coping fell, from about one in six to one in ten, unsurprising in a drought year. The picture is mixed, which sets up the question of which capacities, if any, track the better outcomes.

WHICH CAPACITIES ARE LINKED TO WELLBEING

To test this, households are sorted into five groups by their **baseline** resilience, and the average **endline** wellbeing of each group is compared. Looking from baseline capacity forward to later wellbeing is the more demanding test, and the one the baseline report set out to complete at endline. The figure below follows the overall score; a line that rises from left to right (or, for food insecurity, falls) means more-resilient households went on to have better wellbeing.

Figure 19. Endline wellbeing across baseline resilience levels




The four panels point in different directions, and that contrast is itself the finding. Water access climbs steadily across the five resilience groups and is highest for the most resilient fifth, so more-resilient households went on to have clearly better water access. Experienced food insecurity edges down as resilience rises, the direction one would hope for, though more gently. The share of households that avoided all damaging coping is lowest among the least resilient and higher further up the scale. The food consumption score, by contrast, is close to flat across the five groups: baseline resilience does not predict the later quality of the diet. Baseline resilience therefore tracks some later outcomes, water access most clearly, but not the diet.

The next figure condenses these relationships and adds the three systems alongside the overall score, so that what predicts what can be read at a glance. It is a heat-map. Each row is one wellbeing outcome and each column is one

capacity, the overall RSI and its three systems. Each cell measures how strongly a household’s baseline level of that capacity is associated with that later outcome, all placed on a common scale so the cells can be compared with one another. The colour carries the direction: green means a higher capacity goes with better wellbeing, red means it goes with worse, and the darker the cell the stronger the association. Stars mark associations that are statistically significant. Reading down a column shows what a given capacity predicts; reading across a row shows which capacities predict a given outcome.

Figure 20. How baseline capacity relates to later wellbeing, by outcome and system



Read this way, three patterns stand out. The strongest and most consistent column is the market system, household assets, savings and financial access: it is favourably and significantly associated with experienced food insecurity, water access and avoided coping. This echoes the baseline report, which also found the economic system the strongest predictor of wellbeing, and it reinforces the cross-cutting theme that economic inclusion is the channel that most converts into realised outcomes. Water access is the one outcome predicted by every system, its row green across the board. The food consumption score is the exception: its row shows no significant association with any capacity, the flat gradient seen in the previous figure, and its link to the ecosystem system is even slightly the wrong way. The associations are modest in size throughout, consistent with the literature’s caution that these capacities track realised wellbeing only in part. The same gradients broken down by system, where the market gradients are the steepest, are in the annex.


DID STRONGER RESILIENCE SOFTEN THE DROUGHT?

A central idea behind resilience is buffering: when a shock strikes, a more resilient household should lose less. We test this for the drought, the defining shock of the period, which most panel households experienced. The logic is to compare households that went through the drought with those that did not, and ask whether the gap between them was smaller for households that started out more resilient. To keep the comparison like-for-like, the test holds constant each household’s own baseline level of the outcome, its size, whether it is female-headed or farming, and its district.

The figure below shows the result for experienced food insecurity, and it repays careful reading. The horizontal axis is simply whether the household experienced the drought: the left point is for households that did not, the right point for those that did. The vertical axis is the predicted level of food insecurity, where a higher value means worse. The three lines are households with low, medium and high baseline resilience. The way to read it is to take each line on its own and look at how far it rises from its left point to its right point: that rise is the damage the drought did to that

group. A steep line means the drought hit that group hard; a flat line means the group was largely buffered against it.

Figure 21. Predicted food insecurity with and without drought, by baseline resilience level



For households that did not face the drought, the three resilience groups sit at a similar level of food insecurity, their margins of error overlapping. When the drought is experienced, food insecurity rises for every group, but by very different amounts: by about 1.3 points for the least-resilient households and by only about 0.4 for the most-resilient. The high-resilience line is the flattest of the three, which is exactly the buffering pattern resilience is meant to produce, with the households that had built more resilience hurt least when the shock came. The statistical test of this difference, the interaction between baseline resilience and drought, is significant only at the ten-per-cent level ($p \approx 0.06$), so it is read as suggestive evidence rather than a firm result.

This buffering does not appear for the other three outcomes, as the table below summarises. Each row is a separate model of one endline outcome. The column labelled “RSI × drought” is the interaction term, the quantity that captures buffering: when it points in the wellbeing-improving direction, more-resilient households were less affected by the drought (as with FIES). The two penalty columns give the size of the drought’s effect, the predicted change in the outcome when the drought is experienced, for the least-resilient and the most-resilient households, so the gap between those two numbers is the buffering made concrete. Only for experienced food insecurity is the interaction in the protective direction and approaching significance; for the food consumption score, water access and avoided coping the interaction is small and not significant. The buffering shows up for the lived experience of food insecurity in particular. The full model and the robustness checks across different shocks are in the annex.

Table 23. Did baseline resilience change the drought’s effect? (four outcomes)

Outcome	RSI × drought	Low-RSI penalty	High-RSI penalty	N
FCS (higher = better)	-4.289	+6.02	-1.64	3,875
FIES (lower = better)	-0.498*	+1.31	+0.42	3,307

Outcome	RSI × drought	Low-RSI penalty	High-RSI penalty	N
Water (higher = better)	+0.009	-0.05	-0.03	3,728
Coping (higher = better)	+0.028	-0.00	+0.05	3,875

*Each row is a separate model of the endline outcome on baseline resilience, drought, their interaction, the baseline outcome, and household controls with district fixed effects (survey-weighted, community-clustered). 'RSI × drought' in the wellbeing-improving direction means more-resilient households were less affected. Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.*

Taken together, the predictive gradients and the drought-buffering result are the evidence that the RSI is informative about realised wellbeing: it tracks later water access, food insecurity and coping (most strongly through the economic system), and more-resilient households were somewhat less hurt by the drought. The associations are modest, as the literature would expect, so the index is best read as a useful indicator of resilience rather than a guarantee of outcomes. How these pathways vary across livelihood zones is taken up in the annex.

3.7 Contribution Analysis: Understanding Key Changes

This section applies a contribution analysis lens to the evidence presented in the preceding outcome findings. Rather than attributing observed changes solely to BRCiS, it assesses how plausibly the programme contributed to the changes seen at outcome level. For each outcome it traces the pathways from activities to results, weighs the household survey and community focus group evidence together, and tests the findings against alternative explanations including drought and rainfall variability, conflict, the role of other actors, and pre-existing community and customary systems. The strength of each contribution claim is rated Strong, Moderate, or Limited, as defined in the key below. The summary table sets out these judgements across all six outcomes and the main pathways within them, and the outcome-by-outcome sections that follow present the evidence and reasoning behind each rating. Because Outcome 6 concerns programme-level learning and coordination, it is assessed from stakeholder interviews rather than household or community data, and its ratings should be read in that light. Where a plausible pathway exists, the outcome sections below connect the evidence to the corresponding movement in the relevant component of the Resilience Spectrum Index presented in Section 3.3, since the changes documented at outcome level are, in part, what lies behind that index movement.

Rating key

Rating	Definition
Strong	Survey and FGD evidence both point to a plausible BRCiS contribution, the mechanism is clearly described, and alternative explanations were considered and do not overturn it.
Moderate	Evidence supports a contribution but it is uneven, conditional (on water, rainfall, group functionality, or reach), or partly explained by other factors.
Limited	Little evidence of a programme contribution, or the change is driven mainly by external factors, or the claim is not supported.

Table 24. Summary of contribution across all outcomes

Outcome	Contribution Pathway	Activities	Basis	Strength
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1. Local leaders and community-led structures	Inclusive, better-organised advocacy and consultation (CAP/AAP)	1.2, 1.3	CAP/AAP gave community requests credibility, with specific, counterfactual advocacy examples across most districts, matching the survey. Conditional on partner responsiveness and funding.	Strong
	Inclusion of women and marginalised groups in participation	1.1	About 70% of households saw women's participation rise and credited the GESI training, with broad FGD support. Gains are in participation, not authority.	Strong
	Crisis coordination and referrals by community structures	1.1, 1.4	The CRC was the most-named helpful actor in a crisis and the referral pathway worked for the ~10% reached. Depth is uneven, CRC and CAP were introduced together, and customary structures run in parallel.	Moderate
	Shift in final decision-making authority	1.1	Consultation broadened, but final decisions still rest with male elders in most communities (the El Barde 'presence versus power' pattern).	Limited
2. Ecosystem restoration and NRM	Water access and reduced collection time and labour	2.5, 2.2	Year-round and productive water access rose, and time and labour savings (especially for women and girls) concentrate where points were built and functioning. Rain-dependent points fail in drought, and gains appear only where hardware was completed.	Strong
	Restoration-linked ownership and short-term well-being	2.3, 2.4	Cash-for-work generated genuine ownership and perceived ecological and well-being gains. Restoration reached only 28 of 168 communities and benefits are gated by rainfall.	Moderate
	By-law governance of resources and disputes	2.4	By-laws were used to protect resources and manage disputes, with legitimacy from participatory rule-making. They overlap with, and partly depend on, customary xeer.	Moderate
	Durable, climate-adaptive ecosystem change at scale	2.1-2.4	Many structures were built but drought prevented regreening, and sustainability is constrained by the end of cash-for-work, weak enforcement, and limited maintenance capacity.	Limited
3. Food production and nutrition	Agroecological adoption and production (where water available)	3.1	Improved seeds and training were the two most cited reasons for rising production, and Perma Gardening was widely adopted where water was present. Conditional on water, undelivered in much of the area, and seeds-only in Jowhar (Zamzam).	Strong
	Feeding, hygiene and nutrition-belief change (where campaigns reached)	3.2	FGDs document feeding and hygiene practice and belief change attributed to the campaigns, and sanitation and care-seeking rose in the survey. Campaigns reached fewer than half of communities.	Strong
	Crop-production and diet-composition gains	3.1, 3.2	The Food Consumption Score, dietary diversity, and child feeding all improved.	Moderate

			Drought drove about 94% of production declines and gains are partly seasonal or external.	
	Durable food and nutrition security	3.1, 3.2	Severe food insecurity (FIES) rose, and dietary diversity is the practice households most often cannot afford, driven by drought and poverty.	Limited
4. Market livelihoods and financial inclusion	Savings groups as a shock buffer (where functioning)	4.1	Specific counterfactual accounts of avoiding asset sales and moneylenders appear across most districts, and 55% of members avoided selling an asset. The model works for small shocks, is strained by severe drought, and some groups dissolved after exit.	Strong
	Business-management improvement and cooperative market access	4.2, 3.1	Training improved money management and 78% of cooperative members report better fair-price selling. Most trained businesses were struggling or closed, and cooperatives are evidenced by survey only.	Moderate
	Cash grant preventing distress sales	1.5	42% of recipients avoided distress sales outright and about 51% partially. Survey only, and a one-off transfer in a prolonged drought.	Moderate
	Diversified livelihoods, income growth, and durable inclusion	4.1, 4.2	Loans and savings went to consumption rather than business investment, income growth was capped by the drought-hit market, and sustainability is fragile.	Limited
5. Early warning linked to early action	Functioning community warning system communities use and contribute to	5.2, 5.1	Warnings shifted to community committees (+26pp) and leaders (+12pp), FGDs across most districts give pre-shock examples, and communities both receive and contribute. Near-identical accounts in some districts and traditional knowledge complements the system.	Strong
	Warnings producing anticipatory early action	5.2, 5.3	There is a strong qualitative warning-to-action link via CAP activation, but 41% of warned households took no action and response is capped by poverty and drought severity.	Moderate
	Emergency assistance via the Crisis Modifier	5.3	Assistance was delivered mainly and relatively promptly by BRCiS partners (72%). It reached a minority (17%) of affected households, and is evidenced by survey only.	Moderate
	Link to formal/government EWS and sustainability	5.4	The system is constrained by resources, capacity, and delays, is not yet linked to government, and in places depends on the partner for core tasks; Activity 5.4 was not yet delivered.	Limited
6. Learning and coordination (stakeholder evidence only)	Consortium and government coordination	6.1	Stakeholders across types credit coordination structures with common approaches, quality assurance, better targeting, and government alignment. This rests on stakeholder self-report and the consortium-community link was mediated by partners.	Strong

	Adaptive management and responsiveness	6.1	The CMU and government describe context-specific adaptation and faster response through crisis modifiers. The resilience-humanitarian boundary remains unresolved.	Strong
	Embedded learning (CLA, Outcome Harvesting, products)	6.1, 6.2	The programme built a CLA framework, ran Outcome Harvesting, and published three learning products against a target of two. A donor-indicator versus community-priority tension and a restoration design mismatch were raised as lessons.	Moderate
	VFM informing decisions; durable efficiency via handover	6.3	The value-for-money analysis is not yet shared or informing decisions, and government handover is uneven (water reasonable, EWS uncertain, ecosystem groups fragile).	Limited

Outcome 6 is assessed from stakeholder and partner interviews rather than survey or community focus group data.

