

Review of Norwegian Refugee Council Urban Assistance in Goma, DRC

March 2015
Sarah Bailey

Contents

Acronyms	4
1. Introduction	5
Methodology.....	5
2. Programme description and design	7
Context.....	7
Urban profiling study	8
Pilot design.....	9
3. Findings	12
Was the programme design appropriate for this context?	12
Project objectives and activities	12
Targeting process and criteria	15
Monitoring systems	19
Gender and protection	21
Results.....	21
Timing.....	21
Governance.....	23
Preparedness – microprojects	25
Meeting basic needs - Cash transfers	26
4. Lessons, conclusions and recommendations.....	32
Lessons.....	32
Conclusion.....	33
Recommendations	35
Annex 1: Interviews and focus group discussions	37
Annex 2: Logframe	38
Annex 3: Logframe indicators	46

About the author

Sarah Bailey is an independent consultant on humanitarian practice, policy and evaluation. She has designed, managed and evaluated cash transfer programmes and written widely on this topic.

Acknowledgements

This evaluation benefited from the support of numerous people, particularly Laura Phelps and Zoe Jordan from NRC. The staff participating in the fieldwork were Norbert Maombi, Vincent Bisimwa Chengangu, Celestine Nabahavu, Docky Muheza, Freddy Tunda, Daniel Kabasa and Francois Bagula. The evaluator is grateful to the people consulted in Goma who shared their views on the intervention and their lives.

The views expressed in this report are the author's alone and the author accepts sole responsibility for any factual inaccuracies.

Acronyms

EMMA	Emergency Market Mapping Analysis
FARDC	Democratic Republic of Congo Armed Forces
GPA	Global partnership agreement
HEA	Household Economy Analysis
ICLA	Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance
IDP	Internally displaced person
MONUSCO	United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
PDM	Post-distribution monitoring
SIM	Subscriber Identity Module

1. Introduction

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) undertook a pilot programme in 2014 to respond to urban displacement in Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). NRC commissioned a review of the pilot in order to generate lessons to support the further development of their programming in Goma and elsewhere.

NRC developed the pilot intervention to support an integrated response to urban displacement in Goma and to facilitate local integration as a durable solution for vulnerable internally displaced persons (IDPs). Host families and vulnerable residents were also assisted. The pilot programme, funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA) took place between June 2014 and Dec 2014, with final monitoring and data analysis occurring in January 2015. The intervention took place in two *quartiers* of Goma – Kyeshero and Mabanga Sud.

The design of the pilot was based on a multi-sector profiling and needs assessment of urban IDPs and host families.¹ The pilot had three objectives – contribute to improving accessibility and accountability of government actors, increase preparedness for new displacement and improve the capacity of persons affected by displacement in urban areas to their basic needs (through cash transfers).

The purpose of the review is to provide NRC and NMFA with lessons that can support the further development of the urban pilot response, which will continue in 2015, as well as inform NRC's global learning. The focus was on generating practical, reliable and relevant analysis, and on creating a process whereby NRC was involved in the data collection and analysis. This is not an evaluation of an intervention, but rather a review focused on practical lessons and evidence.

NRC established three primary questions for this review as well as a series of sub-questions in the TOR. The three main questions are:

1. Was the programme design appropriate for this context?
2. What are the main results of the intervention?
3. What is needed to ensure that this model of response can be replicated and improved upon in DRC and elsewhere?

Methodology

The review took place in December 2014 and January 2015. The data collection undertaken in Goma specifically for the review was qualitative and consisted of group discussions (18 groups of 266 individuals) and key informant interviews (8) (See Annex 1). Quantitative data collected by NRC for an IDP profiling exercise, baseline information and endline monitoring was used for contextual analysis, trends and triangulation. It was informed by a review of programme documentation and assessments.

Qualitative data collection was done with seven national NRC staff working on the urban programme. This approach was chosen in order to benefit from the knowledge and experience of the NRC staff and to generate buy-in for findings and lessons. Risks of this approach are that staff may tailor their questioning or interpret answers to match their own views, and recipients may be wary of voicing criticisms directly to staff. To mitigate these risks, the consultant and staff worked closely throughout data collection and openly discussed issues related to bias. Those consulted were encouraged to express any challenges so that NRC could improve its assistance in the future.

¹ NRC (2014) *Living Conditions of Displaced and Host Communities in Urban Goma, DRC*.

The data collection took place in Kyeshero and Mabanga Sud. Kyeshero is a geographically more expansive and more populated *quartier* compared to Mabanga Sud, and data collection took place in two different locations in Kyeshero. In both quarters, groups of 3-13 people were interviewed in groups based on the variables in Table 1. In each area, one each of the following groups were formed - IDP women assisted, IDP men assisted, host family women assisted, host family men assisted, vulnerable women assisted, vulnerable men assisted, women not assisted (mixed IDP and host), local leaders (mixed men and women) and women who received documents through the intervention (mixed IDP and host). The division of groups was determined in consultation with the NRC with a view to reflecting the experiences of different types of individuals.

Table 1: Variables for focus group discussions

Type	Gender	Recipient of assistance	ID documents
IDP	Male	Assisted	Persons who accessed ID documents through the intervention
Host	Female	Not assisted	
Vulnerable			
Local leaders			

This review draws from monitoring data and qualitative data collection. Limitations of the qualitative data include the following – only one focus group per category (e.g. IDP women assisted) was done in each *quartier*;² interviews with certain local authorities (Mayor and quartier authorities in Mabanga Sud) could not be conducted owing to unrest in Goma in late January 2014; previous engagement with NRC (through trainings, sensitisation, etc.) and the desire for continued assistance might have influenced responses.³ Owing to the limited number of organisations familiar with the NRC intervention, priority was given to consultation in the two quartiers. Limitations of the monitoring data include the use of daily labourers (e.g. some questions were not well understood by the daily labourers), that the question on the use of cash transfers was only asked in one of the two quartiers and the lack of post-distribution monitoring (PDM). A final limitation is that the 2014 project was finishing just as the review was taking place. The final cash transfer was transferred by NRC to Airtel in December 2014; Airtel delivered it to recipients at the same time as the review data collection.

² This was a function of the time available and the fact that there were multiple factors to consider in constituting focus groups (i.e. gender, displacement, inclusion or exclusion from assistance). To mitigate this weakness, the findings from focus groups were triangulated with other data sources and among the groups.

³ For example, when asked an open-ended question about their greatest concerns for the future, IDP, host and vulnerable respondents consistently stated that it was that NRC would not assist them in the future.

2. Programme description and design

Context

Despite the end of Congo's second war in 2003, people in eastern DRC have continued to face repeated and protracted humanitarian crises resulting from the long-standing presence of local and foreign armed groups. While the specific groups, leaders and alliances between them shift, the dynamics and consequences remain broadly similar. There are multiple domestic and foreign armed groups advancing their own agenda. Drivers of conflict include ethnic identity, national identity, local power struggles, land tenure, mineral resources, foreign armed groups and regional political and security interests – particularly related to neighbouring Rwanda.

The humanitarian impacts have been severe. While DRC has been consistently one of the largest recipients of humanitarian aid in the last decade, the 2014 humanitarian appeal for \$835m was only 45 percent funded.⁴ In December 2014 there were an estimated 2.7m IDPs in DRC, with the majority in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu. Patterns of displacement are repeated with households in some areas displaced multiple times. In North Kivu, larger population movements in recent years occurred in response to fighting and insecurity related to the CNDP (National Congress for the Defence of the People) in 2008 and the M23 in 2012/13. Offensives by the Democratic Republic of Congo Armed Forces (FARDC) and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) against the M23 resulted in their surrender in November 2013.

Unlike settings like Sudan and Uganda, households in DRC tend to stay in host families, though camps, particularly in North Kivu, became a more common feature following the large waves of displacement in 2008.⁵ Rough estimates are that 70 percent of displaced populations are living amongst host communities with the remainder in camps.⁶ In mid-2014 there were an estimated 59 camps in North Kivu,⁷ though several in Rutchuru and Goma were closed by authorities in late 2014.

Humanitarian responses to displaced populations in North Kivu have focused on newly displaced IDPs (and sometimes host families) in rural villages and towns receiving large numbers of displaced households. IDPs living in camps on the outskirts of Goma and other major towns (e.g. Masisi) have benefited from international aid. There has been little assistance directed to displaced people living with host families or renting accommodation in Goma.⁸

The M23 movement, formed by ex-CNDP soldiers and allegedly linked to Rwanda,⁹ briefly took control of Goma in November and December 2012. In May and June 2013, several thousand people fled to Goma to escape fighting between the Congolese army and the M23. The influx highlighted weaknesses of humanitarian agencies based in Goma in assisting people seeking refuge in the city – including the lack of data on existing displaced populations and the lack of strategies for effectively assisting large numbers of people seeking refuge in Goma.

⁴ OCHA Financial tracking service accessed January 2015

⁵ Haver, K. (2008) Out of Site: Building better responses to displacement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by helping host families. Oxfam GB.

⁶ Healy, S. and S. Tiller (2014) Where is Everyone? Responding to Emergencies in the Most Difficult Places. Médecins sans Frontières.

⁷ White, S. (2014) Now What? The international response to internal displacement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Brookings – LSE Project on Internal Displacement.

⁸ There are exceptions, such as CARE's 2009 Umoja programme in Goma

⁹ For evidence on Rwandan links to M23 see reports by the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo

In August 2013, NRC made the decision to develop a pilot programme to respond to and prepare for displacement in Goma. It was decided that the first step would be to undertake a survey on people affected by displacement in Goma. More than fifteen years of displacement, conflict, state decline and the explosion of humanitarian NGOs have transformed Goma,¹⁰ but little data was available about Goma's populations, including the extent of displaced people live there and whether and how their lives differ from other residents.

At the time that the decision to undertake the pilot was made, fighting between the M23 and the FARDC (supported by MONUSCO) was a key factor. While Goma had received IDPs related to instability and fighting further afield in North Kivu in territories like Masisi and Rutshuru, the presence of the M23 so close to Goma posed a threat to people living in and near the city. It had already led to waves of IDPs coming to the city and increased the likelihood that Goma specifically would be affected in the near future. The surrender of the M23 in November 2013 changed the dynamics upon which the profiling study and the pilot were based.

The decision to undertake an urban intervention was not solely spurred by the impact of conflict and insecurity on Goma in 2013. NRC was taking steps globally to engage more on urban displacement and emergency responses in urban settings. In late 2013 this process included hiring a Technical Advisor specifically on urban issues, mapping its programmes in urban areas and exploring NRC's strengths and gaps for providing assistance in urban settings.¹¹ The initial thinking of emergency staff in the NRC DRC office was that the Goma displacement assessment would be relatively light, but it soon evolved into a larger study in part because of this developing urban focus.

Urban profiling study

An urban profiling study was planned for the period of October 2013 to February 2014. The objective was to take a step in filling this data gap while giving NRC a basis for designing its programming. The fieldwork was completed in December with an internal report completed in April 2014. A public version of the report was put on the web in November 2014.¹² The study was led by a Survey Supervisor hired specifically for the study and the analysis was supported by the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS).

The objective of the study was to provide basic information on the comparative vulnerability and living conditions of IDPs (living outside of camps), host families and residents. It used snowball sampling to identify 32 IDPs, 16 host families and 16 residents in each of Goma's 18 quarters. The sampling approach means that findings cannot be generalized for the entire IDP, host family and resident populations and that caution should be used when interpreting the data.

The study found that:

- The main incentive for IDPs to come to Goma was existing family and friendship ties; 61% of host families were hosting persons from their own family
- Nearly one-third of IDP respondents did not intend to go back to their place of origin even if security conditions changed

¹⁰ Büscher, Karen & Vlassenroot, Koen (2010) "Humanitarian presence and urban development: new opportunities and contrasts in Goma, DRC" in: *Disasters* 34(S2): 256-273.

¹¹ Phelps, L. (2014) Urban Displacement Briefing Note. Draft 6 Nov 2014.

