

Evaluation of Five Humanitarian Programmes of  
the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and of the  
Standby Roster NORCAP

Evaluation Report

Ternstrom Consulting  
in collaboration with Channel Research  
2013

# Ternstrom Consulting



## Acknowledgements

Ternstrom Consulting wishes to thank all the people who have received us and given their time and effort in order to allow us to gather data concerning NRC operations. These people represent beneficiaries, community leaders, local authority officials, local and international NGOs, the United Nations system, donors and responsible governments. They have been welcoming and generous with their time despite challenging agendas.

Special thanks are extended to the staff members of NRC, especially those working with NORCAP, NRC's core competencies, and the case countries Pakistan, Somalia and South Sudan. The evaluation team has benefited from the NRC security and logistics "umbrella". Given the context within which we have worked, this was a necessity. It has implied, at times significant, additional workload for selected NRC staff. The assistance given to us was efficient, friendly, and respectful of our role allowing us to focus on our work.

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This report is the product of its authors, and responsibility for the accuracy of data included in this report rests with the authors. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of EVAL.

Täby 2013

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## Acronyms and abbreviations

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
CAD	Core Activity Database
CGI	Corrugated Galvanised Iron
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
CV	Curriculum Vitae
Danida	Danish International Development Agency
DfID	Department for International Development (UK Aid)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
EFSD	Emergency Food Security Distribution
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
HAPPDA	Humanitarian Assistance and Protection to People Displaced in Africa
GBV	Gender-based violence
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
HO	Head Office
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Resources
ICLA	Information, Counselling and Legal Advice
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT	Information Communication Technology
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
MENA	Middle East North Africa Region
MNOK	Million Norwegian Kroner
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NFI	Non-Food Items
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMFA	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NOK	Norwegian Kroner
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NORCAP	Norwegian Capacity
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
PER	Performance Evaluation Review
PETS	Public Expenditure Tracking System
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRD	United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme

# Executive Summary

## Introduction

This report presents the main results of an evaluation of five core competencies of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP) commissioned by Norad. Three case country reports and a public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) report contain further information gathered by the evaluation team. The evaluation was conducted by Ternstrom Consulting AB in association with Channel Research SPRL.

The **purpose** of the evaluation is to contribute to the improvement of NRC and NORCAP. The **objectives** are to *i)* assess the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of five of NRC's core activities in three countries; *ii)* assess the quality of NORCAP responses (relevance and efficiency); *iii)* assess the existence of synergies between NRC and NORCAP activities; *iv)* provide scope for learning at different levels and; *v)* make recommendations regarding a) making WASH a new core competence; b) improvements in design and implementation of NRC core activities and; c) improvements in NORCAP's competencies.

The **scope** of the evaluation is *i)* the years 2010-2012, *ii)* five of NRC's core competencies in three countries, and *iii)* all of NORCAP's activities. The case countries are Somalia, South Sudan and Pakistan. The core competencies included are Shelter, Information, Counselling and Legal Advice (ICLA), Emergency Food Security and Distribution (EFSD), Camp Management and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH). Education, although a core competency, was not included. Camp Management was not implemented in any of the case countries and the team thus had no basis for findings on this, ICLA was just starting up in Somalia, WASH was new as a core competency.

The evaluation was carried out between July 2012 and January 2013, with field work in the three case countries in September – November 2012. An internet based survey of NORCAP secondees with 263 respondents was done in November. The team has conducted individual or group interviews with over 850 persons and reviewed (in more or less detail) more than 900 documents.

Evaluation field access was limited by the severe security situation in all the countries visited. The team had to rely on NRC, the organisation being evaluated, for arranging meetings, providing transportation and security details, and was unable to interact with the target population to the extent that would be normal in an evaluation. In order to partially compensate for this the team has put substantial effort in examining NRC systems and processes, assessing whether NRC has the organisational capacity to accomplish their objectives and whether they can show that such capacity is being used.

## Findings

### Management and programming:

**NRC is decentralised, its staff is motivated and professional.** Operative management is decentralised. Country Directors have broad mandates and organisational culture in the Case Countries emphasises staff involvement, even at relatively junior levels. The decentralised *modus operandi* supports a highly motivated organisational culture where the vast majority of staff interviewed attested to their commitment to the organisation's purpose



and vision. Overall, NRC staff is well-trained and staff interviewed with few exceptions saw NRC as a 'good employer'.

**Overall, Financial systems are strong and adapted to contextual challenges, but strained.** NRC's financial system is vertically integrated, on the whole computerised and contains appropriate checks and balances. Finance and administration procedures are well defined and known throughout the organisation. Financial software is appropriate and being updated to address problems encountered. There are challenges with recruiting, training and retaining staff as well as cases of managerial role confusion in some contexts.

**Non standardised donor reporting requirements increase costs.** Several administrative processes are designed based on donor reporting requirements. These vary, forcing NRC to manage parallel processes. This is inefficient and drives higher costs.

**Project selection while influenced by strategy was largely based on opportunities for funding and output focussed.** The core competencies functioned as a framework which to some extent limited the type of activities undertaken. Actual project selection was done in an entrepreneurial matching process. Overall needs assessments, generated through the Consolidated Appeals Process or individual cluster coordination efforts, were compared with NRC's organisational capabilities, primarily in the form of staff and networks or access, and were matched with available funding. The process was successful in generating significant funds but lacked strategic direction at the country programme level. In the case countries visited, the process tended to generate a series of stand-alone projects with a strong output focus. This was particularly true for Shelter and EFDS, less so for ICLA.

**NRC interacts and coordinates well with local authorities and other agencies.** Local authorities and UN organisations appreciated the way NRC interacted with local authorities and the cluster system. NRC was described as impartial, adaptable and sharing.

**NRC does not have Theories of Change, Logframes are standardised and baseline data is lacking.** NRC does not use Theories of Change in its programming, and the staff interviewed was not familiar with the methods and techniques it involves. Logframes were developed using standardised targets and indicators and focussed mainly on output. Overall objectives and outcomes were expressed in ways that they could not be measured. There were no baselines that could be used to measure change in order to assess outcomes.

#### **Core Competencies:**

**NRC programme integration and coherence varies.** The team saw both programmes that were clearly linked, and programmes where there was more of a 'silo mentality': for example non-food items and tents projects that assist internally displaced persons during displacement in Pakistan are linked to return assistance such as permanent shelter construction and WASH while in South Sudan, staff interviewed pointed at a silo mentality, even within field offices.

**NRC has good access to difficult areas and acts with conflict sensitivity.** Good relations with external stakeholders, strategic investment in national staff and good contextual understanding combined to give NRC very good access to difficult areas where security issues keep most international organisations out. Conflict sensitivity is apparent in both internal procedures and project implementation.

**Overall, the Shelter projects studied were relevant, effective, efficient and sustainable given the context of implementation.** Staff, beneficiaries and other stakeholders attested to the relevance of NRC's activities. NRC involved beneficiaries in project assessments and monitoring in some projects and adapted projects to feedback. Project reports stated outputs as achieved to a high extent, and stakeholders attested to NRC's ability to deliver planned outputs. In South Sudan some shelter projects were found to be less relevant and effective. The team identified several examples of cost consciousness: In Pakistan, NRC conducts periodic cost comparisons with other agencies, in Somalia cost effectiveness considerations

led NRC to select a more expensive but longer-lasting type of shelter, and NRC has chosen to work with local suppliers to reduce costs. There were examples of taking sustainability into consideration.

**Overall, ICLA projects were relevant to beneficiaries' needs and achieved their intended outputs.** In South Sudan, NRC staff and local authorities and beneficiaries stated their belief that the ICLA programme was relevant. According to project documents, NRC met the ICLA specific targets it set for itself but due to a lack of clarity on how output targets were set, it is difficult to say anything about the efficiency of the achievement. Stakeholders interviewed in Pakistan attested to the effectiveness of ICLA activities and to NRC's professionalism in this area of expertise. Authorities indicated good relations with NRC regarding repatriation issues and emphasised that ICLA staff were experienced and professional.

**ICLA activities were both adapted to and limited by the context.** National ICLA programmes were very different from one country to another as ICLA programmes were tailored to specific contexts and needs, and to the qualifications of available staff.

**There is need for more clarity regarding phasing out criteria for ICLA.** ICLA usually exits either by closing down the programme, by handing over activities to a local structure or it emerges into a local successor organisation. As ICLA is usually following other NRC core activities there is a danger that its activities will be phased out together with other NRC components, regardless of whether ICLA needs have been met or not.

**Emergency food security and distribution projects were relevant to the context but not always fully in line with beneficiaries' priorities.** NRC implements three types of EFSD projects: Emergency food distribution, distribution of non-food items and food security projects. All of these were found to be relevant. In Somalia, NRC's approach of working through local suppliers and alongside local non-governmental organisations to secure access to communities was found to be particularly relevant. The use of food vouchers was also relevant, achieving greater dignity for beneficiaries and allowing them the choice of how to combine timing and quantity of distribution. In Pakistan, needs assessments and selection of items for non-food item kits were carried out with the participation of beneficiaries. In South Sudan, interviews with NRC staff and at the OCHA office in Kwajok confirmed that the food security project was relevant to beneficiaries. However, according to beneficiaries, there was poor selection of seeds such as sorghum that was not adaptable to local climatic conditions and distributions were not always well-timed in relation to planting season.

**In general, the emergency food distribution and non-food items distribution activities were effective, but in Somalia and South Sudan, there were problems with timeliness.** In Pakistan, targets for non-food items distribution were achieved. In Somalia, NRC's quarterly post-distribution monitoring system confirmed the effectiveness of the food vouchers; food items were in line with people's preferences. NRC's decision on the famine response in Somalia was not timely and it then took six weeks to deliver food vouchers to beneficiaries. In South Sudan, there were serious inconsistencies between different sources as to the timeliness of achievements of the food security project. The inconsistencies point at problems not only in reporting, but also in planning and implementation.

**NRC's selected mode of intervention was efficient in reducing leakages.** The team found no evidence of significant NRC leakages in the EFSD projects reviewed. The NRC emergency food distribution team in Somalia went to great lengths to prevent leakage in the programme. Contextual corruption risks go beyond the control of NRC and beyond what was possible to explore in the field. The evaluation notes that NRC withdrew from distributions in some areas where access issues made supervision unfeasible. All purchases of a material nature were made through competitive tender. Specifications were created and on receipt of quotations from various bidders, NRC selected the supplier whose offer most closely complied with the technical specification and with a competitive price. The contents of the non-food items kits were aligned with those of other agencies.

**The use of cash and food vouchers is a good alternative to general distribution, if certain criteria are fulfilled.** In Somalia, Côte d'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo, NRC's use of cash and food vouchers as an alternative to general distribution has been successful. The methodologies require materially different skill profiles for staff, careful analysis of both financial and food market conditions as well as generating security issues which need to be managed. Financial and administrative support systems were periodically placed under significant strain.

**NRC's WASH activities, to date mainly implemented as part of the shelter programme, have been relevant but insufficient.** WASH has essentially been pursued in connection with Shelter activities and the approach of WASH interventions has been more in line with providing support if no other actor was doing so. Beneficiaries in Pakistan and Somalia found the activities relevant and appreciated output but the scale of support was mentioned as being inadequate.

**WASH Effectiveness was compromised by poor implementation in some activities in Somalia and in South Sudan.** In Somalia there were challenges observed related to Sphere standards, and lack of use of baseline data to be able to demonstrate outcomes. Insufficient numbers of latrines were constructed in relation to number of beneficiaries. Other challenges were related to insufficient solid waste handling and waste dumps in close proximity to the shelter areas that were overflowing. However, implementation quality appeared to vary greatly. In South Sudan, the team found that project design was not well adapted to local conditions.

**NRC staff shows awareness of Environment, Gender, Disabilities and Corruption issues.** The team noted that NRC is addressing gender issues in several programmes, environment and disabilities in some. In all three case countries, extensive efforts were taken to mitigate corruption risks.

#### **NORCAP:**

**The quality of NORCAP secondees is considered high and NORCAP is seen as proactive in identifying and meeting changing needs.** UN agency staff interviewed generally considered the quality of NORCAP roster members to be excellent. The secondees are well trained and often have specific agency expertise. The diversity and quality of the profiles deployed by NORCAP is seen by host organisations as a major advantage. NORCAP is seen as strong in moving into new sectors and build the capacity of their roster accordingly.

**Secondees are highly motivated and see a strong sense of purpose in the work that they do, but there are shortcomings in the way they are treated and utilised.** Secondees are driven by the differences they make in the host organisation while providing their technical expertise. However, secondees also reported several shortcomings, such as inadequate access to basic amenities and equipment, lack of access and opportunities to attend relevant briefing, training or meetings, host organisations not fully utilising their expertise, inadequate mechanisms for secondees to air their concerns and inadequate measures to ensure continuity of efforts put in by secondees. The team also found serious shortcomings in safety and security responsibility.

**NORCAP has several strengths compared to other rosters but most host organisations are not prepared to increase cost sharing.** NORCAP has several relative advantages: having a large roster, allowing long-term deployments, being proactive to meet changing needs, providing impartial persons as e.g. cluster coordinators. Despite this, interviewed host organisations had several reasons why increased cost sharing is not an option.

**NORCAP has a highly motivated management team and adequate policies, processes and practices but inadequate quality control mechanisms and inconsistent practices which may deduct from the quality of their response.** The NORCAP management team has the relevant and appropriate background to appreciate the needs of both the partner

organisations and the secondees. NORCAP has developed, or adopted NRC's, required policies, procedures, processes, checklists and practices, but some procedures are clearly missing, such as some emergency procedures during critical incidents. There were some inconsistencies in practices due to inadequate systematisation, capacity development of existing roster members was not done strategically and the recruitment and selection process, although streamlined in recent years, had shortcomings in quality control.

**NORCAP's aim to deploy secondees in 72 hours has become less relevant.** NORCAP aims to deploy secondees in 72 hours and this is seen by NORCAP team as a strength of the roster and added advantage of NORCAP. Roster members are obliged to formally sign up for availability in 72 hours. However, with increasing rates of deployment of secondees to non-emergency contexts, this speed is in reality rarely warranted and poses restrictions on roster eligibility. The team found that in 2011, only 18% of the secondees were actually deployed within three days.

**Synergies between Core Competencies and NORCAP are mainly found at Head Office level.** Among the synergies identified by the evaluation were that NORCAP uses and is linked to NRC's support services including administration, financial management system. Furthermore, as NRC is exiting from Camp Management NORCAP is absorbing camp management experts into its roster. At field level, NORCAP secondees sometimes rely on NRC for administrative purposes such as transfer of salary.

## Conclusions

### **NRC interventions were relevant**

Overall, NRC interventions in the three case countries were relevant. They addressed real needs with appropriate goods and services. Where feasible, the organisation took pains to base planning and intervention design on joint assessment and coordinated efforts through the Consolidated Appeals Process and cluster system, complemented by close interaction with local authorities. ICLA deserves special mention as NRC was commonly the only provider of this service.

### **In Somalia and Pakistan, NRC had unique access to displaced populations**

Good relations with local authorities or their equivalents gave NRC unique access to displaced populations. This was achieved through a mix of conflict awareness, sustained investment in networking and coordination, high profile appointments of national staff and conflict sensitive recruitment.

### **NRC contributed to the functioning of the humanitarian sector**

In all three case countries, NRC successfully contributed to improving the functioning of the humanitarian efforts overall. Organisational investments made ranged from active participation in coordination efforts to piloting intervention methodology, legal development, capacity building of local authority staff and hands on coordination.

### **NRC interventions were mostly effective in achieving output targets**

Overall, NRC interventions in the three case countries were effective in terms of delivering the output (goods and services) specified in project documents, on the time schedule agreed. This was done in very difficult operational environments. It should be noted that proposals and agreements were output oriented and that NRC documentation lacked the necessary data to measure outcomes. There were examples of inappropriate design, delays and support systems not keeping up with the rate of expansion.

### **NRC delivered agreed outputs in ICLA, Shelter, Emergency food and Non-food items**

### **distributions in parallel with rapid expansion**

NRC has implemented a very rapid expansion of its activities in the three case countries in the period evaluated. The organisation has managed to do this under extremely difficult conditions and has, in general, delivered output in ICLA services, Shelter and NFI distributions on time and with the quality committed to in project proposals.

### **Potential welfare gains were lost due to the output and project focus**

NRC's project selection strategy was output focussed and based on opportunities for funding, rather than following a predefined strategy. This approach, combined with a demonstrated ability to deliver output as contracted, helped the organisation attract donor funding as available. It also led to country programmes that to a high extent were clusters of projects rather than integrated programmes. The output focus led to overdependence on quantitative indicators and underinvestment in assessments, baselines, documentation, follow-up and evaluation. Management prioritised “what” ahead of “why” or “how” in project implementation. In consequence, the quality of work suffered and potential welfare gains were lost.

### **NRC interventions were efficient in Somalia and Pakistan, less so in South Sudan**

Operations in the areas where NRC is active require logistics and security systems that are inherently expensive. NRC had the scale of operations, the procurement and financial systems in place to maintain reasonable efficiency under given conditions. Support systems in South Sudan did not keep up with the rate of expansion.

### **NRC's core competencies built identity and trust yet lacked definition**

Many stakeholders appreciated NRC's clarity regarding what they do and do not implement, citing the core competencies. Meanwhile, neither staff nor management could define what differentiates a core competency from other activities and when asked did not refer to common standards such as minimum support structures or similar for core competencies.

