Independent Evaluation of the NRC Expert Deployment/NORCAP Response To The Nepal 2015 Earthquake

Jock Baker and Uma Narayanan

Table of Contents

ANNEXES

Acknowledgements

****

Cover photo: *REUTERS / Adnan Abidi*

1   Executive Summary

1.1 Introduction

This independent evaluation provides an opportunity to learn from NORCAP's response to the 2015 Nepal earthquake, including the value-added of using deployments when compared to other types of interventions. This evaluation covers selected NRC/NORCAP deployments to United Nations (UN) organisations and the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) in Nepal between 25 April 2015, the date of the earthquake, and 31 December 2015. The main users of the results of this evaluation are staff in the Expert Deployment/NORCAP department to inform their planning and programming for future similar interventions. It is expected that this evaluation will also be useful for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), as a major supporter of NORCAP, and to standby partner focal points in host agencies.

1.1.1   NORCAP

Since its establishment in 1991, NORCAP has deployed experts to more than 9,000 missions worldwide. The NORCAP rosters contain more than 900 experienced professionals based in Norway, Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America and is one of the largest standby capacities in the world.

To support the scale up of UN's relief operations in Nepal, the MFA allocated NOK 10 million to support the deployment of 20 experts for 6 months. By 31 December 2015, the NMFA grant had supported the deployment of 20 experts and almost 90 person-months of work in ten specialist areas.   Deployments were also funded by other sources. In total 39 experts were deployed, 31 of which are covered by the scope of this evaluation. The first eight NORCAP experts were deployed within the first week following the earthquake.   NRC/NORCAP deployments prioritised three aspects of the response; coordination, responding to urgent needs and building back better during the recovery phase.

1.1.2   The 2015 Earthquake and Humanitarian Context in Nepal

An earthquake measuring 7.8 magnitude struck an area between Kathmandu and Pokhara on the morning of 25 April 2015, affecting 39 of Nepal's 75 districts. The earthquake and aftershocks caused more than 8,400 casualties and 17,800 injuries, left some 500,000 homeless and had far-reaching impacts on livelihoods and social services.

The operating environment in Nepal posed a number of challenges for international humanitarian agencies due to a combination of difficulties in accessing populations in remote areas and limited capacity of Kathmandu's airport to support relief operations. Outdated national disaster laws and response structures created bottlenecks for delivery of relief. According to national laws, International agencies are not allowed to directly implement, but were required to work through national agencies with limited capacities. The recovery phase was also delayed since it took time for the government to establish the National Reconstruction Authority and finalise and communicate relevant policies and operational plans.

Since the 2015 Nepal earthquake was of a large scale disaster, considerable surge was deployed from both internal rosters and externally from standby partners such as NORCAP. Host agencies mobilized surge staff that increased their staff by 20 – 50% in comparison with pre-disaster levels.

1.2 Methodology

This evaluation was based on the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, outcomes/impact and sustainability. The methodology combined a desk review of secondary data together with a series of semi-structured key informant and focus group interviews that collected quantitative and qualitative data using an interview guide based on the questions in the TOR for the evaluation. A total of 47 key informants from NRC/NORCAP (staff and deployees), UN, IOM, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and peer standby partners were interviewed.

Some of these interviews took place during a brief visit to Kathmandu by one of the team members and findings and recommendations were validated during a workshop at NORCAP HQ in Oslo and during subsequent conference calls involving three of the HQ standby partner focal points for host agencies.

1.3 Main Findings

Based on findings from this evaluation, NORCAP was judged to have provided relevant and timely support to operational presence and deliver humanitarian assistance to populations affected by the crisis. NORCAP expert deployments were allocated amongst seven agencies, with most common functional role as part of the Camp Coordination and Camp management (CCCM) cluster led by IOM.

1.3.1 Relevance

The majority of NORCAP deployees were found to have been equipped with the right attitudes, social skills and experience and were able to hit the ground running upon arrival. Since relatively few host agency staff in Nepal had experience in responding to large scale disasters and international agencies are not allowed under national laws to implement directly, NORCAP deployees who had prior experience in interagency coordination and implementing relief interventions through national agencies with limited capacities were highly valued by host agencies.

1.3.2 Efficiency

Deployments were generally viewed as timely, with the first NORCAP international deployment happening within 72 hours of the disaster. A more important factor influencing timeliness was that most of the host agencies (and government authorities) took time to get organized and had difficulties managing deployments efficiently during the early phases of the response. Decisions about deployments were largely left up to host agency regional offices or their HQs, and this led to differing expectations about deployee roles and confusion about their terms and conditions.

1.3.3 Effectiveness and Outcomes

Host agencies viewed NORCAP as a valued standby partner, citing the size and diversity of the roster along with their appropriate approach and wide experience of deployees. Experts included Nepali nationals and other deployees from the South Asia region who already had a good knowledge of the local context, culture, language and geography. Approximately two-thirds of the deployees interviewed felt that their deployments had been well-utilized by the host agencies and that they were able to directly contribute to the programme objectives.

Deployees who felt their deployments were less successful attributed this to frequent changes of supervisors in the host agency, poor understanding of deployees' role, lack of suitable counterparts, absence of a coherent exit strategy and/or being asked to fill roles where they had little or no previous experience. Although a total of 31 individuals were deployed, there was no visit by senior NORCAP staff until nine months after the earthquake. While most deployees acknowledged that the NORCAP IT system is highly advanced, at the same time they highlighted the lack of a personal connection with the NORCAP secretariat, which can be partially attributed to reorganisation of NORCAP HQ that took place while the response was ongoing.

1.3.4 Sustainability

Sustainability was a challenge, particularly for short deployments and those that took place the initial phase of the response. There were also significant obstacles faced by deployees who stayed for a longer period due to lack of designated counterparts by host agencies and delays in obtaining agreement on a government comprehensive recovery and reconstruction plan where international agencies could contribute. There were nevertheless some positive examples of NORCAP deployees seconded to UN Women, IOM and UNICEF helping to establish systems that were still in use.

1.3.5 Value Added and Value for Money

After the earthquake struck it quickly became apparent that many national and international agencies lacked disaster management capacity and experience to respond to a disaster of such a magnitude. Deployments were seen to add most value where deployees brought in experience of

working in humanitarian systems in large emergencies (clusters, humanitarian financing, coordination) and working with local partners. The major cost drivers of NORCAP's intervention were salaries and benefits accounting for the major share of the approximate average cost of just over US$290/day for a deployee.[1] NORCAP deployees were seen to have a comparative advantage in relation to internal surge of hosting agencies due to their relatively lower cost and longer deployment duration.

1.4 Summary of Recommendations

Two sets of recommendations, one targeted specifically at NORCAP and the other jointly to NORCAP and host agencies, are provided at the end of this report. Recommendations targeted at NORCAP concern the need to develop both "soft" and technical skills of deployees so that they can integrate effectively with host agencies while filling key capacity gaps, not only with technical skills, but also through supporting interagency coordination and delivering relief through local partners. It is also recommended that NORCAP HQ take a more "hands-on" approach to coordination, monitoring and learning for disasters where certain thresholds are exceeded.

Recommendations targeted at both NORCAP and host agencies focus on the need to improve performance review systems and enhance the ability of host agencies to manage and maximise effectiveness of deployments.

---

[1] Source: NORCAP Adviser interview cross based on disbursement amounts as of the end of January 2016. Total cost of Nepal deployments was USD 502,030 for 1,021 days, an average of USD 292 per day.

2   List of abbreviations and acronyms

ACAPS	Assessment Capacities Project
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DSB	Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB)
EiE	Education in Emergencies
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GenCap	Gender Standby Capacity Project
GEWE	Gender equality and women's empowerment
GWG	Inter Cluster Gender Working Group
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HR	Human Resources
HQ	Headquarters
IASC	Interagency Steering Committee
IHP	International Humanitarian Partnership
IOM	International Office of Migration
IT	Information Technology
KII	Key Informant Interview
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Norway)
MPWC	Multi-Purpose Women Centres
NGO	Non-government Organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
PERs	Performance Evaluation Reviews
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
STAIT	Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Program (UN)

3   Introduction

3.1 Evaluation Purpose, Scope and Use

This independent evaluation carried out by two external consultants aims to promote learning and accountability. It provides an opportunity to learn from the outcomes of NORCAP's response to the 2015 Nepal earthquake including the value-added of using deployments, notably those involving NORCAP experts, when compared to other types of interventions. The evaluation also helps the NRC to be accountable to their partners, donors and communities affected by the disaster.

This evaluation covers selected NRC/NORCAP deployments of NORCAP and GenCap experts[2] to UN organisations and IOM in Nepal between 25 April 2015 and 31 December 2015 in Kathmandu and in the earthquake-affected districts of Gorkha and Sindupalchowk districts. The evaluation framework was based on the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, outcomes/impact and sustainability.

The main users of this evaluation are staff in the Expert Deployment/NORCAP department to improve their planning and programming for future similar deployments. The findings are also of potential interest to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) as a major donor for deployments and funder of this evaluation, and to standby partner focal points in host agencies.

3.2 NORCAP Background

NORCAP, the Norwegian Refugee Council's expert deployment capacity, aims to improve international and local capacity to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from crises. This is done by bringing different actors together and deploying experts to the UN, international and regional organisations and national institutions.

Since its establishment in 1991, NORCAP has deployed experts to more than 9,000 missions worldwide. NORCAP rosters contain more than 900 experienced professionals from Norway, Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. NORCAP also operates seven thematic rosters in collaboration with the UN and other partners to provide high-level specialised expertise in the areas of protection, gender, needs assessments, mediation, camp coordination, cash and markets and communication with affected communities. Experts on these rosters work across sectors to improve the response based on needs of affected communities. NORCAP's 2015 Annual Plan for MFA funding focused on two primary objectives:

1. Strengthened UN, international community and national stakeholders in all stages of a crisis, from prevention/early warning and response, to monitoring, reconstruction, conflict resolution, sustainable development and democratic governance.

2. Strengthened relations between the UN and the Norwegian society, humanitarian community and authorities.

During 2015, NORCAP rosters supported international, regional and national actors by contributing more than 220 person-years to the UN and other partners in 70 countries, including Nepal.

3.3 The 2015 Nepal Earthquake

With its complex geophysical structure and vulnerability to various types of disasters, Nepal ranks as one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world.[3] An earthquake measuring 7.8 magnitude struck an area between Kathmandu and Pokhara during the morning of 25 April 2015, affecting 39

---

[2] Nepal deployments from ACAPS, ProCap and one special deployment are not covered by the scope of this evaluation.

[3] Gaire, S. et al (2015)

of Nepal's 75 districts (see map below). The earthquake was followed by a series of aftershocks, including one measuring 7.3 magnitude that struck on 12 May 2015. The April 25th quake and the May 12th aftershock caused more than 8,400 casualties and 17,800 injuries, left some 500,000 homeless and had far-reaching impacts on livelihoods and social services.[4]

Figure 1 – Earthquakes in Nepal during the last Century

3.4 Humanitarian context in Nepal

The operating environment in Nepal posed a number of challenges for international humanitarian agencies. International agencies, including international NGO partners of UN agencies, are not normally allowed directly implement under current Nepalese laws and are required to work through national agencies.[5] Access to dispersed populations in remote mountainous areas made coverage challenging. Kathmandu's airport has limited capacity, which created a bottleneck for delivery of relief items.[6] Prior to the earthquake there had been a broad consensus that Nepal's outdated disaster law and response structures needed to be revised to achieve an effective response[7] and these predictions unfortunately proved to be justified. While the Nepal government led the response, the prevailing view was that gaps in the legal framework and government structures undermined the efficiency and effectiveness of the response due to a lack of clarity about policies and procedures. Gaps in the legal framework and operational guidance contributed to a situation where districts tended to interpret and apply rules differently, further complicating an already complex politically-charged operating environment where much of the government apparatus was engaged with drafting and finalising a new constitution.[8] The recovery phase was also delayed, since it took time for policies and operational plans to be finalized and communicated by the government.[9]

---

[4] OCHA (2015a)

[5] Sanderson *et al.* (2015)

[6] Ismat Sarah Mangla (2015) *Bottleneck at Kathmandu Airport Delays Aid, Strands Passengers*. IBT 29 April 2015

[7] IFRC (2011), Ferris and White (2015)

[8] The new Constitution was launched on 20 September 2015, during the visit of the RTE team.