3.7.1 Outcome 1: Local leaders and community-led structures are more inclusive and better advocate for and manage community priorities

Outcome 1 is focused on community-led governance. Under it, BRCiS established or reactivated Community Resilience Committees (CRCs) and reinforced them with Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI) training, supported communities to develop Community Action Plans (CAPs) and aggregate them into government-validated Area-level Action Plans (AAPs), used those plans as a basis for advocacy and coordination, and set up referral pathways to connect vulnerable households with external services.

This section is focused on understanding whether these structures became more inclusive and more effective at advocating for and managing community priorities, and how much of any change can plausibly be linked to BRCiS.

COMMUNITY STRUCTURES ARE WIDELY RECOGNISED AND SEEN AS BROADLY REPRESENTATIVE OF NEEDS

The structures were embedded in about half of the surveyed communities, and where households were aware of them, they mostly trusted them to speak for their needs. Awareness is the first test of whether a community-led structure exists in practice rather than only on paper, and half of all panel households (50.2%) reported knowing of a CRC, EWEA committee, CREWS, or Water Management Committee in their village. Among households that were aware of an existing community structure, the majority felt that these structures adequately represented their specific needs. Roughly seven in ten felt represented at least some of the time (8% always, 35% mostly, 28% sometimes), while about one in five felt rarely represented (19%) and about one in ten said the BRCiS-supported leadership never reflected their needs (9%).

Through community FGDs, participants consistently credit the Community Action Planning process with creating a sense of representation and structure within community leadership. Participants repeatedly contrasted a fragmented, dispute-prone past, in which requests were scattered and outside actors were met with competing demands, against a present in which a recognized body channels an agreed set of priorities. The CAP and AAP are the mechanism behind that shift. **Community members clearly and consistently report that the plans were used to identify and rank community needs** (most often water access, flood protection, livelihoods, and food security) and that in the large majority of communities receiving support, **the intervention delivered matched a need the plan had**

documented. This link between the planned priority and the realised intervention is the single clearest finding emerging from qualitative interviews with community members and is present in at least 12 of the 20 districts.

One of the most frequently cited outcomes of the plans is that **they did not just organise needs internally, but also gave communities a credible basis for advocacy**. The recurring sequence was that the CAP documented a need, the CRC presented it to an external actor, and the actor responded, with communities naming specific cases such as the Zamzam Foundation rehabilitating wells and river embankments in three Jowhar communities and KAALO drilling a borehole in Galkaio North toward which the communities contributed USD 20,000. Participants credited collective prioritisation and written documentation above all, and in Wanlawayn all six communities pointed to the thumbprinted CAP as the thing that made their request credible. As one participant in Siigole put it,

“They believed us because the plan was clear and showed we had thought about our problems and organized ourselves properly.”

The same evidence marks the limits of the claim. Where the CAP went unused, participants blamed external and programmatic factors rather than the planning itself. Some examples included FCDO funding cuts and early closure in Beletweyne and Jariiban, post-election conflict in Jariiban, and weak follow-up in three of four Afmadow communities, where the plan was described as “a guiding or reference document rather than a living tool.” A sharper counter-pattern emerged in Galkayo, where several communities reported partners arriving with pre-set agendas and delivering short-term cash or food that bypassed CAP priorities.

What separated the communities where the CAP was used from those where it was not was therefore less the quality of the plan than two conditions around it: Whether the plan was followed up and resourced, and whether the external actors it was meant to mobilise aligned to it. In communities in Afmadow, the first condition was absent. Respondents described plans that were never followed up on or linked to resources. In the Galkayo communities, communities described the second situation, where partners delivered against their own agendas rather than in alignment with the plan. The funding cuts and conflict in Beletweyne and Jariiban are external constraints rather than failures of the process.

Evidence that the plan sped up response is genuine but rare, clearly present in fewer than 20 of the 168 communities and concentrated in Beletweyne, Hudur, Baidoa II, and Rabdhure. Where it did appear, the mechanism was consistent: Because the need was already named and agreed in the CAP, the community could act when a shock hit without first commissioning a new assessment or reconvening to settle priorities. In Qurunlow Ashraf (Baidoa II), participants described using the risk-ranking matrix in their CAP to convene an emergency meeting and secure earth-dam rehabilitation “before peak drought conditions, reducing livestock losses and preventing displacement.” A participant in Jariban Town put the time saving plainly, noting that:

“Before BRCiS, more days [were] taken [for] community consultation and needs assessments,” whereas now “there is no need for further community consultation since everything is indicated in the CAP.”

Participants also noted that women, persons with disabilities, and minority clans remained unevenly represented within the structures doing this planning and advocacy, a finding which is covered in more detail below.


Taken together, this growing reliance on the CRC and the CAP, both to coordinate internally and to reach government and external actors, also underscores the results related to social capital emerging from the survey. Households’ connections to institutions and people in positions of power, a form of linking social capital, rose of the survey period (from 0.44 to 0.67), even as bonding and bridging social capital, the horizontal ties within and between communities, fell or stagnated as a result of drought. This movement is both consistent with a BRCiS contribution to

stronger, more outward-facing community structures and also underscores the importance of these structures in the midst of a shock like the drought experienced at endline.

CRC STRUCTURES PROVED MOST USEFUL IN A CRISIS AS A CHANNEL FOR WARNING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION


When a shock hit, households experienced BRCiS-supported CRCs less as an advocate and more as a coordinator, and they named it more often than any traditional authority as their most helpful actor in a crisis. The help CRCs provided was mainly informational and distributional, with early warning the most commonly cited contribution (49%), well ahead of fair aid distribution (25%) and the resolution of resource disputes (10%).

Figure 22. Most important way the BRCiS-supported leadership helped during the last crisis or shock



That coordinating role is what allowed the CRC to stand out against the community's other authorities. Asked to name the single group most helpful in their last crisis, more households chose the BRCiS CRC (38%) than chose any single alternative: traditional elders (21%), religious leaders (15%), or government committees (2%).

Figure 23. Group most helpful in managing the last crisis or shock



FGDs with community members supported these findings. Committee coordination was described in most communities that received support and appeared across all 20 districts. The most concrete accounts came from a cluster of districts including Dhusamareb, Baidoa I, Beletahawa, and Hudur, where committees were described convening emergency meetings, distributing water, allocating resources to vulnerable households, and organizing labor.

FGD responses also explain why, even though the CRC was frequently named as the group most helpful in managing the last crisis or shock, a sizable share of households also still pointed to traditional elders and religious leaders as their most helpful actor. The two systems operate side by side, and understanding how they relate matters for isolating what BRCiS contributed.

Across the FGDs, the BRCiS structures related to the community and customary leadership that already existed in several distinct ways, listed here from roughly the most to least common:

- **BRCiS-supported CRCs and CAPs became the main coordinating body.** This was the most common pattern among communities that received support. In these cases, **the CRC and its CAP, rather than pre-existing leadership, were the active source of better coordination, frequently in communities that previously had no functional structure at all.** This was true in Galkaio North (*“before the CRC was formed, our community had no working structure”*) and Galdogob. Participants tended to credit the community itself more than the plan, with the CAP mainly lending it formal legitimacy. This is the strongest contribution signal.
- **BRCiS structures operated alongside customary authority.** Reported in a substantial minority of communities, where **traditional and clan leaders kept handling functions the BRCiS structures could not** (most visibly, enforcement). In Rasan (Galkayo), disputes were escalated to the Sheikh to make decisions stick.
- **BRCiS structures stayed inert.** A smaller group of communities, most explicitly several in Galkayo, had a CRC and a developed CAP, but **the plan never fed into day-to-day coordination.** It was used mainly as a document to show outside actors when they arrive, rather than as a tool the community itself uses to organise and coordinate. This is the weakest contribution signal.
- **Customary bodies substituted for the BRCiS structures.** In a small number of communities **where the CRC and CAP never took hold, traditional structures filled the same role.** Where this happened, participants pointed to the absence of any clear planning system, with decisions made informally and reactively and community participation low or declining. For example, Baidoa II’s El Cadow had no formal CAP, but had “long relied on traditional, locally-led committees” that “function in a similar way.” Interviews do not highlight a specific reason BRCiS structures did not take hold in these communities, but plausible theories could include funding cuts, conflict, and weak follow-up.
- **BRCiS structures changed how decisions were made.** Distinct from the others, this refers to the criteria for allocation rather than who coordinates. In a handful of communities concentrated in Jariiban, resource decisions had traditionally followed sub-clan lines, with water and land allocated according to which sub-clan a person belonged to. Participants described BRCiS’s inclusive, needs-based planning beginning to shift this, so that **resources were increasingly directed to those who needed them most rather than by clan identity.** As one participant in Seemade put it, *“need became more important than identity.”* This is covered in more detail in the inclusion section, below.

REFERRAL PATHWAYS REACHED FEW HOUSEHOLDS, BUT WORKED WELL FOR THOSE THEY REACHED

The referral mechanism (Activity 1.4) touched a small minority of households, but for that minority, it was effective and, by their own account, often decisive. Around 10% of households received a referral, most commonly to health and nutrition (35%) or financial services (30%), with productive and livelihood services close behind (26%). For most respondents that received a referral, the pathway led somewhere. Four in five reached the service they were sent to, and the barriers that stopped the rest (mainly cost, distance, and being turned away) were each marginal. The services respondents received were also valued, with nearly 93% of respondents reporting that the experience was helpful and almost none (less than 1%) reporting harm.

Most relevant for the contribution question is what households said the referral added. Two-thirds reported they would not have reached the service at all or without a BRCiS referral, and over half said that the committee helped them overcome a specific barrier to access.

**Table 25. Relevance of the committee in guiding households to referral services
(among households that received a referral)**

Indicator	EL mean	95% CI lower	95% CI upper	N
Would not have accessed the service without the referral	67.3%	59.8%	74.8%	409
Committee helped overcome a barrier to accessing it	56.4%	48.5%	64.3%	413

Endline only, among households that received a referral. Survey-weighted shares with 95% CIs.


The evidence for referral access and benefits is primarily quantitative. The qualitative work for this outcome focused on the CAP/AAP advocacy chain rather than individual referrals.

INCREASED PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IS WHERE SHIFTS IN INCLUSIVENESS ARE CLEAREST, BUT PARTICIPATION HAS OUTPACED AUTHORITY

The GESI training (Activity 1.1) targeted the inclusion of women and minority clans in community decision-making. The next figures show households’ perception of change over the last two years and how much of that change they attribute to BRCiS.

Of all the inclusion targets under this outcome, women’s participation is where households perceive the most change and where they most readily credit BRCiS. Around seven in ten households (69%) said women’s participation in decision-making had improved over the past two years, with very few (<5%) reporting any declines. Crucially for the contribution argument, households did not treat this as ambient social change. Among those who saw a shift, a large majority (71%) attributed this either mostly or entirely to the GESI trainings implemented by BRCiS.

Figure 24. How much of the change in women’s inclusion is attributed to BRCiS trainings



The FGDs both confirm this finding and reveal its limitations. Across the great majority of communities where GESI training was delivered, women became more active in meetings and committees, particularly around water. In some places, this produced concrete structural change. El Barde Town’s resource committee was deliberately built with a six-of-ten female majority, and in Wanlawayn and Rabdhure, women’s input was reported to have reshaped specific decisions.

Yet the most consistent qualitative caveat is that **broadened consultation has not become real authority**. Six El Barde communities drew the distinction sharply, describing women as:


“included in the implementation of programs but often excluded from the foundational stages of planning, prioritization, and governance”

and noting that on contentious issues *“the matter is deferred to men.”* A set of communities, including all four in Afmadow and several in Wajid and Diinsor, reported no change or no training at all, which helps account for the quarter of households that saw no improvement. **The contribution claim is therefore strong for participation and consultation, but weak for genuine decision-making power.**

INCLUSION OF MINORITY CLANS FOLLOWS A SIMILAR BUT MORE MUTED PATH

Minority-clan inclusion improved on the same trajectory as women’s, but less decisively. A clear majority of households still reported improvement (63%), though a larger share than for women saw no change at all (32%). Where change was perceived, households again credited the trainings, in similar proportions as they did for women.

Figure 25. How much of the change in minority-clan inclusion is attributed to BRCiS trainings



The qualitative evidence here is thinner but contains one distinctive mechanism. In Jariiban, communities described a move from clan-based to needs-based resource allocation, summed up by one participant as “need became more important than identity.” This is a different pathway from the gender story, addressing exclusion rooted in sub-clan membership rather than gender, and the patchier qualitative coverage fits the larger proportion of survey respondents who reported “no change” for minority clans.

CONTRIBUTION TO OUTCOME 1: CREDIBLE BUT CONDITIONAL

The evidence makes a credible but bounded case for BRCiS’s contribution to Outcome 1. BRCiS structures are recognised in about half of communities and trusted by most who know them. The CAP and AAP gave communities a documented, collectively owned set of priorities that made their advocacy credible and, in many places, gave a previously absent structure a way to coordinate.