### **NRC support systems are sound and there is awareness of cross-cutting issues**

NRC in general has strong support systems in place. The staff was highly appreciative of NRC's willingness to invest in staff development and empowerment. The financial handbook, software and structure, including an internal audit function, jointly create a solid foundation for sound resource management. Advisory functions exist for key areas. Over the years relevant policies and guidelines have been developed. NRC is aware of cross-cutting issues. Overall, gender and corruption issues are well considered in project implementation but there remain capacity gaps, especially in quality control, monitoring and evaluation. We note that systems have been under significant pressure due to rapid expansion and lack of core funding.

### **NORCAP provides response to actual challenges that is of high quality, relevant and overall efficient**

Secondees, management team and host organisations are all pleased with the role of secondees. Host organisations think NORCAP is good at adapting to actual needs. NORCAP has several comparative advantages to other rosters.

### **There is scope for improvements in the systems used to manage the NORCAP roster and secondees**

The team identified a number of shortcomings that, if remedied, could increase relevance and efficiency of NORCAP roster and secondees.

## **Recommendations**

### **NRC should maintain and selectively expand its capacity to deliver output by investing in support systems**

Despite cost implications, NRC should continue to invest in support systems. Selected expansion should be considered both to address unmet needs and to achieve further economies of scale. If such expansion is undertaken, attention to maintaining balance between operational and support systems is crucial.

### **NRC should maintain its positive attitude towards external coordination; donors should consider the resource implications**

We have concluded that NRC consistently invests in active participation in overall coordination efforts. The organisation should continue to do so and donors should recognise that this has resource implications.

### **NRC should continue to invest in national staff empowerment and development**

The organisational roles and responsibilities given to national staff in recognition of their capacity and professionalism should continue to be expanded. Continued investments in staff empowerment and development are recommended. NRC should consider national staff representation on the board.

### **NRC should define characteristics of and prioritise core competencies**

NRC should review their core competencies, define what characterises a core competence and prioritise them according to organisational ambition level: Global lead competencies should imply that the NRC has, and intends to maintain, both theoretical and practical global lead in a particular area. Preferred supplier competencies should imply that NRC has, and intends to maintain, good to excellent implementation capacity in a particular area. Pilot competencies would imply that NRC intends to develop organisationally and practically in an area. Each ambition level should be appropriately resourced.

### **NRC should expand focus beyond projects and outputs towards programmes and outcomes**

NRC should maintain its ability to deliver materials and services on time and to agreed specifications. Never the less, the organisation would raise quality and affect its beneficiaries more positively if it were to redesign systems with a focus on outcomes, rather than activity outputs. Current project focused, donor funding driven, planning should be framed within country level programmes to support cohesion and interproject learning. We are aware of the scale of such a change and do not give this recommendation lightly. The potential increase in quality and results is profound.

### **NRC should introduce further checks and balances, including improving monitoring and evaluation**

The fact that support systems in South Sudan did not keep up with the expansion of activities is troubling. More serious is the NRC Head Office lack of rapid response. A series of unfortunate events led up to the situation and none of these was serious enough to get alarm bells ringing. NRC should consider creating a deputy Secretary General level position focused on "Support, Quality and Follow-up".

The Monitoring and Evaluation function needs to introduce baseline studies and link these to monitoring reports for 'before' and 'after' comparisons of progress tracking. NRC has

developed – and continues to refine - useful monitoring tools such as post-distribution monitoring surveys, Knowledge, Attitude and Practice surveys (KAPs) and random spot-checks. Only when monitoring tools used and being developed are linked to baseline evidence of intervention rationale will the organisation be able to provide evidence of project effectiveness and build on lessons learned.

**NORCAP should improve monitoring and support systems to maintain and increase quality**

NORCAP should become better at documenting secondees' performance, strengthen their quality control mechanism, make further investments in recruitment and selection activities, ensure legal compliance in relation to secondees and ensure that secondees' safety and security is not compromised.

## Introduction and background

This report presents the main results of an evaluation of five core competencies of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP) commissioned by Norad. Three case country reports and a public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) report contain further information gathered by the evaluation team. These other reports are available online from Norad. The evaluation was conducted by Ternstrom Consulting AB in association with Channel Research SPRL.

The case country reports contain evidence and field-based data regarding NRC operations in Somalia, South Sudan and Pakistan and the PETS report contains the findings of a public expenditure tracking survey and analysis of one project in each of these countries. Evidence presented in PETS and case country reports is used as the basis for findings, conclusions and recommendations in the main evaluation report.

The evaluation was carried out between July 2012 and January 2013, with field work in the three case countries in September – November 2012. Interviews with NRC staff in Oslo and Nairobi, with NORCAP secondees and with other stakeholders were carried out intermittently during the evaluation period and an internet based survey of NORCAP secondees was done in November 2012.

The severe security situation in all the countries visited caused restrictions on the way the field work component of the evaluation was carried out. For example, we were unable to interact with the target population to the extent that would be normal in an evaluation. We also had to rely to a large extent on NRC, the organisation being evaluated, for arranging meetings, providing transportation and security details.

The report is structured as follows: Below, the purpose and scope of the evaluation is briefly presented, followed by a description of the context NRC operates in and an overview of NRC's activities, its structure and way of operating. Chapter 2 presents methodology, including limitations. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 present findings relating to core competencies, NORCAP and synergies between NORCAP and NRC's other activities, respectively. Chapter 6 presents conclusions and recommendations. The report structure and length is in line with the instructions provided by Norad, including the way findings, conclusions and recommendations are presented.

## Purpose and scope of the evaluation

The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the evaluation<sup>1</sup> state that the **purpose** of the evaluation is to contribute to the improvement of NRC and NORCAP activities through a detailed assessment process. The evaluation will furthermore indirectly provide input to the future revision of the Humanitarian Strategy of the Norwegian Government.

The ToR specifies **five objectives**: The evaluation shall *assess the i) relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of five of NRC's core activities in three countries; ii) quality of NORCAP responses (relevance and efficiency) and; iii) existence of synergies between NRC and NORCAP activities. The evaluation shall further iv) provide scope for learning at different levels and; v) make recommendations regarding a) making WASH a new core competence; b) improvements in design and implementation of NRC core activities and; c) improvements in NORCAP's competencies.*

The **scope** of the evaluation is *i) the years 2010-2012, ii) five of NRC's core competencies in three countries, and iii) all of NORCAP's activities. The case countries are Somalia, South*

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<sup>1</sup> See Annex 4.



Sudan and Pakistan, with some voucher programming related information from Democratic Republic of Congo and Côte d'Ivoire. The core competencies included are Shelter, Information, Counselling and Legal Advice (ICLA), Emergency Food Security and Distribution (EFSD), Camp Management and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH). Education, another core competence of NRC, is not to be covered by the evaluation. The ToR includes a number of more specific requests regarding descriptions, assessments and recommendations, see Annex 4.

The main intended *users* of this report are Norad, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA), Sida, staff at various departments at NRC Head Office in Oslo (HO), Regional Office (RO) in Nairobi and the staff of NRC's country and field offices in Pakistan, Somalia and South Sudan.

## **NRC and the humanitarian landscape: Contexts and tendencies**

### **1.1.1 The Setting: Emergencies and Refugees**

There are no distinct global trends in numbers of disasters reported or numbers of people affected or killed by disasters, neither in the short term nor in a 10 year perspective. 1.2 million people were killed in disasters in the period 2002 - 2011, around 120,000 per year. 358,000 of these people were killed in 2009 - 2011, also an average of around 120,000 per year. During the same decade 2.7 million people were affected by disasters, i.e. 270,000 per year. The last three years of the decade, 2009 – 2011, 775,000 people were affected, 230,000 per year.<sup>2</sup> No major changes in the overall refugee landscape were evident in the period 2010 - 2012. More than 42 million people in the world were forcibly displaced by the end of 2011, out of which 4.3 million became displaced during 2011. 800,000 of them fled across international borders which is the highest number in a decade.<sup>3</sup> In many cases the crises causing displacement were rooted in internal strife over power and resources, such as Ivory Coast, Afghanistan and Somalia. In Libya the changes were dramatic, as they were in Sudan, albeit planned in Sudan's case.

Some of the developments that lead to human suffering and displacements can be predicted (slow onset disasters such as drought and food insecurity), others are impossible to foresee (rapid onset disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis and floods). This can be exemplified by looking at 2011, the latest year available in statistics. The drought in the Horn of Africa could have been predicted and acted upon earlier than it was.<sup>4</sup> The 'Arab Spring' and the tsunami in Japan on the other hand were not predictable.

In 2011, Pakistan was hosting the highest number of refugees, followed by Iran, Syria, Germany, Jordan and Kenya. Developing countries continued to host the majority of refugees (around 80%) - a figure that reflects their proximity to the countries of origin, normally another developing country, notably Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

This uneven burden is also seen in figures measuring the number of refugees in relation to the GDP per capita of the receiving country: Pakistan has the highest, followed by DRC, Kenya, Liberia and Ethiopia.

### **1.1.2 NRC presence and activities**

<sup>2</sup> IFRC World Disasters Report 2012.

<sup>3</sup> UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) Global Trends 2011.

<sup>4</sup> See Oxfam's publication *Dangerous Delays*, 2012.

NRC was established in 1946 and is run from a head office in Oslo. It is organised as an independent, private foundation and has approximately 3,000 staff members globally. The majority of the staff members are national staff running projects in around 20 countries spread across Africa, Asia, America and Europe. NRC cooperates closely with the United Nations (UN) and other organisations. NRC's project activities are focussed around core competencies: ICLA, Shelter, EFSD, Education, Camp Management (being phased out) and WASH (being phased in). NORCAP, a division of NRC, has some 850 persons on stand-by rosters, which can be deployed on short notice to support the UN and other international organisations with humanitarian aid and emergency relief operations. NRC also works with advocacy and runs the IDMC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre) in Geneva.

NRC has grown significantly in later years. In 2011, the revenue (and operating costs) exceeded MNOK<sup>5</sup> 1,200, more than twice the amount in 2006. During the period 2010 – 2012, NRC was active in 88 countries with project funding in 39.<sup>6</sup> The seven largest from a cost perspective were Somalia, Afghanistan, DRC, Kenya, Pakistan, Uganda and Sudan/South Sudan. Together they accounted for more than half of expenditure. Somalia, DRC and Uganda showed a small decrease, while Afghanistan and Pakistan were increasing. At the other end of the spectrum were a large number of countries receiving small shares of NRC project funding: 70 % of the countries with project funding received 5 % or less of the total project funding.

NRC has most of its project activities in Africa, followed by Asia, MENA<sup>7</sup> and Eastern Europe. The Horn of Africa region received the largest share, between 30 and 37 % in the years 2010 to 2012, West and Central Africa received between 15 and 22 % and Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran between 18 and 23 % of project funding. The Horn of Africa region peaked in 2011 but is still the largest recipient region with about 35 % of total project funding. West and Central Africa, Europe and former Soviet States and Rest of Asia have been steadily decreasing over the three years, while Afghanistan/ Pakistan/ Iran and the MENA region have received increasing shares. Recent developments in Syria are likely to affect this distribution in coming years.

During the same period, NRC had secondments in 78 countries. The geographical distribution was different from the project financing. Palestine, Haiti and South Sudan were at the top. Secondments are short term and reflect different programming cycles where dramatic emergencies (such as Haiti) are immediately reflected in figures. The main host organisations (in terms of cost of secondments) are UNICEF<sup>8</sup>, UNHCR and WFP.

In terms of activities, Shelter is the single largest component (24 – 31 % of costs). This includes some school construction projects and WASH activities. The latter is being introduced as a new core competence and Camp Management, with the lowest share of costs (3 – 4 %), is being phased out.

ICLA, Education and teaching and Secondments are at about the same level of expense, with around 15 % of total costs. However, while the share of costs for Secondments is increasing in 2012, the shares for Education and ICLA are decreasing slightly.<sup>9</sup> Distribution of food and non-food items (NFIs) accounts for around 10 % of expenditure.

### 1.1.3 The humanitarian aid arena

NRC is a major actor in the humanitarian sector, and is still mainly funded by the Norwegian government (52 % of total funding in 2010, 48 % in mid-2012). Other major donors are

<sup>5</sup> MNOK indicates Million Norwegian Kroner.

<sup>6</sup> Note that numbers for 2012 are based on first six months only. For further information see the Statistical overview in Annex 2.

<sup>7</sup> Middle East North Africa Region.

<sup>8</sup> United Nations Children's Fund.

<sup>9</sup> However, please recall that distribution of costs for 2012 is based on first six months only.

ECHO<sup>10</sup> (9 – 13 %), UNHCR (6 – 11 %) and Sida (7 – 9 %). A large group of donors contributes small shares: 27 of the total 31 individual sources of funds contribute less than 5 % of the total.

Development actors have long discussed the need for an increased focus on results, moving from output to outcome; for evidence-based programming; for improved information to stakeholders; for closer cooperation on the ground and for increased predictability and transparency regarding commitments. This has been stated in all four high level meetings on aid – in Rome, Paris, Accra and recently (2011) Busan<sup>11</sup>. The focus has been on development cooperation but the conclusions are applicable also to the humanitarian field. The main objective is to make collaboration more effective - for the recipients, the primary stakeholders.

Originally donor driven, efforts have gradually shifted to become joint commitments and partnerships including an increased South-South collaboration and a greater emphasis, as in the recent Busan Partnership document, on broader co-operation and not just aid.

In addition other major trends affecting all humanitarian agencies are:

- ⌚ Crises are more protracted. Recent years have witnessed a financial crisis and a food crisis. The cost of basic food items has doubled in 10 years. Increases in compensation levels to those living on food or cash for work have not matched price hikes, with negative implications for vulnerable refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).
- ⌚ Competition for scarce resources, especially energy, food, and land is getting harsher. Power struggles over land and water resources have been major factors behind conflicts in e.g. Somalia.
- ⌚ While emergencies caused by unrest or conflicts still dominate, emergencies related to climate change and linked environmental issues are increasing.
- ⌚ Urbanisation. Refugees from developing countries are often rural, and the receiving neighbouring environment is predominantly rural. But conflicts, leading to heightened insecurity and struggle for scarce resources, push IDPs and, to an increasing extent refugees, as in Sudan and Somalia, to urban areas.
- ⌚ More international actors are active, including both government agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).<sup>12</sup>
- ⌚ Increased local involvement. Local authorities, communities, individuals, civil society are often the fastest to respond. Their expanding role challenges international non-governmental organisations to adapt.
- ⌚ Intensified focus on results on the part of most stakeholders. There is pressure to replace planning and reporting on activities and outputs with a focus on outcomes.

NRC's ability to adapt to such trends defines its future as an actor on the humanitarian aid arena, and this depends on how much funding it secures, with which partners it seeks collaboration, and when and where the organisation is selected as an implementing partner.

#### 1.1.4 Somalia, South Sudan, Pakistan: differences and similarities

<sup>10</sup> European Commission Humanitarian Office.

<sup>11</sup> Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2011.

<sup>12</sup> Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2011.

Looking at the context in the three case countries, some similarities are obvious. In other ways, however, they are quite different with strong operational implications.

### **Similarities**

Common for all contexts is that the situations are volatile. The affected people are subject to various forms of stress and oppression, leading to insecurity and vulnerability. Broadly the triggers are either conflicts or natural disasters. However, even the latter are often caused by, or at least exacerbated by, human factors. This is the case in Somalia, where the primary disaster causal factors are power struggles over natural resources, and in South Sudan where there has been, at least partly, a political vacuum not possible to fill before July 2011. The possible solutions are political, primarily national but increasingly regional or sub-regional. Security and safety is a central dimension in all countries and situations. This is of course paramount for the affected, but it also defines room for and scope of outside interventions.

### **Striking differences**

The “emergency areas” vary, from being concentrated to one part of the country to affecting broader areas. The Pakistan emergency is in one sense local, but of a magnitude to become national, even regional. In South Sudan, the causes are multiple and the affected people are scattered and moving. In Somalia, local politics and struggles lead to severe suffering and movement of people, compounded by natural calamities such as drought in poor, large and dispersed areas.

The political and institutional contexts provide the most obvious or striking dissimilarities. South Sudan is a nascent state heavily reliant on one revenue source and focusing on creating basic national institutions. Pakistan is a well-established state with powerful and complex state and regional institutions, rife with internal tensions yet blessed with a broad pool of highly educated professionals in many fields. Somalia in contrast is a failed state where the absence of a functioning government has led to a patchwork of clans, warlords, criminal, faith-based and commercial groupings. In consequence, many areas are very insecure while at the same time, in other areas, there are reasonably well functioning societies, based on local power structures, not on central institutions.

From the above follow significant differences in capacity and competence available in-country. In Pakistan international partners can easily find strong local partners. In Somalia both international and local partners have been subject to harassment and periodically driven out. The government, local and international partners in South Sudan are all extremely weak.

#### **1.1.5 NRC in Somalia, South Sudan and Pakistan**

NRC commenced operations in Somaliland in 2004 and has since expanded to Puntland in 2006 and South Central in 2007. NRC's current plans include five core competencies in Somalia: Shelter, EFSD, Education, ICLA and WASH. At the time of the evaluation NRC had 30 on-going projects funded by 9 different donors. The budgeted forecast for 2012 is over 150 million NOK<sup>13</sup>, making Somalia NRC's biggest country programme in the organisation's history.<sup>14</sup> A total of 85 projects have been implemented in Somalia by NRC during the period 2010 – 2012.