[9] http://www.irinnews.org/report/102359/how-politics-delayed-nepal-reconstruction

3.5   NORCAP Response to the Nepal Earthquake

NRC/NORCAP focused on three aspects of the response, which were described in their application for funds to the MFA:

- **Coordination**: NORCAP aimed to strengthen the capacity of UN partners in Nepal through their contributions to cluster coordination, information management and logistics so that they could respond to emerging humanitarian needs. A key focus for NORCAP's deployments was to be active at a community level and support outreach to affected areas outside Kathmandu.

- **Responding to urgent needs**: NORCAP has a large pool of highly qualified roster members who had the potential to provide essential support to UN organisations meeting basic needs, such as shelter, food, water and sanitation.

- **Building back better**: NRC deployed gender/gender based violence experts and education experts to support the interagency work to find durable solutions within their sectors and explored other ways of supporting UN partners with long-term reconstruction efforts.

To support the scale up NRC's support to the UN's relief operations in Nepal, the MFA allocated NOK 10 million to support the deployment of 20 NORCAP experts over a period of 6 months (or the equivalent in person-months).[10] In total, 39 experts were deployed from the NORCAP rosters until December 31st , thirty-one of whom were covered within the scope of this evaluation. The first eight NORCAP experts were deployed within the first month after the earthquake.

3.6   Timeline for the NORCAP Response

Event	Date
Major earthquake (7.8 magnitude)	25 April 2015
Arrival of the first international NORCAP deployee in Nepal	26 April 2015
Submission of NOK 10 million proposal to MFA	Late April
First requests received from host agencies	30 April 2015
Strong aftershock (7.3 magnitude)	12 May 2015
Declaration of the end of emergency phase by the government	End August 2015

3.7   Surge Capacities for the Nepal Earthquake Response

Since the 2015 Nepal earthquake was a major disaster there was a considerable amount of surge both internally, from host agency surge rosters, and externally from standby partners such as NORCAP. Host agencies mobilized surge staff from their Head Office, Regional Office and Country Offices to increase their staff by 20 – 50% in comparison with pre-disaster levels, with many of these deployments reinforcing programme support functions like HR, Finance and IT. Larger host agencies such as WFP and IOM received support from multiple standby partners during the response, including RedR Australia, MSB, DRC and Irish Aid. WFP also worked with standby partners from the

---

[10] Some of the deployments, including the GenCap deployments were funded by other sources.

private sector including the Eriksson Response Team[11] and EMERGENCY.LU (E-LU) from Luxembourg.

A lessons learned review commissioned by the IASC in early 2016 found a number of shortfalls in the way surge capacities had been managed, notably in terms of inadequate orientation and excessive turnover, which had an adverse effect on their value for money (see Section 5.5).

Top Priorities for Surge[12]

Better management of surge to protect government-international community relationships. Unless involved in in-country preparedness or well briefed, IASC surge resources risk eroding the goodwill of national governments as well as other key actors, due to lack of understanding of, or reference to, local culture and context. Existing pre-disaster government-international community coordination mechanisms risk withdrawal of government involvement and potentially access to affected populations in the response, but also present a high risk of adversely affecting cooperation in post-disaster recovery as well as longer-term development coordination.

Turnover and churn – government and international community. The political dynamics in Nepal mean that there are frequent changes in key government roles which reset many relationships. Frequent changes in staff during the response and, in particular, changes and displacement of national cluster coordinators by international surge have meant a disengagement of government in some instances. There is recognition that international humanitarian agencies continue to face challenges with continuity, handover and knowledge management as well as critical briefing of all staff on context and culture. In recognition of this, the UN Resident Coordinator's Office instituted open daily briefings for incoming staff, made mandatory for UN staff by the UN Resident Coordinator; donors and partners participated too.

Based on findings from this evaluation, the gaps highlighted above seem to be mainly applicable to internal surge rosters of UN and other international humanitarian agencies. As described in more detail below in Section 5.5 under "Main Findings", similar shortfalls were observed with some NORCAP deployments, these represented a minority.[13]

---

[11] http://www.ericsson.com/thecompany/press/mediakits/ericsson_response

[12] Extract from the Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team (STAIT) Review for Nepal - January 2016 (page 14)

[13] It is worth noting that a number of UN and IOM staff supervising NORCAP deployees were deployed from internal surge rosters with the result that some NORCAP deployees had up to three different supervisors due to rapid turnover.

4 Methodology

As described above, this evaluation aimed to promote both learning and accountability. The methodology combined a desk review of secondary data together with a series of semi-structured key informant and focus group interviews that collected quantitative and qualitative data using an interview guide based on the questions in the TOR (attached as an annex). To ensure data integrity and factual accuracy throughout the review process, team members periodically compared and triangulated data that was collected. Recommendations were also reviewed and validated during a stakeholder workshop at NORCAP HQ in Oslo on 7 April 2016[14] and during subsequent conference calls with HQ host agency focal points from IOM, WFP and UN Women. Calls with host agency focal points focused on validating the relevance and achievability of recommendations targeting both NORCAPS and host agencies (Recommendations 10-17).

Key informants were purposively selected to obtain a representative sample to the extent possible within the limited scope to provide the following perspectives:

- Different phases of the response,
- Range of functional responsibilities of NORCAP deployee,
- Different hosting agencies,
- Deployments of different durations,
- Country level and HQ, and
- Other standby partners that had seconded staff to UN agencies and IOM during the Nepal earthquake response to contrast and compare experiences.

Table 1 - Number of Key Informant by Category[15]

Category	Male	Female	Total
NORCAP HQ	2	1	3
Global (Others)[16]	1	6	7
Host Agency staff in Nepal	7	17	24
NORCAP Deployees[17]	10	3	13
Total	20	27	47

During the inception phase of this evaluation it soon became evident that the operational environments in different hosting agencies had significant influence over the results of NORCAP deployments and key informants from hosting agencies were also given the opportunity to provide their perspectives on preliminary findings and recommendations when feasible.

---

[14] See annexes for more details of the methodology along with an agenda for the validation workshop in Oslo on 07 Apr 2016.

[15] A list of key informants is provided as an annex.

[16] Those in the "Other" category include MFA, other standby partners that were involved in the response to the Nepal earthquake (MSB Sweden and RedR Australia) and focal points for standby partners at HQs of UN agencies and IOM.

[17] Six deployees were interviewed during the Nepal field visit who were still serving under a NORCAP contract.

Desk research of secondary data covered a range of themes, but there was a particular focus on developing a good understanding both of the operational environment for NORCAP deployees and their potential contribution to outcomes achieved by hosting agencies. A list of key reference documents used when developing the evidence base for the analysis is attached as an annex, which can be categorised as follows:

- Evaluations and lessons learned reviews undertaken by interagency consortia (IASC, Logistics cluster, UK-based Disasters Emergency Committee) and agencies who have undertaken reviews and evaluations of the response to the Nepal earthquake, and

- Relevant strategic and operational documents and, if available, host agency results frameworks.

Measurement of Outcomes

The evaluation TOR put an emphasis on identifying outcomes. As described below in the Constraints and Limitations section, there were challenges in measuring outcomes due to the limited scope of the evaluation, a limitation that the NORCAP Steering Committee for this evaluation acknowledged during the inception phase. Examples of such challenges included a tendency for deployee roles and responsibilities to deviate from the standard TORs provided or, even if the TOR was aligned at the beginning of their assignment, roles were observed to change over time. A combination of "Most Significant Change" and Outcome Harvesting approaches was used to capture achievements and challenges faced by individual deployees when accomplishing their tasks and developing appropriate exit strategies. These approaches were also used to help in understanding how, and to what extent, deployees contributed to overall outcomes achieved by hosting agencies and how they aligned with priority focus areas identified by NRC/NORCAP for this response (coordination, meeting critical needs and building back better) and data gathered was used as the basis of two case studies describing observed changes along with underlying drivers.

Compensating for potential biases

During the orientation phase at the start of the field work, the evaluation team took steps to ensure that any potential biases of evaluation team members were raised to help ensure impartiality and take appropriate measures when planning interviews, conducting analysis, developing conclusions and elaborating recommendations.

Limitations & Constraints

As noted above, NORCAP's Steering Committee for this evaluation acknowledged the challenges around achieving some of the aims described in the TOR, notably around measuring outcomes, impact and sustainability. Such challenges can be attributed to a variety of factors, notably staff turnover (which meant that many key actors were no longer present in Nepal), the short duration of some deployments and a budget that limited the scope of this evaluation. Noteworthy constraints and mitigation measures include:

- A limited budget meant that only one of the team members was able to make a short visit to Nepal to meet host agency staff and deployees who were still in Nepal. There was insufficient time to visit outlying districts to observe outcomes and gather perspectives from communities that had been most severely affected. This gap was partially filled by the secondary data review and observations of the two team members during visits to affected districts during their previous assignments.

- Most of the interviews, including during the field visit to Nepal, was conducted by a single team member, which imposed limitations when triangulating and analysing data. Mitigation measures included conducting most of the initial interviews jointly, ensuring regular communication between team members and organising data collected into a comparative evidence matrix.

- Staff turnover made it difficult to obtain a comprehensive assessment across all phases of the response. To compensate for this, the team attempted to interview staff who were in Nepal during different phases of the operation.

- Only 11 completed performance evaluation reports (PER) for deployees were available to the team, amounting to only around a third of total deployments. Key informant interviews with host agencies and deployees compensated to some extent for the lack of PERs.

- The response strategies and results frameworks of hosting agencies varied in format and quality, which made it occasionally difficult to identify NORCAP contributions. The use of Outcome Mapping approaches proved to be helpful in filling some of these gaps.

- Apart from a lessons-learned review by MSB of limited scope, NORCAP appeared to be the only standby partner that had commissioned any kind of evaluation or review.

Despite these constraints and limitations, the evaluation team feels they were able to develop a sufficient evidence base to support a sound analysis.

5   Main Findings

Based on findings from this evaluation, NORCAP was judged to have provided relevant and timely support to operational presence and deliver humanitarian assistance to populations affected by the crisis.   Additional details are provided in the findings below, separated into different categories based on evaluation questions in the TOR around relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, outcomes and overall value-added.

Based on NRC/NORCAP data, 91 requests for expert deployments were received from UN agencies and IOM.[18]   A total of 31 individuals were subsequently deployed[19] for the Nepal response who have been included by the scope in the TOR.[20]   Four of the NORCAP deployees were Nepal nationals.

The duration of NORCAP deployments ranged between 11 to 330 calendar days, with an average deployment length of 108 calendar days.[21] This compared favourably with peer standby partners and internal surge deployments which, as described in Section 3.7 above, were criticised for frequent turnover.   Even so, key informants from host agencies felt that value-added of some of the more experienced NORCAP deployees could have been increased had they stayed longer.

Figure 2 - Contract duration of deployees

Most of the secondments were to IOM (12), followed by WFP (7), UN Women (4), UNFPA (3), UNICEF (2), UN Habitat (2) and OCHA (1). The vast majority of NORCAP deployees were based in Kathmandu.

---

[18] Falch (2015)

[19] Some of the 31 deployees were deployed multiple times, giving a total of 39 deployments for the Nepal earthquake response.

[20] An additional 8 experts were deployed by NRC outside the scope of this evaluation, mainly to the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS).

[21] A chart illustrating timelines for individual deployments is attached as an annex.

5.1 Relevance

This section assesses the extent to which NORCAP deployments aligned with priorities of the host agencies responding to the Nepal earthquake and how well deployees were equipped with relevant experience, professional, cross-cultural and social skills.

5.1.1 NORCAP deployments were aligned with the main priorities of host agencies

NORCAP has had long-standing relationships with most host agencies. During the Nepal Earthquake Response, NORCAP expert deployments were allocated amongst seven agencies.

Figure 3- Percentage of deployees seconded to different Host Agencies

NORCAP deployees were asked to support host agencies with expertise in coordination, education in emergencies, logistics, CCCM, shelter and information management. Overall, both deployees and host agencies found the deployments to be relevant, especially during the first six months of the response. The lack of emergency reserve funds in some of the host agencies made the deployments highly relevant since this helped host agencies to respond. The most common functional role for NORCAP deployees was as Camp/Site Management specialists with IOM.