That said, contribution was uneven and conditional, depending on whether partners acted on the plan, whether funding and security allowed it to be used, and whether a functional structure took hold at all. It is direct where the CRC and CAP became the coordinating body, and weak or absent where customary authority absorbed the work, the plan stayed inert, or partners followed their own agendas. Across most communities, gains in inclusive representation were concentrated in increases in participation and consultation rather than final decision-making authority, which still tends to rest with male elders. **The claim is therefore well-supported for more inclusive, better-organised advocacy and consultation, moderate for crisis coordination, and limited for genuine shifts in who holds power.**

Overall, the Resilience Spectrum’s Leadership sub-index, which captures the strength of community structures and governance, rose in step (from 3.29 to 3.57), with the largest gains observed in measures of community decision-making, rights awareness, and the inclusion of vulnerable groups. This suggests that overall gains in resilience, as defined by the survey, are supported by BRCiS contribution to strengthening formal community structures and increasing inclusion.

3.7.2 Outcome 2: Participatory ecosystem restoration and strengthened NRM increase capacity to adapt to climate change

Outcome 2 focused primarily on the natural resource base. BRCiS mapped land and water health, established or strengthened Water Management and NRM committees, engaged communities in ecosystem restoration (such as

constructing half-moon structures, riverbank stabilization, and tree planting) largely through cash-for-work, reintroduced regenerative rangeland, and build climate-resilient water points.

Two features shape how the evidence should be interpreted. First, reach was uneven: Water investments were relatively widespread, reaching about half of households, whereas ecosystem restoration and NRM activities were implemented in only 28 of the 168 surveyed communities. Second, the restoration results depend heavily on rainfall. Many of the structures, such as half-moon catchments and soil bunds, only deliver ecological benefits once rain falls to fill them, so during the drought that dominated this period, a structure could be well-built and still show little visible effect. This makes rainfall a significant explanatory factor influencing many results throughout Outcome 2, and is one outside the programme's control.

WATER ACCESS HAS IMPROVED, WITH GAINS CONCENTRATED WHERE BRCiS BUILT OR REPAIRED A WATER POINT

Access to water is one of the clearest areas in which activities implemented under Outcome 2 appear to have translated into benefits. Across the panel sample, several measures of water access improved between baseline and endline, though these are community-wide changes not exclusively attributable to BRCiS.

The share of households with water available year-round rose by 14 percentage points (to 47%), and the time to collect water in the dry season fell by about seven minutes, even though the average time to collect water from the main source throughout the year remained essentially unchanged.

Table 25. Drinking water for consumption — baseline to endline

Indicator	BL mean (SE)	EL mean (SE)	Δ [95% CI]	N (BL, EL, pair)
Average time to collect water from the main source (minutes)	18.78 (0.95)	21.93 (1.20)	+2.55 [-0.59, +5.68]	3391, 3667, 3232
% of households with water available year-round	33.8% (2.41)	46.8% (2.51)	+13.5pp [+7.2, +19.7]***	3830, 3765, 3707
Average time to collect water in the dry season (minutes)	42.38 (2.04)	34.69 (1.60)	-7.20 [-12.19, -2.21]***	3343, 3588, 3127

Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Survey-weighted means via `svymean()`; Δ is the within-household change on the BLnEL panel (Taylor-linearized SE).

Access to water for production, which matters more directly for livelihoods, improved by a similar magnitude. The share of households able to access water for productive use rose by 13 percentage points in a normal year, and by 12 percentage points during drought (roughly doubling to 24%).

Table 26. Water for production — baseline to endline

Indicator	BL mean (SE)	EL mean (SE)	Δ [95% CI]	N (BL, EL, pair)
% with access to water for productive use in a normal year	21.2% (1.73)	33.7% (2.10)	+12.5pp [+6.8, +18.3]***	3889, 3889, 3889
% who can access water for productive use during drought	12.2% (0.85)	24.1% (1.87)	+11.9pp [+7.8, +16.0]***	3889, 3889, 3889

Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Survey-weighted means via `svymean()`; Δ is the within-household change on the BLnEL panel (Taylor-linearized SE).

The next set of questions speak directly to BRCiS water-point investments (Activity 2.2 and 2.5). Just over half of households (52%) live where BRCiS built or repaired a water point, and among those, over half (58%) had used it. A little over a quarter (28%) reported some conflict or tension over the water point (covered in the conflict discussion, below).

Table 27. Household proximity to BRCiS-built or repaired water points (endline)

Indicator	EL mean	95% CI lower	95% CI upper	N
Lives where BRCiS built or repaired a water point	51.8%	47.4%	56.2%	3,640
Used the BRCiS-built / repaired water point	58.4%	52.5%	64.3%	1,883
Reported conflict or tension over that water point	27.5%	22.8%	32.2%	1,228

Endline only. Survey-weighted shares with 95% CIs.

The water points constructed by BRCiS were also largely working. More than three-quarters (77%) were functional year-round, with the rest split between seasonal functioning (11%) and frequent breakdowns (11%). Less than 2% were fully non-functional.

The FGDs elaborate on gains observed through the quantitative survey, highlighting that they're **very tangible in some communities but are unevenly distributed**. Where a borehole, solar kiosk, or pipeline was actually built and works, participants described collection time dropping from hours to as little as five to twenty minutes.

The gains fall away in two situations. The first is communities that received BRCiS training but no water infrastructure, where the collection burden stayed at pre-project levels (noted in the FGDs for Shanta Barako and Buula Khalif). The second matters more for resilience. Some water points rely on rainfall, so they dry up during drought, precisely when households most need them. One in ten points functions in the rainy season only, and participants described rainwater catchments and berkads that dried up completely in the drought, including newly built and rehabilitated berkads in Beletweyne's Bergadid and the rain-fed catchments in Wanlawayn that communities feared a long dry spell would empty.

Improvements are therefore concentrated among households near a completed point that holds water year-round. In scale, this means the sustained gains reach at most the half of households who live near a BRCiS water point, and within that half, mainly those near the three-quarters of points that function year-round (rather than the quarter that are seasonal or break down).

TIME SAVINGS AS A RESULT OF IMPROVED WATER ACCESS FALLS MOST HEAVILY ON WOMEN AND GIRLS, OPENING UP TIME FOR OTHER ACTIVITIES

Where a functioning water point exists, the saved time and reduced labour matter most for the women and girls who carry the water. When asked to compare their water situation with two years ago, just over a third of households (36%) said they could now access enough water for productive use.

Households also reported that the time they spent collecting water declined in comparison to two years ago. A majority of households (57%) reported spending less time fetching water than two years ago, with only one in ten


households reporting an increase in time spent. In FGDs, participants discussed the effect of these changes on women and girls. Communities described the end of long walks carrying twenty-litre jerry cans, with relief from back and neck pain and from the harassment risk of distant collection. In several Baardhere communities, including Bulo Adey and Shimbirole Eest, participants noted that water points closer to town and farther from the river reduced crocodile attacks. The time freed up was reported to go into childcare, more regular school attendance for girls, and participation in self-help groups or small permagardens.

This pathway is, however, entirely dependent on functioning hardware. Where systems were not built or had broken down, the labour burden remained at pre-project levels, and where drought dried up sources, the gains were reversed. Water quality was seen to improve as well, with two-thirds (67%) describing their main source of water as cleaner than two years ago. Very few households (< 3%) reported that water quality had worsened.

RESTORATION REACHED FAR FEWER COMMUNITIES, BUT PARTICIPANTS SEE CLEAR ECOLOGICAL GAINS WHERE THE RAINS COME

Ecosystem restoration activities (tree planting and soil-erosion barriers) had more limited reach, implemented in only 28 of the 168 communities. Where these activities were implemented, however, there is indication of positive results. Around a fifth of households reported taking part in tree planting (22%) and a slightly smaller share in building soil-erosion barriers (17%). Among those who participated, perceived ecological benefit was high. Roughly four in five participants (79%) said tree planting had improved soil moisture or grass cover.

Figure 26. Perceived improvement in soil moisture or grass from planting trees (among participants)



The soil-erosion barriers were rated even more favourably, with more than nine in ten participants (93%) reporting improvement in soil moisture or grass cover. The FGDs both support and qualify these figures. **Where restoration was implemented, participants reported tangible wellbeing improvements in water availability, food and agricultural productivity, and physical safety from flood protection.** Respondents provided vivid examples, including anecdotes of a canal rehabilitation project letting farmers in Belethawa’s UNSI resume cropping and riverbank embankments protecting maize in Afgoye.

Ecological improvement, however, is highly contingent on rainfall, and in many communities, the structures had been built but drought had kept them from working. In Dhusamareb’s Laanle, participants noted that 1,500 half-moons had been constructed, but almost no rain had fallen since, so no regeneration had occurred. In Galkaio North,

participants similarly reported that “*the half-moons stay empty*” without rain. The strong perceived-improvement figures therefore reflect the experience of participants who saw the structures function, while a large share of restoration sites had not yet delivered visible ecological change at the time of data collection.

Fodder is a narrower case of the same pattern. Only 6% of households had accessed community fodder in the past year, but among those who did, the benefits in a drought were substantial. Among households with fodder access, nearly two-thirds (64%) said it had kept breeding animals alive through the drought and four in five (80%) had avoided buying expensive feed. FGD respondents corroborate these findings in areas where pasture and fodder regeneration had taken hold.

Table 28. Access to community fodder and its implications (endline)

Indicator	EL mean	95% CI lower	95% CI upper	N
Had access to community fodder in the last 12 months	5.9%	4.9%	6.9%	3,889
Kept breeding animals alive in the drought thanks to it	63.6%	52.4%	74.8%	286
Avoided buying expensive feed thanks to it	80.0%	74.4%	85.5%	286

Endline only. Survey-weighted shares with 95% CIs; the fodder-implication rows are among households with fodder access.

CASH-FOR-WORK CREATED REAL OWNERSHIP, BUT WILLINGNESS OUTFRONS THE CAPACITY TO SUSTAIN

One of the strongest qualitative findings under Outcome 2 has no dedicated survey figure: **The cash-for-work model that delivered most restoration also generated a genuine sense of ownership.** Across the communities where cash-for-work occurred, participants consistently described feeling responsible for assets they had built with their own hands, using phrases such as “*because we built it, we protect it*” and “*it is ours, not a project thing.*” This was a strong and consistent finding, reinforced by the fact that communities without cash-for-work programs did not report comparable ownership.

That ownership translates into willingness to maintain the structures, but willingness is not the same as capacity. **Even communities expressing the strongest commitment said maintenance had become harder once payments stopped,** because repairs required tools, materials, and skills they lack and because survival labour competes for time. The expected chain from participation to ownership to sustained protection to climate adaptation is visible in its early links across many communities, but stalls before the final link in most of them, held back by drought, weak committee enforcement authority, and the absence of funds or materials for repairs. It runs the full course only in a minority of well-resourced cases, such as Rabdhure and El Barde Town, where rainfall and stronger governance allowed restored sites to show real benefit.

BY-LAWS PROTECT RESTORED RESOURCES AND MANAGE DISPUTES, OFTEN ALONGSIDE CUSTOMARY LAW

Where restoration landed, communities also used Natural Resource Management (NRM) by-laws to protect resources and manage disputes, and most communities with by-laws reported using them in practice rather than leaving them on paper. Enforcement ran from dialogue and warnings through to fines that varied widely by place and offence. Examples of penalties ranged from one camel for charcoal-cutting in Dhardhaar to USD 500 for felling a live tree in Shalaqben, through to detention or referral to police and courts for violations in Galkayo and Dhusamareb. Other communities used restorative sanctions such as replanting or repair labour, and a few, including three Jariiban communities and poorer Afgoye villages, deliberately levied no fines, either because by-laws excluded them or because “*everyone is too poor to pay.*”

Participants consistently attributed acceptance of enforcement to having helped write the rules, captured by a respondent in Wanlawayn who reported “*the by-laws work because they came from us.*” The most fully developed system was Raddhure’s CREW model, which paired documented evidence and public hearings with transparent use of fine revenue.

This is also where attribution becomes challenging, because customary governance frequently overlapped with project-supported by-laws. The relationship between the BRCiS-supported by-laws and pre-existing custom took a few forms:

- **BRCiS by-laws codified rules where none were written.** In several communities, participants described converting informal practices into written by-laws for the first time under BRCiS. For example, in Jariiban Town, formalisation was cited to be the most important change under the program.
- **BRCiS by-laws layered onto the existing traditional system.** In Jariiban and Galkaio North, communities described project by-laws operating in parallel with customary agreements that pre-dated BRCiS, with Sallah noting it already had “*domestic by-laws*” that written rules “*helped us strengthen.*”
- **Customary and state authority carried the enforcement.** In Galkayo’s Rasan, the committee did not fine directly, but routed disputes to the Sheikh and then government, and in Dhusamareb and Adado, enforcement leaned on local security councils and police.
- **Customary law substituted entirely.** In Jowhar, all nine communities relied on traditional clan-based dispute resolution and reported no NRM by-law enforcement, with one participant in Baarey noting the community “*still prefers to follow their long-standing traditional systems.*”

This is underpinned by survey data on respondents’ experience with conflict. Just over a quarter of households (28%) reported tension over a BRCiS water point, and 12% said conflict had at some point prevented them from using BRCiS services such as water points or meetings.