¹² NRC (2014) Living Conditions of Displaced and Host Communities in Urban Goma, DRC. http://www.nrc.no/arch/img.aspx?file_id=9187068

- Compared to residents and host families - IDPs reported more unemployment, higher reliance on daily labour for income, less incomes overall and less payment for undertaking similar tasks as residents (e.g. earning \$1.20 / day for construction when the average daily wage was \$1.80)
- Indicators of food consumption were worse amongst IDP respondents (35 percent had poor Food Consumption Scores compared to 15 percent of residents)
- More IDP respondents had debts compared to residents (52 percent compared to 20 percent)
- Ten percent of IDPs reported owning property in Goma compared to 36 percent of other respondents
- Quality of housing and access to water did not vary amongst IDP, host and resident respondents
- 80 percent of respondents with school-age children indicated that they attended primary school (IDP rates were 10 percent lower compared to residents), with inability to pay school costs cited as largest barrier to non-attendance¹³
- The majority of respondents reported feeling secure all or most of the time (79 percent of IDPs indicated that have not felt threatened – nearly the same as residents)
- All respondents reported food as a priority; IDPs also reported rent and purchasing household items as important needs
- Nine percent of all households stated coverage of school costs as their primary need, with an additional 16 per cent stating it as their most important secondary need
- Eighty-seven percent of IDP respondents lost household assets due to displacement, most commonly agricultural equipment, land or petty enterprises
- 12 percent of all families reported having received assistance, of which 75 percent was from NGOs
- The majority of respondents did not feel that authorities looked after them - 42 percent of IDP respondents and 47 percent of other respondents expressed that authorities took good care of their well-being
- Primary methods of protection reported by respondents were restricting movement after dark, and alerting neighbours
- 15 percent of women and 21 percent of girls reported rape and sexual violence as the greatest threat facing them
- No estimate on the number of IDPs in Goma was made given the lack of data on which to base such a figure (initial efforts to do so were set aside in favour of focusing on living conditions).

Pilot design

The urban pilot, like the profiling study, was funded through the NFMA. NRC has a global partnership agreement (GPA) with the NMFA. The flexibility of NRC's funding arrangement with the NMFA meant that the urban project did not need a detailed proposal. The initial description for the intervention in the 2014 GPA indicated the design would be based on the urban profiling assessment and was as follows:

NRC aims to organise a pilot project to increase preparedness in responding to new waves of displacement outside camps through community interventions. As the assessment on the prevalence and profile of the existing displaced populations in Goma is not yet complete, the precise nature of the programme will be defined pending the results. The programme will most likely include support to host families and IDPs collectively to improve shelter, WASH, access to services in urban areas. Moreover, it will presumably first focus on short-term aid as a means of improving capacities to respond to new displacement in emergencies. A second phase will build on findings of the exploratory research and the pilot programme

¹³ Respondents were not asked whether children attended full time. It is common in DRC that parents withdraw children from school temporarily due to delays in paying school fees.

*intervention to promote longterm community development and urban planning. The focus will be on community-based intervention.*¹⁴

The profiling assessment produced basic data on a wide range of challenges facing people affected by displacement – related to hosting relationships, housing, livelihoods / sources of income, basic needs, security and governance. The process of using that data to design an intervention involved several individuals in the NRC DRC office – the Survey Manager (who transitioned to become the manager of the urban pilot in April 2014), Food Security Manager and Emergency Coordinator (who had advocated for the intervention in the first place, based on the 2013 IDP influxes to Goma), the Programme Director (who was new and had done work related to durable solutions) and the Policy and Advocacy Advisor. Outside of the NRC DRC office, the Urban Technical Advisor provided input and feedback and the Programme Director was in touch with others in Oslo interested in the pilot. The fact that it was a pilot and that NRC globally was new to urban interventions contributed to the number of people involved.

From the outset NRC had planned that the intervention would combine multiple types of activities from different sectors, in an effort to address displacement in an integrated manner. Like other NRC offices, NRC DRC mainly organises its activities according to NRC's core competencies - Information, Counselling and Legal Advice (ICLA), Shelter, Food Security, Education and WASH.¹⁵ None of the NRC DRC core competencies had undertaken programming activities in Goma and their activities were being implemented in rural areas.

Three main dynamics shaped the design process – the wide range of challenges identified in the profiling study, the number of individuals involved in the design process and the fact that an urban intervention did not have an obvious home within NRC's country office organisational structure. The programme design process became quite complicated and drawn out. People involved had different views about what the intervention should address - was the priority to work on durable solutions for existing IDPs, assist new IDPs or prepare for new waves of displacement? Should it do this by focusing on activities related to governance, community infrastructure, livelihoods, supporting basic needs or access to services like water, which was a chronic problem for both residents and IDPs? Should the starting point be an 'area-based' approach whereby NRC might engage in interventions outside its normal sphere to address identified challenges, or should the starting point be NRC's core competencies? Should NRC look to involve all of its core competencies or focus on specific sectors and activities? The logframe took two months to finalise and was finished in May; two versions were initially shared with Head Office in Oslo because of different visions within the NRC DRC office.

The result was a programme design that focused on responding to challenges associated with urban displacement in two of Goma's 18 quartiers. The overall objective was to support an integrated response to urban displacement in Goma and facilitate local integration as a durable solution for vulnerable IDPs. Specific objectives were to:

1. Contribute to improving accessibility and accountability of government actors and state services for persons affected by displacement in urban areas
2. Increase preparedness to manage and provide assistance to newly displaced persons in Goma
3. Improve the capacity of persons affected by displacement in urban areas to meet their basic needs

¹⁴ NRC 2014 GPA Annual Plan. Part B – Country Programmes.

¹⁵ Core competencies are programming areas and sectors where NRC has developed expertise and concentrates its activities.

The first objective sought to link displaced people with government services, including getting identity documents, through trainings of authorities and local leaders on their responsibilities related to IDPs. Training attendees received \$5 per day to cover expenses. The objective originally included activities to register new arrivals (with mobile phones) but this was dropped due to concerns about how that information would be used.

The second objective, preparedness, focused primarily on improvements to local infrastructure that could be affected by future influxes of IDPs. Projects valued at \$9,000 were identified and managed by committees in each quartier that included representatives of IDPs, the church, local associations, schools and the Cellule Chief. The process was based on the model of Community Driven Reconstruction.

The activity for the final objective – improving the capacity of people affected by displacement to meet basic needs – was the delivery of cash transfers by mobile phones to IDPs and host families. A smaller number of vulnerable resident households, who were neither displaced or hosting IDPs, were included with the intention of increasing the acceptance of the intervention by local authorities, as NRC was concerned authorities might otherwise block activities. Cross-cutting activities focused on assessment and analysis – mapping power structures in targeted areas, developing an advocacy plan and conducting market analysis. The logframe included a total of 20 outputs and 23 indicators (see Annexes 2 and 3).

The intervention did not focus on issues related to the displacement camps near Goma. The profiling study included a small number of focus groups in camps for comparative purposes, where respondents expressed that they did not intend to move to other parts of Goma. While there were occasional signals that camps might be closed, those had occurred in the past and camps remained open. Other organisations had directed some assistance to camps whereas NRC had not engaged with them. The decision was made to focus on areas outside of camps.

The main documents that describe the project design are the short paragraph in 2014 NMFA GPA and the logframe. There are no project documents (i.e. a proposal) or interim reports that lay out the theory of change or indicate the planned timing of the intervention. The views on both differ from people involved in the design of the intervention. Having these documented would have created a clearer frame of reference for the findings in this review that are detailed in the next section.

3. Findings

This section outlines the findings in response to two questions guiding this review – the appropriateness of the programme design and the main results of the intervention. The third question, on the lessons learned from the pilot, is covered in the final section.

Was the programme design appropriate for this context?

Displacement in Goma related to the M23 had established that humanitarian agencies and authorities were ill-equipped to deal with waves of IDPs to the city. NRC’s urban profiling made the case that IDPs faced specific challenges compared to residents – including loss of assets, loss of identify documents, reliance on low-paying daily labour and precarious living circumstances.¹⁶ Both of these variables provided a sound justification for piloting a programme to address urban displacement in Goma. However NRC also faced some ‘unknowns’. The number of IDPs in Goma was and is not known, nor the extent that their presence is having an impact on basic services, local economy, etc. The most important unknown is whether displaced persons in Goma are generally in as dire or direr circumstances than those in rural areas, where humanitarian assistance to IDPs in DRC is directed. If the answer were yes, this would provide a strong basis for advocating for assistance to IDPs in Goma.

Project objectives and activities

The pilot had three objectives –improving accessibility and accountability of government actors and state services for persons affected by displacement, increasing preparedness and improving the capacity of people affected by displacement to meet basic needs. The main activities for each objective are listed in Table 2.

Table 2: Objectives and main activities

Objective	Main activities
Improving accessibility and accountability of government actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Training of government authorities, local leaders and members of Community-Based Associations on good governance — Training of government authorities on civil documentation / identity documents — Provision of office furniture for Mabanga Sud and Kyeshero quartier offices
Increase preparedness to manage and provide assistance to newly displaced persons	Rehabilitation and construction activities identified and managed by local committees <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Afia Maternal Health Centre: 4 latrines, 2 showers and facilities for maternal waste disposal — Nyamulagira Primary School: 16 latrines, 1 water capture system — Ndahura Primary school: 4 classrooms and 2 administrative offices — Rutoboko Primary School: 2 classrooms

¹⁶ Whether IDPs are categorically more vulnerable to certain risks and problems than residents cannot be known for certain, because the study was not based on a random sample and the findings are not representative. This is more so an observation than a critique, given the impracticality of doing random sampling when the size of the IDP population in Goma is not known nor the location of displaced households

Capacity to meet basic needs	Cash assistance using of \$180 (3 instalments of \$60) to 1260 households using mobile phones (60 percent displaced, 20 percent host, 20 percent vulnerable households)
Cross cutting: Assessments and data collection – analysis of state power structures, women’s property rights and assessments of rental, water and credit markets	

This governance objective was logical on the basis that IDPs faced specific challenges that necessitated working through authorities to resolve, specifically the loss of identity documents, as identified in the profiling study. Providing quartier authorities with office furniture and trainings for local authorities was grounded in the fact that they lacked basic resources to fulfil their functions (it may seem odd to train authorities on essentially doing their jobs, but those consulted for the study expressed that the trainings were useful, as discussed below). However, regardless of the appreciation of some local authorities and community leaders of the trainings, not all of the trainings had strong links to challenges related to urban displacement. One training focused on good governance and local associations, but local associations had not been identified in assessments as being a support system for people affected by displacement. The training with the strongest link to displacement was on civil documentation.

Previous waves of displacement had revealed limited capacity of authorities and of humanitarian agencies to identify IDPs outside of camps and provide assistance. The second objective, focused on preparedness for displacement, was clearly linked to that problem. While the preparedness objective was appropriate, the main activity to achieve it – small projects to improve local infrastructure – was less so. The ‘microprojects’ were four projects of \$9,000 identified through groups involving local authorities, community leaders and IDPs. The groups identified problems related to urban displacement (e.g. stresses on basic services) and projects that could help improve the capacity to host. NRC staff reviewed initial project proposals to make sure that they were realistic. This process resulted in projects to construct or rehabilitate classrooms, school latrines and health maternity latrines.

The reality however is that school and health centre infrastructure is weak in Goma, as other places in Congo. It is not known that IDPs specifically are stressing those services now and whether those specific services would be affected in the event of an influx of IDPs to Goma (particularly given that Goma is a city with many schools and health centres). It is possible that those same projects could have emerged by asking the groups to focus on community development rather than impacts of displacement, because poor education and health facilities are a common problem related to the failure of the state to provide a decent level of basic services to its population. Focus group respondents who were familiar with the projects stated that the beneficiaries would be children at the schools and women who used the health centre (including IDPs).

The third objective was to support the capacity of people affected by displacement to meet their basic needs. This was grounded in findings from the urban profiling study, which made the case that IDPs faced specific challenges related to having being displaced – loss of assets, reliance on low-paying daily labour, etc. – as well as findings that hosting IDPs was a stress on host household resources. Focus groups confirmed these challenges and discussed that some IDPs faced greater challenges than other (notably those who had arrived with little money or goods and especially those that lacked family and connections in Goma).¹⁷

¹⁷ As put by one respondent, ‘it is better to flee but have family in Goma to go to, than to flee with money, because the money will be spent and then you will not have anything’.

Providing cash was a sensible approach because diverse needs had been identified that could be met through local markets and systems were in place to deliver money. While the objective was appropriate given the link to the urban profiling study, it arguably should have been more focused on livelihoods rather than on meeting needs. This is because, unlike rural settings where displacement is often more of a temporary phenomenon (that aid agencies address by meeting acute needs), NRC had identified that most IDPs consulted intended to stay in Goma and many had been there for several years. Framing the third objective around livelihoods would have led to a more holistic examination of factors that enable and block them from having positive livelihood outcomes. It is possible that such a framing would have still led to the provision of cash transfers (if providing cash was determined to be the appropriate avenue to support livelihoods) but even so the livelihoods framing would have led to a different way of conceiving and implementing the activity (e.g. different amount, potentially implementing other activities). Table 3 summarises findings on the appropriateness of the design of the cash transfers.