NRC first operated a country office in Khartoum in 2004 and has been working in Southern Sudan since 2005 with an office established in Juba in 2006. Following the abrupt expulsion of NRC from the North of Sudan in 2009, its country office was relocated to Juba in 2009. NRC has field offices in Aweil, Alek, Turalei and Kwajok. NRC's South Sudan activities have expanded very rapidly. The budget for 2012 was 100 million NOK, about four times as much

<sup>13</sup> Norwegian Kroner.

<sup>14</sup> Somalia Project Portfolio from Regional Office Nairobi.

as in 2009. Activities included five core competencies: Shelter, EFSD, Education, ICLA and WASH. At the time of the evaluation NRC had approximately 20 on-going projects funded by 9 different donors, run by 29 International staff and 335 National staff.

NRC commenced operations in Pakistan in 2001, first as part of the Afghanistan-Pakistan regional programme and as an independent country programme since 2010. There is a country office in Peshawar and seven field offices. NRC Pakistan has seven international and over 460 national staff. NRC's activities focus on five core competencies: Shelter (housing and tents and some WASH), EFSD (distribution of non-food items only), ICLA, and Education. The budget for 2012 was over 140 million NOK, making Pakistan one of the largest NRC programmes worldwide.<sup>15</sup>

There were no Camp Management activities in any of the three case countries.

## **NRC: Organisational setup**

The NRC Head Office organisational structure consists of a Board, Secretary General, five departments plus functions such as the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC, Geneva) and Global Security Advisor.<sup>16</sup> The Secretary General has a broad operative mandate and maintains regular interaction with the Chairperson, a relationship the Secretary General describes as close, pragmatic and stimulating. There are specific rules regarding what types of decisions must be referred to the Board (such as country selection, strategy, formalising overall budget etc.).

One of the five departments is the International Programme Department which has support functions and four geographical sections. There are 19 country offices that report to their respective geographical section. NRC is currently organising work related to Somalia and people displaced from there in a regional structure, based in Nairobi. Technical advisors are found in a Technical Support Section of the same department. Operative management is decentralised and Country Directors have broad mandates.

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<sup>15</sup> Budget Proposal Overview 2012 Pakistan.

<sup>16</sup> The following sections based on NRC documents and interviews with staff.




Figure 1: NRC organisational chart. Chart provided by NRC. Please note that in comments to the draft report, NRC has pointed out that NRC Geneva reports directly to the Secretary General.

The NORCAP roster is managed under the Emergency Response Department, another of the five departments. NORCAP, NRC's stand-by roster, was introduced in 1991 and is an instrument for building UN and civilian capacity. NORCAP is funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA) and operated by NRC. NORCAP secondments are managed by a 10-person team with additional support for reporting, management etc.,<sup>17</sup> and since 2012 is witnessing a restructuring, improvement in processes and re-definition of team members' roles and responsibilities in order to increase the efficiency of NORCAP and its quality of response.

## Literature review

Background information on NORCAP and on NRC's operations in the three case countries was drawn from various NRC documents, e.g. the NRC Fact Sheets for Pakistan, Somalia and South Sudan and the NRC website [www.nrc.no](http://www.nrc.no), which gives an overview on NRC's mission, standards and policies. Multi-year and annual strategy proposals and annual progress reports covering the years under review gave additional information about activities planned and implemented. Annual reports for NRC and NORCAP, applications for funds, budgets, project logframes, various country reports (quarterly, annual, project- and donor wise) provided further detail, as did a number of evaluations, both external and internal. Several reports point to a need for improving systems for monitoring and evaluation, and for making evidence-based needs assessments. Many conclude that NRC manages to deliver under highly difficult working conditions. The need to look closer at the transition from emergency to development, and how to target the most vulnerable beneficiaries, are other common topics.

<sup>17</sup> In comments to the draft report, NORCAP has stated that a total of 21 employees work full-time on NORCAP's activities.

A large number of project documents were made available to the evaluation team by NRC Oslo, Nairobi, and country and field offices. A sample of these include: concept papers, assessment reports, logframes, consolidated project portfolios, power-point presentations of area strategy, as well as internal checklists to follow funding, reporting and financial data inputs. Annex 2b provides a more extensive literature review, Annex 2h a full list of documents that the evaluation team has had access to. In total, the document list includes over 900 documents. A large number of these are internal documents – we have not read all in detail, but reviewed all. Please note that in order to make it possible to identify documents, the document list uses the internal NRC names and codes for documents.

## Research Strategy and Methodology

Our task has been to examine five of NRC's core competency activities in three different countries and NORCAP activities. For the Core competencies, the terms of reference focus on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and cross-cutting issues. For the NORCAP part, the ToR limits the scope to relevance and efficiency. The ToR covers a broad range of questions, technical areas and locations.

Our principal resource in implementing this evaluation has been a team of consultants who bring experience and expertise from all levels of the humanitarian aid system, including policy-making, strategy, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, from field level to local administration and headquarters. Together, they cover all technical areas that are included in the evaluation. We have had internal backstopping and a system of team focal points, responsible to ensure that team efforts in their field are realistically designed and coherent. A high level group of technical experts have ensured quality and been instrumental in the analysis of their respective fields. External Quality Assurance has been provided by a highly experienced evaluator. For more information on the team and distribution of roles and responsibilities, see Annex 2a.

Data sharing and joint analysis meetings have been held with NRC at the end of each field visit and with selected stakeholders in Oslo. We have had team meetings before, during and after the field work: In a preparatory two-day team meeting, detailed approach and methodology was discussed and agreed on, data collection tools were developed and preliminary findings based on document analysis were discussed. The case country visit teams had data analysis meetings in connection with field work. After completion of field work, core team members and technical experts had a two-day meeting in Stockholm to share information, analyse data, draw conclusions and draft recommendations.

Below follows a description of the key features of our approach and methodology:

### Approach to DAC criteria

We have aimed at collecting data in a way that fulfils the DAC criteria, despite the difficulties in making first-hand observations and interviewing beneficiaries in the case countries. In line with the DAC criteria, interpreted through the ALNAP<sup>18</sup> Guide for evaluating humanitarian action (Beck 2006), the team's overall evaluation strategy was to conduct a systematic and impartial examination of NRC's humanitarian action intended to draw lessons to improve policy and practice and enhance accountability.

As suggested in the ALNAP Guide, the DAC criteria were used as complementary to each other. This meant that, for example, in evaluating effectiveness the team not only sought to determine if objectives had been met but whether they were appropriate to the context and beneficiary caseload in question, whether they were met efficiently, were sustainable and

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<sup>18</sup> Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance.

complementary to other interventions – both NRC's and other actors' activities. In order to promote lesson learning, the team examined what activities took place and why they were designed and implemented in that way.

The evaluation looked at *relevance* to determine the extent to which NRC's interventions were priority activities according to the needs and priorities of beneficiaries and in line with NRC's core competencies. For *appropriateness*, the team looked mainly at context, seeking to determine if the kind of activity implemented was right for particular events or phases of the humanitarian emergency, opportunities and constraints present at the time, if project interventions were designed with the participation of beneficiaries and were culturally and conflict sensitive. Within the scope of the relevance and appropriateness aspect of the evaluation the team looked also at connectedness and coverage. The analysis of *connectedness* was concerned both with the links between programming and the activities of non-NRC entities (UN, local government, etc.) and with NRC's internal connectedness to its own programmes and with the activities of other partners. For *coverage*, the team examined the extent to which NRC had addressed the needs of major population groups in life-threatening situations and the efforts it had made to identify, reach out and assist them. This entailed an assessment of *conflict-sensitivity*: the extent to which NRC sought to reach the maximum number of people in need within a conflict environment that could have placed them, their implementing partners and beneficiaries at risk.

The team examined *effectiveness*, i.e. the extent to which NRC projects had achieved their objectives, through a variety of techniques. The team focused questions of *efficiency* mainly on the tools that NRC used to ensure that inputs were properly used and/or procured and the system of checks and balances.

In addition the team triangulated information from NRC's documents and statements concerning sustainability and exit strategies in interviews with various stakeholders. Cross-cutting issues were included to assess how they contributed to meeting the DAC criteria: Environment, Gender, Disability and Corruption were specified in the Terms of Reference, and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development and Capacity-building were added by the team as relevant issues.

### Focus on Systems and Processes

Evaluation field access has been severely limited. In order to partially compensate for this we have put substantial effort in examining NRC systems and processes, assessing whether NRC has the organisational capacity to accomplish their objectives and whether they can show that such capacity is being used.

To explore *relevance* we have assessed if a certain activity was relevant to the intended beneficiaries by interviewing different stakeholders, including beneficiaries, and comparing their views with the outputs identified in NRC project documents. We have also looked at the systems in place for assessing relevance, such as needs analyses and interaction with stakeholders. Finally, we have looked at documented evidence of the use of such methods and in the course of interviews researched the extent to which these tools have been used.

The question of whether a certain activity has achieved the intended results (*effectiveness*) has been approached at three different levels. We started by looking at plans and reports, making observations and interviewing different stakeholders to find out if the results have in fact been achieved. Secondly, we examined if NRC has the necessary "tools" for implementing and measuring the intended results, such as a system for reporting and follow-up, necessary staffing and skills etc. Thirdly, we compared reports, internal evaluations and interviews with staff, other organisations, implementing partners and beneficiaries to find out if they have knowledge of these tools and if they are actually being used.

For *efficiency*, a similar approach was adopted, assessing if activities have been implemented and results achieved in an efficient way (i.e. relating the achieved results to the resources spent). The evaluation context has limited the extent of this analysis (see section



on limitations). To compensate for this, we have paid more attention to the systems that enable an organisation to make choices that encourage efficiency, such as methods for monitoring and evaluation, procurement systems, and the way financial and activities data are used in project management. Other evaluation topics, including cross-cutting issues, conflict sensitivity, sustainability etc., have been approached in a similar way.

### **Impartiality vs. participation**

We were hoping to be able to contribute to NRC learning by involving NRC staff (from non-evaluated projects) as research assistants but at the request of Norad this element of participation was rejected in favour of impartiality. However, although this has not been a participatory evaluation, NRC has been heavily involved in the planning, preparation and implementation stages. As part of the learning component, we have sought to involve them in the analysis of data collected by having data sharing and joint analysis sessions with staff and management at the end of all field visits.

### **Attribution of results**

The nature of NRC's planning, reporting and follow-up systems was such that there was little documented information to enable a comparison of "before" and "after" the intervention. Documented baseline studies were not available and reports show that planned efforts to assess results implemented were often delayed, simplified or cancelled. Furthermore, planned and reported results are to a large extent output focussed, giving little information to work with for analysing outcomes. On the other hand, in many cases attribution of output was simple as NRC was the only organisation supplying a certain good or service in that site.

To address attribution of output in other cases, as well as attribution of outcome, the team has used a simplified version of the most significant change method. We asked interviewees what important changes have occurred in their lives and used backwards tracing to find out if the interviewee attributes the change to an activity undertaken by NRC. We have also asked for the effects of NRC activities, to get information about both unintended effects and if the interviewee perceives that intended effects have been achieved.

## **Data collection tools**

An evaluation questions matrix (see Annex 1b for more info) was developed by breaking down all objectives, questions, and tasks in the ToR into single-issue points. Over 50 different points were to be covered. The team then developed and adapted sets of methods and questions to be used as stakeholder and topic specific interview guides. Background notes on different topics, such as shelter, WASH and ICLA, were developed by team members specialising in these areas to give the team a common understanding. A data collection guide for case country visits was produced to give the field teams easy access to the main tools and as a means of keeping data collection focussed on key topics. Team meetings were held before the field work to develop cohesion in terms of terminology and method within the team. Responses and evidence were compiled and shared in the team, through the evaluation questions matrix and at post-field work team meetings.

Data collected and methods varied slightly for different parts of the evaluation. The following is a summary for each main component of the evaluation:

### **1.1.6 Field visits to case countries**

During field visits, data collection on core competencies was prioritised over interviews with NORCAP secondees. This was motivated by time constraints combined with availability of other means of data collection regarding secondments. We obtained information regarding

NRC's performance on its core competencies in the case countries from a variety of sources, triangulating between documents and interviews with different stakeholders. The evaluation placed substantial emphasis on interviews with beneficiaries to assess their views against NRC reports, although this method was often difficult to implement given security and logistical constraints.



Figure 2: Discussion with beneficiaries in Jalozai, Pakistan.

Before the field work began, the team developed a list of people or functions that we wished to interview, and asked for NRC's help in identifying these and setting up interviews. During field work, additional stakeholders were identified and interviewed. Semi-structured interviews were conducted based on interview guidelines/checklists developed from the evaluation questions matrix.

A broad range of project documents for the implemented projects in 2010 - 12 (proposals, periodic reports, logframes, etc.) were reviewed and a sample of projects was selected for each country. The selection criteria were as follows. For details about the selected projects, please see the case country reports available online from Norad.

- ⌚ Projects which were possible to visit, given the security and logistical limitations.
- ⌚ Projects that appeared highest in priority for NRC within each core competency, irrespective of donor.
- ⌚ Projects that had been implemented over the three-year period in review.

The planning of the field work was done in dialogue with NRC, which provided logistics and security during field visits. This was unavoidable given the security situation, the limited availability of transportation, and a concern for possible negative effects on NRC's activities from the presence of the evaluation team.

The field visits were conducted by a team of consultants that visited one or more case countries each. The original plan was to rotate the role of country lead consultant and international consultant among three international consultants, with the team leader and PETS consultant visiting all three countries. However, due to family health emergencies and visa problems in respect of Pakistan, the final distribution of roles in case country field work became the following. Enumerators and research assistants are presented in Annex 2a. Please see Annex 3 for detailed itineraries of field work in the three countries.

Country	International Consultants	Local Consultant (LC)/ Research Assistant (RA)
Pakistan	Anne Davies (Lead) Björn Ternström (Lead in field) Japhet Makongo (PETS)	Abid ur-Rehman (LC) Nousheen Khan (RA)

Somalia	Björn Ternström (Lead) Anne Davies (Lead in Field) Japhet Makongo (PETS)	Abdishakur Othowai (LC/Quality assurance) Liban Hassan Said (RA/LC)
South Sudan	Charles Byamugisha (co-Lead) Björn Ternström (co-Lead) Japhet Makongo (PETS)	Leben Moro (LC)

Figure 3: Final distribution of roles in field work in case countries.

### 1.1.7 PETS

The PETS focussed on a single project in each country. This allowed greater detail and more in-depth information to be collected. Budgetary allocations were compared with transaction lists from the financial system to show how much of the funds that actually reached the intended beneficiaries, indicated budget deviations and possible leakages or diversions. Systems for financial management, e.g. tools for procurement, financial handbooks, verifications of purchases etc. were analysed to assess potential efficiency gains. A large number and great variety of documents were reviewed. Staff, local government, UN agencies and beneficiaries were interviewed, to assess relevance, effectiveness and efficiency.

The PETS consultant, a research assistant and enumerators in each country implemented the surveys. Three main types of tools were used, each adapted to the selected project in the respective countries: Forms and questionnaires for tracking budget allocation and expenditure information (used in interviews with project staff); Score cards (to seek information about programme effectiveness and efficiency from beneficiaries); and a Physical verification form used by the evaluation team visiting selected project sites to triangulate information and establish evidence on the ground. More information and the various data forms and questionnaires are available in the PETS report (available online from Norad).

### 1.1.8 NORCAP

The Terms of Reference state that the evaluation shall assess the quality of NORCAP responses, but specifically its relevance and efficiency. To guide the assessment, key indicators were developed based on information provided by the NORCAP management team and Sphere and HAP<sup>19</sup> standards (See Annex 1c: NORCAP Key Results Areas and Indicators). Apart from the evaluation questions matrix, a checklist was developed to ensure all the human resource (HR) functions in NORCAP were reviewed and reflected upon (See Annex 1d: NORCAP process, procedure, system's review checklist). This included the Recruitment and Selection process, Orientation and Induction process, Performance Management, Reward and Retention, Staff Care and Training and Development components.

The NORCAP review involved 344 respondents representing the key groups of stakeholders, including NORCAP management team in Oslo, NRC staff members with direct involvement in NORCAP, partner organisations, secondees on assignment in case countries between 2010 and 2012, secondees returning from secondments, online survey respondents and respondents from the online follow up interview (see also the detailed list of NORCAP respondents in Annex 3). In total, 41 secondees were interviewed. 18 in person (13 at the NRC HQ and 5 in the field) and 23 via Skype or phone. Due to limitations in time, security and logistics, the evaluation team has prioritised interviews with stakeholders related to NRC's core competencies during field visits. To compensate for this, we conducted an online survey and Skype interviews with secondees.

<sup>19</sup> Humanitarian Accountability Partnership.