By-laws and NRM committees are partly the mechanism communities use to manage these tensions, and where they functioned, participants credited them with reducing disputes over grazing, water, and restored land. But the overlap with customary authority means the reduction in conflict cannot be attributed to BRCiS alone.

CONTRIBUTION TO OUTCOME 2: REAL GAINS, CONDITIONAL ON RAINFALL AND REACH

The evidence supports a real but heavily qualified contribution to gains under Outcome 2. The water investments are the strongest case - where BRCiS built or repaired a functioning point, households report shorter collection times, lighter labour for women and girls, and better water quality. Survey data and FGDs are aligned that gains are concentrated in areas where water hardware landed.

Restoration generated a genuine sense of community ownership and, where rains allowed, visible ecological and well-being benefits, but it reached only 28 communities and its ecological payoff is limited by rainfall that lies outside the programme’s control. By-laws are functioning in many restoration communities, though often beside or inside customary systems that make the BRCiS-specific contribution hard to isolate.

Three constraints run through the whole outcome:

1. **Rainfall:** Rainfall quantity is a binding constraint, repeatedly cited as the reason water structures are not usable and the benefits of restoration projects fail to materialize.
2. **Maintenance:** While many communities feel a strong sense of ownership over the infrastructure they built, they lack the tools, funds, knowledge, and enforcement authority to follow through on maintenance once the cash-for-work program ends.

3. **Competing attribution:** Other funders, the cash-for-work income itself, pre-existing infrastructure, and customary governance each account for part of what communities reported, making it difficult to precisely isolate contribution.

The contribution claim is therefore well supported for water access and the time and labour savings that follow it, moderate for restoration-linked ownership and short-term well-being, and weak or uncertain for durable, climate-adaptive ecosystem change at scale.

These water and restoration gains are also evidenced in the Resilience Spectrum Index. The Ecosystem sub-index, which captures access to and management of natural resources, rose from 3.19 to 3.66, with the components most tied to this outcome supporting the increase: Water Management Committee membership rose from 40% to 52%, ARC-D measures of sustainable environmental management and water security improved, and constant access to ecosystem services rose. This is consistent with a BRCiS contribution to overall household resilience in this area.

3.7.3 Outcome 3: Healthier/sustainable food production & dietary practices improve food/nutrition security

Outcome 3 focuses on two tracks. The first is food production: BRCiS established producer cooperatives and trained farmers in agroecological practices such as Perma Gardening, Resilience Design, and drought-tolerant seed use. The second is nutrition and hygiene: Community education campaigns on Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF), hygiene, and nutrition screening.

Neither track reached every community. Agroecological training was not delivered at all in much of the programme area, including most of Jowhar, all of Afmadow, and much of Diinsor, and the nutrition and hygiene campaigns reached fewer than half of the surveyed communities. The drought that dominated the endline period underscores nearly every finding, as it determines whether applying a trained practice would produce any result as well as whether a household could afford to act on nutrition advice.

This section focuses on whether healthier production and dietary practices improved food and nutrition security, and how much of any change is attributable to BRCiS rather than to drought, other actors, or pre-existing practices.

CROP PRODUCTION: GAINS FROM SEEDS AND TRAINING, LOSSES FROM DROUGHT

Among farming households, crop production more often rose than fell between baseline and endline. The declines that did occur were almost entirely drought-driven. Just over half of crops (52%) increased production relative to before the project, compared to about a third (33%) which decreased. The share of crops sold in the last 12 months increased by nearly 30%, and of households that reported selling crops, three-quarters (75%) reported increased sales values.

Table 29. Changes in crop production and sales relative to baseline (endline)

Indicator	EL mean	95% CI lower	95% CI upper	N
Share of crops with increased production vs before BRCiS	51.5%	47.1%	55.8%	1,336
Share of crops with decreased production vs before BRCiS	35.7%	31.5%	39.9%	1,336
Share of crops that were sold in the last 12 months	28.3%	24.5%	32.0%	1,330
Share of sold crops with increased sales vs before BRCiS	74.8%	67.6%	82.1%	417

Share of sold crops with decreased sales vs before BRCiS	15.0%	9.1%	20.9%	417
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Endline only. Survey-weighted average share of a household's crops in each category, with 95% CIs; N = households reporting crops.

In addition, the crop mix households planted shifted toward more resilient and marketable options. Maize and beans expanded the most, with far more households taking them up than dropping them. Production of vegetables and cow peas also grew modestly, while production of sesame declined.


Table 30. Production patterns by crop — baseline to endline (number of households)

Crop	Produced at BL	Produced at EL	Started at EL	Stopped at EL
Sorghum	794	821	462	435
Maize	538	744	524	318
Cow peas	338	367	293	264
Vegetables	150	243	210	117
Sesame	160	81	61	140
Beans	76	153	141	64

Unweighted counts of panel households. 'Started' = produced at endline but not at baseline (or baseline unknown); 'Stopped' = produced at baseline but not at endline (or endline unknown).

The reasons households gave for rising production centre on BRCiS-supported inputs. Improved seeds (53%) and training on improved practices (41%) were the two most cited drivers, with better access to irrigation or rehabilitated water points also reported by nearly one-third of households (30%). The reasons are computed across all crop records reporting a change (endline).

Figure 27. Main reasons for an increase in crop production (endline)



Drought was overwhelmingly cited as the primary reason for a decrease in crop production, reported by 95% of respondents. Pests (10%), flooding (5%), and conflict (1%) were reported by a considerably smaller fraction of respondents. Among households who reported an increase in income from crop sales, the majority attributed it to either higher yields as a result of better seeds/techniques (49%) or better market prices (47%). A smaller fraction

reported that improved crop quality/health contributed to price increases (10%). Where income declined, the cause was again overwhelmingly lower production driven by drought and pests (86%). A small fraction of respondents reported that either poor market prices (6%) or high transport costs (5%) were responsible for the decrease in income. Additionally, 4% of respondents reported that they had an urgent need for food and had to eat their harvest rather than selling it. This is a small fraction, but represents employing a negative coping strategy in the face of a shock.

The same pattern appears when it comes to which crops households took up or abandoned. The dominant reason for beginning to farm a new crop (across all crops) was receiving seeds or support from an organization, cited in between 43% and 64% of cases, depending on the crop. This was most commonly reported for cow peas (64% of cases), which are also naturally nitrogen-fixing, making them strong editions to a farm in environments where fertilizer might be scarce. The second most commonly-cited reason is the crop's resistance to drought, cited in between 16% and 46% of cases. Abandonment of a particular crop type, by contrast, was driven almost entirely by water scarcity, with insufficient rainfall cited in 70% to 88% of cases.

The FGDs explain how training translated into these survey results and where it broke down. Across the great majority of trained communities, **Perma Gardening was the most widely adopted practice**, taken up using locally available materials and small household plots, with peer diffusion spreading it further in places like Galkaio North and Danshoot (El Barde).

Adoption was tightly conditional on water access, and El Barde shows this within a single district: El Barde Town and Emilow, with borehole and drip-irrigation access, described thriving gardens and income from surplus, while the water-scarce communities of Higlowayn, Lawareeg, and Ayeeyo reported little or no adoption.

The most consistent qualitative finding is that **drought emerged as the dominant barrier to sustaining any practice** (supported by the survey data above). Participants described complete investments rendered unusable by lack of rain, including a cooperative in Yeed (Rabdhure) that received a full solar-powered drip kit it cannot run because the catchment is dry, and 25 households in Nimcan last (Beletweyne) whose gardens are failing as the shallow well dries.

The clearest counter-case is Rebay (Baidoa I), where a community dam provided water and households sustained small-scale vegetable production through the drought.

Two alternative attribution caveats were also raised in the FGDS:

1. Another organization (Zamzam foundation) provided seeds to seven out of nine communities in Jowhar (without agroecological training).
2. As described above, across El Barde and Baardhere, the proximate enabler of gains was water infrastructure rather than training content, which makes the two difficult to separate.


FEEDING AND HYGIENE PRACTICES SHIFTED WHERE THE EDUCATION CAMPAIGNS REACHED

The household survey records changes in hygiene and care-seeking but did not ask why they changed, so on their own, these baseline-to-endline shifts are descriptive and cannot be attributed to BRCiS. The FGDs for this outcome probed deeper into attribution, and the findings in this section combine both sources of data to present a robust picture of shifts in hygiene practices.

When comparing baseline to endline, survey data shows very little change in how households typically wash their hands. There was a slight shift from water-only towards water plus soap or sand, but the difference is minimal. Clearer gains are visible in sanitation practices, with use of a latrine in the house up nearly 17 percentage points.

The use of both open defecation and shared latrines has correspondingly declined (9 percentage points and 8 percentage points, respectively).

Figure 28. Where household members usually defecate — baseline to endline



These modest and uneven aggregate shifts are consistent with the FGD evidence that the campaigns reached some communities and not others. Where campaigns ran, participants reported changes in feeding and hygiene, especially the adoption of exclusive breastfeeding in place of giving infants water, animal milk, or pre-lacteal foods, alongside more handwashing and latrine use, and they attributed these changes in behavior to the sessions.


The strongest qualitative finding in this area is belief change: Across most districts, participants described, in explicit before-and-after terms, abandoning the belief that breast milk alone is insufficient, while Galdogob communities corrected the idea that colostrum is harmful and Galkato communities reconsidered harmful practices such as cauterisation and infant-tooth extraction.

Reach was partial, however. Roughly 90 of the 168 communities had no campaign implementation or gave no response, which likely explains why the survey’s aggregate movement across these indicators is diluted.

HEALTH-SERVICE ACCESS IMPROVED OVERALL

Households became more willing to seek formal care when ill. The share who said they would seek assistance at a clinic, health centre, or hospital for a family member with diarrhoea, fever, infection, or coughing rose almost 14 percentage points, while those who would “do nothing” fell by more than nine percentage points.

Figure 29. What households would do if a member had diarrhoea, fever, infection or coughing — baseline to endline



This shift toward care-seeking coincided with improved availability of services. The share of households with a functioning health centre in their community rose about 11 percentage points (to 57%) and the share reporting they needed health services in the last six months fell by approximately 10 percentage points.


Table 31. Access to health services — baseline to endline

Indicator	BL mean (SE)	EL mean (SE)	Δ [95% CI]	N (BL, EL, pair)
% with a functioning health centre in the community	45.4% (2.46)	56.6% (2.37)	+10.9pp [+3.1, +18.6]***	3797, 3789, 3705
% that needed health services in the last 6 months	49.1% (2.47)	39.6% (2.46)	-9.3pp [-16.5, -2.2]**	3830, 3779, 3723

Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Survey-weighted means via `svymean()`; Δ is the within-household change on the BLnEL panel (Taylor-linearized SE).

The barriers to accessing health services that remain shifted from the demand side to the supply side. Cost as a reason for non-access fell by 5 percentage points, while the absence of drugs and of staff at the health centre both rose (by 5 percentage points each). This is suggestive of a service-provision gap rather than an affordability one.

Figure 30. Reasons households were unable to access health services — baseline to endline



CONFLICT'S TOLL ON MARKETS AND WELLBEING GREW

Conflict's effect on household well-being worsened sharply over the period, with the share of households reporting it affected them "significantly negatively" increasing by nearly 21 percentage points from baseline. Conflict constrained livelihoods directly through market access, with 30% of relevant households reporting it had prevented them from travelling to market. FGD respondents also link challenges with conflict to production and food-security findings. In Afgoye, communities such as Jambaluul and Buula Madino described recurring armed conflict that kept them off their farms and blocked the roads to market, compounding the losses caused by drought.

DIETS DIVERSIFIED, YET SEVERE FOOD INSECURITY DEEPENED

We now turn to food consumption and dietary diversity. The Food Consumption Score (FCS) classifies households as poor, borderline, or acceptable.

The survey results for food security move in two apparently opposing directions, which is explained through qualitative evidence. Diet quality, as measured by the FCS, improved overall, with the fraction of households with a "poor" FCS falling almost 13 percentage points and those with "acceptable" scores rising eight percentage points.


Table 32. Food Consumption Score categories — baseline to endline

Indicator	BL mean (SE)	EL mean (SE)	Δ [95% CI]	N (BL, EL, pair)
% of households with a poor FCS	38.3% (2.42)	25.7% (2.29)	-12.5pp [-19.4, -5.7]***	3889, 3889, 3889
% with a borderline FCS	18.6% (1.80)	23.0% (2.13)	+4.4pp [-1.5, +10.4]	3889, 3889, 3889
% with an acceptable FCS	43.2% (2.39)	51.3% (2.12)	+8.1pp [+1.7, +14.6]**	3889, 3889, 3889

Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Survey-weighted means via `svymean()`; Δ is the within-household change on the BLnEL panel (Taylor-linearized SE).