Table 3: Design details of cash transfer activities

Design aspect	Decision	Findings on appropriateness
Amount	\$180 – based on calculation of gap in meeting monthly costs of food and rent	Linked to ‘basic needs’ aspect of objective Cannot say whether ‘right or wrong’ amount – amount depends on objective and objective was not very specific As IDPs had been identified as having greater needs / less income than host families (and paying rent in most cases), NRC should have considered delivering different amounts to IDPs and host families
Instalments	3 instalments of \$60	Most recipients consulted preferred three transfers to one, on basis that it helped with budgeting (possible bias for what had been received) The minority that preferred one transfer wanted to make bigger investments in small business activities
Delivery method	Airtel SIM	Much more appropriate than using local cooperatives (in which people have no confidence) and banks (which have higher barriers to access)

While all three objectives were appropriate, it is not possible to say whether these were the ‘most appropriate’ objectives. The broad scope of needs, problems and causes of problems means that other objectives could have been appropriate too, for example related to livelihoods or even education, which emerged as a priority use of cash transfers (discussed below in Results) and for the microprojects (construction and rehabilitation of classrooms and latrines).

While not a specific objective, the urban pilot had a strong focus on generating data to inform learning and the future of the programme. In addition to the urban profiling study and baseline monitoring data, analysis was undertaken on women’s housing and property issues and state power structures and assessments conducted of water, rental and credit markets using the Emergency Market Mapping Analysis (EMMA) approach. NRC should have been more strategic about the choice

of markets to analyse. While rent and credit are linked to findings of the urban profiling study, access to clean water in Goma is a general problem. The urban profiling study did not find large differences between respondent groups in relation to water access. Further, Mercy Corps has produced assessments of water and sanitation markets in eastern DRC, including Goma, and Mercy Corps is implementing a five-year DFID-funded programme to rehabilitate and extend municipal water systems in Goma.¹⁸

Targeting process and criteria

The plan for the pilot project was to intervene in two quartiers, with lessons generated from the intervention informing whether and how NRC expanded it. The two quartiers were determined by analysing the survey responses from the urban profiling, which had taken place in all 18 quartiers. Criteria were determined related to shelter, food consumption, access to basic services, protection, disability / chronic illness and property ownership (see Table 4). Each household received a point for each criteria met. The 'scores' were then averaged for the quartier, with the higher scores being an indicator of the IDP households in that quartier being more vulnerable. Mabanga Sud and Kyeshero were targeted on this basis (see Table 5). While by no means a fault proof system, it was a rational approach to geographic targeting based on the available data.

Table 4: Criteria for quartier targeting

Criteria	Threshold
Insufficient place to sleep inside	3+ nights per week
Water source	Lake
Debt	Above survey average (\$42)
Food Consumption Score	Below 28
Multiple displacement	More than once
Door quality	Poor or Very Poor
Access to Electricity	Never
Inability to pay education costs	Yes
Reported threat of violent crime	Yes
Reported threat of sexual violence	Yes
Disability or chronic illness	Yes
Accommodation status	Not owned

Source: NRC DRC

Table 5: Average household 'vulnerability scores' per quartier

Quartier	Average Score IDP	Average Score, All residents
Kashembe	3.4	3.1
Mikeno	3.4	3.3
Ndosho	3.8	3.3
Katindo	3.8	3.5
Les Volcans	3.8	3.5
Himbi	4.0	2.8
Mabanga-Nord	4.2	3.3
Murara	4.2	2.9
Mapendo	4.3	3.7

¹⁸ Mercy Corps (2014) Water Delivery Market Assessment – Eastern DRC; Mercy Corps (2014) Sanitation Market Assessment – Eastern DRC.

Katoyi	4.3	3.5
Virunga	4.2	3.5
Bujovu	4.3	3.5
Lac-vert	4.7	4.1
Bugamba	5.0	4.4
Mugunga	5.0	3.2
Kasika	5.1	4.5
Majengo	5.3	4.2
Mabanga-Sud	5.4	4.5
Kyeshero	6.8	4.8

Source: NRC DRC

For targeting households for cash transfers, NRC decided to assist IDPs (60 percent of recipients), host families (20 percent) and vulnerable residents (20 percent). Considering that the study found IDPs to be in the greatest difficulty according to the urban profiling study, why were host families and vulnerable residents included? Host families were included on the basis that the profiling study also found that they had specific needs and challenges related to hosting: increased expenses, lack of space, quickly filling latrines, etc. However the study also identified that most IDP households pay rent¹⁹ and make contributions to host families, and that in general IDPs had greater needs, so an argument can be made that they should not have been assisted to the same extent. Vulnerable households were included because NRC was initially concerned about whether local authorities would accept a project that only targeted people affected by displacement. In hindsight, this was not necessary for the acceptance of the intervention, as authorities benefited from the trainings, office furniture and by being associated with the assistance through their collaboration with NRC. This review does not question the important role that the cash assistance could play for vulnerable households, but they face chronic challenges that are not linked to displacement.

The household targeting criteria were determined in consultation with local leaders (quartier and commune authorities, avenue chiefs and civil society leaders). The criteria determined were:²⁰

- Displaced or host family
- Widow, divorced or child-headed household
- Older head of household (60 years +)
- Head of household living with a chronic illness or major handicap

Secondary criteria determined were:

- Household with very low income
- Households with several children not in school
- Host families with more than one displaced household
- Households living without proper shelter
- Head of household with children or pregnant and living without family support

NRC could have been clearer on the types of IDPs that it was targeting. While many had arrived in Goma since 2012, some beneficiaries had been in the city since the mid-2000s or even since the early 1990s.²¹ By contrast, rural interventions addressing displacement in DRC typically focus on

¹⁹ The study found that 19% of host families stated that IDPs were not managing to pay rent.

²⁰ NRC DRC (2014) Rapport d'activite de prise de contact avec les leaders communautaires et la mise en place du comite d'appuis pour le ciblage des menages beneficiaires du projet urbain. Internal document. 18 August 2014.

²¹ Based on focus group discussion beneficiary participants

newly displaced on the basis that they face acute needs, though time of arrival is not necessarily a proxy for vulnerability.

NRC put in place a process whereby the *chefs d'avenue* identified and registered people from their avenue that met the criteria. *Chef d'avenue* are usually familiar with populations in their area, which in Kyeshero ranged from 64 to 1300 households per avenue (with an average of 294 households per avenue in Kyeshero and 424 in Mabanga Sud).²² Mabanga Sud has 17 Avenues and Kyeshero has 56. The *chefs d'avenue* asked households questions related to village of origin, number of families being hosted, 'vulnerability criteria' (handicapped, widowed head of HH, etc.), food consumption score and 'non-food item (NFI) score' which is calculated based on the possession of certain household items (jerry can, mattress, blankets and pots). Food consumption score and NFI score were included because NRC was using these criteria in its responses to displacement in rural areas. The criteria were not used to prioritise or eliminate households, and food consumption score was collected through the baseline data so did not need to be asked again. A less data heavy registration approach could have been undertaken, focusing only on the criteria identified in the consultations.

NRC reviewed the initial lists created by the *chefs d'avenue*, removing individuals who had been recorded twice, who were from areas that were not affected by conflict and who were known to have been included by the *chefs* despite not meeting the established criteria (e.g. friends, family) (see Table 6). NRC staff then physically verified each household to assess that they met the criteria and verifying responses to the questions that had been asked by the *chefs* during the initial identification. No households were eliminated during this verification, suggesting that the *chefs* had identified households who met the criteria.

A question though is whether some of the households eliminated prior to the physical verification should have been. Most of the non-beneficiaries consulted expressed that their names had been written down by the *chef* but that they had never been visited by NRC, and that they did not know why they were excluded since they met the criteria.²³ Local leaders also expressed concerns that some people removed from the lists met the criteria. This may have been prevented if NRC had not eliminated 25% of the households ahead of the physical verification and had visited all. This would have added to the time required but would have mitigated potential exclusion errors, which could have occurred due to the *chefs d'avenue* limited experience with the questionnaire or because households eliminated by NRC from the initial list should have been included. If the number of households verified had exceeded the resources, targeting data collected could have been used to prioritise households or the amount of the cash transfer could have been reduced.

Table 6: Targeting of cash households – Original

	Original lists from <i>chefs d'avenue</i>	Removed - Written twice	Removed - From zones without conflict	Removed - Friends / family of <i>chefs d'avenue</i>	Total removed	Verified by NRC	Final list
Mabanga Sud	677	5	145	8	158 (23%)	519	529

²² Households per avenue based on population figures using an average household size of 6. Using population data from, NRC DRC (2014) Rapport de ciblage des beneficiaires de cash transfert, projet urbain. 27/08 au 10/10/2014.

²³ Some chefs wrote down names of IDPs after the initial identification process, so it is not known whether these households were included on lists sent to NRC.

Kyeshero	1015	8	157	105	270 (27%)	755	681 ²⁴
----------	------	---	-----	-----	-----------	-----	-------------------

Targeting is often the most challenging aspect of any intervention, as individuals have incentives to use their influence or misrepresent their situation to be included. In urban interventions, added challenges are difficulty identifying the target population (people affected by displacement), the large number of households, and where to draw the line on who should be included. Particularly given these challenges the process appears to have gone quite well. Those consulted in focus groups appreciated that both *chefs d'avenue* and NRC staff were involved, since the *chefs* knew households in the areas and NRC could keep them honest and discourage them from including people who did not meet the criteria. People consulted indicated that *chefs* did not ask for money during the registration, though a few reportedly approached beneficiaries after they had received cash to ask for a few dollars (none reported giving it). Local leaders, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries consulted²⁵ expressed that the people that had benefited did meet the targeting criteria, though felt that some were left out from the initial lists who also met it. Several individuals suggested that NRC and the *chefs* visit households at the same moment to save time and reduce the potential for favouritism from *chefs*.

However it is difficult to get a wide range of informed opinions on whether the 'right' people benefited. For interventions in villages, people in the village typically know who benefited and who did not, and are in a good position to express opinions on whether those people met the targeting criteria, whether the chief registered family members, etc. Goma is a different environment: less than 5% of the quarter population²⁶ benefited and the design of the intervention intended to not draw attention to people receiving cash for protection reasons. The non-beneficiaries consulted for this study were IDPs and host families who knew about the project through local leaders and project focal points.

The targeting process relied on the competency and willingness of the *chefs d'avenue*, disadvantaging people who had less competent and motivated ones. An example identified by this review was that one *chef* did not register households in his area despite NRC staff following up with him multiple times (eventually he registered two). There were examples of other *chefs* going above and beyond what had been asked of them, for example going to the hospital to register individuals in their area who met the criteria but were ill. While the *chefs* were not given quotas, NRC had planned a roughly even split of beneficiaries between the two quartiers. A more logical starting point would have been to have more beneficiaries from Kyeshero than from Mabanga-Sud, as it was a larger quartier. The 'even split' approach may have led to the exclusion of some households in Kyeshero, where the NRC team verified 74 fewer households than had been retained in the initial lists from *chefs d'avenue*, which suggests exclusion error. Forty of these households were later added once they had been verified, but only after the first transfer had been provided.

The targeting process was influenced by perceptions amongst *chefs* and households that the registration / identification was not going to lead to anything. Some *chefs* and non-beneficiaries said that some people 'chased' the *chefs* away and did not want to answer the registration questions, because surveys had been done in the past that led to nothing. Several *chefs* themselves indicated that they were not convinced aid would result from the activity. The lack of faith in the process may have discouraged more deception and did discourage some households from registering with the *chefs* who may have met criteria for inclusion. In the future, if NRC conducts targeting in those

²⁴ 40 households were added for the 2nd and 3rd transfers

²⁵ 22 non-beneficiaries were consulted in two focus groups, all of whom were displaced or host households.

²⁶ Based on population figures from Kyeshero using an average household size of 6. Using population data from, NRC DRC (2014) Rapport de ciblage des beneficiaires de cash transfert, projet urbain. 27/08 au 10/10/2014.

quartiers or ones where authorities are familiar with NRC’s cash assistance, a reasonable assumption is that it will get harder because of perceived benefits of inclusion.

Despite these challenges, NRC succeeded in finding a manageable and appropriate targeting approach to reach IDPs, host families and some very vulnerable households in Kyeshero and Mabanga Sud. Table 7 summarises the strengths and weaknesses of the targeting process.