The online survey<sup>20</sup> was designed to conduct an independent, confidential, simple and targeted survey to understand perceptions and experiences of NORCAP secondees. The survey was aimed at secondees who have been deployed by NORCAP to any country between 2010 and 2012. The response rate of the online survey was 63% with a total of 289 respondents. In addition, 8% of the total respondents (23 respondents<sup>21</sup>) participated in follow up interviews over Skype or telephone.<sup>22</sup> In line with methodology agreed with Norad, the selection of individuals for follow-up interviews was not random, but based on their replies to the online survey and their stated willingness to be interviewed. This selection method ensures that respondents have interesting information and are willing to share it. However, the information thus collected tends to be biased and the answers are not representative to the whole group of online survey respondents. In the online survey, there was ample opportunity for respondents to give comments and suggestions, which they commonly did. A separate report presenting the full results of the online survey results is available in Annex 2g (NORCAP online Survey Report) followed by the comments and suggestions given by the respondents. The results of the online survey, the respondents' comments and suggestions and the information provided in follow-up interviews have informed the sections on NORCAP below.

### 1.1.9 Triangulation

A large number of sources and methods were used to extract and triangulate<sup>23</sup> information, such as review of internal and external documents, individual and group interviews with a large variety of internal and external stakeholders, physical verification during field visits and an online survey to secondees. The table in Annex 1a lists and discusses methods and sources used. Annex 3 provides a list of interviewees, Annex 2h a list of documents. In total, the evaluation team has interviewed over 850 persons in group or individually. The NORCAP online survey has captured the views of an additional 289 persons. The number of documents consulted exceeds 900.

## Limitations

**Time:** The limited amount of time allotted for the evaluation, combined with the security situation in the selected countries, restricted the field components of the evaluation and limited access to key informants, especially beneficiaries. The start of the evaluation was delayed due to administrative issues and much of the preparations had to be postponed until after Norwegian summer holidays. Despite this, Norad and the evaluation team decided not to postpone field visits. Hence, the time left for preparing field visits was shortened.

**Change of archiving systems:** During the evaluation, NRC was changing its archiving systems and their staff put much effort into locating internal documents for us. Despite this, it delayed the receipt of several documents and made it more difficult to get an overview of the activities before field visits began.

**Security during field visits:** The highly insecure situation in the three case countries affected the selection of areas and projects that were visited, the extent of direct observation that could be made, the way interviews were conducted and the amount of information that

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<sup>20</sup> For the online survey we used the Survey Monkey tool available at [www.surveymonkey.com](http://www.surveymonkey.com).

<sup>21</sup> Of the 23 respondents, 13 were female and 10 male, 11 were between 36 and 45 years old, 8 between 46 and 55 years, 3 between 25 and 35 and one between 56 and 65.

<sup>22</sup> Although a large number of respondents stated in the online survey that they were willing to participate in such follow-up interviews, it turned out to be very difficult to get people to actually participate in the interview. In many cases, the reason was poor access to Skype or telephone as several were on mission in field locations.

<sup>23</sup> We understand the term 'triangulation' according to the OECD/DAC definition: 'the use of three or more theories, sources of information or types of analysis to verify and substantiate an assessment'.

could be collected from the target population. During the inception phase of the evaluation, a security meeting was arranged with NRC, Norad and the evaluation team leader where it was agreed that the team should spend as little time as possible in the field; that NRC should recommend and have the final say in the areas and projects to visit; that detailed field visit plans should be shared with as few individuals and organisations as possible; and that NRC should arrange local transport, security and help in preparations for interviews.

**Comparison of prices:** The evaluation context has limited the ability of the team to compare prices paid by NRC with market prices at the time of purchase, which would have been a natural part of the PETS. This was partly because security concerns prevented the team from e.g. visiting market places to cross-check local prices, partly because several projects were completed some time ago.

**Access to non-beneficiaries:** In a non-conflict context, or a less dangerous one, evaluators would normally mingle in society, conduct spot-check interviews in a market or other public place to assess the level and degree of recovery and the conditions of people in general. This would provide a point of comparison to those whom the client is assisting. The situation in the case countries did not allow us to do this and NRC security would certainly not have permitted it. Thus we do not have such a point of comparison.

**Research assistants:** The team planned to use NRC staff members (from other projects) as translators and research assistants, partly to facilitate access to beneficiaries, partly to contribute to learning within NRC. However, Norad decided against this and use of NRC staff had to be limited. As the decision was taken at a late stage<sup>24</sup> the team had limited time to find other researcher assistants and translators.

**Interruptions:** In Pakistan, two rockets detonated close to the NRC office, raising security concerns and further restricting field visits. After this, security restrictions during an important national religious holiday cut short the field visit by one day.

**Scope and content:** While the Terms of Reference specify that the evaluation is to assess five of NRC's core competencies, in none of the case countries have there been camp management activities in 2010-12. In Pakistan there have been no food distributions during the evaluation period, and in Somalia and South Sudan, none could be visited. In Somalia, although there were some ICLA activities, there were no ICLA projects or programmes.

The Terms of Reference also instruct the team to interview NORCAP personnel on assignments in case countries wherever relevant. In Pakistan, the evaluation team was informed about two secondees: arrangements were made for interviewing one of them but had to be cancelled due to security restrictions. In Somalia and South Sudan, the team interviewed secondees in the field when feasible given time and security limitations and secondees were also interviewed by phone or internet and invited to participate in the online survey.

**Limited space and format for presenting results:** Norad has tightly regulated structure, presentation and length of the evaluation report. This has limited the amount of information included in this report and the way it has been presented.

### 1.1.10 Generalisation, Reliability and Validity

The way the field visits were implemented affects the reliability and validity of the results of the evaluation.

- ⌚ Firstly, neither countries nor projects or areas were selected randomly; countries were decided by Norad, areas were dictated by security and logistics, project selection was based on criteria decided by the evaluation team.<sup>25</sup> Hence results cannot be generalised to other activities, areas or countries.

<sup>24</sup> The decision was taken after field work had started in Somalia and a few days before it started in South Sudan.

- ⌚ Secondly, the involvement of NRC in the selection of projects and locations to visit is a potential cause for bias in the selection of projects, and hence evaluation results. NRC's involvement was necessary regarding locations, and the team made the assessment that the additional value of selecting projects independently was not large enough to outweigh the benefit of NRC of being part of this decision. In the dialogue concerning selection of project areas to visit we have asked for motivations regarding proposals. We have found them to be balanced between evaluation team criteria and logistical/security realities.
- ⌚ Thirdly, although the selection of beneficiaries to interview has not been directly affected by NRC, the way interviews with beneficiaries were conducted (e.g. presence of armed guards and lack of privacy) may have affected the way beneficiaries responded.

## Findings relating to Management and Programming

The three case countries and NRC HO work with common vertically integrated management systems and policies. We have therefore chosen to add a chapter on management and programming which is valid for all core competencies. This chapter discusses and presents findings relating to management and programming. Although NORCAP is part of the HO structure, its purpose and processes differ materially and NORCAP is therefore treated separately. Core competency specific findings are presented in Chapter 4. Information relevant for making WASH a core competency is included in the section on WASH. NORCAP findings are presented in Chapter 5, and synergies between NORCAP and Core Competencies in Chapter 6.

### Management

#### Management Finding 1: NRC is decentralised, and staff are motivated and professional

The organisational structure of NRC is represented in section 1.3 above. Operational management is decentralised. Country Directors have broad mandates and organisational culture in the countries visited emphasises staff involvement, even at relatively junior levels. This is combined with significant commitment to staff development at all levels. National staff representation at senior management levels varied by context in the case countries, ranging from very limited in South Sudan to the Country Director position in Pakistan.

Overall, NRC staff are well-trained, through mandatory induction courses on recruitment and periodic training or refresher courses that meet the demands of their work. Interviewees with few exceptions saw NRC as a 'good employer', providing career advancement possibilities and re-training on new competencies. The NRC National Management Training Programme (NMTP) was especially highly valued. Analysis of high staff turnover some years ago has led NRC to adjust health and pension benefits, changes which have led to greater staff loyalty and a low turnover of national staff. Many staff interviewed indicated their appreciation for "the NRC way"<sup>26</sup>, which can be loosely defined as an institutional culture of professionalism, transparency and consultation. Although the female staff component in all of the three countries was low (under 10%), interviewed female staff members said they wanted to work with NRC partly because they were treated so well.

#### Management Finding 2: Support and control systems are at times too trusting

<sup>25</sup> Criteria varied between evaluation tasks e.g. PETS required relative stability to at all be possible, a project site with more than one core competency represented was given priority, a mix of activities completed in past six months and ongoing was sought.

<sup>26</sup> Referred to and defined in the Organisational Review of the Norwegian Refugee Council (Bain and Sørnum 2009).

The decentralised *modus operandi* supports a highly motivated organisational culture where the vast majority of staff interviewed attested to their commitment to the organisation's purpose and vision. However, our document review and interviews with staff indicate that it has also led to a top level management over-dependence on both consistent open communication and on lower-level self-awareness regarding capacity and competence limitations. Technical and administrative support systems, quality control, monitoring and evaluation have not consistently kept up with the organisation's rapid expansion. NRC is investing in upgrading support and control functions.

### **Management Finding 3: Funding is diversified but core funding is weak**

NRC has a diversified funding base and selected donors are supporting stability in systems development through multi-year funding mechanisms. Such longer term funding partially compensates for the NRC's very limited core funding (refer p.4 in the statistical overview of NRC's humanitarian assistance, Annex 2c).

### **Management Finding 4: There is lack of understanding among junior staff of what drives costs**

Interviews with both junior and senior staff indicated that the non-senior management staff does not seem to understand what drives costs, and junior staff interviewed confirmed that management of budgets is the responsibility of the senior staff. Improvement to sensitise junior staff to cost drivers is underway.

### **Management Finding 5: NRC Financial System is vertically integrated, uses relevant software and is being upgraded to deal with identified problems**

The NRC financial system is an integrated and comprehensive structure. Approved funds are transferred from the donor to NRC Head Office in Oslo and then further transferred to each country office based on cash requests. Monthly consolidated accounts are prepared and shared throughout the organisation. Cash is transferred from Oslo to the country offices according to approved budgets, documented costs and expected cash needs for all projects for the following period. The country office receives the requested funds no later than the end of the month. There is a time lag between field reports and consolidated updated accounts being available to managers in the field – at times causing inefficiencies.

NRC uses software called Agresso, which is well known and widely used. The core module at NRC is the Financial Management module, but there are also modules available for Payroll/HR, Planning/Budgeting/Forecasting, Reporting and Analysis etc. NRC has grown significantly since the original set-up of Agresso. In 2011, the revenue (and operating costs) exceeded MNOK 1,200, more than twice the amount in 2006. The growth has led to new requirements in terms of system functionalities.

The current hardware setup results in Excel-based accounting procedures at field offices level. These are then uploaded to a country office local Agresso database once a month. NRC HO in Oslo consolidates the financial information from all country offices and registers expenses that originate from HO-level (such as salaries of expats). With the total picture only then available, the controller at HO prepares consolidated reports in Excel and sends these to the respective country offices.

The country offices only have complete and updated financial information once a month. The data can be up to 1.5 months old. Current software does not enable registration of committed costs. In practice this means that Project managers and Finance employees at the Country office (i.e. the people spending funds) do not know how much of the funds that are spent. A complete overview of the funds spent (overspending/ under spending) requires manual adjustments and proper cost forecasting is difficult.

Key finance reports and analyses such as the Project Summary, Project Information Form and Budget Proposal Overview are manually created and modified in Excel. This is inefficient and implies risk of incorrect data in reports used for operational decision-making.

Although the financial code system in the current Agresso version enables postings on activities, output, donor accounts etc., we have not seen them in use and NRC comments that they are not fully utilised. These are dimensions necessary to perform donor reporting and to perform value-added analyses of data and without postings on activities, outputs etc. such analyses can only be performed after an extensive amount of manual work - if at all.

NRC is aware of these limitations and is upgrading the system. The new version is web-based and has a user-friendlier interface, according to people interviewed. This should enable all finance staff with internet access to work online with accounting, which in turn would give them (and HO) real time data. NRC will also renew the structure to enable filtration of data with less manual work than today. It is our understanding that the roll-out of the new software version will reduce or even remove most of the risks identified.

### **Management Finding 6: Financial support and control systems are well developed but strained**

Finance support systems mirror NRC's decentralised organisational structure. Each country office has operating responsibilities for managing as well as monitoring the programmes and projects (Finance and Administration Manager (FAM), Project manager and Country director). Staff at the Head Office (Controllers and Project coordinators/Project advisers) have a supporting function as well as a general financial controlling function (not monitoring project details) exercised by Controllers during the country office visits, which take place 1-2 times a year. These can be described as minor Internal Audits at country level with for example compliance to Standard Operating Procedures being monitored.

NRC has developed a network of systems that indicate a concern for efficiency at all levels of management and programme implementation. According to staff interviewed, the systems generate the data they need to assess and follow costs. There is an excellent financial handbook in place with updated and relevant content. It includes guidelines and practical descriptions of specific duties within the finance and administration area. Based on interviews and review of the financial handbook we assess that it is well written, has relevant content for both head office and country office-level, is continuously updated and is used throughout the organisation. The systems examined generate clear and transparent project documents and global Standard Operating Procedures for every aspect of work (procurement, finance, distribution etc.) which have been adapted to country contexts. Cost-tracking at field office level is done by project managers working closely with finance managers who alert them to any deviation from the implementation plan. Current use of cost data is focused on deviations from budget only.

Each controller at HO is responsible for several countries and hence has multiple projects to monitor. According to Finance staff at the HO, finance staff turnover at country office level was quite high and finance competence varied greatly from country to country. This is confirmed by the case country reports. As a result, the majority of the working hours by the HO Controller are spent on operational support (how to record journal vouchers etc.) rather than on "ordinary controlling duties" (such as project monitoring).

Financial reporting and programme target reporting are currently two parallel processes with little or no systemic links (narrative parts of donor reports have few references to financial figures, no links to targets in financial reports). However, there are joint programme/financial staff meetings and there is continuous non-formal contact with programme advisers.

### **Management Finding 7: Non standardised donor reporting requirements increase costs**



Several administrative processes are designed based on donor reporting requirements. These vary, forcing NRC to manage parallel processes, which is time-consuming. This is inefficient and drives higher costs. UNHCR and EuorAid were mentioned in interviews as particularly demanding both in terms of grant applications and project reporting.

### **Management Finding 8: Monitoring and Evaluation functions are recently established and focused on developing basic procedures**

Key informants stated that the current Monitoring and Evaluation advisor is the first to work full time on this function as it was recently established at the HO. In South Sudan, dedicated monitoring and evaluation staff were recruited in 2011. They have produced several project evaluations based on beneficiary perceptions. Although basic these are a valuable first step towards understanding outcomes better. Monitoring of operations in Somalia is part of the overall Horn of Africa Regional Office located in Nairobi where a dedicated Monitoring and Evaluation team was initiated in 2011. Support is given to field staff throughout the region and interesting piloting of mobile phone based surveying is being undertaken. A Programme Development Unit was established in Peshawar, Pakistan, in February 2012 with a Monitoring and Evaluation function separate from line management. Although late, this is a very positive investment which needs continued management support and organisational investment. To date the focus of activities in all three case countries has been developing basic procedures and standards.

## **Programming**

Overall strategy is decided in a participatory process involving staff in annual iterations. Management recommends focus countries and core competencies which the Board decides on. Country level strategy is also the object of participatory annual discussions.

### **Programming Finding 1: Core competencies provide identity but lack definition**

Programming is organised around the Core Competencies. Although it is clear *which* the Core Competencies are, the definition of *what constitutes* a Core Competency remains a topic of debate at all levels of the organisation. None of the interviewees presented a clear definition when asked about this, a lack of clarity which allowed creative adaptation of the term to differing needs. Similarly, the revised NRC Programme Policy<sup>27</sup> does not include a definition of what constitutes a core competence. This implies that identifying an area as a Core Competency need not imply any particular comparative advantage, organisational structure or competence in that field. It was also clear that organisational commitment and capacity varied significantly between for example ICLA, Shelter and WASH.

### **Programming Finding 2: Project selection is influenced by strategy but was largely based on opportunities**

The core competencies functioned as a framework (interpreted through a participatory<sup>28</sup> annual strategy process), and management in all three case countries could cite examples of projects not being selected for implementation as they did not 'fit' the NRC profile. For example, project staff stated that NRC decided not to undertake ICLA activities in Punjab and Sindh provinces, requested by UNHCR, given that it had no knowledge of or presence in the area. Similarly, NRC declined targeted calls for proposals for shelter programming in Baluchistan as the organisation did not feel it could respond with sufficient quality at that time.<sup>29</sup>

Actual project selection was done in an entrepreneurial matching process. Overall needs assessments, generated through the Consolidated Appeals Process or individual cluster

<sup>27</sup> Presented in draft form to the team.

<sup>28</sup> As in broad representation of staff, not involvement of non-NRC stakeholders.

<sup>29</sup> Information from staff interviews.

coordination efforts<sup>30</sup>, were compared with organisational capabilities, primarily in the form of staff, networks or access, and were matched with available funding.

### **Programming Finding 3: The success in attracting funding severely challenged support systems**

NRC fundraising was very successful in all three studied countries, expanding rapidly year on year. This severely challenged support systems such as logistics, administration and finance. In Pakistan and Somalia the systems managed to keep up with requirements while in South Sudan there were serious gaps.