Consumption became more varied across the board, with vegetables, fruit, staples, meat or fish, pulses, and sugar all eaten on more days of the week than at baseline.

Figure 31. Average number of days each food group was consumed in the past week — baseline to endline



Experienced food insecurity, however, **worsened at the severe end of the scale**. The fraction of households experiencing “severe” food insecurity, as measured by the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) rose more than six percentage points to 64%. A household falls into this category when it affirms seven or eight of the scale’s eight experiences, meaning household members did not only worry about food or eat less than they felt they should, but reached the most extreme experiences the scale captures. This includes running out of food entirely, being hungry but not eating, and going a whole day without eating. This increase appears to reflect a net shift of households out of the food-secure and moderately insecure categories, both of which fell, into the more severe ones.


Table 33. Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) categories — baseline to endline

Indicator	BL mean (SE)	EL mean (SE)	Δ [95% CI]	N (BL, EL, pair)
% food secure (FIES 0)	12.7% (1.71)	9.0% (1.00)	-3.5pp [-7.6, +0.5]*	3661, 3506, 3312
% mild food insecurity (FIES 1–3)	9.9% (1.42)	12.2% (1.12)	+2.3pp [-1.5, +6.2]	3661, 3506, 3312
% moderate food insecurity (FIES 4–6)	19.4% (2.00)	15.0% (1.09)	-5.0pp [-9.5, -0.5]**	3661, 3506, 3312
% severe food insecurity (FIES 7–8)	58.0% (2.53)	63.8% (1.50)	+6.2pp [+0.4, +12.0]**	3661, 3506, 3312

Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Survey-weighted means via `svymean()`; Δ is the within-household change on the BLnEL panel (Taylor-linearized SE).

Looking at specific experiences of food insecurity confirms the deterioration at the top of the scale. Worrying about food, running out of food, and being hungry but not eating all increased between baseline and endline.

Figure 32. Share of households reporting each FIES experience in the past 30 days — baseline to endline



Young children’s feeding improved markedly. The share of households with a child aged 6 to 23 months who ate solid or semi-solid food the previous day nearly doubled, rising 23 percentage points to 50%.

Table 34. Children who ate solid or semi-solid food yesterday — baseline to endline

Indicator	BL mean (SE)	EL mean (SE)	Δ [95% CI]	N (BL, EL, pair)
% of households (with a child 6–23 months) whose child ate solid/semi-solid food yesterday	27.5% (2.96)	49.6% (3.38)	+23.0pp [+10.6, +35.4]***	1870, 1952, 1123

Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Survey-weighted means via `svymean()`; Δ is the within-household change on the BLnEL panel (Taylor-linearized SE).

The diversity of what those children ate also widened, with grains, dairy, and legumes each consumed by 24 to 33 percentage points more children than at baseline.

Responses in the community FGDs explain how diet composition and child feeding improved while severe food insecurity worsened. The qualitative evidence is consistent that **dietary diversity is the single practice households most often could not fully adopt, and that the barrier is resources rather than knowledge.**

Participants across more than a dozen districts named the recommended foods precisely and then said they could not afford them. A respondents in Baarey (Jowhar) and in Qurunlow Ashraf (Baidoa II) summed this up by saying:

“Knowledge alone is not enough; we need resources to make the changes real.”

“We know what children should eat, but sometimes we cannot afford it.”

Drought and poverty, not education, drive the FIES deterioration, and in the most extreme case in Bandarqaali (Galkayo), participants reported rising acute-malnutrition and supplementary-feeding caseloads. The BRCiS campaigns plausibly shifted knowledge, feeding practices, and the diversity of foods households managed to consume, while drought and poverty deepened the most severe food insecurity.

The food dimension of resilience does appear in the Resilience Spectrum Index, and the agroecological and water-for-production gains documented here help explain its movement. Within the Ecosystem sub-index, the ARC-D component measuring a secure and sufficient food supply rose from 1.56 to 1.89, and the asset and income components of the Market sub-index also increased. What the index does not capture is households' lived experience of food insecurity, measured by the FIES, which as we see in this section worsened over the study period. This explains when the overall index rose, while instances of severe food insecurity also rose. The index reflects the community-level food supply and economic capacities the programme worked on, while the experienced-hunger measure that sits outside it deteriorated under the drought.

CONTRIBUTION TO OUTCOME 3: KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICES SHIFTED, OUTCOMES LIMITED BY DROUGHT AND RESOURCES

BRCiS programme contributions to indicators under Outcome 3 are concentrated at the knowledge-and-practices end of the causal chain. On production, the survey and FGDs agree that improved seeds and agroecological training raised output where conditions allowed, with improved seeds and training the two most cited reasons for rising production. On nutrition, the campaigns appear to have changed feeding and hygiene practices and, most clearly, beliefs, wherever they reached, and the food-composition and child-feeding gains in the survey are consistent with that.

The chain from practice to food and nutrition security is interrupted by forces outside the programme. Drought accounts for almost all production declines and is the dominant reason households cannot sustain trained practices. Maintaining recommended dietary diversity is the practice households most often cannot afford, and severe food insecurity rose over the study period. Limited programme reach compounds this, as both training and campaigns covered only parts of the programme area.

Several alternative explanations also temper attribution: Zamzam Foundation also delivered seeds (without training) across most of Jowhar, water infrastructure rather than training is the proximate enabler of many production gains, and in some regions (primarily Rabdhure), nutrition counselling came from ACF and MARDO rather than BRCiS.

The contribution claim is therefore well-supported for agroecological adoption where water was available and for changes in feeding, hygiene, and nutrition beliefs where campaigns reached, moderate for crop-production and diet-composition gains, and not supported for durable food and nutrition security, which drought and poverty have driven downward at the severe end despite practice-level progress.

3.7.4 Outcome 4: Communities engaged in diverse, market-based livelihoods and financial inclusion

Outcome 4 covers BRCiS investments in financial inclusion and livelihoods. The activities are the expansion and strengthening of savings groups, organised as Self-Help Groups (SHGs) or Village Savings and Loan groups (Output 4.1), business development support and training (Output 4.2), producer cooperatives, and a small cash grant provided to some households during the drought (the Small Grants Fund, linked to Activity 1.5).

Reach was very uneven across these activities. Savings groups were established in most surveyed communities, while business training and cooperatives reached far fewer, and the qualitative work covered the savings groups and business training in depth, but did not ask dedicated questions about cooperatives or the cash grant, which are therefore evaluated through the survey alone. The drought again shapes the results.

This section focuses on whether communities moved into more diverse, market-based livelihoods and stronger financial inclusion, and how much of any change is attributable to BRCiS. The questions covered in this section are new at endline, so unless noted the tables and figures below are **endline only**, survey-weighted with 95% confidence intervals on the analytical panel. “Don’t know” and “Refused” answers are treated as missing throughout.

SAVINGS GROUPS REACHED ABOUT A FIFTH OF HOUSEHOLDS AND WORKED MAINLY AS A SAFETY NET

Savings groups were the most widespread of the Outcome 4 activities and functioned mainly as a source of emergency credit. About one in five households (22%) belonged to a SHG or Village Savings and Loan group, and among members, most had drawn on the group. Across the endline sample, 63% had taken a loan in the past year, and 55% said the group had allowed them to avoid selling a productive asset.


Table 35. Membership of savings groups, access to loans, and their implications (endline)

Indicator	EL mean	95% CI lower	95% CI upper	N
Member of a Self-Help Group (SHG) or Village Savings & Loan (VSL) group	21.5%	17.4%	25.7%	3,889
SHG/VSL members who took a loan from the group in the last 12 months	63.2%	52.1%	74.4%	836
SHG/VSL members who, thanks to the group, avoided selling a productive asset to buy food	54.8%	41.8%	67.7%	836
SHG/VSL members for whom conflict or insecurity stopped them attending meetings	47.5%	34.5%	60.6%	836

Endline only. Survey-weighted shares with 95% CIs. The membership row is over all households that answered; the remaining rows are among SHG/VSL members. 'Don't know'/'Refused' treated as missing.

Members were broadly, though not strongly, confident that the group helped them face the next shock, with about four in ten saying they were “always” or “mostly” confident and another 38% reporting they were “sometimes” confident. The purpose of those loans was almost always consumption. Loans went to food or water in 78% of cases and to school or medical fees in another 18%, while starting or growing a business (3%) and buying tools or animals (2%) were rare.

Figure 33. Primary use of the loan taken from the SHG/VSL group (members who took a loan)



The FGDs corroborate this across at least 14 of 21 districts and in the large majority of communities with active groups, where participants gave specific accounts of borrowing to cover a sudden illness, a short drought, or a small business loss instead of selling a goat or borrowing from a moneylender at high interest. The counterfactual was stated directly by one respondent in Baidoa I's Rebay:

"When my child became sick, the group gave me a small loan immediately, and I was able to pay for treatment without selling my goats."

This is a clear contribution to financial resilience. It is, however, a **safety-net function rather than a livelihood-diversification one**. Both the survey loan-use pattern and the qualitative accounts show the groups smoothing consumption through shocks, not financing new or expanded businesses.

SHG SAVINGS BECAME A MORE COMMON COPING STRATEGY, BUT SEVERE DROUGHT STRAINED THE GROUPS

Because saving groups are meant to strengthen financial resilience, the survey examined whether the strategies households use when shocks hit have shifted toward savings. The shock context itself intensified slightly between rounds, with almost all households at endline experiencing a shock in the last 12 months (95%, up from 91% at baseline). The share of households receiving any early warning also fell sharply, from 47% to 28%, although the share that both expected the main shock and had a mitigation strategy in place rose. (a more complete overview can be found in Section 3.2).

Table 36. Shocks, early warning, and preparedness — baseline to endline

Indicator	BL % (SE)	EL % (SE)	Change in pp [95% CI]	N
Experienced at least one shock in the last 12 months	91.3% (1.1)	94.9% (0.9)	+3.5 [0.7, 6.4]**	3889 / 3889
Received an early warning for the shock (shocks 7, 8, 16 only)	47.2% (2.9)	28.1% (2.8)	-19.2 [-27.0, -11.3]***	3363 / 3023
Expected the main shock was coming	21.5% (2.1)	27.9% (2.4)	+6.4 [0.2, 12.5]**	3260 / 3345
Had a strategy ahead of time to mitigate the main shock	31.4% (4.0)	42.5% (4.8)	+11.1 [-1.3, 23.4]*	832 / 972

Survey-weighted shares, SE in parentheses (pp); each row is over its own respondent base (N = baseline / endline). The early-warning row is at the shock-event level, restricted to shocks 7, 8 and 16 (the shocks for which the question was fielded at endline) in both rounds. Change is an independent two-sample difference with its 95% CI. Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Among the households that did prepare, cash savings were the dominant tool, named as a strategy by 36% of the small group who implemented any mitigation strategy, and as the single most important strategy by 63% of them. Those savings were spent overwhelmingly on essentials, with food (83%), medical expenses (63%), and water (53%) far ahead of school fees or transport, consistent with savings functioning as a consumption buffer.

Across the panel, the use of savings as a coping and preparedness strategy rose, even if from a low base. Drawing on own savings to recover from a shock and increasing savings to protect against future shocks both rose significantly, although the large majority of households (about 90%) still cited a lack of savings as a constraint to preparing.

Table 37. Savings and loans as a strategy for coping and preparedness — baseline to endline

Indicator	BL % (SE)	EL % (SE)	Change in pp [95% CI]	N
Used own savings to recover from a major community shock	1.0% (0.3)	2.7% (0.4)	+1.7 [0.8, 2.7]***	3889 / 3889
Took out a loan to recover from a major community shock	10.7% (1.1)	9.7% (1.1)	-1.0 [-4.0, 2.1]	3889 / 3889
Increased savings to protect against future shocks	4.1% (1.0)	10.1% (1.6)	+6.0 [2.3, 9.7]***	3758 / 3889
Would save money to prepare for future shocks (among households with a plan)	56.2% (6.2)	68.7% (4.4)	+12.6 [-2.3, 27.5]*	278 / 541
Cites lack of savings as a constraint to preparing (among households with no plan)	78.2% (2.1)	79.6% (2.4)	+1.3 [-5.0, 7.6]	3611 / 3348

Survey-weighted shares, SE in parentheses (pp); N = baseline / endline. Independent two-sample comparison. The 'increased savings' row changed question format between rounds (baseline: a single main strategy; endline: all that apply), so it is not a like-for-like comparison. Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Where groups were active, members **consistently described the savings and loan mechanism reducing harmful coping**, with one estimate in Afgoye's Buula Khalif that "*maybe 20 goats were saved because of the group.*" The model held for small, manageable shocks but was strained or overwhelmed by severe and prolonged drought. In Adado, El Barde, and Hudur communities, participants described depleted savings, members unable to repay, and lending suspended at the moment it was most needed, summarised in Adado's Docooley:

"It has not improved our ability to cope with unexpected shocks, as the scale of the current drought is overwhelming."