Relatively few host agency staff in Nepal had prior experience of responding to large scale disasters and, according to national laws, international agencies were not allowed to implement directly. A common need was thus for deployees who not only had expertise in disaster response management, but also with interagency coordination and implementing relief interventions through national agencies with limited capacities. Deployees with these profiles were highly valued by host agencies and, where these skills were lacking, there was usually a mutual dissatisfaction of both deployee and host agency about the result.

5.1.2 NORCAP deployments supported the three priorities in the MFA Application

NORCAP deployments were found to have supported the three priorities described in the initial application to MFA for funding; coordination, meeting urgent needs and building back better. These aims were sufficiently broad to ensure consistency with host agency response strategies. The main challenges faced were during implementation due to operational constraints described in the introductory section (e.g. delays in producing a government recovery plan) or lack of experience of some deployees in one of the priority areas, notably interagency coordination and working with local partners.

Figure 4 - Number of Deployments for type of Specialisation

Host agencies interviewed constantly reiterated the need for an appropriate mix of expertise of coordination and technical skills.

5.1.3 Most deployees were largely equipped to "hit the ground running"

Previous reviews have highlighted the importance of deploying "right people". [22] The majority of NORCAP deployees were found to have been equipped with the right attitudes, social skills and experience and were able to hit the ground running upon arrival. Host agencies interviewed were appreciative of this since the majority of the deployees demonstrated the ability to think and act quickly and appropriately. More than 50% of key informants from host agencies in Nepal interviewed had no prior experience responding to large-scale disasters and support from experienced standby partners were viewed as highly relevant.

Some deployees faced challenges in obtaining essential equipment such as laptops or, due to initial accommodation shortages, tents. TORs for two of the IMO deployments clearly stated that there is limited communication equipment on the ground and deployees were expected to bring their own equipment with them. This contradicts the provisions in the MoUs between NRC and host agencies, since host agencies are obliged to provide basic equipment. NORCAP HQ appears not to have noticed this condition in the TORs and these deployees subsequently faced challenges in starting operations. Some other deployees seconded to IOM, WFP and UNFPA also had to wait for a few days before they were fully equipped but it did not appear to significantly hamper their work. It appeared to be only the IMOs who were severely handicapped in fulfilling their allocated tasks due to delays in obtaining laptops.

In the case of at least four deployees, host agencies felt that the effectiveness of their support was undermined by a lack of flexibility (e.g. unwillingness to do anything not specifically described in their TOR), lack of cultural and social sensitivity, and/or not having the required level of technical expertise. Flexibility was seen as one of the key attributes for an effective deployment particularly during the start-up phase of the response when support needs were somewhat unpredictable and evolved as the operating context changed over time. In at least three cases where the deployments

were perceived as less successful, the deployees were deemed to have an attitude problem and lacked sensitivity.

Feedback from NORCAP deployees suggest that the main factors within host agencies that were viewed as influencing the effectiveness of their deployments were:

- Leadership and management capacity;

- Level of awareness about standby deployments (e.g. applicable terms and conditions);

- Expectations of host agencies matching those of deployees;

- The extent to which host agencies' own staff were directly affected by the earthquake (e.g. relatives killed or injured, damage to houses) therefore physically and emotionally at times unavailable to fully support and engage with the deployees; and

- Degree of experience of responding to large-scale disasters.

5.1.4 NORCAP deployments contributed to resilience and local capacity building

A key focus for NORCAP's deployments during the Nepal response was to build local capacity, both national and international longer-term staff, and and extend support to the most-affected districts outside of Kathmandu. Based on a review of the deployee TORs, it was found that the duty station of most deployees was in Kathmandu. However, interviews with partners such as UN Women and UNICEF indicated that NORCAP deployees made efforts to travel outside Kathmandu and were able to enhance their capacity either by introducing relevant systems, policies or procedures and practices. IOM had activities in of Gorkha, Makwanpur and Dhading districts where NORCAP deployees acted as CCCM hub coordinators where they had direct contact and engagement with local authorities as well as local populations. A review of case studies developed for IOM by the team of deployees indicated that IOM contributed to efforts by communities to "build back better" to increase their resilience to future such disasters. Several national staff in the host agencies acknowledged the relevance of the deployment and particularly welcomed the contributions of NORCAP and GenCap Advisors to build national staff capacity. A few of the national staff interviewed continued to seek informal advice from the deployees even though their assignments had ended.

Positions such as Capacity Building Officer with a specific mandate to build local capacity and resilience was also seen as relevant. The focus under this portfolio is on conducting a series of trainings on CCCM to government authorities and local agencies. Carried out in batches, the trainings aimed to build local capacity although it was unclear how or if the results were being monitored.

The lack of a systematic link between the work of GenCap Advisors and of NORCAP experts to help promote gender issues within different sectors and different host agencies was viewed as a missed opportunity by some key informants.

5.2 Efficiency

This section assesses the timeliness of NORCAP deployments based on agency requirements and the relative value-added of NORCAP deployments versus surge from other sources.

5.2.1 Timely deployments

Deployments were generally viewed as timely, with the first international NORCAP deployment happening within 72 hours of the disaster.   A more important factor influencing timeliness was that most of the host agencies and government authorities took time to get organized and had difficulties managing deployments efficiently during the early phases of the response.

5.2.2 Lack of understanding of NORCAP's role by host agencies

The majority of host agency staff interviewed were unfamiliar with NORCAP and the way it operates. Some host agencies HQ focal points were of the view it shouldn't be necessary for country-level staff to know about NORCAP in depth. Rather, it was expected that NORCAP deployee should arrive already knowing how to integrate into the host agency's system.

Decisions regarding NORCAP deployments were largely left up to host agency regional offices or their HQs, including contracting, finalizing TORs and designation of duty stations. The sole exception was UN Women Nepal, whose staff demonstrated a good understanding of standby partner protocols and led decision-making during each stage of the deployment process. It was consequently not a surprise that most of the HR and operations staff of other host agencies, who were mainly national staff, had virtually no knowledge about the terms and conditions (salary, accommodation arrangements, DSA, annual leave, etc.) of the NORCAP deployees. Host agency focal persons at HQ noted that the terms and conditions are shared with country offices (e.g. WFP briefing sheet) and attributed rapid staff turnover and heavy workload to these communication gaps.

5.2.3 The NORCAP Information Technology (IT) system has significantly increased efficiency

Continued upgrading of the NORCAP IT system has increased the efficiency and reduced workloads of NORCAP Advisors allowing them more time to pay more attention to other tasks. Minor problems were encountered, notably when data was not updated or synchronised with the financial system.

5.3 Effectiveness and Outcomes

This section assesses the extent to which NORCAP deployments were aligned with both the priorities in the proposal to MFA[23] and of host agencies, and how they influenced and supported host agency operations and contributed to relevant outcomes.

5.3.1 NORCAP stands out for its technical expertise, capacity and diversity

Host agencies viewed NORCAP as a valued standby partner, with many citing the size and diversity of the roster along with the good approach and wide experience of deployees as an asset. Interviews with host agency focal points at head offices confirmed that NORCAP is a standby partner of choice due to its expertise and capacity both in terms of size and in diversity of profiles available.

> *"NORCAP/NRC is always really fast and is our number one partner. We are very pleased with the range of profiles. Some of other rosters have limited profiles and not diverse enough for us to select from"*, Host Agency standby partner focal point at HQ

Indeed, host agencies at HQ and in Nepal as well as partner organisations interviewed viewed the diversity offered by NORCAP as one of its main comparative advantage, something that is consistent with findings from previous reviews.[24] Experts deployed included Nepalese nationals with an integral knowledge of the local context, culture, language and geography of the country. Deployees from the South Asia region such as Pakistan were able to communicate using a common language and brought with them past experiences of working in an earthquake response.

---

[23] Coordination, meeting urgent needs and building back better.

[24] Baker *et al.* (2012)

Figure 5 – Number of deployees by gender and citizenship

5.3.2 **Two thirds of deployees felt they had positively influenced operations and directly contributed to programme objectives of host agencies**

Approximately two-thirds of the deployees interviewed felt that their deployments had been well-utilized by the host agencies and they were able to directly contribute to the programme objectives. Desk review findings and interviews with various stakeholders clearly indicate the areas where deployees were able to make decisions and influence the operations in the host agencies. This is both at policy and operational level.

Deployees who have had direct engagement with national entities, including government authorities and communities, reported higher levels of job satisfaction and were more easily able to describe how they had contributed to specific outcomes.

Deployees who felt they had less successful deployments cited reasons such as frequent changes of supervisors in the host agency, poor understanding of deployees' role, a lack of a suitable counterpart, absence of a coherent exit strategy and/or being asked to fill roles where they had little previous experience. Most of the deployees interviewed felt that the pre-departure information provided by NORCAP HQ had been adequate for understanding the operating context and their mission. Deployees reported receiving copious amount of documents prior to their deployment, but without guidance on which documents were a priority to help prepare for their deployment. Two such examples most frequently cited by deployees was that they had not expected to be mainly involved in coordination rather than in operations (which had been their experience during prior deployments) along with a forewarning about the lack of emergency response capacities within the host agencies.

Some deployees felt that receiving a short description of the Nepalese culture, highlighting cultural sensitivities (dress codes and information about climate so they knew what to pack, protocols for dealing with government official, etc.) would have been very useful.[25]

Handovers between deployees where they replaced another NORCAP deployee were viewed as inadequate by a majority of deployees. An exception was the handover in GenCap, which seems to have had an effective handover. The main gaps being reported by deployees to the CCCM cluster. One of the best examples of a deployee handover system identified actually came from the private sector. Despite the fact that most deployees from Eriksson Response,[26] another WFP standby

---

[25] Within a few days following the earthquake the UN Humanitarian Coordinator's office in Nepal was distributing a two-pager to help with cultural orientation of newly arriving international staff which could have been circulated in advance.

[26] http://www.ericsson.com/thecompany/press/mediakits/ericsson_response

partner, only came for a short period of time, interviewees in WFP Nepal noted that their handover processes helped to ensure consistent support and that the rapid turnover was not an issue.

The majority of host agency staff interviewed during the field visit to Nepal stated that frequent changes of supervisors was inevitable and it was the deployee's responsibility to adapt and contribute in order to stay relevant and utilized.

> "*During emergencies the context changes so frequently so the role will change by the time assignment comes to an end.*" Key informant in a host agency.

The question of why one deployee faced with frequent changes of supervisors was able to contribute effectively whilst another experienced difficulties was mainly attributed to attitude. Host agencies cited two examples where a lack of interpersonal skills and inflexibility as the key reasons behind ineffective deployments. The effectiveness of another deployee was compromised as it was felt that they identified more with NORCAP than with the host agency.

5.3.3   Prior experience with regional and global cluster coordination was highly valued

Those deployees with extensive experience with global and regional clusters coordination roles were particularly valued. Host agency staff and other interviewees consistently acknowledged the specific contribution of such deployees thanks to their rapid understanding of the context, useful advice, together with their support and guidance while agencies set up or strengthened links with existing networks to achieve their goals. Three of the host agencies reported that deployees had been instrumental in helping to develop agency contributions to the flash appeal during the early stages of the disaster response that help mobilise the necessary funding. There is also continuity in terms of support and advice from those assuming regional or global roles.

In addition, these deployees also demonstrated a distinct approach to capacity building in that emphasis was in building local capacity while these advisors work alongside the host agency team and remained 'behind the scene' to allow greater ownership in the host agency.

5.3.4   Initial lack of preparedness to deal with aftershocks

One of the reasons for the delayed response by humanitarian agencies was that their staff were among those affected by the earthquake.[27]   This was also the case with some of the locally-recruited NORCAP deployees who either experienced damage to their homes or had to take time off to help family members who had been affected. On top of this, NORCAP deployees were not prepared for the effects of the many aftershocks following the earthquake,[28] which this perceived not only as risky but also stressful. Some of the aftershocks were severe, including a 7.5 magnitude aftershock east of Kathmandu in mid-May that caused even more damage and casualties. NORCAP had a staff care system in place prior to the Nepal earthquake, but it was not adapted for sudden onset disasters. NORCAP/NRC has since developed updated protocols that require that deployees be contacted within a week of their deployments and added an improved security monitoring system to cover events such as aftershocks.