Table 7: Strengths and weaknesses of targeting approach

Strengths of targeting approach	Weaknesses of targeting approach	Issues to consider for future targeting
<p>Used criteria identified by local authorities and community leaders</p> <p>Profited from familiarity of local authorities with populations – surveying all quartier to identify IDP, host and vulnerable households would have been cost / time prohibitive</p> <p>NRC staff’s familiarity with intervention areas enabled them to identify people included with ties to chiefs</p> <p>Physical verification of households by NRC mitigates ghost households / misrepresentation of living situation</p> <p>Beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries consulted expressed inclusion error was negligible (i.e. reached intended beneficiaries)</p>	<p>Disadvantages people living in avenues where the <i>chef</i> is incompetent, unmotivated, biased or not familiar with all households</p> <p>NRC’s verification relies to a certain extent on staff knowing / learning who on lists are friends (challenging in areas they are less familiar with)</p> <p>Data heavy – households asked detailed questions by both chefs and NRC staff</p> <p>Time intensive – particularly the physical verification of households by NRC</p> <p>Some households from Kyeshero left out of first transfer while being verified</p> <p>Planned repartition between Kyeshero and Mabanga Sud should have considered different population sizes from beginning</p>	<p><i>Chefs</i> may know of pilot intervention and have more faith that registration will lead to assistance, increasing risk of inclusion error</p> <p>Measures should be in place to avoid exclusion error caused by incompetent or biased <i>chefs d’avenue</i></p> <p>Registration by chefs and verification by NRC should not be overly heavy on data, only asking questions pertinent to targeting and verification</p> <p>Sufficient time needs to be planned for so that no households are left out while data being verified</p> <p>Transparency on how / why households are eliminated from initial lists should be increased or NRC should verify all households registered by <i>chefs d’avenue</i></p>

Monitoring systems

NRC’s monitoring involved four main processes:

- Baseline survey in the quartiers
- Baseline survey of all cash transfer beneficiaries
- Endline survey of cash transfer beneficiaries
- Feedback system for cash transfer beneficiaries – local focal points

The data collection exercises are summarised in Table 8. A large number of questions were asked in the two baselines (204 in total), some of which overlapped with one another and with questions in the urban profiling. The justification for covering some of the same issues from the urban profiling study was to produce more reliable data from the intervention areas that could inform the project design and implementation, as well as be used to generate data and lessons on the pilot. However the data was not routinely analysed and synthesised owing to time, capacity and the amount of data. Also it was generated at a stage where the programme design was firmly in place and there

were only a few months left to implement the intervention. A more strategic approach would have been to establish in advance a manageable set of key questions that NRC wanted to answer about the intervention, rather than casting such a wide net (or investing more resources in data analysis to ensure that the collected data was analysed).

Table 8: Monitoring data collection

Type of monitoring	Date	Sample size	Type of data collected	Observations
Community baseline	2014 Aug	886	Baseline data on demographics, hosting profiles, challenges related to displacement, willingness to host, identity documents, access to basic services, income / livelihoods, perceptions of authorities, community engagement	153 questions; large amount of data produced but not synthesised / summarised; questions that overlapped with urban profiling and were not related to indicators could have been reduced / eliminated
Baseline of cash benef.	2014 Sept	1158	Baseline data on household demographics, debt, expenditures and priority needs	61 questions, questions that overlapped with previous surveys and weren't related to intervention (e.g. number of school aged children) were not necessary
Endline survey	2015 Jan	160	Data on demographics, expenditures, identity documents, Data only collected for cash recipients	72 questions; questions that overlapped with previous surveys and weren't related to intervention (e.g. number of school aged children) should have been removed; questions on expenditures (e.g. how much spent last month on X) cannot be linked with cash transfers and should have been more strongly tied to cash transfers (e.g. 'what was the primary use of the cash transfer'; 'what did the cash transfer enable you to do that otherwise would not have')

The cash transfer baseline survey asked households how much they had spent on health, non-food items and entertainment in the previous month, how much they spent on food the previous day, how much they spend on water per week and school fees per month. These questions were then asked again in the endline. Asking about expenditure patterns can be an effective way to gauge how marginal income from cash transfers is used, but really is only reliable when done as part of a household economy analysis (HEA) approach (which is time consuming and requires training). In this case it was done as part of a wider survey implemented by daily hires (i.e. not a specific HEA exercise), the expenditure questions covered different time periods (previous day v. previous month) and some asked how much *households had spent* while others asked more generally how much *they spend*. Those questions therefore are not a reliable way to determine how cash transfers were used, or what they enabled recipients to do, which is a fundamental question for the pilot. A question on how cash transfers were used was added mid-way through the endline data collection, so data for it is only from Kyeshero. Asking a sample of beneficiaries how transfers were used after

each transfer was distributed (i.e. through PDM) would have been better approach, as less time would have elapsed and more details could have been asked about the use each transfer.²⁷

NRC set up a feedback system for the cash transfers in order to address any problems that beneficiaries faced in receiving transfers. Two people (one man and one woman) were identified per avenue who were contact points for NRC – passing information to others about the transfer and phoning NRC staff to let them know about problems (e.g. lost SIM cards). They did not receive any compensation for their services but some did participate in the trainings (and attendees receive money for expenses). Overall this system seems to have worked well to resolve technical problems related to receiving cash (see Results).

Gender and protection

How were gender and protection were factored into the design? For the cash transfers, NRC strongly encouraged, though did not require, that women in the household be the recipients. This was done on the logic that the transfers were intended to meet household needs and women take the lead in this domain. Both men and women consulted emphasised the central role of women in managing household needs and that women and men dealt with / were affected by household problems differently. Men were described as bread-winners who dealt less with the daily household realities. Women were the ones who found ways to meet needs amidst limited resources, making meals and ‘facing the children’ (one woman expressed, ‘men can find a job to feed them for the day, but women cannot eat without their children’). For these reasons encouraging women to be the recipients was appropriate, and more than two-third of the SIMs were registered to women. As discussed later this review did not find reports of tensions between men and women related to the use of the cash transfer.

NRC considered protection risks amidst other factors (e.g. feasibility, accessibility) when choosing to deliver the cash transfers via SIM cards as opposed to banks and savings cooperatives. An advantage of the mobile phone delivery is that it is discreet. Airtel cash out points are in the same areas as other shops and businesses; unlike banks and cooperatives it is not obvious that a financial transaction is being made. Through preparatory messaging and sensitisation NRC encouraged households to not advertise that they were receiving money or tell neighbours that they were collecting it.

NRC considered whether certain households, namely elderly ones selected as ‘vulnerable’ households, should have a dedicated approach to receive the cash, such as NRC staff accompanying them to receive their transfer on a specified day. In hindsight, NRC should have. As discussed below (Results), some elderly individuals were deceived by children and grandchildren who kept their money or swapped their SIM cards.

Results

Timing

The intervention faced delays because the profiling exercise took longer than planned (ending in March / April rather than February), the design involved drawn-out negotiations and hiring staff took longer than anticipated. Establishing the contract between NRC and Airtel was also a lengthy

²⁷ An issue for monitoring cash is that it is fungible, meaning that it is not possible to determine whether it was the NRC cash or the recipients own income that went to a particular purchase. However it is still better to ask this question than to not, as it does provide some insight on how they used the additional money. An additional way to approach this question is by asking recipients what they cash enabled them to do that they otherwise would not have done.

process. NRC DRC and Airtel established a draft contract in August that was forwarded to NRC lawyers in August. Negotiations on the content took more than a month and it was finally signed in October. NRC should have factored such possible delays into the planning, given that other NGOs in Goma had experienced challenges working with mobile network operators for mobile money delivery and that it was new for NRC. A further delay of two weeks occurred when the bank transfer for the first cash transfer was sent to the wrong Airtel account.

The bulk of implementation occurred in October through December 2014 – this is when household were targeted, the first and second cash transfers were provided and microprojects were undertaken (see Table 9). This makes for a short time frame to implement an intervention and to judge results. The third cash transfer was received when the fieldwork for this review was taking place, and the microprojects had just been finished; people consulted were not in a position to comment on them. Having a project document with planned and agreed upon timings would have been a useful reference to gauge the extent of delays because different individuals have different views on when activities should have occurred (the submission for the 2014 NMFA indicated that it was a January to December 2014 intervention, but the plan was to design it following the profiling study, meaning the *de facto* start date was not January and closer to March).

The delays most noticeably affected the planned design of the cash transfers – they were planned for August to December and were provided instead over a 6 week period from late November to January. No beneficiaries consulted expressed that they would have preferred more time between the transfers and did not prefer more / smaller transfers, so the delay in cash did not have any noticeable impacts for recipients. It did mean though that staff were rushed to get the activities in place, which contributed to some households not being included for the first transfer while they were verified as beneficiaries.

Table 9: Timeline of urban pilot

2013	
August	Decision taken to undertake profiling study and pilot urban intervention
September	Survey Supervisor hired for profiling study
October	NRC global Urban Advisor starts
	Survey Supervisor in Goma
	Urban displacement profiling study begins
December	IDP profiling study data collection
	Proposal for pilot submitted to NMFA (under framework agreement)
2014	
January	Urban profiling data analysed
February	Briefing held on urban profiling study findings
March	Urban profiling study completed (internal report)
April	First logframe drafted
May	Survey Supervisor becomes Urban Team Leader
	Logframe finalised
June	Recruitment process for urban team starts
July	Programme Officer and cash assistants recruited
	Preliminary meetings with quartier leadership
August	Decision taken to use Airtel
	Airtel contract to NRC lawyer
	Household targeting begins

September	Household targeting ends
	Baseline survey
	Staff in place for microprojects
October	Data collection women's property rights
	14 - 21 October 2014 Governance training 1
	Team Leader supervision changes to be under Programme Director
	Microproject identification starts
	Contract signed with Airtel
	Urban profiling study published
November	4 – 7 November Community Association training 1
	Money sent to Airtel (to wrong Airtel account)
	13 – 18 November 2014 Governance training 2
	17 – 18 November Community Association training 2
	Data collection for EMMA
	Money arrives in (correct) Airtel mobile money account
	Beneficiaries receive 1st cash transfer
	Microproject implementation starts
	Beneficiaries received 2 nd transfer
December	Dec 29/30 Feedback workshop with authorities and community leaders
	Project 'officially' closes
	Microproject implementation ends
	NRC transfers funds for third transfer to Airtel
2015	
January	Beneficiaries receive 3rd cash transfer from Airtel
	Programme review data collection
	Endline monitoring data collection
	EMMA report signed off

Governance

Two main activities were undertaken for the governance objective – trainings of local leaders and provision of office furniture to quartier authorities. The trainings were on the roles of responsibilities of authorities related to displaced persons, good governance and civil documentation. Trainings had a total of 195 participants of which one-quarter were women (some people attended more than one training).²⁸ Trainings lasted from 1-2 days each, and participants received \$5/day to cover expenses.

NRC judged the comprehension of the training through short tests on the training topics before and after the trainings, and scores on the tests improved after the training (see Table 10). Participants elaborated action plans on steps they would take after the trainings, including passing on information to others (e.g. on how to obtain certain ID documents). In discussions for this review local leaders consulted indicated that the trainings were useful and that they had made changes because of them, specifically related to civil documentation (see below). However they said that some of the 'follow up actions' were outside of their control or that they lacked resources to follow up. One example given was that they were able to follow up on the recommendation of sharing information about displaced households in their meetings and issuing *témoignage* letters, but that

²⁸ The small proportion of women in trainings was a function of the fact that there are fewer women local leaders than men.

quartier authorities did not have control over issuing *actes de naissance* (birth certificates) if these became ‘blocked’ at the commune level.

Table 10: Training test results

Training	Percent of questions answered correctly	
	Pre-test	Post-test
Civil documentation ²⁹	53%	89%
Good governance ³⁰	47%	84%
Roles and responsibilities towards IDPs ³¹	50%	87%

NRC encouraged the issuance of civil documents through a training of local leaders that focused on the importance of different documents, how leaders could assist IDPs with getting documents and information about documentation that should be transmitted to IDPs. This training was based on findings from the profiling study that many IDPs had lost identity documents. NRC asked authorities to issue *témoignage* letters for cash beneficiaries that lacked documentation so that they could show ID when retrieving the cash. These letters, issued by quartier authorities, attest that that the person is a resident. They serve as a basic form of official identification that can reduce problems if they need to prove their identity (e.g. if stopped by police). Elector cards are considered to be the most important form of ID and can be used to travel to Rwanda.³² A *témoignage* letter can be used to get an attestation of loss of elector card (by commune authorities), which serves as a close substitute for an elector card and can be used to get a duplicate elector card. The trainings also covered documents that did not have direct links to displacement (i.e. birth, marriage and death certificates).

Participants in the trainings were meant to report the content to others in their areas affected by displacement (e.g. on how they could obtain certain documents). Most participants in focus groups stated that their *chefs d’avenue* or other participants passed on information and even helped them to get *témoignage* letters or submit documents for birth certificates. Others though had not received the information, suggesting that this approach is uneven.

People accessed 451 documents as a result of the trainings and the request of NRC to quartier authorities that they issue *témoignage* letters to cash beneficiaries lacking documentation (see Table 11).³³ More than half of these civil documents were *témoignage* letters. Focus groups and leaders reported that some quartier authorities had previously charged \$5 for *témoignage* letters and provided them for free because of the NRC project. Birth certificates (which could be issued within 90 days of a child being born) accounted for 20% of the documents.³⁴ Obtaining the *témoignage* document from the quartier was reportedly not difficult, most likely because NRC was working with those authorities.