Sustainability is the second limit. Some groups were durable and self-sustaining, with all eight Galkaio North communities stating they would continue without the project and Adado's Gidheys carrying groups over from BRCiS II, but others dissolved after BRCiS exited (the Jariiban communities of Labilamane and Celxager) or collapsed under drought (El Barde's Ondare), and pastoral mobility undermined regular contributions in Hudur. **The financial-inclusion gain is therefore real but conditional on continued group functionality, adequate capital, and manageable shock conditions.** One attribution caveat also applies: In several communities, the group's lending capacity rested on an external BRCiS grant of USD 2,000 to 4,000 rather than on accumulated member savings.

BUSINESS TRAINING IMPROVED MONEY MANAGEMENT, BUT MOST TRAINED BUSINESSES ARE STRUGGLING

Business development support reached far fewer households than the savings groups, with about one in five (21%) reporting they had received BRCiS training or support to start or grow a small business.

The state of those businesses reflects the operating environment more than the training. Among trained households, only 19% described their business as growing, while 48% were struggling and 34% had closed. Confidence that the training helped them face the next shock was mixed, with about 47% saying “always” or “mostly” and a similar share less sure.

Among trained participants across eleven districts, the most consistent change the FGDs record was in money management, including budgeting, daily record-keeping, separating household and business finances, and adjusting stock to demand, often with specific examples of preventing a loss or making a modest gain. The ceiling on these gains was external and was described directly by participants. Drought reduced customers’ purchasing power, market access and transport were costly, and conflict disrupted trade, summarised in Wanlawayn’s Masiirey:

“The training helps me survive in my business, but I cannot fill my customers’ pockets when they have no money.”

Afgoye’s Balow added a threshold condition, that those with no starting assets could not act on the training at all. The training plausibly improved management and helped some businesses survive, but the high closure and struggling rates indicate that the contribution to improved growth was capped by the drought-hit markets.

COOPERATIVES IMPROVED FAIR-PRICE SELLING FOR MEMBERS


Producer cooperative membership was reported by 14% of households, and conflict was a significant disruptor of participation, stopping just over half of members (52%) from attending at some point. Members who did participate reported a clear benefit in their ability to sell at a fair price, with 79% saying it had improved since they joined.

Table 38. Membership of a BRCiS-supported Producer Cooperative and the impact of conflict (endline)

Indicator	EL mean	95% CI lower	95% CI upper	N
Member of a BRCiS-supported Producer Cooperative (e.g. for selling crops or milk)	14.3%	10.8%	17.7%	3,889
Cooperative members for whom conflict or insecurity stopped them attending meetings	52.1%	39.0%	65.1%	526

Endline only. Survey-weighted shares with 95% CIs. The membership row is over all households that answered; the conflict row is among cooperative members.

Figure 34. Change in the ability to sell products at a fair price since joining the cooperative (members)



Confidence about facing the next shock followed the same broad but not strong pattern seen for the other groups, with about 38% reporting being “always” or “mostly” confident, and 46% “sometimes.” The qualitative work did not include a dedicated question on cooperatives, so this finding rests on the survey. The fair-price improvement is consistent with the cooperative model’s intent, but it cannot be corroborated or qualified with member testimony here, and the high rate of conflict-disrupted attendance is a notable constraint on it.

A SMALL CASH GRANT HELPED RECIPIENTS AVOID SOME DISTRESS SALES

During the drought, 16% of households received a small cash grant through the Small Grants Fund. The grant’s effect on distress coping was partial. Among recipients, 42% said it prevented them from selling livestock or taking high-interest loans outright, while a slightly larger group (51%) said it helped but they still had to sell assets or borrow, and only 7% said it did not help. As with cooperatives, the grant had no dedicated qualitative question, though SHG-focused FGDs in Rabdhure and Diinsor mentioned grant-funded food and water distributions channelled through the groups. On the survey evidence, the grant prevented distress coping for a substantial minority of recipients and softened it for most of the rest, which is consistent with what would be expected from a one-off transfer during a severe, prolonged drought.

CONTRIBUTION TO OUTCOME 4: STRONG ON THE SAFETY NET, WEAK ON DIVERSIFIED LIVELIHOODS

The contribution to financial inclusion is well-supported, but it is concentrated in one function. Savings groups demonstrably helped members avoid harmful coping where the groups were active, a finding evidenced in specific detail across most districts and consistent with survey data. The contribution to the other half of the outcome, diverse market-based livelihoods, is weak. Loans and savings went overwhelmingly to food, water, and medical needs rather than to business investment. Business training, while it improved money management for the one in five households that received it, left most trained businesses struggling or closed in a drought-hit market.

Three limits qualify the contribution. Sustainability is the clearest, since several groups dissolved after BRCiS exited or collapsed under drought, and pastoral mobility and depleted capital strained others, so the financial inclusion gain depends on continued functionality. Reach is the second, with business training and cooperatives covering only a small share of households. Attribution is the third, since some groups’ lending rested on external BRCiS grants rather than member savings and pre-existing family and clan support networks operate in parallel. The claim is therefore well supported for savings groups as a shock buffer where they functioned, moderate for improved business

management and cooperative market access, and weak for diversified livelihoods, income growth, and durable financial inclusion, all constrained by drought, limited capital, and post-exit fragility.

Overall, findings around savings groups also directly underpin the overall resilience results presented above. The Resilience Spectrum's Market sub-index, which captures household assets, income, and financial inclusion, rose the most of the three systems (from 3.23 to 3.92). The components behind that increase align with the work under Outcome 3: Membership in a savings or VSL group rose from 17% to 33%, the number of productive assets owned nearly doubled, and the ARC-D measures of access to markets and to financial services rose strongly.

Savings groups, which serve to connect members to formal savings-and-lending structures, are also one of the clearest examples of linking social capital, which rose during the study period (from 0.44 to 0.67). At the same time, the survey's bonding and bridging social capital indices fell or stagnated. This suggests that the groups strengthened a specific formal structure more than they lifted social cohesion across the community as a whole.

3.7.5 Outcome 5: Target communities benefit from and contribute to functioning EWS, linked to Early Action

Outcome 5 concerns early warning and early action. BRCiS updated the EWEA system and its indicators and the Real-Time Risk Monitoring dashboard (Activity 5.1), established community-level EWEA subcommittees (Activity 5.2), ran a Crisis Modifier for emergency response to triggered shocks (Activity 5.3), and planned to link community systems to national and state structures (Activity 5.4, scheduled for the following year).

Unlike most outcomes, the community structures here reached almost every surveyed community, so the question is less about reach than about whether the warnings lead to anticipatory action and whether the system can function and survive without the project. The drought that dominated the endline period also changed the shock profile against which warnings are measured. The evaluation question is whether communities both benefit from and contribute to a functioning early-warning system linked to early action, and how much of this is attributable to BRCiS.

COMMUNITY STRUCTURES HAVE BECOME THE MAIN SOURCE OF EARLY WARNINGS

The clearest contribution in this outcome is a shift in where warnings come from. **Overall warning receipt fell between rounds, but this reflects the change in the dominant shock rather than a weakening of the system.** Warnings were common for flooding, the defining baseline shock (60%), and less common for drought, the defining endline shock (30%), so as drought displaced flooding the headline receipt rate declined.


Table 39. Households receiving an early warning, by shock — baseline to endline

Shock	BL % warned (SE)	EL % warned (SE)	Change in pp [95% CI]	N
Excessive rains / flooding	58.8% (4.0)	31.3% (3.8)	-27.4 [-38.3, -16.6]***	2290 / 176
Failed rains / drought	30.1% (4.5)	28.9% (2.9)	-1.2 [-11.7, 9.3]	730 / 2673
Livestock disease/death	15.3% (10.4)	12.6% (1.7)	-2.8 [-23.5, 18.0]	343 / 174
All three shocks (7, 8, 16)	47.2% (2.9)	28.1% (2.8)	-19.2 [-27.0, -11.3]***	3363 / 3023

Share of households experiencing the shock who received a prior warning, survey-weighted, with the Taylor-linearized standard error in parentheses (percentage points). The early-warning question was fielded only for these shocks (the same base at baseline and endline). N = baseline / endline counts. Change is an independent two-sample difference in percentage points with its 95% CI. Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

What changed more meaningfully is the channel. In the survey, warnings delivered through community committees (CDMCs/CRCs) rose by 27 percentage points and warnings from community leaders and elders by 12 points, while phone or SMS warnings fell by 23 points and radio, social media, and newspapers all declined.


Figure 35. Source of the early warning — baseline to endline (all three warning shocks)



Shares are among households that received a warning, pooled across the three warning shocks and survey-weighted; baseline vs endline is an independent two-sample comparison. Households could report more than one source, so shares need not sum to 100%. Significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

The contrast between the two rounds' dominant shocks makes the same point. Flooding warnings at baseline came mainly from radio (55%) and phone or SMS (45%), whereas drought warnings at endline came mainly from word of mouth (54%), community committees (33%), and community leaders (15%), with radio and phone much reduced.

Figure 36. Source of the early warning for the dominant shock of each round



Survey-weighted shares with 95% CIs, among households warned about that shock. Left: excessive rains/flooding at baseline. Right: failed rains/drought at endline. Households could report more than one source.

The FGDs corroborate this shift and rate it as strong evidence. Across 18 of 20 districts and the large majority of the roughly 140 communities with an active system, participants gave concrete examples of EWEA subcommittees issuing warnings before a drought, flood, or disease outbreak, drawing on rainfall and water-level monitoring, livestock condition, and forecasts. They also described how warnings were spread beyond the committee, through community meetings, mosque announcements for those without phones, house-to-house visits, and monthly mobile-phone reporting. This both confirms that communities receive warnings from the BRCiS structures and that they contribute to them, the two halves of the outcome statement.

WARNINGS INCREASINGLY PROMPTED ANTICIPATORY ACTION, THOUGH RESOURCES CAP THE RESPONSE

Whether warnings led to action is more qualified. Among warned households in the survey, the most common response was to take no action (41%), followed by stockpiling food or water (32%), with asset-based or migratory responses such as selling livestock early (13%) or moving family or livestock (9%) less common.

The FGDs both strengthen and explain this. Where the system was active, participants across most districts described warnings triggering specific protective actions, including water conservation, early livestock migration and off-take, fodder storage, embankment and drainage work, and disease-prevention measures, frequently by activating measures already written into the Community Action Plan. The analysts rate this warning-to-action link as strong. The same evidence accounts for the large share who took no action, since response depended on having the means to act. In Galkayo's Dawaf, participants said that without an emergency grant the warnings "often serve only as a reminder of our vulnerability," and in several Afgoye communities the drought was too severe to prepare for. The warnings were necessary but not sufficient.

EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE WAS DELIVERED MAINLY, AND RELATIVELY PROMPTLY, BY BRCiS PARTNERS

When early action took the form of emergency assistance, it came largely through the programme. Assistance reached a minority of affected households overall (17%), more for clan conflict (35%) and pasture depletion (22%),

and it was delivered overwhelmingly by BRCiS partners (72%), then other NGOs or UN agencies (22%), with government (1%) and relatives (5%) marginal.

That assistance was also relatively timely. Among recipients, BRCiS partners and other NGOs or UN agencies most often delivered before or around the point of hunger, while the small numbers relying on government or relatives more often reported it arriving after they had already lost assets or skipped meals.

These two tables rest on the survey. The qualitative questions for this outcome focused on the community warning system rather than on who delivered emergency aid, though some FGDs noted external responses triggered by warnings, such as IRC support to 80 households in Galkayo following community advocacy.

THE SYSTEM WORKS BUT REMAINS FRAGILE AND UNLINKED TO GOVERNMENT

The most uniformly documented qualitative finding is that the system, though established almost everywhere, does not yet function reliably or independently. Participants across all 21 districts named the same constraints, which the analysts rate as strong evidence:

- **Resources and equipment.** Subcommittees lacked monitoring tools, smartphones, airtime, transport, and small operating funds, and in several communities members relied on personal contributions to keep going.
- **Technical capacity and delays.** Limited ability to collect and interpret data, compounded by illiteracy in places, and slow information flow meant warnings sometimes arrived late. In Wanlawayn's Siigole, a forecast was heard *"two weeks after the dry spell started."*
- **No link to government.** Communities repeatedly said that without integration into formal disaster-management structures such as MoHADM and SODMA the system would not survive project closure, which is the linkage that Activity 5.4 was scheduled to build but had not yet delivered.
- **Operational dependence.** In Diinsor's Yaqshiid, the implementing partner still printed the data forms and submitted the data on the community's behalf, so the core reporting function had not been internalised.

Community ownership was real and frequently expressed, with all eight Galkaio North communities stating they would continue reporting after the project ends. But ownership was consistently described as necessary rather than sufficient, since commitment alone cannot supply equipment, funds, or a government body to receive and act on the reports.