5.3.5   Feedback and Learning

Effectiveness is influenced by timely feedback and learning, but a number of gaps were found in this feedback "loop". Although a total of 31 individuals were deployed for the Nepal response, the first visit by a senior NORCAP staff did not take place until January 2016, nine months after the earthquake, and this did not include a visit to districts outside Kathmandu that had been most affected. Deployees acknowledged that the NORCAP web-based system is highly advanced, but that a 'personal touch' seemed to be lacking. Almost all of the deployees interviewed felt there was a lack of a connection with the NORCAP secretariat. Most deployees, including those who have done a number of previous deployments with NORCAP, felt that contact was mostly about administrative matters with less emphasis on checking up on the safety and well-being of the deployees. Some of

---

[27] Baker, et. al. (2015) and Sanderson, et al. (2015)

[28] More than 290 aftershocks with magnitude four or greater had been recorded in Nepal by the end of May 2015. http://beforeitsnews.com/weather/2015/05/earthquake-aftershock-in-nepal-may-30-2015-2444466.html

those who had less deployment experience expressed a reluctance to contact NORCAP Advisors or to raise concerns about host agencies since they were afraid that this could be perceived as trying to causing trouble and were unable to be self-reliant, which in turn could mean they wouldn't be considered for future deployments. There was an expectation amongst many deployees that NORCAP Advisors would have been more proactive in making personal contact, something that was particularly evident in those cases where deployees experienced difficulties in integrating with the host agency. NORCAP HQ key informants noted that this perceived lack of contact could be partially attributed to the reorganisation at NORCAP HQ that was taking place at the same time as the response to the Nepal earthquake. Deployees who had verbal debriefs at the end of their missions with NORCAP Advisors were particularly appreciative of this personal contact.

Performance Evaluation Reports (PER) were made available to the team for only a third of the individuals who had been deployed to Nepal and some of those did not manage to have a debrief with their supervisor prior to departure. The PERs that were reviewed were of relatively high quality, comprehensive and objective. However, it is not clear the extent to which PERs and End of Mission (EOM) Reports are used by NORCAP to help improve future deployments.

Figure 6 – Performance Evaluation Results for NORCAP Deployments

Comparisons were made with RedR Australia, which seconded a total of 16 experts to various United Nations agencies[29] during the Nepal earthquake response. RedR Australia's approach placed a particular emphasis on personal contact with deployees, including a a visit to Nepal by a senior adviser from RedR Australia HQ two weeks after the earthquake and subsequent visits every 1-2 months. Host agencies were appreciative of visits by senior staff from RedR Australia HQ since this helped to clarify their questions about terms and conditions of the deployments. One result was that PER processes were completed for virtually all of the RedR Australia deployees.

5.3.6   Outcomes of Deployments

Aside from with short deployment length, the other main factor that adversely affected outcomes of deployments was the lack of a suitable counterpart within host agencies that could increase the value-added of NORCAP deployments by building capacity and enhance the outcomes of interventions. Despite the challenges with achieving and measuring outcomes mentioned above, some examples of positive outcomes from the response to the Nepal earthquake were identified.

---

[29] Including to FAO, IOM, OCHA, UNFPA, UNICEM and WFP

Examples where NORCAP deployees were found to have significantly influenced outcomes include secondments to UN Women, UNICEF and IOM as illustrated below.

Table 2 – Outcomes from NORCAP Deployments[30]

UN Women/Humanitarian Country Team: GenCap Advisors, deployed as inter-agency resources hosted by UN Women, contributed to developing gender equality response monitoring indicators, gender equality updates and a Nepal gender profile. The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) ended up adopting recommended Key Advocacy Messages and recommendations on Gender Equality in humanitarian action and Disaster Risk Reduction, integration of gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE) and sex and age disaggregated data and gender analysis during assessments by different clusters, joint assessments, monitoring and reporting tools.

UNICEF WASH: *"Set up the "Who does What Where When" (4W) dashboard[31] and matrixes."*

UNICEF Education: *"During her assignment she visited 7 of the 14 most affected districts to help with the establishment and orientation of sub-national Education Cluster focal points and provided follow up support."*

IOM site planning – the Nepalese engineers recruited to work on site planning had no previous experience in planning IDP camps or constructing emergency shelters. NORCAP deployees not only helped train Nepali engineers to plan and construct temporary sites and structures, but gave them experience in using participatory approaches with communities.

The example of UN Women in particular demonstrates how close involvement in relevant processes and ownership of the host agency increases the effectiveness of deployments. While the evaluation team was not able to observe outcomes at a community level themselves due to various constraints described above, there were indications that the combination of the engagement of country-level staff in developing the TOR, selecting candidates, gaining a good understanding of deployee management and ensuring that deployees benefited from cultural sensitivity orientation helped to ensure that deployees significantly contributed to outcomes.

5.4 Sustainability

This section assesses the extent to which NORCAP deployments have developed capacity and left something behind that host agencies continue to find useful.

Sustainability has generally been a challenge, particularly for short deployments and those that took place during the initial phase of the response.

> *"During emergencies we don't think about sustainability & continuity; an emergency response is all about firefighting*." Host agency staff member in Nepal.

There were also significant obstacles faced by deployees who stayed for a longer period. A common complaint from deployees was the lack of designated counterpart who they could provide with on-the-job training. Another key factor was the long delay by the government in establishing the National Reconstruction Authority and agreement on a comprehensive recovery and reconstruction plan where international agencies could contribute.

At the same time, there were a number of positive examples of outcomes. Most deployees saw it as part of their role to build capacity host agency staff, particularly national staff, and deployees were able to provide a number of examples. Good practice examples of sustainability from NORCAP

---

[30] Case studies providing more details of these three examples are attached as annexes.

[31] For a sample output from this deployment, see
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/wash_district_dashboard_kathmandu_20150722v1.pdf

deployments are summarised below and in more detail in the case studies for UNICEF and UN Women in the attached annex.

> **UNICEF WASH:** supported the preparation of district-level contingency plans.
>
> **UNICEF Education:** Provided virtual "help desk" support by Skype after leaving Nepal.
>
> **UN Women:** Continue to use gender equality monitoring indicators developed with support from NORCAP deployees for assessment, design and monitoring.

5.5 Value Added and Value for Money

This section looks at whether host agencies considered alternatives to standby deployments, to what extent deployments have provided value for money and what were the main cost drivers of the intervention.

Despite a number of preparedness activities (including simulations shortly before the earthquake), when the earthquake struck it soon became apparent that many international agencies lacked disaster management capacity and experience to respond to a disaster of such a scale.[32] In addition, national laws required international agencies to work through local partners in Nepal, which have limited capacity. Deployments were thus seen to add most value where deployees brought experience of working in humanitarian systems in large emergencies (clusters, humanitarian financing, coordination) and working with local partners.

NORCAP requested, and received, a total allocation of NOK 10 million for the Nepal earthquake response, which amounted to around 8% of the NOK 130 million of the total allocation of the MFA to the Nepal earthquake response.[33]

Figure 7 – MFA Allocations for the Nepal Earthquake Response[34]

Chart Area

- National agencies 6%
- NORCAP 8%
- UN 33%
- DSB/IHP 1%
- INGOs (NORAD Framework) 11%
- Other INGOs 41%

---

[32] Baker, *et. al* (2015) and Sanderson, D *et. al* (2015).

[33] A total of NOK 55 million was allocated to support UN agencies and IOM. NOK 43 million was allocated to four UN agencies (WFP, UNICEF, WHO and OCHA) with an additional NOK 2 million allocated to the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB) to support their participation in the International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP).

[34] MFA data

As could be expected, the major cost drivers[35] of NORCAP's intervention are salaries and benefits, which amount to 65% of the total budget with another 15% allocated to rent and communications. These two cost drivers thus account for the major share of the approximate average cost of just over US$290/day[36] for a deployee. As other studies[37] have found, benchmarking between different standby partners poses difficulties due to the different ways that agencies use to calculate costs. At the same time it is evident that this rate is at the lower end of the UN's P3 salary scale, even when post adjustment and other allowances are excluded.[38] The relatively higher cost of UN staff together with, as illustrated in Section 3.7 above, a tendency of UN agencies to have rapid turnover and insufficient orientation of their internal surge capacity that undermined the relevance and effectiveness of these deployments,[39] indicates that NORCAP deployees generally provided better value for money than internal surge.

NORCAP often has cost-sharing with host agencies when extensions are requested although cost-sharing is rare for sudden onset emergencies, and in fact there was no cost-sharing for the Nepal earthquake response. As described above, one of the areas where NORCAP deployees were seen to provide significant value-added was with the rapid deployment of fully funded experts that helped agencies to kick start their own response. However, at the time of the field visit to Nepal, questions were raised about the value added of some of the extended deployments. Findings from reviews of standby deployments[40] have shown that cost-sharing can put pressure on host agencies to review whether extensions of deployment contracts actually provide value-for-money.

6   Conclusions

NORCAP has developed a solid reputation amongst its partners and peers based on many years of delivering timely, flexible, and quality support. An underlying driver for this success has been the scale and diversity of the NORCAP roster, but this in turn poses management and coordination challenges when responding to a large-scale quick onset disaster since it requires a more hands-on approach by NORCAP HQ. The response to the Nepal earthquake has also highlighted the need to better adapt to needs of host agencies, both in terms of attention to "soft skills" of employees and also to adopt a more results-based approach by moving beyond simply having an operational role to supporting host agencies update their needs assessments and develop viable exit strategies. As national capacities continue to increase and governments continue to put measures in place to discourage direct implementation by international agencies, NORCAP also needs to ensure deployees are equipped with skills in order to help host agencies to perform effectively in such contexts.

Recommendations in this evaluation have not only been targeted at NORCAP, but also at host agencies since it is evident that delivering on accountability commitments to communities who have been affected by disaster is very much a joint responsibility. Follow up on recommendations should not only aim to improve the value-added of NORCAP support, but surge capacities in general, so as to streamline processes and better fulfil each agency's accountability commitments to disaster-affected communities.

---

[35] To gain a better understanding of Value for Money it is useful to identify the main cost drivers of the programme and determine how these could be minimized without compromising quality

[36] NORCAP data

[37] Baker, J. *et al.* (2012)

[38] http://icsc.un.org/resources/pdfs/sal/sabeng12.pdf

[39] IASC (2016)

[40] See, for example, Sandeson, P. (2012)

7   Recommendations

7.1 NORCAP

1. Ensure that deployees are fit for purpose to meet priority needs. In the Nepal response, agencies needed expertise to help support interagency coordination and establish effective ways of working through local partners with limited capacities during a large-scale disaster event.

2. NORCAP should try and ensure minimum three months' availability of deployees in case of need and to ensure continuity. Handovers from deployee to host agency staff should be systematized, deployees should be trained in handover processes and held accountable for making efforts to try and ensure transitions result in positive outcomes.[41]

3. NORCAP should apply relevant learning from the Nepal response to enhance their screening for emotional intelligence and related capacity building by placing more emphasis on deployee capability to:

   • Adapt to different cultural contexts; and
   • "Manage upwards", notably for cases where deployees have significantly more experience and are more senior than their counterparts in host agencies.

4. For deployments where equipment is critical to deployee performance, it should be made available. This could apply to essential equipment needed to perform allotted tasks and/or, in contexts where accommodation may be at a premium (such as large earthquakes), accommodation and other personal needs.   The Nepal experience demonstrated that IMO positions in particular are highly dependent on equipment to accomplish their tasks efficiently and NORCAP should support the purchase of laptops and software licences if required.

5. NORCAP should periodically review MoUs during regular consultations with host agencies to ensure that the shared allocation of roles and responsibilities remain relevant.   For example, consideration should be given to changing the equipment clause for IMOs so that they arrive equipped with a laptop pre-loaded with necessary software. When reviewing requests from host agencies the consistency of the relevant MoUs should be checked to ensure that any significant variations can be taken care of prior to deployments.

6. NORCAP HQ should learn from RedR Australia's experience with connecting with deployees to assess whether it would be useful to replicate some of their practices when engaging with deployees.