²⁹ NRC (2014) Rapport de la formation sur la documentation civile:l'accès aux services publics par les personnes affectées par le déplacement en milieu urbain. Internal document.

³⁰ NRC (2014) Rapport de la 2^{ième} formation des leaders communautaires et représentants des associations locales des quartiers Kyeshero et Mabanga Sud tenue en date du 17 au 18 novembre 2014 sur la bonne gouvernance. Internal document.

³¹ NRC (2014) Rapport de la formation sur les rôles et responsabilités des autorités locales vis-a-vis des personnes affectées par le déplacement en milieu urbain tenue en date de 14 au 21 octobre 2014. Internal document.

³² From baseline data and focus group discussions

³³ Data from NRC DRC

³⁴ Quartier authorities can submit the paperwork but the commune issues the birth certificates

A total of 85 people acquired attestations of loss as a result of the pilot through commune level authorities. However getting documents through commune level faced obstacles related to bureaucracy, time and money. Some of those consulted said that they were discouraged from getting the attestation of loss of elector card because of the cost (\$7). Numerous applications for birth certificates had been made three months previously but had not been issued by the commune. The project was most effective for facilitating documents at the quartier level.

Table 11: Civil documents issues during pilot

Document	Kyeshero	Mabanga Sud	Total
Témoignage of residence	166	77	246
Attestation of loss of elector card	58	27	85
Duplicate of elector card	18	6	24
Birth certificate	60	28	88
Marriage certificate	6	2	8
Total	308	140	451

Source: NRC DRC

NRC provided office furniture (e.g. desks, chairs, office supplies) to the quartier authorities to support them to issue documents and implement recommendations from the trainings. This cost less than \$1000 of project funding and appeared to have gone a long way in generating support from them. Authorities from Kyeshero indicated that it showed that NRC supported them to do their work and undertaking tasks related to the documentation and training, and that overall they were doing more related to IDPs in their area because of the project.³⁵

A general observation though is that it is difficult to know the precise role of these activities in encouraging the buy-in of local authorities. Would authorities have issued *témoignage* letters (and for free) even if NRC had not purchased office furniture? Did authorities need the information in the trainings, was some of the information more relevant than others, or were they mainly motivated by the small amount of money they received towards expenses? These questions cannot be answered. It is worth noting though that certain baseline data suggested a positive relationship of people affected by displacement with local authorities before the project. When asked whether their inputs influenced local authorities' decision-making, 92% responded 'yes'.

It is clear though that NRC's process of engagement generated buy-in from authorities, who played a critical role in issuing documents and identifying beneficiaries. Authorities consulted indicated that the project reflected them in a good light - it showed that authorities were involved in activities that were providing aid in their areas. Overall humanitarian NGOs were well known in Goma, but none had been known to provide humanitarian assistance *in* Goma. They were associated with a rare provision of resources to people in their area. They wrote NRC letters thanking them for the urban assistance programme and asking NRC that the project continue and be expanded.

Preparedness – microprojects

The primary activity for the 'preparedness' objective were *microprojects* managed by committees of IDPs, local authorities and local leaders. NRC staff provided technical support and verified receipts, but the purchase of materials and management of the construction was done by the committee, based on the hypothesis that this would generate a sense of ownership that would contribute to the sustainability of the projects. The projects also an opportunity for those participating in it to talk about existing preparedness measures and the impact of displacement in the quartiers. The projects

³⁵ Only Kyeshero quartier authorities were consulted for this review

were just finishing when the review was undertaken. It therefore was not possible to have discussions on changes that people had experienced as a result or to speculate on their sustainability and maintenance. Some focus group participants though did indicate that their children had participated in sanitation trainings (related to the new school latrines) and had shared information on the importance of hand washing with them. Key informants and IDPs interviewed for this review who were aware of the projects felt that they were good choices that corresponded with priority needs in the area, and that IDPs with school-aged children and who used the maternity health centre would benefit. The main critique of this activity was made earlier in this section – while they were chosen based on links to future displacement, the reality is that there is little evidence that these specific infrastructures would be affected. Their poor state of infrastructure is rather linked to the chronic problem of poor governance in Congo.

This objective also included activities related to preparedness of aid agencies, including improving and updating inter-cluster humanitarian preparedness plans for new waves of forced displacement in urban Goma. However these were not fully achieved, instead NRC fed into discussions amongst aid agencies on durable solutions. NRC also participated in discussions in late December 2014 when the government announced that Goma IDP camps were closed. As indicated in the previous section, camp closures though were not strongly on the radar of the pilot project. Thus this was a blind spot when the closure was announced, particularly given that the pilot was positioning NRC as a leading NGO for responding to displacement in Goma. The pilot's approach to preparedness would have benefited from some basic contingency planning with NRC emergency programme managers and other aid agencies about how NRC would position itself in different scenarios (i.e. large wave of displaced, continued 'trickle' of displaced from conflict-affected areas of North Kivu, camp closures).

Meeting basic needs - Cash transfers

NRC provided \$180 in three instalments. Beneficiaries did not expect that they would receive assistance, even after they had been registered. Those consulted across the board had not heard of NGOs providing assistance outside of camps in Goma and had not heard of NGOs giving money.

Use of cash transfers

The use of cash transfers was diverse, going to school fees, rent, small businesses (charcoal, vegetables, flour, beignets, peanuts, jerry cans, sand for construction), small livestock, school uniforms, kitchen equipment, metal sheeting (for housing), debt repayment, healthcare and ceremonies.³⁶ Table 12 shows the primary use of each cash transfer according to NRC endline monitoring. This table shows that:

- The largest use of the transfer was for school fees (primary school fees cost \$5-\$10/ month; secondary cost \$15-\$20/month)
- The other top categories were food, household items, ceremonies and investment in small businesses
- The primary use of cash transfer varied substantially between households – the single largest reported of any of the cash transfers was that 34 percent of respondents indicated that they used for the first transfer mainly for school fees³⁷
- The primary expenditure changed between transfers. One-third of people indicated that school fees were the largest use of the first transfer but only 10 percent did so for the third transfer. The third transfer was used more for food and investing in small businesses compared to the previous two.

³⁶ Examples from focus group discussions

³⁷ The transfers were provided towards the beginning of the school year; this timing may have influenced the extent that transfers were used to pay school fees

Table 12: Main use of each transfer

Category	1st transfer	2nd transfer	3rd transfer	Average
School fees	34%	26%	10%	23%
Food	10%	20%	23%	18%
Household items	15%	12%	12%	13%
Ceremonies	12%	15%	12%	13%
Business	11%	4%	18%	11%
Clothing	2%	11%	9%	7%
Rent	7%	4%	4%	5%
Other	3%	2%	7%	4%
Home improve.	2%	4%	4%	3%
Livestock	2%	0%	1%	1%
Debt repayment	0%	1%	1%	1%
Health care	1%	0%	0%	0%
Land	0%	0%	0%	0%

Source: Endline monitoring, Kyeshero

The findings from the baseline and urban profiling study on ‘priority needs’ did not correspond very closely to the ‘primary’ use of the cash transfers in the endline monitoring. The priority need most commonly identified by households was food, and food was cited by an average of only 18% of households as the main use of transfers in the endline data. While rent was noted as a top priority in the urban profiling study, only an average of 5% of households stated that it was the primary use of the transfers. This divergence can be explained by the fact that ‘priorities’ does not equate with ‘primary use of a windfall of money’ (for example, food is a priority that they address on a daily basis regardless of whether they receive external assistance). This is worth noting because these patterns would have been difficult to predict based on the profiling study and baseline data. The absence of PDM is a missed opportunity for more detailed analysis of how transfers were spent and to follow up on the reasons for those choices. NRC could have asked more detailed information on the use of each transfer (i.e. how much of each transfer went to school fees, food and other categories). The timing of the transfers (during the school year) likely played a role in the use of transfers for school fees.

Some of the cash was gifted, loaned and shared.³⁸ One-third of households stated that they gave money as a gift (an average of \$8.53) and 14 percent loaned money, primarily to neighbours (44 percent), friends (38 percent) and family (17 percent). The average loan amount was \$16.52. Forty-one percent of IDP households indicated that they shared some of the money received with host families.

When asked about the most important changes they had experienced as a result of the cash assistance, beneficiaries consulted indicated the following:

- Paying rent for a longer period of time, thus preventing problems and improving relations with landlords and host families
- Investments in small businesses, which can provide profits in the future
- Supporting education for children by paying school fees, because otherwise they can go into debt to pay the fees, and education is important so that kids can provide for the family in the future

³⁸ Endline monitoring

- Going to the hospital / doctor to get treatment for health problems
- Having more meals (this was emphasised by vulnerable households consulted)


Recipients portrayed the cash as an important but temporary boost to meet many (not all) of their needs – not as a permanent solution. Several who described eating better meals indicated that that would not continue. A few women who had used cash to increase their small business stock and activities expressed concerns that they would have to sell it to pay for school fees in the future, especially because the profits made were small (particularly for individuals who did not have identity documents to cross into Rwanda to purchase items more cheaply). It was difficult to have an unbiased discussion on sustainability with beneficiaries, who expressed on multiple occasions that NRC should continue the cash assistance and that things would worsen without it.

Delivery mechanism and problems encountered

As indicated in the discussion on appropriateness, using SIM cards as the delivery mechanism was very appropriate - it was discreet (i.e. others did not know that beneficiaries were collecting cash) and cash out points were accessible. It was vastly preferred by those consulted to banks and savings cooperatives. Saving cooperatives like IMARA have faced mismanagement and collapse in recent years – causing people to lose savings – and are not trusted.

The mobile phone approach though did result in numerous technical problems. Problems with mobile networks and connections resulted in delays in people receiving their transfer. Several people had instances where they had gone to the Airtel agent, but the agent was not able to give the cash because the network not in service (meaning that they had to make a second or even third trip). Recipients had PIN numbers to retrieve the transfer – a prudent measure given that there were 53 cases of SIMs being lost or stolen. However if people forgot their PIN it would be become blocked after multiple incorrect attempts. NRC had to resolve 82 cases of blocked SIMs. These issues were dealt with through NRC’s system of having local focal points who contacted NRC staff to report problems. Through this system NRC received and resolved 141 issues (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Problems reported to NRC on cash transfers



Source: NRC DRC internal reports on problems / complaints received

The most notable problem with the mobile money transfer system was that a small number of vulnerable beneficiaries (staff estimate less than 20) were taken advantage of by friends or family members. NRC had considered modifying the delivery system for vulnerable beneficiaries, such as

choosing a day where NRC staff would be there to help them. In the end they assigned them the same PINs and wrote them down to make it easier for them to retrieve the cash or to identify someone to get it for them. The following cases were noted during focus groups:

- One woman's grandson told her multiple times that the SIM was blocked, but he had actually been withdrawing the cash. NRC took steps to block withdrawal of the final transfer when it learned of this through the focus group discussion, but the money had already been retrieved
- One person's SIM had been replaced by another SIM by someone in the household, who withdrew the money

Other impacts

Tensions within households: Focus groups stated that the cash did not cause problems between husbands and wives, though the environment of a focus group would not likely encourage details on such a sensitive topic. Participants expressed positive examples – that men saw that their wives were good at managing money, that men were encouraged to come home (rather than going to out drinking or finding another woman) because the children were happy and food was on the table and that households in general had more harmony because there was less stress.

Tensions with host families: Endline monitoring asked whether the money had improved or harmed IDPs' relationship with host families; all respondents indicated that it had improved it. Additionally 41 percent reported sharing some of the transfer with host families.

Insecurity: Recipients consulted indicated that they did not face any security risks related to the cash transfer. The mobile money was described as discreet because Airtel was not like a bank where people could see them go in and know that they were getting money.

Using SIMs to make calls or transfer money: In theory SIMs could be used for communication and sending money, but they rarely were. Recipients consulted said that they guarded the SIM 'like a treasure'. They cited cases that they had heard of where people had had lost the SIM because their mobile phone had been stolen. Some indicated that they kept the SIM hidden and would not even tell their children where it was. A small number of participants in the groups though did indicate that they had made phone calls on the SIM. An unforeseen benefit of the transfer was that recipients could retrieve money in areas outside of Goma if they travelled; a group of women reportedly did so when travelling to make purchases for their businesses.

NRC held a workshop with local leaders who were familiar with and had participated in the activities to discuss their feedback. Table 12 summarises the strengths, weaknesses and recommendations identified by the local leaders.

Table 12: Summary of strengths, weaknesses and recommendations on pilot from local leaders³⁹

³⁹ This table was compiled by NRC based on a feedback session with local leaders. It has been translated from French.