### **Programming Finding 4: Programming was very project and output focused**

The programming process was successful in generating significant funds but lacked strategic direction at the country programme level in case countries. In the countries visited, the process tended to generate a series of stand-alone projects with a strong output focus. Project documents give a clear indication of the activities NRC intends to perform and who the intended beneficiaries are but seldom identify intended outcomes in a clear and specific manner adapted to the local context. This was particularly true for shelter documents which tended to focus only on the number of shelters, and EFDS which focused on the number of NFI kits, kilos of seed distributed, and the number of people trained. However in ICLA project proposals first order outcomes were referred to – including the number of cases resolved, and the number of people registered for Computerised National identity cards).<sup>31</sup>

Policies and management debate were less output focused. NRC's internal language addressed displaced people's needs more holistically and there was often awareness of intended outcomes.<sup>32</sup> This had not consistently spread to field staff who often perceived delivery of output as the highest organisational priority.<sup>33</sup>

### **Programming Finding 5: Programming was well coordinated externally and mostly based on joint assessments generated through the Consolidated Appeal Process or cluster system**

In all three case countries NRC was repeatedly commended by stakeholders interviewed for their active participation in the cluster system and other coordination efforts. This included contributing technical expertise to assessments, to information sharing and to the development of cluster guidelines and standards. Country strategies and project proposals consistently refer to existing overall assessments made.

In South Sudan, NRC is the co-lead of the protection cluster in collaboration with UNHCR. NRC shares referral systems with other partners like ICRC<sup>34</sup> and UNHCR with whom they share information, generate consensus on protection issues and coordinate with local authorities and CBOs<sup>35</sup>.

There is in general good documentation about coordination with various national and international stakeholders. ICLA staff are usually active in cluster coordination (cluster meetings and working groups) related to protection. In some cases we found that ICLA could be more strategic about the choice of coordination fora it is attending and needs to link these choices more closely to programme priorities.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Both the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and the cluster system are UN led efforts to ensure better coordination in humanitarian interventions.

<sup>31</sup> First order outcome refers to an intermediate effect such as getting a national ID card. Second order outcome would look at the welfare consequences for the client such as getting government compensation or entry to subsidy programmes as a result of having been registered (example from Pakistan).

<sup>32</sup> Illustrated in the data sharing and joint analysis sessions.

<sup>33</sup> Based on multiple interviews with field staff.

<sup>34</sup> International Committee of the Red Cross.

<sup>35</sup> Community Based Organisations.

<sup>36</sup> See for example Sri Lanka evaluation, page 39.

In interviews with local authorities and UN organisations, most key stakeholders expressed appreciation with the way NRC interacted with local authorities and the cluster system. NRC was said to be an appreciated and impartial contributor to cluster meetings, adaptable and sharing. The only exception from this was found in South Sudan, where relationships with some local authorities were strained (although not only with NRC) and where a partner organisation expressed frustration with NRC.

Shelter based evidence gathered from humanitarian agencies and national and local entities interviewed<sup>37</sup> shows that NRC activities are well-coordinated with other actors who provide different inputs in the same sites and designs are commensurate with Shelter Cluster decisions.<sup>38</sup> For example, NRC, in conjunction with other agencies, is actively seeking more durable solutions to the protracted displacement situation in Bossaso and Mogadishu. Another example of successful coordination with local authorities is in Burao, Somaliland, where beneficiaries and local authorities objected to the design of proposed durable shelters. Local authorities requested that such shelters be built with a larger floor area in order to enable a subdivision of the space allowing parents and female children separate living spaces (based on the assumption that boys would stay outdoors). NRC noted the additional costs and managed to negotiate with the local authorities a cost-sharing arrangement with local authorities providing in-kind support in the form of water and sand deliveries with an estimated value of US\$150 per unit. The local authorities were then able to use this cost-sharing arrangement to leverage further funding from other donors as these were impressed by the commitment showed by the arrangement.<sup>39</sup>

In Pakistan NRC partners interviewed attest to close consultations and coordination to ensure that programmes are efficiently incorporated into country priorities. For example, the beneficiary selection format for permanent shelter was finalised after consultation with political administration, Federal Disaster Management Authority, return communities and other stakeholders. NRC works closely with UNHCR to ensure programmatic synergies, cost-efficiencies and optimum distribution efficiency of the project assets of both agencies.

### **Programming Finding 6: Overall assessments were not validated through documented assessments or baselines in project areas**

Project design was commonly made on the basis of overall assessments and calls for proposals. The evaluation team noted that overall needs assessments were seldom complemented with local assessments, and when done these were insufficiently documented (with the exception of Somalia). There were no baselines that could be used to measure change in order to assess outcomes.<sup>40</sup>

Detailed context analysis and needs assessments are crucial to ensure programme relevance. It is positive that in some cases research is undertaken about specific needs in order to prepare ICLA interventions, such as research into housing, land and property (HLP) in Somalia. Needs assessments for ICLA are often done ad hoc and as the programme develops, illustrating an ambition to adapt over time based on evidence. Examples of individual deeper assessments that are carried out by ICLA do, however, exist<sup>41</sup>.

### **Programming Finding 7: NRC's way of programming makes it difficult to assess effectiveness**

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<sup>37</sup> UNHCR, Danish Refugee Council, World Concern, Mayor of Bossaso and of Burao, Provincial Disaster Management Authority, Federal Disaster Management Authority, Commissioner for Afghan Refugees.

<sup>38</sup> Interview with UNHCR, 2 October 2012.

<sup>39</sup> Interview with Mr Mohamud Hasan, Major of Burao Town, confirmed by NRC staff.

<sup>40</sup> At least, the evaluation was not provided with examples of any such documents, despite repeated requests. We are therefore not in a position to assess the quality of any existing baseline documents on which important decisions were made. Several staff interviews indicated the absence of such documents.

<sup>41</sup> For example: In February 2007, the ICLA Project Coordinator in Kabul, carried out an Assessment of the Durability and Enforcement of Decisions in the Informal and Formal Justice Systems in Kabul.

Lack of clarity in goal setting and a lack of consistency of objectives and intervention strategies at national level is identified as impacting negatively on effectiveness in previous evaluations of ICLA.<sup>42</sup> The same applies for the lack of awareness among national staff interviewed of policies, strategies and priorities that are identified as best practice at head office level.

The EFSD programme in South Sudan is likely to have been effective i.e. to have resulted in positive and sustainable change, but there is no data to support this. One of the NRC staff commented that "...in the absence of credible data, it can be subjectively suggested that there was positive change from the EFSD programme intervention".

NRC project proposals give a clear indication of the activities they intend to perform and who the intended beneficiaries are. However, as discerned in the case-country studies, logframes used are not well-adapted to measuring outcome indicators. For example, in shelter projects the set template logframes used do not require measurement of outcome indicators. In consequence staff are not required to assess or report on whether and how living conditions had improved by the end of the project. With mostly output data to relate to it becomes difficult to assess effectiveness.

ICLA is very good at reporting on output and to some extent first-order outcome level data. Output targets (e.g. number of beneficiaries assisted, number of cases solved and number of referrals) are very often met. However, reporting and analysis would be stronger if the origin of the target numbers became clearer. Ideally they would be linked to systematic needs assessments and presented with the total number of persons in need in relation to the number of persons assisted by NRC. There is also a risk that registering cases in order to meet output targets becomes the priority over focussing on problems that are most relevant for the programme.<sup>43</sup> We note that this does not preclude revised targets in the face of contextual change, as long as changes and motivations are documented.

### **Programming Finding 8: Programming lacks Exit Strategies**

Document review and interviews with NRC staff show that exit strategies are generally not considered in programme design. Key informants often referred to rapidly changing contexts making exit strategies less relevant and not something to focus on in project design. Nevertheless, NRC's relief programming is often linked to what it calls "durable solutions". In Pakistan for example, its future strategy aims to ensure capacity building of national staff to take on senior positions and of local partners to strengthen and prepare them to take over certain activities when NRC phases out. It also aims to engage in joint efforts with more development-oriented activities and local organisations to take over from NRC at a later stage when conditions are feasible.<sup>44</sup> These examples illustrate that exit strategies are both relevant and feasible even in humanitarian contexts as dynamic as those NRC works in.

### **Programming Finding 9: Theories of change are neither explicit nor used**

We have seen no signs that NRC is using Theories of Change in its programming. With very few exceptions, staff interviewed were unaware of the concept and associated terminology but showed great interest when programming was discussed in such terms. Some staff were able to translate output goals into intended outcomes, discuss project assumptions and describe risks. On several occasions the evaluation team made attempts to map underlying implicit theories of change jointly with selected NRC staff. These attempts were discontinued in the face of time constraints and the lack of sufficient common theoretical background.

## **1.1.11 Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS)**

<sup>42</sup> See for example Sri Lanka Evaluation, page 4, 27 and Nepal evaluation, pages 17 and 18.

<sup>43</sup> See Pakistan evaluation 2009, page 22

<sup>44</sup> NRC Pakistan 2012 – 2014 Strategy document.

The evaluation includes a public expenditure tracking survey and analysis of three selected projects: The non-food items distribution in Peshawar in Pakistan (PKFM1102, MNOK 12, tents, mobile phones and basic kits), the school construction in Aweil in South Sudan (SDFS1001, MNOK 12.2) and the semi-permanent shelters in Burao, Somaliland (SOFS1011, MNOK 3.2, 380 shelters, two settlement centres). The purpose of the PETS was to provide supplementary information to the overall assessment of NRC's work in the three case countries, to establish evidence as to whether NRC demonstrated cost effectiveness and efficiency. In particular it should trace funds in order to identify possible space for efficiency gains and look for evidence of significant losses due to administrative control difficulties.

**PETS Finding 1: The team found no evidence of losses due to administrative control difficulties and no evidence of leakage of funds but there was a lack of transparency towards beneficiaries. Goods and services provided were in accordance with beneficiaries' needs and effectively and efficiently delivered.**

The objective of the project in Pakistan was to support vulnerable households affected by conflict-related challenges through provision of non-food items. The evaluation team found the criteria for the identification of eligible IDPs for the NFI kits to be clear and efficiently followed, ensuring that as many beneficiaries as possible were reached. In Pakistan, the beneficiaries were highly satisfied with the NFI items, despite some concern about seasonal needs and gender differences in appreciation. Inclusion of mobile phones was universally praised. In Somalia appreciation of shelters received was high and in South Sudan parents and teachers were pleased with the schools provided.

The team found that the NRC support systems, including procurement, management, local adaptation of operating procedures, physical verifications of deliveries and checks and balances in distribution functioned well. There remained challenges related to post distribution monitoring. Only some of these were related to security and gender.



*Figure 4: Traditional shelter (Tukus) and Improved Semi-Permanent shelter at Aden Suleiman camp in Burao, Somalia. Photo by J. Makongo.*

The project at Burao (Togdheer region, Somaliland) aimed to provide 380 households with secure semi-permanent shelters, to distribute NFI kits to about 850 households and construct two communal spaces (social centres). The project had been completed and, thanks to savings during implementation, NRC surpassed the project target by adding extra 40 units. NRC worked closely with the authorities which made significant in-kind contributions. These contributions did not feature in the project budget estimates or in the expenditure reports and budget expenditure reports were not shared with the beneficiaries (IDPs and local authority). This lack of transparency led to beneficiaries voicing their suspicions that NRC was holding back project funds. The project did not experience any significant funding delays. Most of the expenditure and payments were done in Nairobi (bulk procurement of construction materials and transportation) and Hargeisa. The payment route was thus short and presented few opportunities for leakages. There were effective financial control systems and oversight

processes to monitor compliance of staff in fund utilisation. Explanations to justify budget variances still needed to be more qualitative however. Staff members were regularly being trained, but beneficiaries complained that they were not trained in simple repairs of the shelters or in leadership (for the IDP committee members). No funds were allocated in the budget for capacity building of beneficiaries. Our assessment of the financial and progress reports has not revealed any indication of misuse or diversion of funds for this project.

The School Construction project surveyed is located in Aweil in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, South Sudan. The project was implemented with all deliverables achieved, as outlined in the project document. The opinion of stakeholders is that the school infrastructure constructed is of good quality and meets the needs of the beneficiaries. However, designs had flaws and the school construction project had the same components in all four locations, which led to underutilisation in some areas and overcrowding in others.

NRC has a comprehensive financial and management control system to alert and give warning of any losses, deviations or any other malpractices. In South Sudan there were operational and management capacity challenges, some of which were noted in the audit report. Overall, the school construction project funds were appropriately received and used for project purposes. Procurement of goods and services is an area which requires close attention by the management. It has been noted that corruption is a major challenge in South Sudan, making procurement vulnerable to corrupt practices. However, NRC had developed strict control systems and rigorous check lists for procurement processes to help staff and management facilitate smooth and quick services. Community participation and contribution of labour and construction materials such as sand, water, and bricks in some schools have not been factored into the costs of the project. This affected the sense of ownership and sustainability of project activities.

### **PETS Finding 2: A smaller share of project funds reached beneficiaries in the South Sudan PETS project than in the Somalia and Pakistan PETS projects**

The actual amount of project funds accruing to beneficiaries differs considerably between the three projects studied for the PETS, even for the two Shelter projects (school construction in South Sudan and semi-permanent shelters in Somalia). In the South Sudanese project, SDFS1101 (school constructions), direct costs on behalf of beneficiaries were only about 40%, in the Somalia project, SOFS1101 (shelter) they were roughly 60%. The percentage reaching beneficiaries illustrates the high cost of interventions in fragile states where many of the activities are service-oriented, such as staffing, security and capacity-building for staff and partners. NRC's policy of minimising expatriate presence limits overheads but can only be driven so far. In South Sudan this policy has been less successfully implemented, increasing the overhead costs further.

## **Findings relating to Core Competencies**

The core competencies Shelter, ICLA, EFSD, Camp Management and WASH included in this evaluation differed significantly in terms of the type of input supplied, the resources spent and NRC's "role" in providing them. WASH was new as a core competency and was a stand-alone programme only in Somalia: elsewhere WASH activities were part of Shelter projects. Camp Management, on the other hand, was being phased out as a core competency, and none of the three case countries had Camp Management programmes or projects.

The evaluation found that there are strong links between NRC's core competencies. While we address evaluation questions by Core Competency in line with the Terms of Reference, we begin with a section of findings that relate to core competencies in general. We then present findings relating to Shelter, ICLA, EFSD, WASH, Camp Management and Cross-

Cutting Issues. For each core competency, we present findings relating to relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

Please note that all field level findings are based on interviews and observations made at the locations visited during the field visits, unless otherwise stated. As mentioned in the methodology section, results cannot be generally assumed to be the same for other locations. However, findings that refer to systems, structures and procedures within NRC are, in our opinion, of a more general nature.

## Findings relating to core competencies in general

### **Core Competencies Finding 1: NRC programmes are often closely integrated with each other, promoting efficiency and coherence across sectors.**

There were multiple examples in both documents and interviews of synergies between core competency activities within country offices. These went beyond the obvious value of common support systems such as logistics, human resources and finance. Shelter interventions were often linked to ICLA activities (land tenure issues, registration issues). WASH programming grew out of needs identified within shelter projects. EFSD projects were commonly coordinated with shelter interventions.

Programmes are clearly linked: Evaluation interviews, observations and project documents reviewed show that the NFI and tents distribution projects that assist IDPs during displacement are linked to return assistance such as permanent shelter construction and WASH, Education is clearly linked to the Food, Shelter and WASH sectors. Synergies not only improve overall efficiency but also constitute the sectors of most relevance to beneficiaries in responding to their most pressing needs.

The ICLA programme also has multiple points of interaction with other NRC activities (advocacy, protection, livelihoods, shelter etc.). For example, support to the drafting of the Land Law was described as an ICLA activity and staff described how they were approached by beneficiaries over a broad range of issues, commonly not related to ICLA. This was interpreted both as a sign of trust, an indication of the lack of other sources of assistance and as a challenge given their core task. In order to streamline activities staff had been instructed to refer clients to the appropriate service providers. In some cases this was other departments in NRC, in other cases local authorities or UN agencies. Project documents reveal that the manner in which ICLA coordinates with other NRC core activities depends on the context, the type of ICLA programme and the form and content of those core activities. Joint implementation of programmes remains limited, with the most interaction between ICLA and shelter activities, with ICLA staff being deployed to shelter teams and joint assessments.

Exploiting the coherence of activities by exploiting such synergies was commonly addressed with area based field offices headed by an area manager. The team noted significant variance in how well projects were integrated ranging from field offices where project staff showed a strong silo mentality, to well-balanced inter-project collaboration.

### **1.1.12 Fungibility**

#### **Core Competencies Finding 2: There is little evidence of fungibility**

Most persons interviewed had no opinion regarding the impact of NRC funding on national or local resource use. Some were reluctant to respond, most simply stated they lacked data to comment. None of the key informants cited examples of local or national authorities choosing

to delay assistance to affected people due to NRC interventions or expected NRC interventions. Several regarded attribution to individual actors as irrelevant although recognising the possibility of such an effect of humanitarian activities.

Nevertheless, the team has found some examples of situations where NRC funding appeared to have freed up local administrations' resources. In Burao, Somaliland, municipality staff stated that in the year preceding NRC's programming, the municipal offices were blocked on a daily basis by affected people seeking support. Following the establishment of NRC activities (primarily shelter programming) such problems were now unusual, indicating a positive effect on municipal management capacity. The staff also noted that in the budget year following NRC's arrival municipal garbage collection in Burao town and minor infrastructure investment in villages surrounding Burao town had become possible. The municipality staff attributed this to resources freed up by NRC's activities.