7. NORCAP should determine thresholds for different disaster types to help identify additional requirements in terms of coordination and monitoring, preferably as an interagency initiative with peer standby partners. Relevant Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for sudden onset disasters can be revised to include categorisation of disaster types, monitoring and coordination support. Coordination and monitoring will help to manage expectations between host agencies and deployees, identify potential areas of complementarity between deployees, facilitate handovers and ensure that host agencies manage deployees efficiently and maximise their value-added. When there is an additional large injection of funds, this could be a trigger to send an adviser to update the assessment and follow-up with deployees.

8. For large scale disasters involving numerous deployments, interagency reviews or evaluations that consider outcomes at community level should be part of preparedness planning.

9. As part of the approval process, ensure that deployment contracts are always registered in the NORCAP Database as Missions with the status of "Ready".

---

[41] While it is clear that there are significant differences between IT and GenCap deployments, It may be worth looking more closely at approaches used by Ericsson Response Team since, even though there was constant turnover, WFP cited them as an example where turnover was seamless.

7.2   NORCAP and Host Agencies

10. NORCAP and host agencies should work together to ensure that host agencies in country are equipped to maximise value-added of deployments by:

    • Incorporating management of standby roster deployments into preparedness training for host agency staff to help improve their awareness on how to request deployments, manage seconded staff and generally maximise the value-added of surge capacity;

    • Briefing of country office staff by host agency focal points and sharing a 1-2 page guidance note;

    • Involvement in joint After Action Reviews with NORCAP and other standby partners using webinars.

11. Improve performance systems for deployees to ensure:

    • Systematic reviews of TORs prior to deployments so that any significant differences with MoU conditions (such as provision of IT equipment) can be addressed early. This would also be an opportunity to suggest improvements to the host agency based on lessons-learned from previous deployments.

    • Safe spaces are created where host agency staff and deployees can raise issues of concern and agree on improvements needed.

    • TORs are reviewed together when there is turnover of either the supervisor in the host agency or deployee to manage expectations, updating the TOR if necessary to maximise effectiveness and help facilitate future communication between the supervisor and deployee.

12. NORCAP should coordinate with deployees and peer standby partners to help minimise confusion within host agency administration, HR and finance departments about the terms and conditions of deployments.

13. Completion of PERs should be a joint responsibility of deployee and host agencies. Examples of good practice suggest that deployees who are pro-active in sharing the PERs right at the start of the mission are more likely to receive completed PERs, which also increases personal accountability.

14. In consultation with host agencies, NORCAP should identify deployment categories with the potential to significantly contribute to agency outcomes during a response, including promoting sustainability of interventions.   A menu of possible outcomes from selected deployments could be developed that would the support results framework of the agency (or the cluster they are leading).   This would allow more systematic tracking of outcomes through, for example, analysis of End of Mission reports and provide the basis for guidance and case studies that could be integrated into training and guidelines.

15. NORCAP and host agencies should jointly review trends in national involvement in disaster preparedness and response and ensure that standby capacities are equipped to, for example, support responses through several national partners with limited capacities.

16. NORCAP and host agencies should ensure that a proactive staff care system and Standard Operating Procedures are in place to prepare deal with trauma due to aftershocks.

17. Host agencies should include a review of the main findings and joint recommendations in the agenda for their annual consultations.

8 Lessons

1. Host agency's preparedness level to receive and manage the deployment is crucial to the success of deployment.

2. Clarifying expectations of both deployees and hosting agencies at country level right from the start helps increase effectiveness while minimizing frustrations.

3. Performance reviews at the end of a deployment period and prior to a contract extension provides an opportunity to revisit the priorities and mutual expectations.

4. Longer deployments at the start of the response, notably of GenCap Advisors, could have helped to increase their effectiveness and sustainability.

5. Identification of appropriate counterpart/s by host agencies ensures easier transfer of capacity and continuity.

6. When the availability of candidates changes, it is important that NORCAPs immediately informs the requesting agency so that they can continue their search for suitable candidates.

7. Prior experience of global clusters or in regional coordination roles provides relevant exposure, expertise, authority and networking skills for a successful deployment to a large-scale quick onset disaster.

8. Deployments tend to be more effective if they understand how to integrate with the host agency, are flexible and deployees are able to "manage upwards" to enable the host agency to make more effective use of deployees.

9. The experience of RedR Australia has demonstrated that regular visits from HQ staff can significantly improve working relationships with host agencies, morale of deployees and implementation of PER systems.

10. Large scale emergencies that result in significant numbers of deployments merit additional attention from NORCAP HQ, notably an early visit, coordination arrangements to support both deployees and host agencies along with regular monitoring. Similar to the approach by IHP, this could be shared between standby partners in a way that not only reduces costs to individual agencies but also improves interagency coordination and encourages learning.

11. Many of the issues with surge capacities that have surfaced during the response to the Nepal earthquake have either been identified in previous reviews and evaluations or, such as the government's emphasis on use of national capacities, represent emerging challenges. At the same time, NORCAP appears to be the only standby partner that has attempted a comprehensive review that looks at outcomes suggesting that similar problems are likely to emerge in future.

Annexes

Annex 1 – NRC Evaluation Terms of Reference

NRC EXPERT DEPLOYMENT/NORCAP RESPONSE TO THE NEPAL 2015 EARTHQUAKE

Country: Nepal

Duration: 5 weeks

Reporting to: Head of Strategy, Information and Support Section, ED/N.

1.   BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Background on the conflict/context
Nepal was struck by a devastating 7.8 magnitude earthquake on 25 April 2015. On 12 May, an aftershock struck with a magnitude of 7.3, its epicentre in Dolakha, 76 km northeast of Kathmandu. 8,969 people were killed in the earthquakes and 22,321 injured[42].   Initial assessments indicated that around eight million people had been affected in 39 districts across the country. More than two million people live in eleven of the most severely affected districts and 3.5 million people were in need of food assistance.   The UN initiated a large-scale relief operation and the cluster system was activated to ensure a coordinated response. UN agencies relied on its standby partners to provide experienced personnel to fill key positions both in the initial response phase and for more long term reconstruction work.   **Background on NRC and NORCAP:**   NRC's work with standby rosters started in response to the displacement crisis caused by the Gulf war in 1991. With mandate and financial support from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA), NRC deployed seven field officers to support the UN High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) relief operations in Iraq and Turkey. NRC's rapid expert deployment was a success, which encouraged the UN, the NMFA and NRC to set up a permanent system which would enable the rapid deployment of experts to other international humanitarian operations. There has been considerable growth over the years in the NRC's roster system, and to date over 8500 international experts have been deployed to partner organisations' operations worldwide. From their origins in providing specialist humanitarian expertise to support relief operations, the rosters now provide multiple expert profiles, including in resilience, peacebuilding and capacity development to the whole international system.   NRC's expert deployment department and its standby rosters, including NORCAP, strengthens the capacity of the international community to prevent and respond to humanitarian challenges through provision of expert personnel to national governments and international organisations.   In 2014 NORCAP seconded staff to 312 assignments, accounting for 114 person-years of work in the field. Most of the secondments took place in sub-Saharan Africa, followed by the Middle East and North Africa, Asia, the Americas and Europe.
Background on the thematic area in this context
The initial flash appeal issued by UN OCHA on 29 April 2015, identifies the most immediate humanitarian needs as: 1. **"Access to safe drinking water and sanitation and hygiene.** Safe water, temporary latrines and bathing spaces are urgently needed for the most vulnerable displaced populations and for institutional facilities. Promotion of hygiene in the wider affected population and limited collection of solid waste in camps for displaced populations is critical to reduce the risk of

waterborne disease outbreaks, especially as cholera is endemic.

2. **Food Security.** Covering basic food and nutrition needs and stemming further deterioration of nutrition status among vulnerable people and communities. Ensuring time-critical inputs to re-establish livelihood support for 20,000 households in the nine most food insecure districts.

3. **Emergency shelter and essential items.** Damage and destruction of homes has displaced an estimated 2.8 million people. These people urgently need shelter and essential relief items.

4. **Access to medical care.** Support for mass casualty management is urgently needed in addition to re-establishment of disrupted life-saving health services for women and children.

5. **Protection of the most vulnerable populations.** Protection systems and key inputs are needed to prevent and respond to violence and gender-based violence against children and women, particularly among displaced populations. This includes providing learning activities for children in safe spaces and providing psychosocial support[43].

NRC/NORCAP Presence and Activities in the Country

Shortly after the earthquake, several UN organisations requested support from NORCAP to strengthen their operations and to ensure a coordinated and comprehensive crisis response.

By 30 April, NORCAP had received 28 requests for personnel from its partners in Nepal, including UNICEF, WFP, IOM, FAO, UNFPA, UN Women and WHO. NORCAP was continuously processing incoming requests and identifying candidates for rapid deployment. Based on experiences from previous natural disasters such as the 2013 typhoon in the Philippines and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, NORCAP expected a considerable increase in the number of requests in the coming weeks.

The UN expressed a particular need for experts on coordination, information management and technology, camp management, water and sanitation, logistics and gender-based violence.

In the same period, the first eight experts were deployed, within camp coordination/camp management (IOM), Information Management (UNHCR), Humanitarian needs assessment, gender and water, sanitation and hygiene.

By the end of 2015, NORCAP had deployed 39 experts to IOM, WFP, UNFPA, UNICEF, UN Women, UN Habitat, OCHA and UNHCR.

NRC/NORCAP's Intervention

NORCAP had a particular focus on three aspects of the response. In the April 2015 application for funds from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the following areas were outlined:

" **Coordination:** NORCAP's aim is to strengthen the capacity of our UN partners in Nepal to enable them to respond to emerging humanitarian needs. In this regard, ensuring a coordinated response is essential. NRC is already contributing to – and sees a need for further support to - cluster coordination, information management and logistics, to strengthen mechanisms set up by the cluster system. A key focus for NORCAP's deployments will be to involve the Nepali grassroots and reaching out to affected areas outside of Kathmandu.

Responding to urgent needs: UN organisations need support to respond to basic needs, such as shelter, food, water and sanitation. NORCAP has a large pool of highly qualified roster members who can provide essential support in these areas.

Building back better: Sustainable solutions in the crisis response are of key importance to ensure a successful reconstruction. NRC will be deploying its gender/gender based violence experts and education experts to support the interagency work to find durable solutions within their sectors, and is in discussions with UN partners about other ways to support long-term reconstruction efforts."

---

[43] UN OCHA; NEPAL Flash Appeal for Response to the Nepal Earthquake, April-July 2015; 29 April 2015

2.   PURPOSE OF EVALUATION AND INTENDED USE

The overarching purpose of this evaluation is to learn more about NORCAP's overall impact on the Nepal response and the added value related to using deployed experts in general and NRC deployed experts in particular. In addition the evaluation should be an opportunity for NRC to be accountable to beneficiaries, partners and donors.

The primary users of the evaluation will be the Expert Deployment/NORCAP department and in particular the Partnership and Development section and the Deployment section that will use them to improve planning and programming. The findings are also of interest to ED/N's main donor, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has agreed to fund the evaluation.

The findings and conclusions will be shared with all these actors. The evaluation will support the transference of learning; what specific lessons learned and best practices should be highlighted and continued or disseminated either within ED/N or more widely within NRC.

3.   SCOPE OF WORK AND LINES OF INQUIRY

3.1 Evaluation Scope

- Deployments to UN organisations in Nepal from NRC/NORCAP, between 25 April 2015 and 31 December 2015

- The outcome/impact of their work in response operations in Kathmandu, Ghorka and Sindupalchwok.

3.2 Lines of inquiry

1.   Relevance: How relevant was the capacity provided by NRC/NORCAP?

i. Did NORCAP stick to the main priorities of the UN organisations present in Nepal?

ii. How equipped were the deployed personnel to "hit the ground running" in terms of experience, professional and social skills?

2.   Efficiency: understanding the value for money of the secondment mechanism

i. How timely/quick were the deployments – relative to the need for capacity?

ii. What are the pros and cons of receiving personnel rather than additional funding?

iii. Is there an added value of getting deployees from NRC/NORCAP in particular , if so, what is this?