Governance	<p>Strengths</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training local leaders, community leaders and heads of associations - Provision of modules and other training materials - Delivery of official documents to people affected by displacement and elderly people - Support and integration of the urban project by authorities <p>Area for improvement</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not enough trainings - More leaders need to be trained - Short courses with too much material - Not enough partnership with local grassroots organizations <p>Recommendations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increase / expand trainings for all local leaders - NRC should transfer skills to local associations on a partnership basis - Follow up on the materials learned during all training - NRC should provide training certificates to all training participants - Expand the number of days per training module because there is too much material - Strengthen the post-training activities (restitution and putting into practice the recommendations formulated)
Cash transfers	<p>Strengths</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Identifying the beneficiaries - Unconditional transfer to all the selected recipients - Satisfaction of basic needs by recipients (payment of rent, small business, school fees for children ...) <p>Areas for improvement</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Only half of households identified in Kyeshero were assisted (1025 identified but only 600 assisted in Kyeshero) - Disruption of the mobile connection causing the delay in the collection of funds - Receipt of Congolese francs instead of dollars⁴⁰ <p>Recommendations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increase the number of beneficiaries as vulnerable IDPs remain unassisted - Ensure a quality mobile connection in the receipt of funds - Continue to support cash transfer to beneficiaries - Expand the activities to all <i>quartiers</i> of Goma

⁴⁰ This point was not raised by any beneficiaries consulted.

Strengths

- Undertaking focus group discussions to inform the urban project
- Identifying the areas of origin, causes of displacement,
- Outreach of the urban project activities
- Identifying the needs of the displaced
- Identifying the needs of the community
- Creation of community micro-projects
- Community involvement in the process and micro-project implementation activities
- Training of school 'student guards' in hygiene and sanitation

Areas for improvement

- Time allowed for the implementation of micro-projects
- Lack of resources for supervision of activities by monitoring committees set up
- Reduction of vendor quotes by NRC

Recommendations

- Plan in time the implementation of micro-projects
- Provide funding for monitoring committees set up to facilitate the monitoring of the work and the involvement of all
- NRC should educate displaced children
- NRC should provide hygiene kits and school supplies for displaced children
- Many needs remain

Source: NRC (2014) Rapport de l'atelier de formation préparation communautaire tenue en date du 29 au 30/12/2014.

4. Lessons, conclusions and recommendations

The final question examined by this review is what lessons can be drawn from the pilot to inform programming in Goma and potentially beyond. This section outlines these lessons as well as conclusions and recommendations.

Lessons

NRC had the skills and capacity to undertake the pilot intervention. Urban programming though is new to NRC, and there are not yet resources and global objectives firmly in place to guide it. Having these would have provided the NRC DRC office with a frame of reference for designing and implementing the intervention. However, the challenges facing people affected by displacement in Goma and entry-points for addressing must be anchored in reality of Goma rather than experiences of NRC in other urban areas, which may not be relevant.

There are a wide range of challenges facing people affected by displacement in Goma, a large number of people affected by displacement and numerous possible entry points for aid agencies. NRC and other aid agencies need to be strategic about where they can bring added value in urban areas and where they draw the line, as the number of IDPs already present would vastly exceed resources available for directly assisting them. In DRC one tendency over time has been for aid agencies to concentrate their interventions on newly displaced populations, such as through the UNICEF-supported Rapid Response to Population Movements programme. More recently some aid agencies are framing approaches with longer-term visions, such as through supporting resilience. In 2014 humanitarian funding was lower than previous years, a trend that could continue. Multiple humanitarian priorities and limited funding highlight the importance of having a very focused vision for programming in urban areas in DRC, as it opens a door to new geographic programming when the tendency amongst most donors and aid agencies is to limit the scope of humanitarian activities rather than expand them.

New interventions in urban areas are opportunities to generate data and lessons, but this should be done strategically. The urban profiling study took important steps towards addressing a widely recognised gap in data (on IDPs outside of camps in Goma). However the collection of monitoring data vastly out-weighed the analysis of it, and some data collection was repetitive (e.g. on demographics / profiles in community baseline and cash baseline), not strategic (e.g. asking inconsistent questions about expenditure patterns in endline survey) or not clearly linked to displacement (e.g. analysis of water markets). A more strategic approach would be establishing a set of clear questions at the beginning of the intervention, based on what NRC *needs* to know to design, implement and generate lessons (e.g. data on how cash transfer were used and what changed as a result).

The line between needs and vulnerabilities related to displacement and those related to poverty / poor governance are often blurred. The profiling study found and the intervention addressed some issues with direct links to displacement, such as the loss of identity documents. However poor governance and poverty were also at the heart of many of the challenges identified, such as access to basic services and work opportunities.

Programming in urban settings requires working with certain unknown variables. When populations are displaced in rural areas of DRC, aid agencies are fairly adept at establishing the numbers of IDPs, their priority needs and the severity of the needs, which informs their responses and advocacy. In Goma NRC faced several unknowns. The profiling study makes case that IDPs are more vulnerable than local residents (related to networks, livelihoods, etc.), but it not known whether their challenges are lesser or greater than IDPs in rural areas, nor is their overall number known. NRC

needs to be cognisant of assumptions made and be prudent with its analysis and advocacy messaging (i.e. not overstepping conclusions on the vulnerability of IDPs v. others).⁴¹

If response analysis leads to the decision to transfer resources to individuals and households, then cash transfers are more appropriate compared to in-kind aid. The markets in Goma are vibrant and easily accessible with a variety of goods and services available. Systems are in place to get money to people.

NRC needs to be able to accommodate new approaches or otherwise anticipate that there will be delays. The negotiation of the contract with Airtel and the first bank transfer to Airtel from NRC resulted in delays because it was a new system for NRC.

Multi-sector urban interventions do not have obvious homes in an organisational structure defined by core competencies. If an urban intervention spans sectors and incorporates activities that are not part of NRC's core competencies, then a new management arrangement has to be found that profits from NRC's knowledge but does not balkanize the programme amidst departments. For an intervention in a specific sector (e.g. an education intervention implemented in an urban area) this would not be an issue. NRC is in the process of re-organising management structures.

The pilot's targeting approach could be used to identify IDPs in the event of future displacement of populations to Goma. The process must involve local authorities because aid agencies alone would be unable to identify IDPs living outside of camps, and circumventing authorities would undermine and discourage their collaboration. However the process needs checks in place to mitigate inclusion and exclusions error, by verifying household identified by authorities and ensuring that people are aware that they can register with authorities if they meet the criteria. NRC should consider verifying all households on lists established by authorities rather than eliminating ones ahead of the verification exercise. Local community groups were also usefully involved in elaborating targeting criteria.

Local government authorities and community leaders bought into the process because of close engagement by NRC and direct and indirect benefits. It would have been inappropriate to work around local government authorities, who are necessary for targeting and play a key role in issuing documentation and disseminating information.

Lessons and positive findings from Congo are not necessarily applicable to other countries. For example, the targeting process was influenced by the lack of data on people affected by displacement and grounded in finding a balance between needing to work with local authorities but not being able to trust them. This dynamic may well be applicable to other contexts outside of DRC, but contextual analysis will be essential in all cases.

Conclusion

Through the urban pilot project NRC established that it can respond to urban displacement in Goma through engagement with local authorities, identifying people affected by displacement and providing assistance. The objectives were grounded in data, analysis and experience related to displacement in Goma, specifically a study that made a strong case that IDPs in Goma were more vulnerable to certain risks and challenges compared to other residents. While appropriate, it is not

⁴¹ For example, the EMMA summary on credit markets (draft) states that IDPs do not have the financial or social capital to obtain credit. This is a strong message, but the baseline survey of cash beneficiaries found that 59% had debts and 31% had taken credit in the previous two months, indicating that they do have access to credit.

possible to say whether those objectives were the ‘most’ appropriate given the number of possible entry points, and the appropriateness of the activities to achieve those objectives varied. Given that analysis has not been undertaken on the needs and vulnerability of people affected by displacement in Goma compared to rural areas, the review cannot draw a firm conclusion on whether people affected by displacement in Goma should be prioritised (on that basis) for humanitarian response. A major accomplishment is that NRC established strategic in-roads for working with authorities on issues related to displacement, which will provide an important avenue for continued engagement and programming on these issues. Working with local authorities to engage on issues related to displacement was in many respects a ‘low cost’ approach to achieve tangible results, namely issuing identity documents.

The project had important achievements and was supported by dedicated staff committed to implementing the pilot in what was new territory for NRC in DRC. The pilot produced data on a wide range of issues related to living conditions, vulnerability and needs of IDPs and host families compared to other Goma residents – taking important steps towards addressing data gaps on IDPs in Goma. It established a practical targeting strategy for identifying IDPs, host families and vulnerable people in Goma – an approach that will likely be more challenging in the future as stakeholders may be more aware that the process could lead to assistance. Cash transfers were successfully delivered via mobile phones and NRC resolved technical problems related to blocked, stolen and lost SIM cards. Encouraged by trainings and NRC’s close engagement, authorities issued more than 400 civil documents to people affected by displacement and ceased charging for *témoignage* letters. Small projects were implemented through committees that corresponded to locally identified priorities.

The project though faced some challenges. The design process was unnecessarily complicated owing to different visions of the project objectives and design. The number of people involved and level of interest within NRC DRC and headquarters was influenced by the fact it was a pilot. Delays were experienced related to the drawn-out design, delays in hiring and lengthy negotiation of a contract with the mobile network operator. Some of activities did not have strong links to displacement, namely the microprojects and the training of local associations on good governance. Baseline data was over-collected and under-analysed, and overall a more strategic approach to data collection was needed. While there were achievements in issuing documents through the quartier, documents beyond the quartier level were not as easily obtained. Some elderly recipients could not navigate cash delivery system and were deceived by relatives, losing their money.

There were some missed opportunities. NRC could have worked more strongly on preparedness plans with aid agency coordination structures, as well as contingency planning on whether / how NRC would respond to camp closures and other displacement scenarios (e.g. through assessments, assistance, taking a leading role amongst aid agencies, direct provision of assistance). NRC could have framed its approach to addressing ‘basic needs’ through a livelihoods lens rather than only through an asset transfer, which would have encouraged more holistic thinking on how households would meet their needs beyond the life-cycle of the intervention.⁴² Finally, undertaking PDM of cash transfers would have provided a useful overview of how they were being used and what they were enabling recipients to accomplish.

The pilot has resulted in a significant amount of learning that will shape NRC’s engagement moving forward. The pilot was less of a specific model of assistance and more of a combination of activities to address needs and challenges related to displacement, any of which could be feasibly expanded and replicated should NRC choose to do so. However, there are four important dynamics at play highlighted by this review. The line between chronic needs and those linked to displacement are blurred, the vulnerability of people affected by displacement in urban areas compared to those in

⁴² The next phase of the project includes a stronger livelihoods focus.

rural areas is unknown, humanitarian funding for DRC appears to be decreasing and there are many possible entry points for addressing challenges people in Goma experience related to displacement. The key question should not be *whether the approach can be replicated* but rather *what is NRC's vision moving forward for addressing needs and challenges associated with urban displacement*.

NRC has introduced a new dynamic by providing assistance to IDPs outside of camps, and there are numerous IDPs already in Goma with more undoubtedly coming in the future. Through this pilot NRC is by default setting itself up as the NGO in Goma that will lead on urban assistance questions. NRC should establish a strategic vision of urban engagement in DRC, which will guide the objectives and design of future actions. It should consider re-orienting the focus on preparedness towards how the government and aid agencies can address displacement in future scenarios. NRC should also look at whether and in what circumstances the programme should directly transfer resources to individuals, given the large number of IDPS already present in Goma.