Another example is the ICLA programme in South Sudan, which provided trainings on the new land law. The trainings were provided on the request of local authorities in areas where they perceived that land related tensions were rising, as the trainings reduced tensions. As tensions were reduced, so was presumably the need for local authorities to spend resources on solving them. We have no data on possible alternative use of such resources.

### **1.1.13 Conflict sensitivity**

#### **Core Competencies Finding 3: NRC's approach is conflict-sensitive**

NRC interventions in all three countries show a pattern of iterative planning. Activities are adapted to changing needs and security requirements. The conflict sensitivity is also reflected in structure such as staffing patterns which in terms of gender and ethnicity reflect contextual realities.

In all three countries Housing, Land and Property – covered under Shelter - are inextricably linked and extremely sensitive issues. They have to be addressed with care not to unduly disturb existing customs and customary law, which could provoke conflict with host communities, while searching for durable solutions for vulnerable groups. NRC is at the forefront of tackling these issues – addressed in greater detail in the section on ICLA – and has consistently aimed at reaching durable solutions in its shelter activities for all involved, relevant to the prevailing contexts and in coordination with stakeholders.

In South Central Somalia NRC chose to respond to the famine with blanket distributions of food vouchers in selected affected populations, in part motivated by the risk of contributing to conflict among population groups. Similarly in Somalia, project documents and interviews with staff demonstrate a commitment to ensuring cross-clan balance in terms of benefits and jobs, ensuring security and minimising grievances.

#### **Core Competencies Finding 4: NRC is present where others are not**

NRC is present in many hard-to-reach areas, usually areas of high security and emergency risks. The organisation's history in Mogadishu and its current presence in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan illustrate this. Key informants from the UN system highlighted these examples as one of the advantages with NRC. According to UNHCR in Aweil, NRC often contributed data from areas where few others had access. This access is crucial to their ability to act on behalf of vulnerable populations, thus meeting the 'impartiality' standard of humanitarian principles.

## **Shelter**



NRC had shelter activities in all three countries included in the evaluation. Below, we first present a brief summary of the shelter activities in the countries visited, then present findings related to shelter.



*Figure 5: A crowded IDP settlement in central Mogadishu where NRC plastic sheets complement traditional buuls. Photo by A. Davies.*

In **Somalia**, NRC's Shelter activities have addressed needs over the full spectrum of relief, recovery and development in different areas of responsibility. In South Central, NRC responded mainly to sudden-onset emergencies with inputs such as poles and plastic sheeting and fire-retardant tents. In 2012 NRC started to plan and implement a recovery project in a bid to de-congest tightly packed spontaneous IDP settlements. On a site provided by the authorities, NRC designed site plans and had started construction of transitional shelters for long-staying, vulnerable IDPs. The shelters were of a hybrid nature: durable materials that could be dismantled and moved to another site should the need arise.

In Bossaso, Puntland, NRC had also responded to emergency needs through the use of tents but was moving into a transitional recovery phase with construction of 1,500 durable shelters in sites where NRC and other agencies had successfully negotiated with landowners for a five-year land tenure. An additional 250 permanent shelters were constructed in Galkayo and ownership deeds negotiated for beneficiaries.

In Burao, Somaliland, NRC negotiated with the authorities to obtain land for permanent settlement for 380 families (savings led to an additional 40 shelters). NRC successfully negotiated local authority in-kind support (water and sand deliveries). The authorities leveraged this cost-sharing arrangement to generate further funding from other donors.

In **Pakistan** NRC's shelter activities have responded to sudden-onset crises with the provision – in conjunction with UNHCR - of tents to IDPs in designated sites, including in return areas where returnees are awaiting permanent shelter. In 2011 NRC built over 4,500 one room shelters and implemented some school construction. Plans for 2012 were of similar scale. The distribution of NFI kits was integrated into the shelter programme. 37,000 were distributed in 2011.<sup>45</sup> NRC also constructed 200 permanent shelters in Bajaur, a return area, consisting of concrete blocks, each containing a bathroom.

In **South Sudan** NRC provided 1,450 emergency shelter kits composed of plastic sheets and poles as a pilot emergency response to the Abyei crisis of May/June 2011. In order to

<sup>45</sup> NRC Pakistan Fact Sheet March 2012.

encourage permanent settlement in some sites NRC constructed temporary classrooms and out-patient nutritional rooms were constructed in the returnee transit site of Mayen Abun. The shelter programme also has WASH and environment-oriented components.<sup>46</sup>

#### 1.1.14 Relevance

##### **Shelter Finding 1: NRC Shelter response provides beneficiaries with greater protection**

Shelter projects in all three countries have been highly relevant by providing beneficiaries greater protection from the elements, theft, fire, gender-based violence and malaria, according to beneficiaries. In Somalia, IDPs attested to greater protection afforded them by the hard ‘CGI shelters’<sup>47</sup> which were not so easy to break into and were less prone to fire incidents than the traditional *buuls* and tents in tightly packed sites.

*“Our new house is bigger than our buuls and protects us from the cold so our children do not get sick. Also, it protects us against people trying to get in to steal things”.*

*Beneficiary interviewed in Bossaso.*

In South Central Somalia and Pakistan IDPs appreciated NRC’s provision of tents, plastic sheeting and poles which safeguarded their health from not having to sleep out in the open. Evaluation field observations noted that NRC-provided shelter has contributed to safer and more hygienic environments overall, despite acute problems of over-crowding in Mogadishu (which are not attributable to NRC but are due to the city having to accommodate an immense influx of IDPs).

##### **Shelter Finding 2: NRC provided shelter in line with the needs of target groups**

Shelter activities had been provided according to the specific context and, according to beneficiaries, had met their most pressing needs. They were also in line with the Consolidated Appeals Process and cluster priorities. Sudden-onset crises such as floods, famine and conflict outbursts in South Central Somalia, floods and conflict in Pakistan, conflict and mass return movements in South Sudan were promptly addressed with emergency shelter - mainly plastic sheeting, poles and tents. Chronic internal displacement crises such as in Puntland and Somaliland were addressed with transitional shelter constructed according to cluster design and standards with creative additions, such as the ‘community development’ model of self-help shelters in Bossaso and hybrid designs that could be dismantled and moved to other sites if IDPs were evicted (Bossaso and Mogadishu).

While some beneficiaries interviewed in Bossaso complained about perceived CGI design defects, when asked if they would prefer to live in tents or buuls, all of them replied in the negative. In Hargeisa, Somaliland and Galkayo, Puntland, NRC and partners had successfully negotiated with the authorities to obtain land for permanent or semi-permanent shelter construction, helping IDPs to achieve durable solutions. IDPs had participated in the design and targeting of shelter activities, providing feedback that allowed refinements in responding to cultural and climatic conditions. Where possible, NRC had built as much flexibility as possible into its designs in response to beneficiary preferences – such as the three options provided to IDPs benefiting from the ‘community development’ model of CGI shelter in Bossaso and semi-permanent shelter design in Burao.

<sup>46</sup> NRC South Sudan Fact Sheet Feb 2012.

<sup>47</sup> Corrugated Galvanised Iron.



Figure 6: Focus group discussion with beneficiaries in Warrap state in South Sudan. Photo by C. Byamugisha.

### Shelter Finding 3: NRC did not always follow beneficiary preferences

Beneficiaries in Warrap State, South Sudan indicated that although they had received shelter kits composed of items including plastic sheets and wooden poles, they would have preferred to receive locally made materials to complete the *tukuls* they were occupying. On the other hand, Shelter objectives included off-setting the environmental impact of deforestation and promoting a high percentage of shelter kit utilisation in all distribution locations, as well as a significant improvement in living conditions. Provision of local materials might not have achieved this uniformly.

In Mogadishu, Somalia, beneficiaries of the new CGI shelter site at Zona K did not want to move out of their *buuls* into the new shelters because they feared not looking sufficiently vulnerable to attract aid. NRC considers this attitude as defeatist and has targeted only the most vulnerable as beneficiaries of the new shelters.<sup>48</sup>

In Pakistan, while the one-room permanent shelters provided to returnees in Bajaur were stated by beneficiaries to fit their most pressing needs, a significant percentage of those interviewed said they were reluctant to move in before constructing a boundary wall – not included in the housing package. Boundary walls are a cultural pre-requisite for housing in north-western areas of Pakistan, to the extent that some beneficiaries had not yet moved their families into the new house because they were still working on building the boundary walls. The need for a boundary wall is related to the taboo against women being seen in public – without the wall, women become 'prisoners' unable to get fresh air or sunlight and unable to conduct their daily chores.<sup>49</sup>

### Shelter Finding 4: The provision of improved shelter has provided a 'most significant change' in beneficiaries' lives

Beneficiaries in Nowshera, Pakistan were asked what had contributed to the most significant change in their lives. All of them stated that they had experienced a positive change in their living standards when they received a permanent house from NRC. Beneficiaries in Bossaso expressed similar views after moving into more durable CGI shelters from tents and *buuls*.

<sup>48</sup> Protection and Other Concerns for the New Shelter Typology in Zona K Settlement (South Central), NRC, June 2012.

<sup>49</sup> Beneficiary and staff interviews.

### **Shelter Finding 5: Beneficiaries were involved in NRC assessments, planning, construction and monitoring**

Beneficiaries interviewed in Somalia and Pakistan were satisfied that their community leaders were involved in needs assessments and monitoring. Beneficiaries in Pakistan stated that NRC had consulted with them as to what they needed most as well as the design and placement of their houses. Community leaders confirmed in interviews that they were involved in all phases of assessment, planning and monitoring of shelter interventions. NRC visited the sites periodically to ensure beneficiaries' well-being and learn of any grievances. Such participation contributed to relevance, allowing NRC to consider beneficiary preferences and modify its approach if necessary. In South Central Somalia, such community participation was a security guarantee for NRC staff given that beneficiaries work closely with them, building mutual trust.

#### **1.1.15 Effectiveness**

### **Shelter Finding 6: Shelter projects are effective in providing safe and protective homes and are in line with cluster guidelines**

Overall, NRC's Shelter programmes implemented in all three countries have met their objectives in providing protection, promoting survival with dignity and preventing deterioration of health. Plastic sheets and poles in the early stages of IDP influx (Mogadishu, Jalozi, and Warrap) were effective in providing a minimum of shelter for people with none at all. Hard (CGI) shelters in Somalia were cost-effective compared with tents due to their longer duration (four years for CGI shelters, one year for tents); they also provide improved protection against intruders and fires. Permanent shelters built in Pakistan and Somalia were effective start-up homes which can be added to later with beneficiary inputs. Shelters constructed were consistent with cluster guidelines in each country.

### **Shelter Finding 7: Shelter projects have achieved their intended outputs but some quality issues detract from outcomes**

Project reports and interviews with staff and beneficiaries show that NRC Shelter projects achieve their intended outputs to a high degree. For example, the NRC Humanitarian Assistance and Protection to People Displaced in Africa (HAPPDA) 2011 Annual Report state that out of the 1,500 returnee and IDP households targeted for emergency shelter in Warrap state, South Sudan, 1,450 received the shelter kits. In addition, 4 temporary classrooms and 2 out-patient nutritional rooms were constructed at Mayen Abun transit site according to plan. The School Construction project SDFS1001, was implemented with all deliverables achieved, as outlined in the project document. However, project quality of some components in SDFS1001 was less than satisfactory. Furthermore, beneficiaries and leaders have not demonstrated initiative to sustain and maintain the facilities, leading to a conclusion that NRC has not undertaken effective maintenance training or community responsabilisation.



*Figure 7: Kitchen/Storage (left) and Cooking stove on the floor (right) in Warahel Primary school. Floor based cooking is likely to lead to cracking, does not provide smoke ventilation and uses significantly more fuel than a stove. Photo: J. Makongo*

In Pakistan, NRC assisted beneficiaries of the permanent shelter project in Bajaur with tents to afford them shelter protection during the time it took to reconstruct their houses. A total of 900 tents were provided against a target of 1,300. NRC decided not to buy more tents as UNHCR had a large supply and was covering this gap. In Nowsehra and Charsadda beneficiaries raised quality concerns regarding some of the shelters. These were related to quality of construction materials, to lack of adaptation to needs of people with disabilities and to elements of overall design. It was pointed out that wash rooms without drainage and kitchens without chimneys which were not practical and that wash rooms were not adapted for the disabled or infirm.

Project SOFS1101, implemented in Burao in Somaliland, aimed to provide 380 households (approximately 2,280 people) with secure semi-permanent shelters and construct two communal spaces (social centres) at the settlements of Koorsoor and Aden Suleiman respectively. Reports, confirmed on-site, show that NRC, thanks to savings made, were able to surpass the project target by constructing 420 shelter units.

### **Shelter Finding 8: Community contributions are considered highly important but are not visible in the budget**

According to NRC staff, participation and contribution made by local communities are considered to be key elements of efficient utilisation of NRC's external resource support. The PETS report confirms that participation has been used as a means to sensitise people, in the selection of construction sites, construction materials and potential youth trainees or community workers. In the construction of the school project in Aweil, beneficiaries were also asked to mobilise their labour in the collection of locally available building materials such as sand, stone, water and bricks. Similarly, in Burao, Somaliland, NRC worked closely with the local authorities who have made significant in-kind contributions. While the contribution of NRC is clearly indicated in monetary terms no attempt is made to assess or report on the community contribution in the budget. Furthermore, the local contributions have not been communicated to beneficiaries. In some cases, this lack of transparency has led to beneficiaries voicing their suspicions that NRC is holding back project funds.

### **Shelter Finding 9: Flexible funding for preparedness improved effectiveness**

Lessons learned from previous experience in Pakistan have cautioned NRC to stockpile emergency shelter items: the speed with which a crisis and resulting displacement can occur typically results in scarce and expensive goods in local markets. UNHCR cited with appreciation that NRC had been flexible and adaptable thanks to stockpiles in several cases. NRC noted that among donors both NMFA and Sida were seen as enabling such adaptability

through flexible funding rules. Similarly, according to project documentation, and confirmed by staff and UN interviewees, Sida framework funding in South Sudan and Pakistan allowed NRC to establish preparedness for emergency shelter. This capacity was effectively put to use following 2011 events in Abyei. NRC was able to respond more rapidly than would otherwise have been possible, with temporary shelter for populations in transit and building materials to displaced households.

NRC in Somalia had similar plans to stockpile emergency shelter (and other distribution items) given the recurrence of sudden onset emergencies. However it claimed to be faced with donor resistance to preparedness planning and to its annual programming cycle restrictions.

### **Shelter Finding 10: Effectiveness varies between and within Shelter projects**

The evaluation noted several instances where lack of sufficient investment in preparations and local knowledge lessened effectiveness, for instance the inappropriate methodology for introducing latrines in Warrap, South Sudan. According to beneficiaries interviewed, confirmed on-site by the evaluation team, the schools constructed in Northern Bahr el Ghazal were of overall good quality; despite some design flaws such as kitchens not adapted to local cooking methods. The site selection was appropriately done in close consultation with authorities and the handover process was described as simple and clear. However, the project had the same package of deliverables/outputs in each school regardless of the location and population of children in the respective areas. This has led to establishing an infrastructure which is underutilised in some areas while classrooms are overcrowded in other areas.



*Figure 8: School construction project with standardised design leads to crowded classrooms. Photo by J. Makongo.*

Beneficiary feedback in Burao led to shelters being designed more in accordance with people's preferences. Careful community work in Bossaso led NRC to design CGI shelters that are effective both for long-term fixed-structure use and can be moved if IDPs are evicted. NRC's patient but persistent approach to identifying land for permanent settlement has been effective in areas of Puntland and Somaliland but has not borne fruit for the majority of IDPs.

Meanwhile, NRC was repeatedly commended by partners for their ability to deliver shelter output according to contracted timelines and in agreed quantities.<sup>50</sup> Both Somalia and Pakistan show stepwise evolution of both intervention and technical designs, in part based on beneficiary feedback.

### **1.1.16 Efficiency**

<sup>50</sup> For example UNHCR Pakistan, Somalia and Aweil (SS), local authorities Peshawar, Burao.

### **Shelter Finding 11: NRC Shelter projects are competitive in relation to their costs**

NRC is one of three preferred suppliers to UNHCR in Peshawar, a decision based in part on cost. The organisation is described as "not the cheapest – not the most expensive" by funding partner representatives.

The team identified several examples of cost consciousness: In Pakistan, NRC conducts periodic cost comparisons with other agencies. In 2012, cost per beneficiary for a one room shelter was 1,791 NOK (US\$ 320) per beneficiary. NRC administration cost per beneficiary was 13 NOK.<sup>51</sup> This is an extremely competitive per beneficiary cost. In 2011 NRC was able to exceed its beneficiary target due to savings from procurement of fewer tents, receiving some items from UNHCR, and construction of one-room shelters. The savings allowed NRC to provide for flood-affected IDPs in Kurram agency.<sup>52</sup>

In Somalia, the newly planned transitional shelters made with corrugated galvanised iron sheets were more expensive to purchase than plastic sheets and poles, but the new type were expected to last three years longer. In both Pakistan and Somalia, NRC had found that working with local suppliers was a rational approach to reducing costs and promoting employment opportunities, which in turn favoured the local market.