3.   Effectiveness and impact: What did the provision of capacity from NRC/NORCAP enable the partner organisations to achieve?

i. How did the deployees deliver on the three most important priorities in the initial application to the NMFA for funding: coordination, urgent needs and reconstruction?

ii. How did the deployees contribute to other intended or unintended outcomes or impact?

iii. What where the main challenges for the hosting organizations related to receiving deployees from NRC/NORCAP?

4.   Sustainability: How sustainable has the capacity support been?

i. To what extent did the deployees leave something behind in the form of systems, developed capacity, culture, etc?

ii. What are the main challenges related to sustainability of deployments?

4.   METHODOLOGY

The evaluator will be expected to utilize qualitative and quantitative data collection methods to undertake this study. This will include the following:

Desk review of existing project documents, reports, background information, monitoring data, minutes meetings. This includes, but is not limited to:

- Terms of Reference for Nepal missions
- CVs of deployed personnel
- Deployees' mid-term and final reports
- Performance evaluation reports from receiving organisations
- NORCAP database (for tracking incoming requests, response time, deployments)

Qualitative key stakeholder interviews as follows:

1. Interviews with staff in Oslo involved in the response – preferably in the form of focus group interviews
2. Interviews with key staff / representatives from receiving (UN) organisations in Nepal
3. Interviews with NRC/NORCAP experts deployed to the Nepal response

The consultant should suggest qualitative evaluation approaches that can identify the contributions of deployees in a context that required flexibility and where many outcomes were not pre-determined. Terms of reference and even duty stations are frequently changed after NORCAP experts are deployed due to the nature of the situations. Outcome harvesting and similar methods have been used in previous evaluations in order to identify and assess the contribution of the deployees to outcomes and impact, but alternative qualitative approaches may be suggested by the consultant.

All NRC evaluations are required to respond to a strategically important question for NRC which is determined annually. The question is 'Are we reaching the right people'. For this evaluation, NRC will discuss with the consultant whether the question is relevant and what the focus should be.

5. EVALUATION FOLLOW UP AND LEARNING

NRC follows up all evaluations with a management response, and its implementation is subsequently tracked.

This evaluation will contribute to an annual learning review which feeds into annual strategic planning processes. Key findings will be reported to NRC's senior management team in Oslo.

6. EVALUATION PRINCIPALS

- The views expressed in the report shall be the independent and candid professional opinion of the evaluator. The evaluation will be guided by the following ethical considerations:
  - o Openness - of information given, to the highest possible degree to all involved parties
  - o Public access - to the results when there are not special considerations against this
  - o Broad participation - the interested parties should be involved where relevant and possible
  - o Reliability and independence - the evaluation should be conducted so that findings and conclusions are correct and trustworthy
- The evaluation findings should be based on quality evidence, in line with NRC's evidence principles.

7. COORDINATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE EVALUATION

An evaluation steering committee will be established by NRC, with the following members:

Head of Deployment Section, Nina Hjellegjerde (Chair)

Head of Roster Management Section, Ragna Os Eskeland
Adviser in NORCAP unit, Astrid Tveteraas

ED/N Analysis and Reporting Adviser, Hilde Faugli (Focal point)

The focal point is responsible to facilitate access to information, documentation sources, travel, and field logistics. In case of any changes in the positions at Head Office, the Steering Committee will be adjusted accordingly.

The Steering committee will oversee administration and overall coordination, including monitoring progress. The main functions of the Steering committee will be:

- to establish the Terms of Reference of the evaluation;

- select external evaluator(s);

- review and comment on the inception report and approve the proposed evaluation strategy;

- review and comment on the draft evaluation report;

- establish a dissemination and utilization strategy.

8. DELIVERABLES AND REPORTING DEADLINES

The main deliverable of the assignment is a final report covering results (see above), key challenges and recommendations. In addition, a two-pager with initial findings are to be submitted by mail no later than 1 March 2016, to be incorporated in NRC/NORCAP's annual report. Finally, the evaluator would be expected to facilitate a 1 day workshop in Oslo to present and discuss the final report.

All NRC evaluations should include the following:

- An inception report (see separate guidelines)

- A presentation of findings which are discussed and validated and key learnings documented

- Draft Report

- Final Report (no longer than 30 pages)

- A presentation of findings tailored to the interests of NRC/NORCAP's main donor(s)

All material collected in the undertaking of the evaluation process should be lodged with the Chair of the NRC Evaluation Steering Committee prior to the termination of the contract.

9. TIMEFRAME

Approximate timeframe:

- 5 days to draft the inception report (this includes an initial desk study and review and analysis of existing data)and field work prep

- 6 days for skype interviews

- 7 days for field work and interviews in Nepal

- 5 days to develop a draft report

- 1 day for revision based on inputs from ED/N, deployees and partners

- 1 day for the validation and feedback workshop in Oslo

- Report finalised by end of March 2016

Start date for evaluation: January 2016 or as soon as possible

Key deadlines:

1. Inception report: 25.01.2015

2. Dates for field visits: February

3. Two-pager with preliminary findings based on field-work: before 01.03.2015

4. Draft report: 14.03.2015

5. Dates for presentations: 17.03.2015

6. Final report deadline: 31.03.2015

In event of serious problems or delays, the team leader should inform the Steering Committee immediately. Any significant changes to review timetables shall be approved by the Steering Committee in advance.

10. EVALUATION CONSULTANT TEAM

NRC seeks expressions of interest from people with the following skills/qualifications:

- Experience with leading evaluations of UN organisations and/or large-scale humanitarian crisis

- Knowledge of deployments and rosters in emergency response

- Minimum 5 years of experience of working in the humanitarian sector at an advisor level or above.

- Proven social research skills: including qualitative method such as outcome harvesting or most significant change.

- Fluency in written and spoken English is required of all team members.

11. APPLICATION PROCESS AND REQUIREMENTS

Application Deadline: Wednesday 6th January 2016

Interview dates: Friday 8th January 2016

Bids must include the following:

- Proposal including, outline of evaluation framework and methods, including comments on the TOR, proposed time frame and work plan **(bids over 3 pages will be automatically excluded**).

- Proposed evaluation budget

- CVs and evidence of past evaluations for each team member

Annex 2 – Methodological Notes and Interview Guide

Data collection for this study was done through purposively selected key informant interviews (KII), desk research of secondary data, structured focus group discussions (FGD), observations during the field visit to Nepal and anticipated feedback from the workshop in Oslo in early April. **Data collection and quality control** was done in three phases:

- Document review and interviews during the inception phase to inform this report;

- During the implementation phase, data collected during interviews, field observations and desk research will be collated and organized based on the questions in the interview guide to facilitate analysis of trends and track diversity.

- Validation of findings during the analysis and drafting phase

Only 7 consultant days in total were allocated for interviews, which included the field visit to Nepal by the HR Specialist during February 14-19, and it was thus important to prioritise and purposively select key informants for this study so as to provide a representative sample based on the following criteria:

- An appropriate sample of staff from NRC/NORCAP that provides a reasonable perspective of the range of contexts where deployees were working, specifically:
    o Those working during different phases of the response;
    o The range of functional responsibilities and sectoral operational focus;
    o Range of host agencies; and
    o Different lengths of deployment.

- Perspective of the major donor.

- A sample of host agency staff, namely:
    o HQ – focal point for standby partners providing secondments.
    o Nepal: senior management (Country Director and/or Deputy Country Director), operations (HR-Admin) and field level (senior national staff);

- Members of clusters where NORCAP deployees had a coordinating role;

- Other relevant stakeholders (e.g. staff and deployees from peer agencies that provided secondment services to Nepal, namely MSB Sweden and RedR Australia.

Triangulation of findings was an important tool during this evaluation to aid in determining levels of convergence, by means of:

- ✓ Source triangulation: team members compared information from different sources, e.g. at different management levels and between different functional units.

- ✓ Method triangulation: comparison of information collected by different methods, e.g. interviews, focus group discussion, document review.

- ✓ Comparator agency triangulation. Contrast and compare the operations, technical support and cost structures of selected peer agencies.

- ✓ Data from each source was placed into a comparative matrix tool to assist with analysing data collected by evaluation question and by stakeholder group.

Measurement of Outcomes

The TOR for the evaluation placed emphasis on identifying outcomes although there was a recognition of challenges of accomplishing this due to the limited scope. There were several where either deployee roles and responsibilities differed from the standard TORs provided or their roles changed over time. A combination of Most Significant Change and Outcome Harvesting approaches were used to to understand what happened? ...who contributed to the outcome? ...what is the evidence? ...why it was important? ...and what are the underlying drivers? focusing on two aspects in particular:

- What were the achievements made and challenges faced by individual deployees in terms of both accomplishing their tasks and fulfilling their responsibilities in promoting an appropriate exit strategy (e.g. building national capacities)?

- How, and to what extent, deployees contributed to overall outcomes achieved by hosting agencies, including the alignment with the agency's strategic objectives and operational plans and with the priority focus areas identified by NRC/NORCAP for this response (coordination, meeting critical needs and building back better)?

Data gathered through this means was helpful in measuring outcomes and was also used during the development of case studies to illustrate NORCAP contributions along with underlying drivers to facilitate identification and future application of relevant lessons.

Interview Guide and Evaluative Matrix

A set of questions and sub-questions based on the TOR for the evaluation were used to organize results from interviews, focus group discussions and document research. Before starting an interview, team members clarified the ground rules for the interview, notably its voluntary nature, non-attribution and confidentiality requirements.

The interview guide was used, as the name suggests, as a "guide" and not a questionnaire and team members used this as a checklist with the understanding that key informants would not be able to respond to all questions.

Questions	Sub-Questions	Source/Method
Perspective of the key informant	✓ What was the nature of the key informant's involvement in the Nepal earthquake response? ✓ What relevant experience has the key informant had with NORCAP and other secondments, either in Nepal or elsewhere?	KII, FGD
Relevance: How relevant was the capacity provided by NRC/NORCAP?	✓ Did NORCAP align to the main priorities of the UN organisations present in Nepal? ✓ How equipped were the deployed personnel to "hit the ground running" in terms of experience, professional, cross-cultural and social skills?	Host agency, NRC/NORCAP staff, KII/FGD and documents Performance evaluations and end of mission reports.
Efficiency: How efficient was the secondment mechanism?	✓ How timely/quick were the deployments – relative to the need for capacity? ✓ Is there an added value of getting deployees from NRC/NORCAP in particular and, if so, what is this?	Host agency, NRC/NORCAP staff & deployee KII/FGD. Deployment records. KII with peer agencies (e.g. MSB)
Effectiveness and Outcomes: What did the provision of capacity from NRC/NORCAP enable the partner organisations to achieve?	✓ How did the deployees deliver on the three most important priorities in the initial application to the NMFA for funding (coordination, meeting urgent needs and building back better)? ✓ What are relevant outcomes in the response/recovery strategies and operational plans of the host agency? How did the host agency foresee that deployees would contribute to relevant outcomes? ✓ How were NORCAP deployees able to influence operations?... (e.g. to what extent were they involved in assessments? ...decision-making about the design? ...monitoring? ...planning exit	Host agency, NRC/NORCAP staff and deployee KII/FGD. Performance evaluations and end of mission reports. Agency plans, assessment, monitoring and evaluation reports.

Questions	Sub-Questions	Source/Method
	strategies?)?	
	✓ How has the deployee influenced changes? What, and when and where? What is the verifiable change that can be seen in the individual, group, community, organization, or institution?	
	✓ Which changes were most significant? What were the underlying drivers of these changes and to what extent could they be replicated?	
	✓ How did the deployees contribute to other intended or unintended outcomes or impact?	
	✓ What where the main challenges for the hosting organizations related to receiving deployees from NRC/NORCAP?	
Sustainability: How sustainable has the capacity support been?	✓ To what extent did the deployees leave something behind in the form of systems, developed capacity, culture, etc. in the hosting agency or local partner (local government, civil society)? ✓ What are the main challenges related to sustainability of deployments?	Host agency, NRC/NORCAP staff and deployee KII/FGD. Performance evaluations and end of mission reports. Agency plans, assessment, monitoring and evaluation reports.
Value for Money:[44] Is there evidence that other suitable alternatives were considered, or how deployments could have provided more value for money?	✓ Does the host agency's mandate and operations match NORCAP's priorities? ✓ What is the rationale for intervention in this country context, political area etc.? What are the primary humanitarian needs? ✓ What other agencies are involved in similar operations (secondments)? Why is the agency best or well placed to undertake this activity? What are the particular comparative advantages that justify the agency's intervention? Who could potentially fill such a role more effectively if the agency was absent? ✓ What are the agency strategies and approaches to meet identified needs? Is it clear why was this particular operational approach chosen on Value for Money (VFM) grounds? What are the pros and cons of deploying personnel instead of, for example, providing additional funds to the host agency? ✓ Why was this particular operational approach chosen on VFM grounds? What were the alternative approaches considered?	Host agency, NRC/NORCAP staff and deployee KII/FGD. Performance evaluations and end of mission reports. Agency plans, assessment, monitoring and evaluation reports. Financial records and comparisons with peers.