CONTRIBUTION TO OUTCOME 5: A FUNCTIONING WARNING SYSTEM, A WEAKER LINK TO ACTION AND SUSTAINABILITY

The contribution to the early-warning half of the outcome is well supported. BRCiS established community structures that now issue warnings ahead of shocks and have become the main channel through which warnings travel, a shift visible in both the survey, where community committees and leaders rose sharply as warning sources, and the FGDs, where subcommittees across most districts gave concrete examples of pre-shock warnings. Communities both receive and contribute to these warnings, which is the outcome as written.

The link to action and the durability of the system are weaker. Warnings translated into anticipatory action where households had the means, often by activating Community Action Plan measures, but a plurality of warned households took no action, constrained by poverty and by a drought too severe to prepare for. Emergency assistance, when it came, was delivered mainly and relatively promptly by BRCiS partners, but reached a minority of affected households. And the system's day-to-day functioning remains constrained by resources, technical capacity, and information delays, is not yet linked to government, and in places still depends on the implementing partner for core tasks, so its survival beyond the project is uncertain. Two alternative explanations also qualify the picture: traditional and indigenous knowledge and local leaders complement and sometimes substitute for the EWEA

warnings, as in Afgoye's Buula Khalif where households read bird and animal behaviour in the absence of equipment, and the near-identical wording of warning accounts across the Galkaio North communities is a data-quality caution. The claim is therefore well supported for a functioning community warning system that communities use and contribute to, moderate for warnings producing anticipatory early action, and weak for the link to formal early-warning systems and for sustainability beyond BRCiS.

3.7.6 Outcome 6: Sector-wide learning and coordination contribute to improved efficiency/effectiveness

Outcome 6 concerns programme-level systems rather than household or community results, and it cannot be assessed through the household survey or the community FGDs that underpin the other outcomes. It is assessed instead from programme documentation and from key-informant interviews with programme stakeholders, namely the Consortium Management Unit (CMU), implementing partners, and federal and state government representatives, conducted for the parallel Lessons Learned study, supplemented by preliminary interviews with consortium partners. These two sources serve different roles: The desk review of programme documentation underpins the assessment of activities, outputs, and outcomes across the results chain, while the key-informant interviews mainly inform Outcome 6, since respondents did not discuss each activity, output, and outcome systematically.

Attribution in this section is therefore to types of stakeholder rather than to communities, and the evidence is the judgement of those who designed and delivered the programme rather than independent measurement. Under this outcome BRCiS engaged the Centre for Humanitarian Change as a learning partner to develop and embed a Collaborating, Learning and Adapting (CLA) framework (Activity 6.1), produced and disseminated learning products (Activity 6.2), and commissioned a real-time value-for-money analysis (Activity 6.3). The evaluation question is whether sector-wide learning and coordination improved the programme's efficiency and effectiveness.

CONSORTIUM AND GOVERNMENT COORDINATION SUPPORTED COMMON APPROACHES AND ALIGNMENT

Stakeholders of all types described coordination as a working strength of the programme. The consortium coordinated implementing partners through monthly Programme Management Group meetings and quarterly reviews, alongside thematic work streams covering early warning, resilience design, community leadership, and value for money. CMU respondents and implementing partners credited these mechanisms with applying common approaches and guidelines across locations and creating shared spaces for learning and quality assurance among the implementing partners. Coordination with government, through MOUs, joint planning meetings, steering committees, and area-based forums, was described by government respondents at all levels as generally effective and continuous, and as having improved targeting of vulnerable groups and alignment with government priorities.

Two limitations were raised from within these same accounts. A federal government respondent recommended a clearer governance framework defining meeting frequency, membership, and responsibilities. CMU respondents noted that communication between the consortium and communities relied heavily on implementing partners, which limited direct consortium-community engagement.

ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT WAS A STRENGTH, BUT THE RESILIENCE-HUMANITARIAN TENSION IS UNRESOLVED

Adaptive management was the second mechanism stakeholders credited. CMU respondents explained that the programme worked with communities to find context-specific solutions because climate programming in Somalia did not follow a standard model, making flexibility essential as risks evolved. Government respondents pointed to the same flexibility in responding to droughts, flooding, and displacement, and noted that the programme drew on monitoring data, assessments, community feedback, learning products, and coordination meetings to inform

decisions and improve targeting, with crisis modifiers and small grants funds enabling faster responses to urgent needs.

The unresolved issue, raised independently by government and partner stakeholders, is the boundary between resilience and humanitarian response. A federal government respondent cautioned that resilience programmes should avoid shifting too frequently into humanitarian response, since humanitarian budgets already exceed development budgets, and that resilience programming should stay focused on building community capacity over time. One program partner described the same problem from the delivery side: "we have been implementing a resilience program in a straight line. You train farmers, provide inputs, and provide irrigation. Then drought comes and turns everything upside down." The crisis modifier is intended to bridge this gap, but partners raised open questions about whether it was triggered at the right threshold, whether it kept communities on a resilience trajectory or only provided relief, and what happens to beneficiaries given that the project is closing during an active drought.

LEARNING WAS EMBEDDED, THOUGH EVIDENCE USE AND VALUE-FOR-MONEY HAVE LIMITS

The programme put structured learning mechanisms in place. With the Centre for Humanitarian Change it developed a CLA framework comprising a Learning Agenda, Knowledge Management Strategy, and Collaboration Strategy, ran Pause and Reflect sessions and Outcome Harvesting pilots in Belet Hawa and Galdogob, and published three learning products against a target of two, including the Gatekeeping in Somalia brief, the Ecosystem Baseline Assessment, and a Lessons Learned brief. One program partner singled out the Outcome Harvesting process as a success.

The limit is in how fully that learning reshaped programming. A program partner observed that "when programming is overly guided by predefined indicators and outcomes, there is a risk of overlooking high-value activities identified by communities themselves," a tension echoed by CMU reflections that Community Action Plans were sometimes developed but not operationalised. A concrete instance of a learning gap also surfaced: partners noted that ecosystem restoration was in places poorly matched to the land-use context, set up on farmland where post-harvest grazing occurs rather than on rangeland. The value-for-money analysis is a further case of learning not yet closing. A year-two analysis was completed by the IRC BUR and presented in preliminary form during year-three planning, with final findings intended for the redesign workshop, but a program partner's request to be shown the value-for-money findings indicates they are not yet widely shared or informing decisions.

SUSTAINABILITY AND GOVERNMENT HANDOVER REMAIN THE OPEN QUESTION

The efficiency and effectiveness this outcome is meant to secure ultimately depend on whether gains outlast the project, and here the evidence is mixed. CMU respondents described a handover process including Community Resilience Extension Workers and ministry staff training. A program partner characterised the results as uneven, with water-infrastructure handover to the Ministry of Water and Energy working reasonably well in some areas, early-warning institutionalisation into government more uncertain, and ecosystem-management groups the most fragile, and suggested government counterparts are best placed to judge whether handover was genuine or performative. Government respondents themselves recommended stronger government involvement from the design and planning stage, greater use of government information systems to register projects, and tighter coordination across federal, state, and local levels, both to reduce duplication and to improve continuity with the successor programme, AARAN.

CONTRIBUTION TO OUTCOME 6: COORDINATION AND ADAPTATION DELIVERED, LEARNING AND SUSTAINABILITY LESS CERTAIN

On the evidence available, which is stakeholder judgement rather than measurement, BRCiS made a clear contribution to the coordination and adaptive-management half of this outcome. Consortium structures were credited

with producing common approaches and quality assurance, and government respondents credited coordination with better targeting and alignment, and crisis modifiers with faster response. Learning was genuinely embedded through the CLA framework, structured reflection, Outcome Harvesting, and learning products that exceeded their target.

The contribution to improved efficiency and effectiveness is more qualified. Evidence use was constrained by the tension between donor-defined indicators and community-defined priorities, at least one design mismatch went uncorrected, the resilience-humanitarian boundary and crisis-modifier design remain unresolved, and the value-for-money analysis is not yet informing decisions or in wide circulation. The decisive test, whether coordination and learning translate into gains that survive through government handover, is still open and, by partner accounts, uneven across sectors. A caveat on attribution applies throughout: this outcome rests heavily on the self-assessment of those who ran the programme, partly offset by the candour of government respondents and program partners about what has not yet worked. The claim is therefore well supported for coordination and adaptive management improving effectiveness during implementation, moderate for embedded learning, and weak or not yet evidenced for value-for-money influencing decisions and for durable efficiency gains through sustained government handover.

4.0 DISCUSSION

This report measures a programme whose resilience capacities rose materially over a cycle that was dominated, for most communities, by a severe and prolonged drought. The dominant shock shifted from flooding at baseline to drought at endline, and that inversion runs underneath every result: it constrained the outcomes the programme was designed to produce while leaving much of its proximate work, the structures, skills and practices it put in place, largely intact. Two questions organise what follows. The first is what changed and what it was worth, read from the resilience measurement itself. The second is how far BRCiS contributed to it, read from the contribution analysis. The drought is the lens for both.

RESILIENCE ROSE EVEN AS THE DROUGHT PRESSED, AND THE TWO ARE NOT A CONTRADICTION

The central empirical result is that measured resilience rose substantially. The Resilience Spectrum Index moved from 3.24 to 3.71 on a five-point scale, all three systems improved, the gain was broad across households and clusters and larger where resilience started lower, and 64% of households cleared the KPI-4 benchmark of improving on at least one absorptive and one adaptive capacity. The community-level ARC-D assessment and an independently constructed resilience index point the same way. At the same time, the lived experience of food security worsened: severe food insecurity rose from 58% to 64% of households, and households' ability to recover from shocks, and their expectations of recovering, both fell.

These two facts are not in tension once the measures are read for what they are. The index captures the assets, behaviours and connections that should help a household withstand and adapt to shocks; it is not itself a measure of wellbeing. The capacities the programme worked on, savings groups, financial access, water and resource governance, inclusive community structures, are what rose, while the experienced-hunger measure that sits outside the index deteriorated under a drought of a scale the design did not assume. The right reading of the period is therefore a programme that built resilience capacity while the shock pressed down on the outcomes that capacity is meant to protect. This distinction between measured capacity and lived outcome is the key to the rest of the discussion.

THE GAINS CAME THROUGH ECONOMIC INCLUSION AND COMMUNITY ORGANISATION, NOT THROUGH INCOME

The shape of the rise matters more than its size. The largest driver was the market system, and within it the gains came from what households could access and own rather than from what they earned. The availability of savings groups roughly doubled, from 17% to 33% of households, financial and market access rose, remittances widened in reach, and productive assets more than doubled, while earned income was close to flat and a third of households saw it fall. Much of the asset-building was resourced from outside earned income, through programme support, remittances and group savings, and a good part of it was held as a store of value rather than as a source of income, with households reporting that they bought livestock as an investment for the future. This is a real gain in the assets and financial buffers a household can draw on in a shock. It is also a question for sustainability, because gains resourced largely from outside earned income depend on that external support continuing.

Alongside finance, the other engine was community organisation. Communities became better at reaching decisions inclusively, at drawing in their most vulnerable members, and at preventing and resolving conflict, and households' participation in collective action more than doubled. But this institutional strengthening came with a counter-movement: membership of active community-leadership committees fell from about 86% to 70% of households, and horizontal, peer-to-peer social ties softened. The leadership system therefore posts a real but modest net gain, in which a broad strengthening of formal governance is set against an erosion of the informal ties it is replacing.

SOCIAL CAPITAL WAS RE-CHANNELLED, AND THE GAINS WERE LARGELY RURAL

That counter-movement is best understood as a re-channelling of social capital rather than a loss of it. Households came to rely a little less on one another and a little more on institutions: their committee membership and bonding and bridging ties eased, while their vertical, linking ties to government officials and to NGO and humanitarian staff strengthened. The household survey and the community focus groups describe the same shift, from informal arrangements toward formal, often newly created structures. In rural areas this was a healthy rebalancing. It bears watching nonetheless, because informal mutual support is what households fall back on when formal structures cannot reach them, and the same drought that the new structures were built to address also strained the kinship and clan networks that had served as the first safety net.

The rebalancing did not work everywhere. The resilience gains were overwhelmingly rural: agro-pastoral and pastoral households improved most, while urban households were flat overall and urban was the only zone where a system fell. In urban areas committee membership collapsed, from about 97% to 49% of households, informal ties weakened more sharply than in the rural zones, and the community-governance gains that lifted rural leadership did not arrive to replace them, so the informal base thinned and the formal gains did not come. Urban resilience needs a different model from the rural one that worked here, a point that carries directly into the design of the next phase.

ONE DIVIDE RUNS THROUGH BOTH MEASURES: SELF-ORGANISED CAPACITY ROSE, EXTERNALLY PROVIDED CAPACITY LAGGED

The household index and the community assessment are built from different data by different methods, yet they reach the same structural conclusion, and it is the deepest pattern in the report: resilience rose where households and communities could organise it themselves, and lagged where it depended on outside facilities and services. In the RSI decomposition the gains are in inclusive governance, savings groups and financial access, while emergency infrastructure, formal employment and services drag. In the ARC-D assessment the self-organised components, committees, early warning, savings and conflict resolution, rose strongly, with the early-warning system posting the single largest gain anywhere, while the components that rest on capital and outside provision, health, infrastructure, housing and social protection, stalled and carried most of the declines.