Recommendations

Strategic Approach

- Focus more on strategy and less on activities: what is NRC's vision for engaging in Goma and other areas in DRC?
- Ensure that relevant resources on urban programming are available for NRC staff globally, while recognising that approach will be context-specific and area-based
- Be strategic with data collection, focusing on quality over quantity, based on a clear understanding of the information that NRC needs to determine its approach in addressing effects of displacement and risks of future displacement, to conduct targeting and to understand the results of its programming (collect what will be used and use what is collected)
- Efforts should be made to compare rural and urban data to analyse relative levels of need and vulnerability while recognising differences in contexts
- Continue to work closely with local government authorities, including facilitating access to identity documents

Targeting

- Recognise that household targeting may become more difficult in future interventions and put in place measures to mitigate inclusion and exclusion error
- Any future interventions that target households should consider the likely number of households affected by displacement in the quartier (which may correspond to its size)

Cash transfers

- If cash transfer interventions are undertaken in the future in Goma, continue to use mobile transfers but establish measures to ensure that vulnerable people can access their money (e.g. accompanying them on a specific day)NRC needs to identify and provide cash transfers to the elderly people in the pilot who lost their money because someone took their SIM card or kept their money when retrieving it
- Post-distribution monitoring should be done and include questions on how cash was used, what it enabled recipients to do and the most important change they experienced

Preparedness

- NRC should establish its own preparedness and contingency plan which outlines the actions it would take in different scenarios (e.g. status quo, large influx of IDPs), in consultation with other (I)NGOs and municipal authorities.
- Monitor whether infrastructure constructed and rehabilitated is being used and maintained; determine whether support is needed for the committees that manage these structures

ICLA

- Follow up on whether local leaders are continuing to undertake actions that had been discussed through the trainings – such as giving *témoignage* letters for free

Annex 1: Interviews and focus group discussions

	IDP		Host family		Vulnerable		Non-benef		Benef civil docs		Leaders		<i>Total</i>
	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	
Kyeshero	13	13	10	8	13	6	12	0	6	0	4	6	91
Mabanga Sud	9	6	11	7	10	8	10	0	3	0	5	6	75
<i>Total</i>	22	19	21	15	23	14	22	0	9	0	9	12	166

Interviews

Brooke Loughten	NRC	Policy and Advocacy Advisor
Zoe Jordan	NRC	Urban Team Lead
Juliette Syn	NRC	ICLA Program Manager
Laura Phelps	NRC	Urban Technical Advisor
Norbert Maombi	NRC	Urban Project Officer
Nicole Weber	Mercy Corps	Health and Behaviour Change Manager
	Government	Kyeshero Chefs Quarter - Adjoint
	Government	Kyeshero Chefs Quarter - Adjoint

Annex 2: Logframe

RESULTS	Intervention Logic	Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVI)	Sources of Verification (SOV)	Assumptions
	<p><u>OVERALL OBJECTIVE (IMPACT)</u></p> <p>To support an integrated response to urban displacement in Goma and facilitate local integration as a durable solution for vulnerable IDPs</p>			
	<p><u>SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE (OUTCOME)</u></p> <p>1. Contribute to improving accessibility and accountability of government actors and state services for persons affected by displacement (PAD⁴³) in urban areas.</p> <p>2. To increase preparedness to manage and provide</p>	<p>1.a. % increase in the number of IDPs (m/f) referring concerns to government and state services/using government or state services</p> <p>1.b. % of IDP concerns raised which receive a positive response from the relevant authority</p> <p>1.c. % increase of PAD who perceive that their inputs influence decision making of targeted government actors.</p> <p>2.a % of targeted community-level institutions (churches/schools/health centres) with preparedness plans for</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Baseline and Endline survey ▪ NRC Evaluation Report ▪ NRC monthly reports ▪ Government and civil society reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The security situation remains stable, and allows for ongoing humanitarian activities • Community members will see value in civil society programmes and have time to participate. • Government actors see value in NRC activities and fully participate • Humanitarian community/clusters willing to engage on this topic

⁴³ For the purpose of this project a person affected by displacement (PAD) will be understood as either an Internally Displaced Person (IDP) or an individual/family who is hosting IDPs in their residence

<p>assistance to newly displaced persons in Goma</p> <p>3. To improve the capacity of persons affected by displacement in urban areas to meet their basic needs</p>	<p>new waves of forced displacement to their areas.</p> <p>2.b % of social infrastructures with improved capacity to absorb new IDPs at the end of project implementation.</p> <p>3. a. % increase in number of IDPs (m/f), who know where to go and which services (basic needs, information, and legal services) they can access following displacement.</p> <p>3.b. % increase in IDPs or host family members (m/f) accessing identified basic needs relative to baseline</p> <p>3.c. Change in reported primary needs towards education, healthcare, and treated water</p>		
<p><u>OUTPUTS</u></p> <p>1.1 Provincial and municipal authorities have an improved awareness of their roles and responsibilities towards urban IDPs, and increasingly identify, document, and respond to their needs.</p>	<p>1.1.a. # attendants (m/f) at Roles & Responsibility workshops (R&R)</p> <p>1.1.b. % of government representatives (m/f) trained by NRC who receive post test score of at least 70%</p> <p>1.1.c % of urban IDPs (m/f) registered in accordance with Congolese law</p> <p>1.1.d. # of PAD (m/f) concerns formally registered with government institutions in targeted zones.</p> <p>1.2.a. # of meetings between civil society representatives or groups and</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ NRC monthly reporting ▪ Training reports ▪ Civil society reporting ▪ Meeting notes ▪ Government policy reporting ▪ Baseline/endline survey 	<p><u>Same as above</u></p>

<p>1.2 Community based civil society structures engage in systematic dialogue with relevant authorities in order to address IDP concerns in urban areas.</p> <p>2.1 Communities in Goma have an improved capacity to absorb newly displaced persons and support their local integration.</p> <p>2.2 PADs have access to information in all phases of displacement regarding where to go for help, and which services are available.</p>	<p>authorities in which IDP concerns are raised and documented.</p> <p>1.2.b. # of action points from meetings which are followed up on</p> <p>1.2.c # of PADs (m/f) who report feeling more confident to approach authorities with concerns at the end of project implementation.</p> <p>2.1 a # of service providers identified with excess absorption capacity.</p> <p>2.1.b # of upgraded community structures</p> <p>2.1.c. # of contracts/negotiation documents signed with service providers which contain conditionality for expansion in event of new arrivals</p> <p>2.1.d # of preparedness meetings/workshops with local and community authorities, and CBOs.</p> <p>2.2.a # referral systems created</p> <p>2.2.b # of visits by PADs (m/f) to referral system with requests on service provision, government responsibilities, etc.</p> <p>2.2.c # of referral services provided</p> <p>2.2.d. # of key information documents produced and disseminated</p> <p>3.1.a # of beneficiaries (m/f) receiving unconditional cash transfers to meet gap needs.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Power mapping available 	
---	---	---	--

	<p>3.1 PADs have improved resources to meet basic needs.</p> <p>3.2 Persons affected by displacement have enhanced access to quality services to respond to basic needs.</p>	<p>3.1b # of households which report using cash transfers for essential needs</p> <p>3.1c % of households surveyed with increased FCS⁴⁴</p> <p>3.1.d. # of families receiving cash transfers reporting a decrease in household debt</p> <p>3.2.a. # PADs reporting accessing education services in targeted districts</p> <p>3.2b # PADs reporting accessing healthcare services in targeted districts</p> <p>3.2c # PADs reporting accessing legal services in targeted districts</p>		
	<p><u>ACTIVITIES</u></p> <p><u>Cross-cutting activities</u></p> <p>2.2.1 Mapping of relevant state power structures in targeted urban zones (both those currently accessed and those not being accessed by the displaced). Mapping of community/traditional power structures in targeted urban zones (both those currently accessed and those not being accessed by the displaced)</p> <p>2.2.2 Development and implementation of an advocacy plan</p> <p>2.2.3 Conduct a market analysis of urban Goma using the EMMA tool, with a focus on basic needs</p>	<p><u>INPUTS</u></p> <p><u>Project Management/Support</u></p> <p>Urban Displacement Team Leader (35%)</p> <p>Urban Displacement Officer (10%)</p> <p>FAM, Country Director, 1 driver, 1 M&E staff, support of office running costs (including rent, utilities, security, office equipment/supplies), maintenance and fuel of 1 car, project evaluation, international travel</p> <p><u>Output 1.1</u></p>	<p><u>COSTS</u></p> <p><u>Project Management/Support</u></p> <p>37%</p> <p>245,347</p> <p><u>Output 1.1.</u></p> <p>3.68%</p> <p>24,172</p> <p><u>Output 1.2.</u></p> <p>2.83%</p>	<p><u>ASSUMPTIONS</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The risk of corruption can be mitigated by strong internal controls and rigorous response to any cases that arise • NRC is able to retain high quality staff throughout the project period (e.g. the project experiences minimal staff turnover) • Government and Local NGO partners have the capacity to integrate lessons learned from NRC training and support

⁴⁴ Food Consumption Score

<p>provision, petty trading, access to rental markets, and income generation.</p>	<p>Urban Displacement Team Leader (10%)</p>	<p>18,557</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There will be further arrivals of IDPs to urban areas.
<p>Output 1.1</p>	<p>Urban Displacement Officer (15%)</p>	<p>Output 2.1.</p>	<p>PRECONDITIONS</p>
<p>2.2.4 Train key state actors and authorities on their roles and responsibilities vis-a-vis displaced persons living in their jurisdiction</p>	<p>Governance assistants (2 x 40%)</p>	<p>7.25%</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The USD/NOK exchange rate does not undergo extreme fluctuation during the project period
<p>2.2.5 Provide mentorship and material support to key institutions in order to improve their capacity to respond to PAD concerns.</p>	<p>Training and workshop costs</p>	<p>47,600</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The security situation remains stable, and allows for ongoing humanitarian activities
<p>2.2.6 Systematically monitor actions taken by authorities in response to PAD concerns raised by civil society representatives.</p>	<p>Training and workshop supplies</p>	<p>Output 2.2.</p>	
<p>2.2.7 Pilot community based approach to registration using cell-phones</p>	<p>Mapping costs</p>	<p>1.93%</p>	
<p>Output 1.2</p>	<p>Material support costs</p>	<p>12,678</p>	
<p>2.2.8 Work with identified community-based structures to ensure adequate integration and empowerment of IDP representatives.</p>	<p>Output 1.2</p>	<p>Output 3.1</p>	
<p>2.2.9 Carry out workshops with community based civil society structures to strengthen engagement strategy with local authorities.</p>	<p>Urban Displacement Team Leader (10%)</p>	<p>39.97%</p>	
<p>2.2.10 Engage local civil society and key state institutions in joint collaborative forums to allow PAD concerns to be systematically raised and addressed by appropriate authorities.</p>	<p>Urban Displacement Officer (15%)</p>	<p>262,443</p>	
<p>2.2.11 Assessment of existing hosting capacity and service</p>	<p>Governance assistants (2 x 40%)</p>	<p>Output 3.2</p>	
<p>Output 2.1</p>	<p>Training and workshop costs</p>	<p>6.98%</p>	
<p>2.2.11 Assessment of existing hosting capacity and service</p>	<p>Training and workshop supplies</p>	<p>45,854</p>	
<p>Output 2.1</p>	<p>Mapping costs</p>	<p>Administration (7%)</p>	
<p>2.2.11 Assessment of existing hosting capacity and service</p>	<p>Material support costs</p>	<p>301,001</p>	
<p>2.2.11 Assessment of existing hosting capacity and service</p>	<p>Forum meeting costs</p>	<p>Total Cost</p>	
<p>2.2.11 Assessment of existing hosting capacity and service</p>	<p>Output 2.1</p>	<p>4,300,000</p>	
<p>2.2.11 Assessment of existing hosting capacity and service</p>	<p>Urban Displacement Team Leader (10%)</p>		
<p>2.2.11 Assessment of existing hosting capacity and service</p>	<p>Urban Displacement Officer (15%)</p>		
<p>2.2.11 Assessment of existing hosting capacity and service</p>	<p>Preparedness assistant (60%)</p>		
<p>2.2.11 Assessment of existing hosting capacity and service</p>	<p>Training and workshop costs including food, material supplies and support materials</p>		

	<p>providers, and identification of areas in need of expansion or support.</p> <p>2.2.12 Negotiate agreements with key services providers to facilitate rapid-response of basic services following new displacement.</p> <p>2.2.13 Work with communities to identify small scale capacity gaps for hosting IDPs</p> <p>2.2.14 Work with NRC core-competencies to execute micro-projects that respond to community identified capacity gaps.</p> <p><u>Output 2.2</u></p> <p>2.2.15 Identify and train community focal points to support PADs through the referral system</p> <p>2.2.16 Develop and strategically disseminate informational materials designed to inform IDPs on where and how to access services</p> <p><u>Output 3.1</u></p> <p>2.2.17 Negotiate cash transfer mechanism with mobile phone provider</p> <p>2.2.18 Provide monthly cash transfers to meet gap needs to 600 families in 2 targeted urban localities (1200 total).</p> <p><u>Output 3.2</u></p> <p>2.2.19 Identify barriers facing IDPs in urban areas which</p>	<p>Mapping costs</p> <p>Microproject implementation</p> <p><u>Output 2.2</u></p> <p>Urban Displacement Team Leader (10%)</p> <p>Urban Displacement Officer (15%)</p> <p>Preparedness assistant (40%)</p> <p>Governance assistants (2 x 20%)</p> <p>Information material production and dissemination costs</p> <p>Training costs</p> <p>Mapping costs</p> <p><u>Output 3.1</u></p> <p>Urban Displacement Team Leader (15%)</p> <p>Urban Displacement Officer (15%)</p> <p>Cash assistants (2 x 75%)</p> <p>Cash transfer costs (including sim cards, transfer fees, etc.)</p> <p><u>Output 3.2</u></p> <p>Urban Displacement Team Leader (10%)</p>		
--	---	---	--	--

	<p>prevent access to high quality basic social services.</p> <p>2.2.20 Respond to service gaps identified by PADs in targeted areas⁴⁵</p>	<p>Urban Displacement Officer (15%)</p> <p>Cash assistants (2 x 25%)</p> <p>Direct support costs</p>		
--	--	--	--	--

⁴⁵ This could include (among other responses): distribution of educational vouchers to targeted schools to help meet education costs, distribution of jerry cans to improve access to clean water, and hand-washing campaigns and water treatment information to improve sanitation, or rehabilitation of doors and windows and installation of locks to improve security of property.