---

[44] Although Value for Money was limited to efficiency in the TOR, it is more usual to look at an appropriate balance of economy, efficiency, effectiveness and, if relevant, equity (e.g. addressing vulnerability, which may introduce additional costs) - see Baker, J. et al. (2013) for more details.

Questions	Sub-Questions	Source/Method
	✓ What are key cost drivers of the intervention? What systems are in place to minimise costs of the key cost drivers and mitigate risks while ensuring quality standards are met?	
Utility: How can this evaluation be useful to stakeholders?	✓ What do you expect from this evaluation? ✓ What could be the utility of this evaluation from your perspective?	KII/FGD. Documented examples of good practice evaluations and evaluation process.
Additional resources: documents/key informants	✓ Are there any relevant documents that it would be important for us to review? Is there anyone else that you think we should try and speak to?	KII/FGD
Any other comments or suggestions?		KII/FGD

Annex 3 – Case Studies of NORCAP Deployments: UNICEF, UN Women and IOM

NORCAP Case Study 1: UNICEF - strengthening coordination in Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) and Education in Emergencies (EiE)

What was UNICEF Nepal's role during the response?

Working closely with the Government of Nepal and other humanitarian partners, UNICEF aimed to services to help rebuild the lives of children and women in the most affected districts of Nepal with a range of services. UNICEF focused on the six programmatic areas of particular importance for the survival, development and protection of children, i.e. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH); Health; Nutrition; Education; Child Protection and Social Protection.

What were the requests to standby partners?

UNICEF requested a total of 18 deployments to help respond to the earthquake; 8 for Information Management, 5 for WASH, 3 for Child Protection, 1 for Telecoms and 1 for Nutrition. UNICEF also deployed the Rapid Response Team (RRT) coordinator from the Education Cluster.

How did NORCAP respond?

NRC proposed candidates for 4 of the roles, which were considered along with 11 other candidates proposed by different standby partners. NORCAP nominated three candidates the day after UNICEF sent their request.[45] One NORCAP candidate was selected, along with two from RedR Australia. The RRT coordinator from the Education Cluster was also from NORCAP.[46]

Why was deployment of a standby partner requested?

WASH: There was an immediate need for Information Manager (IM) to support the WASH cluster coordinator in providing relevant government ministries and partners with timely and useful WASH-related assessment data and analysis.

Education: UNICEF Nepal and partners were taking the lead to get children back to education as soon as possible including working to set up child friendly spaces and temporary learning spaces in 14 districts affected by the earthquake.

What were the key contributions of NORCAP deployees?

NORCAP deployments were able to deliver on the three priorities NORCAP had identified, namely coordination, meeting urgent needs and building back better.

WASH: the NORCAP Information Management Officer (IMO), a Nepali national, began his work on April 30th, five days after the earthquake. During the following 7 months he supported coordination by collecting data from cluster members, organizing and disseminating relevant information that facilitated decision-making by both humanitarian agencies and government authorities. In addition to "Who does What Where When" (4W) dashboard[47] and matrixes, he also supported the preparation of district-level contingency plans. Being of Nepali origin, the deployee had a good understanding of the local context and needs.

Education: NORCAP's Rapid Response Team (RRT) member was deployed on May 5th for a six-week period to support the UNICEF Education Cluster Coordinator with developing their strategic direction, promoting greater collaboration between the cluster, OCHA and the Ministry of Education. She also helped to develop the structure, define functional responsibilities, draft relevant guidance and revised the cluster's contingency plan. During her assignment she visited 7 of the 14 most affected districts to help with the establishment and orientation of sub-national Education Cluster focal points

---

[45] This was in addition to two NORCAP deployees to ProCap which were selected by ProCap's steering committee.

[46] http://educationcluster.net/who-we-are/rrt/

[47] For a sample output from this deployment, see
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/wash_district_dashboard_kathmandu_20150722v1.pdf

and provided virtual "help desk" support by Skype after leaving Nepal.

What were the main challenges with deployments?

UNICEF had to abandon the search for the nutritionist due to lack of available candidates. Eventually the NORCAP candidate was selected but UNICEF was only informed later that he was no longer available since his contract for his existing role was extended. UNICEF reinitiated their search but could not find suitable candidates and ended up abandoning that role.

What were key lessons learned?

- Deployees with prior experience working with global cluster or regional positions can be very useful in contexts where host agencies have limited experience of large-scale emergency response as bringing relevant expertise, experience and coordination skills.

- When availability of candidates change, it is important that NORCAPs informs the requesting agency as soon as possible so that they can continue their search for suitable candidates.

NORCAP Case Study 2: UN Women – strengthened coordination for integrated women's empowerment and gender equality.

What was UN Women's role during the response?

Working closely with the Government of Nepal, OCHA, Civil Society and Women's Organisations, and other humanitarian partners, UN Women through its triple mandate (normative, coordination and operational) aimed to ensure adequate, consistent and sustainable integration of gender equality and women's empowerment in identifying and addressing the needs and vulnerabilities of crisis-affected population.

What were the requests to standby partners?

UN Women immediate needs was for coordination skills and technical expertise in gender and they requested experts to support in two areas: coordination and operations.

How did NORCAP respond?

NORCAP deployed three GENCAP Advisors and a Gender and Humanitarian Advisor immediately after the earthquake to support UN Women.

Why was deployment of a standby partner requested?

Coordination: There was an immediate need for GenCap Advisors primarily to support the clusters through the creation and smooth running of Inter Cluster Gender Working Group (GWG).

Operations: In the aftermath there was a need to address cultural constraints, limited access to information and access to services by women. UN Women, with technical support of the GenCap Advisor, established five Multi-Purpose Women Centres (MPWCs) through its local partners. NORCAP deployees provided supported during the design, set up, implementation and monitoring of these centres.

What were the key contributions of NORCAP deployees?

Coordination: The first GenCap Advisor arrived on 29 April 2015 for two weeks and was replaced by another GenCap Advisor who also stayed for less than a month. The third deployee stayed more than 6 months. GenCAP Advisors provided inter-agency technical and capacity development support to UN Women and the Gender Working Group. GenCap Advisors contributed to pioneering achievements which include producing gender equality response monitoring indicators, gender equality updates and a Nepal gender profile. The HCT adopted Key Advocacy Messages and recommendations on Gender Equality in humanitarian action and Disaster Risk Reduction, integration of gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE) and sex and age disaggregated data and gender analysis during assessments by different clusters, joint assessments, monitoring and reporting tools. GenCap Advisors worked closely with UN Women staff that was at the forefront of the coordination mechanism, ensuring continuity in the absence of GENCAP Advisors.

Operations: UN Women through women's organisations operated five Multi-Purpose Women Centres (MPWCs) in collaboration with local government in five districts (Sindhupalchowk, Gorkha, Kathmandu, Kavre and Nuwakot). Through the MPWCs, 19,116 women accessed a range of services (psychosocial counselling and trauma assistance to 1,532 women, awareness raising and information dissemination to 13,966 women, 1,392 women were engaged in early recovery (399) and social groups (930), and 618 women received referral services).

Four of the women's groups interviewed acknowledged the increased knowledge and skill in setting up and managing the MPWCs, including their staff ability to record data related to Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) which was previously non-existent. One of the centres was handed over to the local government authorities in early 2016.

What were the main challenges with deployments?

Mission lengths, especially for the first two GenCap Advisors, was short and lacked continuity. The relatively rapid turnover also meant that the HCT in general and UN Women as the host had to adapt to each deployed Advisor's different style and approach.

What were the lessons learned?

- Host agency's preparedness level to receive and manage the deployment is crucial to the success of deployment.

- Taking time to clarify expectations right from the start of the deployments increases effectiveness while minimizing frustrations from host agency and deployees.

- Performance reviews at the end of the contract prior to extension provides an opportunity to revisit priorities and mutual expectations.

- The deployments would have benefitted from longer duration of GenCap Advisor missions to ensure continuity.

- Identification of relevant counterpart/s ensures easier transfer of capacity and promotes sustainability.

NORCAP Case Study 3: IOM – enhanced technical support and guidance through NORCAP deployments to strengthen coordination and managed displaced populations in Nepal.

What was IOM's role during the response?

Working closely with the Government of Nepal, IOM's initial focus was on the resettlement of Bhutanese refugees. Since then IOM has diversified its areas of cooperation into additional fields such as Forced Migration, Migration Health, Migration and Development, Facilitating Migration and Regulating Migration. During the Nepal EQ, IOM supported the earthquake-affected populations with Shelter, Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM), Health and Psychosocial Support, Protection and Early Recovery activities. Furthermore, IOM launched the Relief, Recovery and Reconstruction Programme to efficiently and timely respond to the pressing needs in the aftermath of the earthquakes.

What were the requests to standby partners?

IOM immediate needs were for coordination skills and technical expertise in CCCM.

How did NORCAP respond?

NORCAP quickly deployed experts in the area of Shelter, Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) and Capacity Building to meet short and medium term needs. The percentage of the acceptance of deployee candidates was 44%, the highest acceptance rate out of all Nepal deployments. The experts shared a diverse background, including nationals from Nepal, from the regional in addition to other country nationals.

Why was deployment of a standby partner requested?

Coordination: There was an immediate need for support to CCCM clusters at national and district levels.

Operations: Aside from working with partners, IOM directly implemented two IDP camps during the earthquake response. NORCAP deployees supported these targeted interventions with the design, set up and implementation and monitoring of the sites.

Capacity Building: NORCAP Capacity Building Officer designed and conducted trainings for IOM and its partners and government authorities on CCCM.

What were the key contributions of NORCAP deployees?

Coordination: NORCAP deployees assisted IOM in leading cluster meetings at national and district levels. Nepalese deployees were able to access communication with local authorities.

Operations: NORCAP deployees were instrumental in setting up IOM sub-offices and sites in Dhading, Makwanpur and Gorkha districts. NORCAP deployees were part of the needs assessment team. The team travelled in urban and rural areas to conduct assessment, locate displaced people and to gather information about their living conditions. National staff were hired and trained by NORCAP deployee such as in Chautara sub-office.

Capacity Building: Capacity building officer along with IOM team members conducted series of CCCM trainings that focused on all steps of CCCM including exit strategy which was the stage at the time of reporting. IOM team especially the national staff are now familiar with the training modules and delivery, better equipped to share the knowledge in absence of capacity building officer.   Nepalese engineers recruited to work on site planning had no previous experience in planning IDP camps or constructing emergency shelters. NORCAP deployees not only helped train Nepali engineers to plan and construct temporary sites and structures, but also in participatory approaches with communities.

What were the main challenges with deployments?

The relatively rapid turnover in IOM also meant that the deployees had to adapt to each supervisor's different style and approach while ensuring continuity of the work.

Roles and responsibilities of deployees after the emergency period (first three months) evolved and

there were changed needs in comparison with the original ToR.

Deployees from standby partners were treated differently from IOM surge capacity (e.g. IOM staff tended to stay in better quality accommodation as their living allowances were relatively higher).

Capacity building work takes time. IOM did not place a particular emphasis on transfer of skills internally or measuring capacity building in the ToR. It proved to be a challenge to measure outcome and impact of this capacity building effort without a clear agreement as to how this should be done.

What were the lessons learned?

- Host agency's preparedness level to receive and manage the deployment is crucial to the success of deployment.

- Taking time to clarify expectations right from the start of the deployments increases effectiveness while minimizing frustrations from host agency and deployees.