### **Shelter Finding 12: Shelter projects carry a large part of the costs for local administration**

NRC finances the costs of local administration (e.g. country and regional level offices) by allocating a certain percentage of project funds to cover these costs. As shelter is a capital-intensive activity, shelter projects tend to fund a large share of the total cost for local administration. Key informants among staff recognised that a country programme without capital intensive projects, such as Shelter, would not be feasible in terms of covering support costs.

## **1.1.17 Sustainability**

### **Shelter Finding 12: NRC seeks to build sustainability into its Shelter projects**

While emergency shelter projects such as plastic sheeting, poles and tents were designed to provide immediate protection and did not have a sustainability element built in, recovery and longer-term development shelter activities aimed at sustainability<sup>53</sup> to the extent possible. In Puntland and Somaliland the 'CGI shelters' are designed for durability but are sufficiently flexible to be dismantled and transported elsewhere. This is important in a context of frequent evictions where land tenure is extremely fragile. NRC has done its best to negotiate for secure land tenure with landowners and local authorities and has had a measure of success, allowing for the construction of the longer-term transitional shelters. Where possible, such as in Galkayo, Burao in Somalia and Bajaur in Pakistan, NRC has successfully negotiated for permanent land tenure and where this has taken place, it has been able to construct permanent shelters with hard materials, designed for durability.

## **ICLA**

ICLA was launched as an NRC core activity in 2001. The purpose of the ICLA programme according to the most recent policy from 2012 is: "*To assist displaced persons to claim and fulfil rights, reach durable solutions and to prevent further displacement through application of information and legal methods.*" The central toolkit for ICLA is a comprehensive and well-

<sup>51</sup> NRC-PKFM1202-PKFS-1202-188082-PKFT1202-Revised Proposal to NMFA, March 2012.

<sup>52</sup> PKFM1102 final report.

<sup>53</sup> The ToR direct us to address the issue of sustainability. NRC avoids the word, preferring to speak of "durable solutions".

presented handbook. Specific tools exist for ICLA thematic areas, for trainings and for monitoring and evaluation.

ICLA activities are implemented in any phase of a crisis, from acute emergencies to protracted displacement. At the time of the evaluation, ICLA was being implemented in 17 countries, with 564 staff working in national ICLA programmes, the large majority being national staff, 212 of these in Pakistan and in Afghanistan. There were three ICLA advisors at the NRC Head office. They visited countries regularly and advised country teams, including staff from other core competencies. Their influence was limited as they were advisors to the programmes but lacked the mandate to enforce policies and practices.

**ICLA Pakistan** started in 2002 as a joint programme with ICLA Afghanistan providing assistance to Afghan refugees. The same programme activities had been carried out over time with some adaptations. The ICLA Pakistan programme was focused on IDPs displaced by internal conflict and natural disasters. There were also activities in support of voluntary repatriation of refugees. Since 2010, ICLA Pakistan had grown considerably and it was at the time of evaluation one of the biggest ICLA programmes globally.

The **South Sudan** ICLA programme was the oldest of NRC's programmes in the country and was established in 2004. It was mainly implemented in three States: Central Equatoria, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap. The programme included protection monitoring, assessment and analysis in the return areas, information, individual and group counselling on reintegration assistance and available services, as well as capacity development of local authorities and customary chiefs regarding land issues. An important part was advocacy and research on land issues. ICLA provided advice and assistance on the new South Sudan Nationality Act (Land Law). NRC was engaged with a variety of advocacy fora, such as the Humanitarian Country Team, the NGO Steering Committee (of which NRC was the chair in 2011), and the protection cluster (of which NRC was co-chair). NRC co-led the Land Coordination Forum and was responding to requests from donors for briefings on issues related to land rights.

An **ICLA Somalia** programme was planned to start in 2013. In 2009, NRC completed a housing, land and property research study for all of Somalia in cooperation with UN-HABITAT<sup>54</sup> and UNHCR<sup>55</sup>. NRC was involved in some ICLA activities, including support and monitoring of local partners undertaking Population Movement Tracking and Protection Monitoring Network activities.

### 1.1.1 Relevance

#### **ICLA Finding 1: The ICLA programme is overall a relevant activity and stakeholders are satisfied with NRC's ICLA activities**

Stakeholders interviewed in Pakistan attested to the effectiveness of ICLA activities and to NRC's professionalism in this area of expertise. Both Pakistan and Afghan authorities indicated good relations with NRC regarding repatriation issues and emphasised that ICLA staff were experienced and professional. Project managers acted as an 'expertise bridge' with the authorities, having the highest levels of technical competence of any international NGO working in Pakistan, according to stakeholders. A number of beneficiaries said what they most appreciated with NRC was assistance in obtaining Computerised National Identity

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<sup>54</sup> United Nations Human Settlements Programme.

<sup>55</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.



Cards (CNICs) and the training sessions that had made them aware of its importance.<sup>56</sup> This was a key aspect of ICLA given that the Computerised National Identity Card is necessary for IDPs to obtain assistance, birth certificates, enrolling children in school and access to other civil rights.

In South Sudan, NRC staff and local authorities stated their belief that the ICLA programme was relevant. This was confirmed by beneficiaries interviewed. In Warrap, where NRC is the only agency implementing ICLA activities, its role had been significant. Interviews with both beneficiaries and OCHA identify the likelihood of a series of negative consequences should NRC not operate in the area.

The ICLA programme thus corresponded to the needs of populations in NRC's target countries and has the potential of addressing protection needs at various levels, from local level needs to needs for changes in the national legal framework. ICLA was implemented in remote locations and reached target groups that did not find legal protection elsewhere. An ICLA strength was to be able to offer comprehensive packages of information, counselling and legal assistance both at community as well as at national level. ICLA supported beneficiaries claiming and exercising their rights through both formal and informal systems.

### **ICLA Finding 2: ICLA was both adapted to and limited by the local context**

While ICLA focused on five main thematic areas and included a set of standard activities, the ICLA Programme Policy states that ICLA programmes may exceptionally engage in other activities related to legal assistance if needed. National ICLA programmes were very different from one country to another as ICLA programmes were tailored to specific contexts and needs. This was one of the strengths of the programme.

For example, within the ICLA programme in South Sudan there were several examples of creative adaptation to context. Service demand in a migrant population was gauged by using mobile teams to start up activities and assess needs. Stakeholders were proactively approached with training on the new Land Law and local authorities stated that they requested NRC to hold such trainings in areas where they perceived land related tensions were rising – and that such training lessened tension. When confronted with traditional leaders refusing to consider land rights for women, users' rights were negotiated as a compromise between formal and traditional law.<sup>57</sup>

While this diversity is strength, it also bears the risks of diluting national ICLA programmes as protection needs and other needs for legal assistance are usually manifold in NRC's target countries. When it comes to ICLA's relevance the question is whether a national ICLA programme with its diverse intervention options is properly targeted to address the most relevant needs and whether the existing methodologies and resources are utilised in the most appropriate and efficient way.

There were indications that not only the context but also the personal background of key staff determined what strategic priorities a national ICLA programme was following. Like many humanitarian programmes, ICLA was facing challenges in the recruitment and retention of staff. According to NRC HO staff the background and qualifications of staff played a key role in how exactly ICLA worked at country level. A staff member with a background in conflict related protection for example might prioritise other aspects of ICLA than a lawyer with a background in litigation. According to project documents, ICLA faced challenges in hiring suitably qualified legal staff in some contexts.

According to interviews with ICLA staff NRC overall aims to become more relevant to crisis situations. The new ICLA programme policy, within the new NRC overall policy, aims to be more focused on NRC's main target groups. NRC also wants to focus more on core ICLA themes by, for example, moving away from general legal counselling (such as for divorces) but also from activities related to sexual and gender based violence. While the intention is

<sup>56</sup> Focus group discussion in Nowseehra and Charsadda.

<sup>57</sup> Interview with Payom leader, confirmed by staff.

clear at policy and HO level it will probably take some time and effort to implement this shift at country level.

### **ICLA Finding 3: ICLA encountered challenges in identifying and targeting the most vulnerable**

ICLA encountered special challenges in identifying the most vulnerable members of a target group and balancing support among different population groups. In for example, housing, land and property (HLP) activities, which were very relevant in many NRC intervention contexts, helping those who claim their land rights raises concerns about favouring groups that own land at the expense of those who are landless. Clearly defining and communicating vulnerability criteria is essential and remains a constant challenge for ICLA as is shown by e.g. the Liberia evaluation (Hagen 2012).

Donors and agencies such as UNHCR know NRC and its ICLA programme as a niche service provider. They approach NRC with particular interests in funding specific activities. Such a position bears the risk of NRC becoming too responsive to donors and the international community in order to maintain this niche position and to secure funding rather than staying needs-based and beneficiary-focussed. According to interviews at NRC head office, NRC's approach is to respond to these requests as long as the requested activities are within the ICLA policy. NRC engages donors in dialogue and usually maintains its independence.<sup>58</sup>

## **1.1.2 Effectiveness**

### **ICLA Finding 4: NRC met or surpassed targets for ICLA activities**

According to project documents, overall NRC met the ICLA specific targets it set for itself. This was a remarkable achievement given the fact that most ICLA interventions took place in very challenging contexts. According to Country Fact Sheets, the ICLA Pakistan project for example assisted 8,000 refugees and 13,800 IDPs in 2011 and in South Sudan NRC provided information on reintegration issues to 18,798 people and counselling to 4,585 people. 3,231 people benefitted from training on protection or land issues and 222 cases were opened within the ICLA programme in 2011. The evaluation team has not had the possibility to validate these numbers, but interviews with staff and other stakeholders confirm the organisation's ability to deliver in line with its reporting.

According to ICLA Pakistan project reports, in 2011 NRC superseded its targets in the cases of Afghan property claims registered, prepared and referred to NRC ICLA in Afghanistan; administration cases registered and resolved and information dissemination and counselling carried out with individuals. 85% of legal cases were resolved in favour of clients. The evaluation was unable to triangulate these reports from non-NRC sources.

From interviews conducted with NRC staff, beneficiaries and the UN in South Sudan, it can be deduced that ICLA was one of the most effective programmes implemented by NRC in Warrap state. There was a high level of acknowledgement by the beneficiaries of the results, which included committees formed to claim their land or property rights and compensation in courts of law, obtaining legal land documentation, re-integration with host communities and treatment of disabilities that had in turn improved school attendance. Stakeholders stated that trainings on land and returnee related issues had lessened tensions.

However, it is difficult to say anything about the value of the achievement in terms of effectiveness of the ICLA programme, as there is a lack of clarity on how exactly the self-

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<sup>58</sup> See for an example where NRC did not follow a donor suggestion for an ICLA related project Sudan Status Report 2010, Q4. A case where NRC's engagement is said to be linked to the interests of the international community without solid data about ICLA specific needs can be found in Nepal evaluation (Wyckoff and Sharma 2009), page 3.

determined output targets where set. The evaluation of the effectiveness of the ICLA programme is even more challenging when it comes to results beyond the output level.

#### **ICLA Finding 5: There is a lack of documented information about achievement of overall objectives**

Even NRC country specific evaluations and ICLA specific evaluations lack information about the achievement of ICLA's overall objectives.<sup>59</sup> At the same time they do not raise any doubt about the success of counselling, legal support and advocacy activities within ICLA. A number of factors that indicate achievements can be identified from various documents. For example, the acceptance of NRC as competent legal experts at all levels from national down to lower administrative levels is an important factor in being able to influence the legal and policy framework of a given context (see for example the ICLA programme in South Sudan that includes support in drafting and disseminating legislation).

#### **ICLA Finding 6: ICLA has complaints mechanisms and satisfaction surveys are carried out but analyses of longer-term effects are lacking**

Mechanisms to share information and air complaints between NRC and beneficiaries exist in the ICLA projects. This was expressed by staff and confirmed by beneficiaries in interviews. Through beneficiary satisfaction surveys in connection with training programmes, beneficiaries have the opportunity to openly comment on ICLA services. Results on beneficiary satisfaction are measured as increases in the rate of solving land disputes and improvement in co-existence between host communities and returnees. Un-intended results included identification and support for separated and un-accompanied minors who don't fall under NRC mandate.

ICLA staff are close to communities often working in very remote locations and the programme actively involves community members in the day-to-day activities. Nonetheless, there could be more systematic involvement beyond day-to-day contact at counselling centres and information session. Otherwise the level and quality of the involvement is difficult to verify. For example, while training targets are usually met, and pre- and post-training assessments indicate positive achievements, what happens after the trainings, i.e. how the new skills are used by those trained, is usually not assessed.

#### **ICLA Finding 7: Effectiveness can be increased by focussing on outcomes rather than outputs when planning activities**

In some instances ICLA could be improved by focusing more on empowering stakeholders rather than taking over responsibility for them. While project documents illustrate that 'number of cases solved' is a common target, working with targets for cases solved might be an obstacle in this regard. First, case numbers become important for funding proposals. Once funding is obtained working with case numbers might create the pressure to resolve cases quickly rather than going the longer way of enabling others to come to a solution. Donor reporting on the numbers of cases solved is happening within the one-year programme duration. While enabling beneficiaries to solve their cases by themselves might take longer, in the long run it may lower the number of the cases.

While generally choosing very relevant training topics, the training methodologies used often appear to be focussed on one-off workshop-based formats. ICLA topics are complex and lasting effects from short training interventions are doubtful. Some internal reporting suggests that some trainings are more information sessions rather than systematic trainings based on

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<sup>59</sup> See for example NRC Colombia evaluation (Thomas and Szabo, 2011), page 16, Sri Lanka evaluation (Asiimwe 2008), page 30 and ICLA Pakistan evaluation (Pierce 2009), page 23.

existing training tools. Training approaches, frequency and depth may therefore need to be reviewed.

Evaluations of ICLA programmes at country level are carried out regularly. The quality of these evaluations varies and largely depends on the background of the evaluation team. Evaluation results are firmly part of programme management and oversight. Learning from evaluations is however challenging due to a number of factors including the decentralised way of working, which can inhibit learning and information exchange between different countries and regions.

**ICLA Finding 8: ICLA programmes have a high potential for impact and sustainability, but due to insufficient data it is not possible to assess if this is realised.**

As mentioned above, there is not enough data available for a meaningful assessment of impact. The same applies for sustainability, which would be important given the high level objective of contributing to durable solutions. ICLA has a high potential for sustainability. It is a humanitarian programme that includes elements ranging from the emergency response (e.g. by supporting IDPs in getting access to assistance) to longer-term capacity building and changes in legal frameworks. ICLA has the potential of being a model case transition programme if the balance between individual short-term support and long-term work on structures and underlying causes for human rights violations is found.

**ICLA Finding 9: Exit and phasing out could be improved**

ICLA usually exits either by closing down the programme, by handing over activities to a local structure (examples can be found in Occupied Palestinian Territories, Colombia and Sri Lanka) or it emerges into a local successor organisation, as in e.g. Uganda.

There is need for more clarity regarding phasing out criteria for ICLA. As ICLA is usually following other NRC core activities it might also leave a certain context together with other NRC components, regardless whether ICLA needs have been met or not, as expressed in the evaluation of ICLA in Nepal and Liberia (Wyckoff and Sharma 2009 and Hagen et.al. 2012). More clarity is also needed how exactly NRC's focus on crisis contexts relates to ICLA's longer-term approach regarding structural obstacles. Interventions in crisis context are usually flexible, based on opportunities and focussing on quick gains. Addressing longer-term structural issues requires a more planned approach and usually takes more time.

NRC's new policy on ICLA now clearly emphasises the need to bring cases to closure or hand them over to other relevant organisations. NRC actively strives to identify local partners to take over ICLA activities, which is very positive.<sup>60</sup> According to NRC it is more challenging to work with newly created structures, such as creating community protection committees in South Sudan. More systematic and regular mapping of existing local capacities and structures is recommendable to identify the most viable options.

### **1.1.3 Efficiency**

The question of efficiency is important for the ICLA programme. For example, the choice whether to work on individual documentation of cases or to address structural issues such as administrative processes for documentation has resource implications. Within the limits of this evaluation, it was not possible to assess efficiency systematically, partly because NRC does not assess the efficiency of ICLA systematically. There are occasional attempts at calculating costs per case (or per case solved) or costs per beneficiary (See for example Sri Lanka evaluation (Asiimwe 2008), page 33 and Azerbaijan evaluation (Kirsch-Wood and Amirova 2008), page 23). These are however not seen in relation to the objectives of the intervention and do not include an assessment of alternatives.

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<sup>60</sup> Examples can be found in Colombia and in Sri Lanka.

## Emergency food security and distribution (EFSD)<sup>61</sup>

The EFSD activities may be broadly categorised into three groups: **Emergency food**, including direct distribution of foodstuffs in bulk or via food voucher based systems together with implementing partners or market actors such as local merchants. Needs can also be met through cash voucher systems (see comparison in section 4.4.6 below). These interventions can be lifesaving and timeliness is important.

**Non-food items** may include kitchen utensils, hygiene products (soap, sanitation pads), blankets, tools and even mobile phones. These activities are welfare enhancing but not directly lifesaving (although it can be argued that hygiene products and blankets are lifesaving in some circumstances).

**Food security** includes a broad range of inputs such as seeds, tools and trainings. The provision of seeds and tools, as within the Food Security and Livelihoods programme in South Sudan, represents a step on the way towards the organisation's ambition to support durable solutions. Timeliness here is important in relation to e.g. planting seasons and can affect immediate survival.