Annex 3: Logframe indicators

Logframe indicators

INTERVENTION LOGIC	Sub-project name: Urban Displacement Sub-project code: CDFY1403	Comments if deviation from target																								
<p><u>OVERALL OBJECTIVE (IMPACT)</u></p> <p>To support an integrated response to urban displacement in Goma and facilitate local integration as a durable solution for vulnerable IDPs</p>																										
<p><u>SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE (OUTCOME)</u></p> <p>4. Contribute to improving accessibility and accountability of government actors and state services for persons affected by displacement (PAD⁴⁶) in urban areas.</p>	<p>1.a. % increase in the number of IDPs (m/f) referring concerns to government and state services/using government or state services. Target: 10% Achieved:</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; margin-bottom: 10px;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="width: 35%;">Referral to community leaders</th> <th style="width: 15%;">Security problem</th> <th style="width: 15%;">Social problem</th> <th style="width: 15%;">Domestic problem</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Endline</td> <td style="text-align: center;">37%</td> <td style="text-align: center;">24%</td> <td style="text-align: center;">24%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Baseline</td> <td style="text-align: center;">22%</td> <td style="text-align: center;">22%</td> <td style="text-align: center;">17%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>1.b. % of IDP concerns raised which receive a positive response from the relevant authority Target: 25% Achieved: Not monitored</p> <p>1.c. % increase of PAD who perceive that their inputs influence decision making of targeted government actors. Achieved:</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; margin-bottom: 10px;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="width: 35%;"></th> <th style="width: 15%;">10 houses</th> <th style="width: 15%;">Avenue</th> <th style="width: 15%;">Quartier</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Endline</td> <td style="text-align: center;">97%</td> <td style="text-align: center;">98%</td> <td style="text-align: center;">96%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Baseline</td> <td style="text-align: center;">91%</td> <td style="text-align: center;">93%</td> <td style="text-align: center;">90%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>2.a % of targeted community-level institutions (churches/schools/health centres) with preparedness plans for new waves of forced displacement to their areas.</p>	Referral to community leaders	Security problem	Social problem	Domestic problem	Endline	37%	24%	24%	Baseline	22%	22%	17%		10 houses	Avenue	Quartier	Endline	97%	98%	96%	Baseline	91%	93%	90%	<p>1.a. Social and domestic problems are more likely to be referred to family members or religious authorities than the state.</p>
Referral to community leaders	Security problem	Social problem	Domestic problem																							
Endline	37%	24%	24%																							
Baseline	22%	22%	17%																							
	10 houses	Avenue	Quartier																							
Endline	97%	98%	96%																							
Baseline	91%	93%	90%																							
<p>5. To increase preparedness to</p>																										

⁴⁶ For the purpose of this project a person affected by displacement (PAD) will be understood as either an Internally Displaced Person (IDP) or an individual/family who is hosting IDPs in their residence

<p>manage and provide assistance to newly displaced persons in Goma</p> <p>6. To improve the capacity of persons affected by displacement in urban areas to meet their basic needs</p>	<p>Target: 4 Achieved: 0</p> <p>2.b Improved and updated inter-cluster humanitarian preparedness plan for new waves of forced displacement in urban Goma exists.</p> <p>Target: 1 Achieved: 0</p> <p>2.c % of social infrastructures with improved capacity to absorb new IDPs at the end of project implementation.</p> <p>Target: 2 Achieved: 2</p> <p>3.a. % increase in number of IDPs (m/f), who know where to go and which services (basic needs, information, and legal services) they can access following displacement.</p> <p>Achieved:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="400 954 1257 1171"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>Birth certificate</th> <th>School registration</th> <th>Health Services</th> <th>Marriages</th> <th>Register Displacement</th> <th>Legal complaint</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Endline</td> <td>31%</td> <td>91%</td> <td>94%</td> <td>44%</td> <td>73%</td> <td>35%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Baseline</td> <td>47%</td> <td>87%</td> <td>94%</td> <td>66%</td> <td>39%</td> <td>43%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>3.b. % increase in IDPs or host family members (m/f) accessing identified basic needs relative to baseline</p> <p>Achieved:</p> <p>Food: Achieved: 59% with a food consumption score above 42 (Increase from 52%)</p> <p>Clean water: 44% of households rely on lake water (no change from baseline)</p> <p>3.c. Change in reported primary needs towards education, healthcare, and treated water</p> <p>Achieved:</p> <p>Education: 48% (13.5% baseline)</p> <p>Healthcare: 47% (5% baseline)</p>		Birth certificate	School registration	Health Services	Marriages	Register Displacement	Legal complaint	Endline	31%	91%	94%	44%	73%	35%	Baseline	47%	87%	94%	66%	39%	43%	<p>2.a. Workshops were held in the community to begin discussions around preparedness for new displacement. Key problems were identified and suggestions made, but these have not yet been transformed into formal plans. The question was complicated by the announcement of camp closure, which is highly political.</p> <p>2.b. Fed into humanitarian discussion on camp closure and durable solutions.</p>
	Birth certificate	School registration	Health Services	Marriages	Register Displacement	Legal complaint																	
Endline	31%	91%	94%	44%	73%	35%																	
Baseline	47%	87%	94%	66%	39%	43%																	
<p>OUTPUTS</p> <p>1.3 Provincial and municipal authorities have an improved awareness</p>	<p>1.1.a. # attendants (m/f) at Roles & Responsibility workshops (R&R)</p> <p>Target: 92 Achieved: 92</p> <p>1.1.b. # of formal commitments to workshop recommendations signed</p>	<p>1.1.d. This activity was dropped, due to protection concerns around use of data</p>																					

<p>of their roles and responsibilities towards urban IDPs, and increasingly identify, document, and respond to their needs.</p> <p>1.4 Community based civil society structures engage in systematic dialogue with relevant authorities in order to address IDP concerns in urban areas.</p>	<p>by participants</p> <p>Target: 100%</p> <p>Achieved: 100% committed to 11 recommendations</p> <p>1.1.c. % of government representatives (m/f) trained by NRC who receive post test score of at least 70%</p> <p>Target: 60%</p> <p>Achieved: 48%</p> <p>1.1.d % of urban IDPs (m/f) registered in accordance with Congolese law</p> <p>Achieved: See comments</p> <p>1.1.e. # of PAD (m/f) concerns formally registered with government institutions in targeted zones.</p> <p>Achieved: Not monitored</p> <p>1.2.a. # of meetings between civil society representatives or groups and authorities in which IDP concerns are raised and documented.</p> <p>Target: 3</p> <p>Achieved: 4</p> <p>1.2.b. # of action points from meetings which are followed up on</p> <p>Achieved: See comments</p> <p>1.2.c % of PADs (m/f) who report feeling more confident to approach authorities with concerns at the end of project implementation.</p> <p>Achieved: 87% (baseline: 69.5%)</p> <p>2.1 a # of service providers identified with excess absorption capacity.</p> <p>Target: 1</p> <p>Achieved: 1</p> <p>2.1.b # of upgraded community structures</p> <p>Target: 4</p> <p>Achieved: 4</p> <p>2.1.c. # of contracts/negotiation documents signed with service providers</p> <p>Achieved: 1</p> <p>2.1.d # of preparedness meetings/workshops with local and community authorities, and CBOs.</p> <p>Target: 3</p> <p>Achieved: 12</p> <p>2.2.a # referral systems created</p> <p>Target: 1</p> <p>Achieved: See comments</p> <p>2.2.b # of visits by PADs (m/f) to referral system with requests on service provision, government responsibilities, etc.</p>	<p>1.2.b 2 trainings in each quartier with local associations. 4 further meetings have been held to follow up on action plans developed in the trainings.</p> <p>2.1.b : Structures built : Health Centre Afia : 4 latrines, 2 showers, and facilities for maternal waste disposal EP Nyamulagira: 16 latrines, 1 water capture system EP Ndahura: 4 classrooms and 2 administrative offices EP Rutoboko: 2 classrooms</p> <p>2.2.a and 2.2.b: Method of implementation</p>
--	--	---

<p>2.2 PADs have access to information in all phases of displacement regarding where to go for help, and which services are available.</p>	<p>Achieved: See comments</p> <p>2.2.c # of referral services provided</p> <p>Achieved: 246 attestations of residence, 85 proof of loss documents for identity cards, 24 replacement identity cards issued, 88 children registered with the state (46 girls and 42 boys), 8 marriages registered with the state</p> <p>2.2.d. # of key information documents produced and disseminated</p> <p>Target: 1 radio, 2 print</p> <p>Achieved: 0</p> <p>3.1.a # of targeted beneficiaries (m/f) receiving unconditional cash transfers to meet gap needs.</p> <p>Target: 1200</p> <p>Achieved: 1260 (854 women, 406 men)</p> <p>3.1.b # of households report using cash transfers for essential needs</p>	<p>changed – participants in trainings had responsibility to share information learnt with constituents.</p> <p>2.2.c lists documents received by project beneficiaries following trainings.</p> <p>3.1.b shows the primary use of cash transfers for each round. Primary uses were: Education, household items, small businesses, and ceremonies.</p>																																																								
<p>3.1 PADs have improved resources to meet basic needs.</p>	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>1st transfer</th> <th>2nd transfer</th> <th>3rd transfer</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Home improvement</td> <td>2%</td> <td>4%</td> <td>4%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Clothing</td> <td>2%</td> <td>11%</td> <td>9%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Paying rent/accom</td> <td>7%</td> <td>4%</td> <td>4%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Household items</td> <td>15%</td> <td>12%</td> <td>12%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Livestock</td> <td>2%</td> <td>0%</td> <td>1%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Business</td> <td>11%</td> <td>4%</td> <td>18%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>School fees</td> <td>34%</td> <td>26%</td> <td>10%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Food</td> <td>10%</td> <td>20%</td> <td>23%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Debt repayment</td> <td>0%</td> <td>1%</td> <td>1%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ceremonies</td> <td>12%</td> <td>15%</td> <td>12%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Health care</td> <td>1%</td> <td>0%</td> <td>0%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Land</td> <td>0%</td> <td>0%</td> <td>0%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Other</td> <td>3%</td> <td>2%</td> <td>7%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		1st transfer	2 nd transfer	3rd transfer	Home improvement	2%	4%	4%	Clothing	2%	11%	9%	Paying rent/accom	7%	4%	4%	Household items	15%	12%	12%	Livestock	2%	0%	1%	Business	11%	4%	18%	School fees	34%	26%	10%	Food	10%	20%	23%	Debt repayment	0%	1%	1%	Ceremonies	12%	15%	12%	Health care	1%	0%	0%	Land	0%	0%	0%	Other	3%	2%	7%	
	1st transfer	2 nd transfer	3rd transfer																																																							
Home improvement	2%	4%	4%																																																							
Clothing	2%	11%	9%																																																							
Paying rent/accom	7%	4%	4%																																																							
Household items	15%	12%	12%																																																							
Livestock	2%	0%	1%																																																							
Business	11%	4%	18%																																																							
School fees	34%	26%	10%																																																							
Food	10%	20%	23%																																																							
Debt repayment	0%	1%	1%																																																							
Ceremonies	12%	15%	12%																																																							
Health care	1%	0%	0%																																																							
Land	0%	0%	0%																																																							
Other	3%	2%	7%																																																							
<p>3.2 Persons affected by displacement have enhanced access to</p>	<p>3.1c # of families with FCS⁴⁷ above 42</p> <p>Achieved: 59%</p> <p>3.1.d. # of families reporting a decrease in household debt</p> <p>Achieved: 58%</p> <p>3.2.a. # IDPs accessing services (education, healthcare, legal)</p> <p>Food: Achieved: 59% with a food consumption score above 42 (Increase from 52%)</p> <p>Clean water: 44% of households rely on lake water. No change from baseline</p> <p>Average expenditure healthcare: \$28.5 (\$20.6 baseline)</p>																																																									

⁴⁷ Food Consumption Score

quality services to respond to basic needs.		
--	--	--