- Capacity building efforts without clear outcome or impact measurement poses a challenge to attribute contribution of technical experts

Annex 4 – Agenda for the NORCAP Nepal Earthquake Evaluation Working Session

Background

The workshop will be co-facilitated by the Team Leader and a NRC staff member where provisional findings and recommendations will be presented.   The workshop is timed to take place shortly after the draft evaluation report has been circulated and before written feedback has been collected and forwarded to the evaluation team. The workshop will give participants a chance to review and discuss provisional findings and recommendations in plenary before breaking into working groups (divided by section) in order to prioritise recommendations while at the same time assessing their relevance and feasibility, suggesting revisions or additions where appropriate.

Objectives

- Review and validate provisional findings and recommendations

- Prioritize recommendations and identify any missing recommendations

- Provide the opportunity for functional teams to propose follow up on recommendations

Agenda

Time	Topic	Format
09:00 – 09:15	Introduction of Participants	Plenary
09:15 – 10:15	Introductory Session: • Objectives of the Evaluation • Presentation of Provisional Findings & Recommendations • Questions for clarification • Instructions for the Working Groups	Plenary
10:15 – 10:45	Coffee/Tea Break	
10:45 – 12:00	Working groups will fill in the templates provided to respond to the following questions: 1. Are the recommendations relevant? How realistic/achievable are they? 2. Are there important recommendations missing? 3. What are the priorities? ...for the short term (next 6 months)? ...for the longer term?	Working Groups
12:00 – 13:00	Lunch	
13:00 – 13:30	Prepare presentations	Working Groups
13:30 – 14:15	Presentations by Working Groups	Plenary
15:00 – 15:45	Wrap-up	Plenary

Annex 5 – Timeline of NORCAP Deployments (April 25 - December 31, 2015

Annex 6 – List of Interviewees

NORCAP Deployees

Name	Org. and function	♂	♀	Date	Interviewee Location
Johnny Abbas	Logistics Officer (UNFPA) P3	1		5-Feb-16	Lebanon (Skype)
Khidir Ali	IMO	1		5-Feb-16	Amman (Skype)
Chandra Rana Jung	IMO	1		7-Feb-16	Sierra Leone (Skype)
Annelies Ollieuz	Education Cluster Coordinator		1	9-Feb-16	Geneva (Skype)
Devanna de la Peunte	GBV REGA		1	11-Feb-16	Columbia (Skype)
Astrid Sofie Arne	CCCM Capacity Building Officer (IOM)		1	15-Feb-16	Nepal
Omer Suleiman	CCCM Hub Coordinator (IOM)	1		16-Feb-16	Nepal
Leela Raj Upadhay & Suman Karna	CCCM Coordinator & CCCM Site (IOM)	2		18-Feb-16	Nepal
Jamil Awan	CCCM CM/Site (IOM)	1		18-Feb-16	Nepal
Erling Bratheim	Subnational Food Security Cluster Coordinator (WFP)	1		9-Feb-16	Oslo (Skype)
Chrispine Donald Ojiambo	Shelter Specialist (UN-HABITAT)	1		10-Feb-16	Malawi (Skype)
Amirkambiz Hamedanizadeh	Health Specialist (UNFPA)	1		20-Apr-16	Skype

Host Agency Staff in Nepal

Name	Org. and function	♂	♀	Date	Interviewee Location
Mala Rai	HR officer (WFP)		1	15-Feb-16	Nepal
Bhawana Upadhay	Head of ICT (WFP)		1	16-Feb-16	Nepal
Katherine Carey	Programme Policy Officer (WFP)		1	16-Feb-16	Nepal
Francesca Caponera & Frank Aynes	Deputy Country Director & Head of Supply Chaim and Common Services (WFP)	1	1	15-Feb-16	Nepal
Marian Hodgkins	Education Specialist (UNICEF)		1	15-Feb-16	Nepal

Name	Org. and function	♂	♀	Date	Interviewee Location
Padma Joshi	Head of Office (UN Habitat Nepal)	1		16-Feb-16	Nepal
Naima Gherdaoui	International Operations Manager (UNFPA)		1	17-Feb-16	Nepal
Shilu Adhikari	SRH Specialist (UNFPA)		1	17-Feb-16	Nepal
Suzana Paklar & Arun Chowdhury	Program Manager & Resource Management Officer (IOM)	1	1	18-Feb-16	Nepal
Sama Shrestha, Ganesh Chaulagain, Gitanjali Singh	Unit Manager, District Gender Coordinator, Deputy Country Representative (UN Women)	1	2	18-Feb-16	Nepal
Ziad Sheikh	Country Representative (UN Women)	1		18-Feb-16	Nepal
Marie Sophie Pettersson	Coordination Analyst (UN Women)		1	18-Feb-16	Nepal
Damar Prasad Ghimire	Operations Manager (UN Women)	1		18-Feb-16	Nepal
Surekchya Rana, Reshma Thapa, Rajin Rayamajhi, Bishnu Kala Bhandari	Advocacay Officer (Saathi), Program Manager (WHR), Program Manager Legal (WHR), Coordinator (WOREC/ National Alliance of Women Human Rights Defenders)		4	18-Feb-16	Nepal
Vedha Karuppiah	Head of Sub Office, Chautara (IOM)	1		18-Feb-16	Nepal
Patricia Schiavinato	CCCM & Protection Leader		1	1-Mar-16	Nepal
Richie Bhattarai	Hub Manager for Humanitarian Staging Area		1	1-Mar-16	Nepal

NRC/NORCAP HQ

Name	Org. and function	♂	♀	Date	Interviewee Location
Nina Hjellegjerde	Head of Deployments		1	21-Jan-16	Bangkok (Skype)
Jørn C. Øwre	CCCMCAP PM / Adviser NORCAP NRC Emergency Response Dept	1		21-Jan-16	Oslo (Skype)
Peter Schioler	Special Adviser Knowledge Technology	1		8-Feb-16	Oslo (skype)

Host Agency HQ

Name	Org. and function	♂	♀	Date	Interviewee Location
Julien Temple & Lauren Cheshire	Manager, Humanitarian Partnership Emergency Specialist, Standby Arrangements, Office of Emergency Programmes, UNICEF	1	1	27-Jan-16	Geneva (Skype)
Nicol U	Secondment Focal Point, Preparedness and Response Division, Dept. of Operations and Emergencies, IOM		1	21/01/2016 and 1/3/2016	Geneva (Skype)
Kristin Hoem Langsholt	Norwegian MFA and NORCAP focal point		1	10-Feb-16	Oslo (tel)
Bruno Dercon	Senior Humanitarian Settlements Officer, UNHABITAT	1		11-Mar-16	Japan (skype)
Caroline Legros	Augmented Logistics Intervention Team for Emergencies (ALITE) Supply Chain Division, WFP		1	11-Mar-16	Rome (skype)
Dr. Henia Dakkak, MPH	Programme Adviser Humanitarian and Fragile Context Branch, Programme Division		1	24-Mar-16	Geneva (Skype)
David Coffey	Humanitarian Program Specialist, UN Women	1		26-Apr-16	NYC (Skype)

Other Standby Deployment Agencies

Name	Org. and function	♂	♀	Date	Interviewee Location
David Sundstrom	Knowledge Manager, MSB Sweden	1		27-Jan-16	Karlstad (Skype)
Samy Mounir	Talent Acquisition Advisor – International Emergency Response, RedR Australia	1		11-Feb-16	(Victoria, Australia)Skype
Carolyn Cummins	Deployment Officer, RedR Australia		1	11-Feb-16	Victoria, Australia Skype
Emilio König	Nepal Response Manager, MSB Sweden	1		24-Feb-16	Stockholm (Skype)

Annex 7 – Key Reference Documents

Baker, J. et al. (2012) Study of Sida's Support to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) 2006-2011. http://www.sida.se/contentassets/298540ac734848fbb096653c83bc7ecb/study-of-sidas-support-to-the-swedish-civil-contingencies-agency-msb-2006-2011---synthesis-report_3388.pdf

Baker, J., Dross, E., Shah, V. and Polastro R. (2013) Study: How to Define and Measure Value for Money in the Humanitarian Sector. Joint study commissioned by ICRC and Sida http://www.alnap.org/resource/12404

Baker, J., Palkovits, K., Abeywickrama, T., Lee, C., and Keen, P. (2015) Real Time Evaluation of the Nepal Earthquake Response Operation http://www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-reports/evaluations/?c=&co=&fy=&mo=&mr=1&r=&ti=Nepal%20Earthquake&ty=&tyr=&z=

Falch, A. (2015) Lessons from NRC's Expert Deployment/NORCAP's response to the Nepal Earthquake. August 2015.

Gaire, S. et al (2015) Disaster risk profile and existing legal framework of Nepal: floods and landslides. https://www.dovepress.com/disaster-risk-profile-and-existing-legal-framework-of-nepal-floods-and-peer-reviewed-article-RMHP

Humanitarian Country Team for Nepal (2015) After Action Review: Workshop Summary Report.

IASC (2015) STAIT Learning Review Preparedness for Response in Nepal.

IOM (2015) Nepal Earthquake IOM Response. Situation Report: 17 September 2015.

Logistics Cluster (2016) Nepal Lessons Learned Report. January 2016. http://www.logcluster.org/document/logistics-clusternepal-LLreport-jan2016

MSB (2015) Ansökan: Överenskommelse om humanitär ram 2014-2017.

NRC/NORCAP Request to MFA for Additional Financial Support for the Nepal Earthquake Response – April 2015.

NORCAP Annual Plan for 2015

OCHA (2015a) Nepal Earthquake: Humanitarian Snapshot (as of 24 August 2015) http://reliefweb.int/report/nepal/nepal-earthquake-humanitarian-snapshot-24-august-2015

OCHA (2015b) Nepal Flash Appeal Revision: Nepal Earthquake April - September 2015 http://reliefweb.int/report/nepal/nepal-flash-appeal-revision-nepal-earthquake-april-september-2015

OCHA (2015c) Humanitarian Bulletin Nepal Earthquake Issue 03 | 1 – 31 August 2015 http://reliefweb.int/report/nepal/humanitarian-bulletin-nepal-earthquake-issue-03-1-31-august-2015

Open Mic Nepal (2015) Bulletin Issue #4. July 27, 2015 https://www.internews.org/

Sanderson, David; Rodericks, Andrea; Shrestha, Nabina and Ramalingam Ben (2015) Nepal Earthquake Appeal Response Review. September 2015. http://www.alnap.org/resource/21348

Sandison, Peta (2012) A Review of the Standby Partnership Programme http://norcapweb.no/arch/_img/9153563.pdf

Ternstrom Consulting (2013) Evaluation of Five Humanitarian Programmes of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and of the Standby Roster NORCAP http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9180055.pdf

World Vision (2015) Real-time Evaluation of World Vision's Response to the Nepal Earthquake Emergency http://www.alnap.org/resource/21277

In addition to the above, a collection of relevant internal documents was consulted, including NRC/NORCAP deployment records related to the Nepal earthquake response, NRC Updates for the MFA, Nepal earthquake strategies, appeal documents and results frameworks of host agencies.

Annex 8 – Team Member Profiles

Jock Baker, Team Leader, began working as an independent consultant in 1999 following a career of almost two decades in various field-based and HQ program management positions with four different United Nations agencies and international NGOs in Asia, Central America, Africa, eastern Europe, the Pacific. He holds a MSc in Economics from the London School of Economics. He has led a number of interagency reviews and evaluations and led a review of Sweden's MSB global operations in 2012. He is a native English speaker and has worked on both long- and short-term assignments in Nepal during the past two decades, including two assignments in Nepal after the earthquake to provide technical support to a NGO consortium in May 2015 and a second visit in September 2015 to lead the IFRC's Real Time Evaluation of their response.

Ms. Uma Narayanan, HR Expert, has worked for the past 10 years in humanitarian and development contexts with a range of UN, Red Cross and faith-based organizations in capacity building, HR management, organizational development and accountability. Past assignments include setting up IFRC's standby roster systems, a review of Save the Children Norway's standby roster system and as team member for the 2013 Evaluation of Five Humanitarian Programmes of the Norwegian Refugee Council and Standby Roster NORCAP. She holds an MSc in HR Management and International Employment Relationships from London School of Economics.