This is the same finding the contribution analysis reaches from the other direction, and it explains why. The programme could reliably move the levers within a community's own reach, organisation, inclusion, planning, and the spread of savings and financial access, and it did. What it could not move on its own was the physical and service base, the boreholes, clinics, roads, schools and durable income that a community cannot build out of organisation alone, and that base is where the gains were smallest and most fragile. Read this way, the conditional pathway in the contribution analysis is not a series of separate disappointments but a single structural fact about where resilience-building of this kind reaches and where it does not.

THE RESILIENCE MEASURED HERE IS INFORMATIVE ABOUT WELLBEING, AND PARTLY BUFFERED THE DROUGHT

Because the same households were measured in both rounds, the index could be tested against a more demanding standard than was possible at baseline, namely whether a household's resilience predicts its later wellbeing. It does, in part. Looking from baseline capacity forward to endline outcomes, more-resilient households went on to have clearly better water access, somewhat lower experienced food insecurity, and a higher chance of avoiding damaging coping, while the quality of the diet was not predicted by resilience. The economic system was the strongest and most consistent predictor across outcomes, which reinforces, from a third angle, that economic inclusion is the capacity that most often translates into better wellbeing. There is also suggestive evidence of buffering: when the drought struck, experienced food insecurity rose far less for the most-resilient households than for the least-resilient, the pattern resilience is meant to produce, though the test reaches significance only at the ten-per-cent level and the buffering appears for food insecurity and not for the other outcomes.

The associations are modest in size throughout. This is what the resilience literature would lead one to expect of capacity indices of this kind, which track realised outcomes only in part and describe a correlation rather than proof of cause (Barrett et al. 2021; Smith and Frankenberg 2017). The index is therefore best read as a useful and now partly validated indicator of resilience, informative about later wellbeing and especially so through its economic component, rather than as a guarantee of outcomes. For a final evaluation that is a meaningful result in its own right: the measurement approach the programme adopted holds up when put to the test on comparable data.

WELLBEING WEAKENED WHERE THE DROUGHT PRESSED, AND FELL HARDEST ON THE MOST VULNERABLE

The deterioration in lived outcomes was real and was not evenly shared. Diet quality and young children's feeding improved, and the share of households in humanitarian need fell, but severe food insecurity rose, and the qualitative evidence is consistent that the binding constraint was resources rather than knowledge: dietary diversity was the practice households most often named precisely and then said they could not afford. Households coped more actively than at baseline, with fewer able to do nothing, but largely through strategies that carry a cost, above all reducing food consumption and borrowing to buy food, so the question is less whether households coped than at what cost.

The burden fell unevenly. Households with a member living with a disability recovered notably less than the sample as a whole, and both they and households with an elderly member were the most pessimistic about recovering from future shocks. Female-headed and disability-affected households also saw the largest rises in food insecurity, though those differences are not statistically significant given the smaller group sizes. The direction is consistent: the drought left the households that were already most vulnerable less able to recover and more exposed. That points to recovery and food-security support being better targeted toward these households than delivered uniformly, an equity dimension that the headline averages do not show.

WHAT BRCiS CONTRIBUTED: STRONGEST AT STRUCTURES, KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICES, CONDITIONAL, AND SHARED

Turning from what changed to how far BRCiS contributed to it, the contribution analysis finds the strongest evidence at the level of the programme's proximate outputs. Community Resilience Committees are recognised in about half of communities and trusted by most who know them, and the Community Action Planning process gave communities a credible basis to advocate, supported by specific counterfactual examples across most districts. Agroecological practices were widely adopted where water was available, feeding and hygiene behaviours and beliefs shifted where the campaigns reached, savings groups let members avoid selling assets after small shocks, and the source of early warnings shifted toward community committees. Inclusion broadened on the same evidence, though participation has advanced faster than authority: women became more present in community structures while final decisions still tend to rest with male elders, the distinction between presence and power that focus-group participants drew directly. Reshaping customary authority was not a project objective, so the change is better read as a widening of who takes part.

The recurring qualification is that these outputs translated into outcomes only where a complementary condition was present. Training raised production where water was available and did little where it was not, a contrast visible within a single district in El Barde; warnings reached households but two in five took no action, constrained by resources rather than information; nutrition knowledge improved while the recommended diet remained unaffordable; and savings groups buffered illness and minor setbacks but were overwhelmed when the drought hit every member at once. In each case the programme supplied a necessary input while the binding constraint remained something else, water, household assets, rainfall, group capital, or a functioning market. Attribution is also genuinely shared. Rainfall confounds the ecological and water findings in both directions; pre-existing customary systems were formalised rather than created, so the marginal contribution is hard to isolate; the cash-for-work income that accompanied restoration plausibly produced some of the food-security gains through a different pathway than the ecological one; and other actors co-invested in several domains, including the boreholes behind some water-access gains and the seeds delivered through other agencies in Jowhar. Coordination mechanisms, including area-level and government-led coordination, kept most of this activity complementary rather than overlapping.

SUSTAINABILITY REMAINS THE CENTRAL OPEN QUESTION

The durability of what has been built is uncertain and, in places, already declining. The pattern follows the divide above: the self-organised capacities are real but rest on continued community and partner effort, while the externally dependent ones were never consolidated. Some savings groups dissolved after BRCiS exited, restoration sites risk reverting once cash-for-work ends, water points are sometimes regarded as the partner's property with no one able to maintain them, and the early-warning system depends in places on the implementing partner for core functions and is not yet linked to government. The same picture appears at the programme level: coordination and adaptive management functioned well during implementation, but the value-for-money analysis is not yet informing decisions, government handover is uneven across sectors, and the tension between resilience and humanitarian response remains unresolved, made sharper by the project closing during an active drought. Much of the asset and financial gain was resourced from outside earned income, which raises the same question from the economic side. Whether the capacities recorded here become durable resilience outcomes will be determined largely after the programme ends, by future rainfall, government uptake, and follow-on financing, which is why the recommendations that follow centre on sequencing, institutional handover, and the design of the successor programme.

The endline tells a consistent story across very different sectors. BRCiS has, in most of its programme areas, put working structures, skills, and practices in place, and households and communities recognise them. What is far less certain is whether those gains translate into the durable resilience outcomes the Theory of Change envisages, because that translation depends on conditions the programme does not control. This section synthesises the six

outcome analyses around that pattern. It should be read in the context of the severe, prolonged drought that ran through the evaluation period in many programme areas.

5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

These recommendations mirror those in the Executive Summary, set out here in fuller detail. They draw on the endline participatory workshop, in which BRCiS implementing partners reviewed each outcome and nominated practices to stop, start and scale, and on the contribution analysis in Section 3.5, with the sustainability and institutionalisation points drawing additionally on the stakeholder interviews. They are directed mainly at the design of the successor programme, AARAN. Two cautions frame them. First, because BRCiS III closed early under successive FCDO funding reductions, some of the gaps below reflect activities that were curtailed or never funded rather than design choices. Second, several recommendations affirm and sharpen existing BRCiS practice rather than introduce new requirements; where that is the case, it is noted.

- **Co-locate soft interventions with the hard assets that unlock them.** The central finding of the contribution analysis is that training, plans and warnings produced outcomes only where a complementary asset, predominantly water, was already present. Agroecological training raised production in communities with a functioning water point and did little in water-scarce ones, a contrast visible within a single district in El Barde, and business-development support produced little where households had no starting capital to invest. This affirms existing BRCiS sequencing guidance rather than introducing a new requirement; the evidence simply shows where it broke down, in water committees formed without a water source and training delivered without inputs. AARAN should sequence the asset first and deliver the soft intervention only where the complementary input exists, tying business support to a minimum starting-asset threshold. Where water is in place, the agricultural support that follows should emphasise the practices that proved durable, agroecological methods tied to the seasonal calendar, local seed systems, farmer cooperatives and a strengthened extension cadre, while reconsidering hybrid seeds and “green construction” case by case on appropriateness and value-for-money grounds. Multi-purpose water infrastructure serving both human consumption and agricultural production should be prioritised. Under the budget reductions that shortened the project, protecting this sequencing should take priority over breadth of coverage.
- **Close the gap between early warning and action through government, not a standalone external transfer.** The early-warning system now reaches households and is one of the project's strongest contributions, but the link to action is weak: two in five warned households took no action, not for lack of information but for lack of resources, and partner-delivered emergency assistance reached only 17% of affected households. The response should strengthen the system itself rather than bolt on an external transfer. Early-warning data should not be treated as upward reporting only but returned, with analysis and feedback, to the communities that supply it; the system should be integrated into government structures with shared standard operating procedures; and community-based early warning linked to government should be scaled, together with reporting tools and contingency-funding planning. Where the warning must trigger resources, the financing should run through government contingency planning, the existing BRCiS crisis modifier, and SODMA and MoHADM channels rather than a new, perpetual external cash facility, which would be difficult to sustain in the current funding environment.
- **Support savings groups as multi-purpose platforms, while managing their fragility to repeated covariate shocks.** Savings groups were an effective buffer for idiosyncratic shocks such as illness, where members could borrow without selling assets, but they came under strain in the covariate drought, when every member was affected at once, the pool was drawn down and lending paused. In the short term this is

the model working as intended: the accumulated fund existed to be used in a shock, and most groups reconstituted and resumed saving afterwards. That short-term function should not, however, be mistaken for resilience to a prolonged crisis. Drawing the pool to zero carries real risks: if members cannot repay outstanding loans the group can collapse, and where shocks are repeated or prolonged, groups may be unable to re-form at all. The resilience question for AARAN is therefore whether groups can reform and rebuild after a covariate shock, which should be monitored directly, rather than whether the fund survives the shock intact. Savings groups should not be confined to a single financial output, since they also carry social-capital and early-warning functions, and they are typically among the structures where women participate most actively. Stronger groups should be supported to graduate into business enterprises, with mentorship and linkages to financial institutions, and over-clustering of groups in the same community should stop. The evaluation does not support building in an external recapitalisation backstop during shocks, which would substitute external finance for the self-reliance the model is meant to build; the more durable response is to strengthen groups' own capacity to re-form.

- **Target inclusion at the specific decision-making spaces where women and minorities remain excluded.** The GESI training broadened women's, and less consistently minority members', participation in community decision-making, the change households credited most readily to BRCiS. But participation has advanced faster than influence: women and minority members became more present in community structures while remaining unevenly represented in the specific spaces where decisions are actually made, the distinction between presence and power that FGD participants in El Barde drew directly. Changing the locus of authority within customary institutions was not an explicit project objective, and norm change exceeds a single project cycle, so success should be judged against whether the groups the project supports report greater voice, not against an external definition of inclusion. The practical implication for AARAN is to identify the particular decision-making structures from which women and minorities are still excluded, and to target inclusion where it would be most consequential over the long term. The committee structures within which this inclusion happens should also be strengthened: consolidating the parallel referral routes into a single harmonised complaints and response mechanism, scaling the Community Resilience Committees' coordination and advocacy role, and, where communities choose, supporting community-led CRC elections with clear affirmative-action guidelines while managing the local tension elections can create.
- **Differentiate sustainability and handover planning by asset type.** The durability of what BRCiS built varies sharply by asset, so a uniform handover will not work. The transfer of water infrastructure to the Ministry of Water and Energy worked reasonably well and is a model to repeat, whereas ecosystem-management groups are the most fragile and risk reverting once cash-for-work ends, some savings groups dissolved before others reconstituted, and some structures are seen as the implementing partner's property with no one to maintain them. Each asset class needs a named successor and an explicit maintenance-financing plan, and, to make this practical, a short sustainability and ownership assessment should be conducted before infrastructure is built, with an action plan drawn from it. Water points in particular need a community contribution or cost-recovery arrangement, set within a clear community-government-partner agreement, to build ownership and counter the perception that the asset belongs to the partner. The arrangements that already worked should be treated as models to scale, including the female-majority committee in El Barde Town where participation translated into influence. Given the early close, these arrangements should be put in place now rather than deferred.
- **Institutionalise the early-warning system into government before exit.** Communities were clear that the early-warning system, though functioning, will not survive without a formal link to government, the linkage that Activity 5.4 was meant to build but had not yet delivered, and in places the system still depends on the implementing partner for core tasks such as printing and submitting the forms. Before AARAN's design is finalised, the real-time risk-monitoring data flow should be transferred to MoHADM and SODMA under a

formal agreement, with recurrent funding secured for committee airtime, equipment and transport, and the partner removed from routine reporting so the system runs on its own. More broadly, the coordination and adaptive-management practices that worked well during implementation, together with the complementarity lessons emerging from alignment with the Danwadaag programme, should be carried into AARAN's design rather than rebuilt, and savings groups' multiple functions retained rather than reduced to a single output.

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