In **Pakistan**, the type of EFSD activities implemented during the evaluation period was mainly distribution of non-food items kits (NFI kits). NRC provided standard NFI kits to two different groups of people: IDPs and returnees. IDPs comprise newly-displaced families arriving in camps or host communities as well as 'stayees' (those displaced within their home areas), and to beneficiaries of permanent shelter on handover of the house. Among distributed items were tents (distributed among Bajaur returnees at the time of their return to the area of origin), summerised and winterised NFIs, and mobile phones.



Figure 9: Mobile phones distributed in Pakistan. Photo by J. Makongo.

In **Somalia**, NRC conducted emergency food distributions through a voucher system to displaced populations in South Central Somalia. In 2011 and 2012, NRC's overwhelming attention was addressed to the 2011 famine, although it had previously engaged in providing agricultural inputs in both South Central and Somaliland.

<sup>61</sup> The core competence EFSD was renamed "Food Security" during the time of the evaluation. We have chosen to use name EFSD as this is the one used in the ToR.

EFSD in **South Sudan** comprised mainly Food Security and Livelihood (FSL) activities in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap. The activities were initiated in 2011 and included providing returnees, IDPs and host communities with agricultural inputs, training in agricultural practices, training in livelihoods and income generating activities (IGAs) and awareness raising in diet diversity, food hygiene and tree planting (to limit environmental degradation). Project activities were designed for a mix of targets groups including vulnerable individuals, farmers groups, schools and local authorities. The intention was to benefit returnees/IDPs and host communities aiming for a 75/25 distribution between the groups.

#### 1.1.4 Relevance

##### **EFSD Finding 1: EFSD was relevant both in relation to needs and to NRC purpose**

EFSD interventions were in line with overall assessments made at national/regional levels by the humanitarian community as expressed in the Consolidated Appeals Process and cluster coordination mechanisms. According to UNHCR Aweil, NRC took part in such assessments and often contributed data from areas where few others had access. NFIs distributed were appropriate and in line with cluster guidelines (often NRC was part of developing these). The items distributed are those that beneficiaries consider most necessary and useful, according to beneficiary satisfaction and post distribution monitoring surveys and are strongly oriented to the needs of women and children.

##### **EFSD Finding 2: Targeting criteria and quality varied between case countries**

In Pakistan, the evaluation team found the criteria for the identification of eligible IDPs for the NFI kits in the project studied under the PETS to be clear and efficiently followed, ensuring that as many beneficiaries as possible were reached. A majority of beneficiaries interviewed agreed with this. All respondents (male and female) said that they were satisfied with the contents and a majority with the quality of the NFI items they have received from NRC, but some suggested that additional items should be included.

In Pakistan, NRC targeted conflict affected families in camps and selected villages, which were identified through mutual discussion with other stakeholders including: Commission for Afghan refugees (CAR), Federal Disaster Management Authority (FDMA), Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA), and local NGOs, aiming to ensure a fair and transparent selection process. NFIs provided to IDPs in camps in Pakistan were distributed upon arrival and registration.

In South Central Somalia a different approach was chosen for the famine response with blanket distributions of food vouchers in selected affected populations. This was in part motivated by the risk of contributing to conflict among population groups. The strategy was apparently successful with no reported security incidents.

The quality of targeting is core to programme effectiveness. In South Sudan, there were problems with principle – practice gaps and inconsistent quality of targeting. The recent evaluation of the food security programme in South Sudan found that the beneficiary selection criteria were "... appropriate in theory, yet were found to be inadequately defined, designed, applied, monitored and recorded in practice..."<sup>62</sup>

##### **EFSD Finding 3: NRC's emergency food response was relevant to the context but not always fully in line with beneficiaries' priorities**

In Somalia, NRC's approach of working through local suppliers and alongside local NGOs to secure access to communities that no other NGO was able to reach, while keeping direct control over the implementation of the project, was found to be particularly relevant, according to interviews with staff and an earlier evaluation report (Guillemois, 2012). The use

<sup>62</sup> Herd et. al. 2012, p. 22.

of food vouchers was particularly relevant, achieving greater dignity for beneficiaries and allowing them to choose when and how much to access of their ration at any particular time, using the vouchers. The vouchers were also a relevant security measure for beneficiaries, minimising theft at distribution points and at home. However, the late delivery of food vouchers – while not a point raised by beneficiaries in interviews - detracts from the effectiveness, and possibly the relevance, of the emergency food intervention.

In Pakistan the EFSD and Shelter activities were closely linked, including joint funding. Needs assessments for NFI kits were carried out with the participation of beneficiaries and selection of items was made according to what had been best value for money, and most appreciated by beneficiaries in the past.<sup>63</sup> NRC informed beneficiaries regularly on what they would be receiving and when:

*“Prior to the tents and NFI distribution all the IDPs were well informed by NRC team. First, NRC team visited the camp and issued the tokens amongst all IDPs and then the NFI materials and tents were distributed”.*

*FGD statement, Bajaur, Nov 2012.*

In Pakistan, beneficiaries indicated overwhelmingly that the tents had met their most pressing shelter needs, protecting their families and assets. Without this assistance they would have been exposed to the elements and have fallen sick. They considered that all the tents provided were used for the intended purpose of sheltering families. However, UNHCR noted that their post distribution follow-up in Jalozai had uncovered instances of tents unused for lack of beneficiaries. UNHCR noted that this was attributable to gaps in pre-NRC involvement needs assessment and that NRC had fulfilled their assigned contract with UNHCR to build tents.

Based on interviews in several locations, the great majority of beneficiaries stated that the other non-food items also responded to their needs, even though they had been pre-determined by NRC and not based on beneficiaries' expressed needs. The mobile phones included in the kit were noted by beneficiaries to be particularly useful:

- *People can now communicate easily with their relatives in home areas.*
- *Aid agencies working in the camp can contact them easily via phone to provide information.*
- *Entertainment value (the elderly noted with appreciation that they can listen in to news and other current affairs programmes).*
- *Male beneficiaries working outside the camp can stay in contact with their families without having to incur expensive transportation costs to visit them.*

The evaluation team however received different information depending on whom and how interviewees were asked. In Pakistan, e.g., male and female respondents had different views on the targeting of mobile phone distribution and content of NFI kits. Similarly, interviewees were more positive in focus groups, than when asked in individual interviews. In group discussions in Pakistan, some beneficiaries said the quantity of items was not sufficient and some items were of bad quality, indicating that a local agency, Sarhad Rural Support Programme (SRSP), had better quality NFIs than NRC's.<sup>64</sup> Others (male) said they would have preferred other items such as fans and gas cylinders because distributed items were useful to women only – indicating that NRC had taken into account women's needs when deciding on kit components. Almost a quarter of those interviewed individually were unhappy

<sup>63</sup> The NFI kits (some of which were distributed to those targeted to receive tents) consisted of: blankets, plastic mats, steel cooking set, water bottles, soap, bed sheets, jerry cans, shoes, cloth for women, kitchen set (spoons, knives etc).

<sup>64</sup> Triangulation revealed this to be true. However, the other organisation had distributed kits valued at Rs 6,000 while NRC kits (in line with cluster standards) were valued at Rs 1,500.

in the camps due to non-availability of basic needs, which they attributed to lack of government assistance. Tents were noted by over a quarter of beneficiaries to have been damaged on arrival, resulting in lower protection coverage from heavy rains and storms. These tents were, however, provided by another organisation.<sup>65</sup>

In South Sudan, interviewed NRC staff said that the food security project was relevant to beneficiaries. This was confirmed during interviews with the OCHA office in Kuajok.<sup>66</sup> However, according to beneficiaries, there was poor selection of seeds such as sorghum that was not adaptable to local climatic conditions. Furthermore, their means to improve livelihoods have also been constrained by other factors, such as the small size of the plots allocated per household.<sup>67</sup> The project targets were returnees, IDPs and host communities. The target was to use 25% for the benefit of host communities, but according to the evaluation of the food security programme (Herd et. al. 2012); only 11% of the actual distributions went to that group.

### 1.1.5 Effectiveness

#### **EFSD Finding 4: The Somalia Food Distribution intervention was effective in responding to beneficiary needs**

NRC's quarterly post-distribution monitoring system, which surveys beneficiaries according to various indicators, confirms the effectiveness of the food vouchers; beneficiaries used these for the intended purpose and food items covered by the voucher were in line with people's preferences. The post-distribution monitoring tool also shows that beneficiaries purchased these items with the vouchers and did not attempt to trade them for other food inputs – although this situation was starting to change by early 2012. Beneficiaries interviewed by the team were satisfied with the food although some said the quantity was not sufficient, not adapted to infants and some items were of bad quality. Asked what input most responded to their needs during the emergency, beneficiaries stated that it was food. Asked what had been the most significant change to their lives since they came to the sites, they responded that being able to eat more and more often, as well as better nutrition of their children. This conforms to information provided in the post-distribution monitoring reports.

#### **EFSD Finding 5: In South Sudan, overall programme effectiveness was compromised by weak planning and implementation**

In South Sudan, the evaluation encountered evidence that the EFSD programme, while relevant at the macro level, had its effectiveness reduced by weak implementation.<sup>68</sup> Implementation seems to have been guided by the planned project timeline as opposed to whether beneficiaries can continue with the activities on their own or not. Consistent with the EFSD policy, NRC Alek planned for a short term intervention to address immediate emergency needs and hence, results targets were expressed as short term indicators mainly focusing on output. However, as this was a food security, rather than food distribution, programme, such short term focus would decrease the chances of successful achievement of programme objectives.

The recent evaluation of the food security programme confirmed this: "Regarding the FSL [food, security and livelihoods] intervention areas of CCP [cereal crop production], VCP [vegetable crop production], livelihood training and fishing, the evaluation generally found all

<sup>65</sup> The tents distributed were recycled – a good practice from many perspectives. Information provided by NRC in comments to the draft report.

<sup>66</sup> Attempts to further triangulate with Warrap local authorities failed, as the team was asked not to contact them due to bad relations with NRC at the time of visit.

<sup>67</sup> Focus group discussion at Mayan Gumel in Warrap state.

<sup>68</sup> Interviews with staff and representatives of other key stakeholders.



areas to be relevant to the existing livelihood and food security needs and priorities of the BNF [beneficiaries].<sup>69</sup>

Although demand from beneficiaries for continued similar support confirms beneficiaries overall appreciation, the food security evaluation found the intervention to be built on low quality baseline studies, limited consultation with the beneficiaries, poorly made assumptions about the situation and little local knowledge. Furthermore, the food security evaluation found no evidence that monitoring data generated had led to learning.<sup>70</sup>

#### **EFSD Finding 6: In Somalia and South Sudan, there were problems with timeliness**

NRC's decision to engage in a large-scale food security programme in response to the famine in Somalia was not taken in a timely manner, due to expectations that other agencies would meet the needs. NRC only began its response when it became clear that other agencies were not able to address the overwhelming needs.

Once NRC took the decision to intervene, it took six weeks to deliver food vouchers to beneficiaries through the chosen procurement arrangement. While the time lag may be explained by NRC's having to scale up its capacities in terms of funding, staff and implementation modalities, this is still too long for an emergency response, forcing beneficiaries to deplete their already meagre assets in the search for survival. Given NRC's knowledge of the impending famine, it should have been able to plan for a more timely intervention and put in place contingency plans and a rapid response scale-up strategy.

In South Sudan, there were inconsistencies between different sources as to the timeliness of achievements in the food security project SDFK1102: The South Sudan quarterly report for April to June 2011 states that the distribution of agricultural inputs was timely for several projects, including SDFK1102. Staff sources, requesting not to be identified, claimed that the late distribution of agricultural seeds to beneficiaries, i.e. in July as opposed to April 2011, resulted in poor yields. Other sources claim that the programme started six months late, in June 2011, which led to a rush in programme implementation that overlooked essential steps in the programme design process, especially in conducting a needs assessment. A baseline survey, said to have informed planning, was reportedly carried out in July 2011.<sup>71</sup> The report was not available to the team, and we note that according to the second quarterly report, it must have been carried out after the distribution of agricultural inputs. The team has not been able to find any contextual analysis good enough to identify realistic assumptions enabling a comparison with results.

#### **EFSD Finding 7: The EFSD programme in Alek, South Sudan, was overly ambitious**

There was a rather late start of the projects and limited logistical, administrative and human resource capacity. The planning process was rushed and lacked systematic approach. The staff interviewed attributed this to the large geographical coverage and large beneficiary caseload, which increased from 2,000 to 4,000 households within one year.

During the same period there was high staff turnover and slow recruitment of key staff members. This is largely attributed to resentment by local population for employees from outside Warrap state, environmental living hardships and acute lack of skilled manpower in the state. Most staff confirmed this.

### **1.1.6 Efficiency**

#### **EFSD Finding 8: NRC's selected mode of intervention was efficient in reducing leakages**

<sup>69</sup> Herd et. al. 2012, p.15.

<sup>70</sup> Herd et. al. 2012, pp.16 -17.

<sup>71</sup> The team was informed that the baseline survey report was still in draft form and a copy was not available.

The team found no evidence of significant NRC leakages in the EFSD projects reviewed. According to interviews with NRC Somalia staff and project documents, the NRC emergency food distribution team there went to great lengths to prevent leakage in the programme. By selecting the voucher system, corruption and leakage have been minimised: vouchers are printed on paper that would be difficult to forge, according to the staff interviewed, and distributions are announced only two days in advance to minimise the risk of theft of food items when beneficiaries go to distribution points to collect them. However, NRC has been unable to detect the extent to which beneficiaries have to hand over part of their food and non-food package to 'gatekeepers' or other authority, this being a contentious and potentially dangerous line of inquiry.

The Pakistan NFIs including tents were procured through competitive tender. Specifications were created looking into the market availability and analysing the stock of the suppliers present in NRC suppliers' database. On receipt of quotations from various bidders, NRC selected the supplier whose offer most closely complied with the technical specification and with a competitive price. The contents of the kits were aligned with those of other agencies.<sup>72</sup>

### **EFSD Finding 9: The food intervention in Somalia could have been more efficient had it been reviewed and revised in a timely manner**

Despite being initially intended as a six-month project, the NMFA-funded food voucher project was extended for a further nine months, due to end in December 2012. Without a clearly-defined, timely reassessment of needs, the project has been allowed to drift. The 'famine evaluation' (Guillemois, 2012), conducted in early 2012, found that an earlier re-assessment of needs could have revealed the IDPs' evolving coping mechanisms, allowing NRC to adapt intervention modalities earlier. Yet, several months after these findings NRC had not been proactive in redressing the situation. The current evaluation found that NRC was considering conducting a beneficiary intentions survey at a later unspecified date, but given that the UN declared the famine to be over in February 2012, a re-assessment should have been conducted much earlier.

## **1.1.7 Sustainability**

### **EFSD Finding 10: EFSD interventions rarely regard sustainability**

The evaluation team found little evidence of focus on sustainability in the EFSD interventions reviewed. Some of the contents of the NFI kits could have been selected with sustainability in mind, and the food security interventions could be seen as contributing to sustainability of those benefitting. For instance, the Somalia famine response should have built in mechanisms to ensure gradual phase-out of food vouchers into a more appropriate early recovery food security mechanism and to have implemented this much earlier in order to avoid the risk of building a dependency culture among beneficiaries.

## **1.1.8 Conflict Sensitivity**

### **EFSD Finding 11: NRC's emergency food programming in Somalia was conflict-sensitive**

NRC adapted rapidly to the al-Shabaab ban to two of the areas where NRC and its partners were conducting distribution, re-directing resources to newly arriving IDPs in Mogadishu.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>72</sup> PKFM1102 report to NMFA, confirmed in key informant interviews.

<sup>73</sup> Interviews with project management staff explained that, at the time NRC was delivering food to people in their home areas to prevent them from displacing, Al Shabaab decided to ban the activities of all humanitarian agencies in those sites. NRC decided that it would not be responsible to deliver the food vouchers to Al Shabaab,

Blanket targeting of all new arrivals in specific sites reduced potential conflict, although this is difficult to verify: given the widespread needs and overall famine status of newly-arriving IDPs, it would have been very contentious, not to mention time-consuming, to have conducted a beneficiary targeting exercise. Re-orientation of emergency food-voucher delivery to only those who could reach Mogadishu was a responsible action to protect project funds, given that NRC would not have been able to monitor activities outside Mogadishu. By selecting suppliers from different clans and from different areas of Mogadishu, NRC not only ensures fair and transparent allocation of resources but also helps to allow access to beneficiaries and maintain security, since suppliers are from within the communities and want to ensure their safety.<sup>74</sup>

Furthermore, project documents and interviews with staff in Somalia demonstrate a commitment to ensuring cross-clan benefits and jobs, ensuring security and minimising grievances. The Mogadishu Emergency Food Distribution concept document states in its selection criteria for suppliers: ‘Suppliers to be identified from different tribes in the city on the basis on geographical location, fair and transparent allocation of resources in the society’. The Distribution Steps document indicates that selection criteria of beneficiaries shall include ‘Vulnerable members of the local host community living within the periphery of the IDP settlements’, the aim being to minimise resentment of the host community to the IDPs.

**1.1.9 Comparison of cash and food vouchers and emergency food distribution**

The ToR requests that the evaluation compares advantages and disadvantages of using cash and food vouchers instead of direct food hand-outs. Côte d'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo shall be included in this comparison. The only case country where food distribution had taken place during the evaluation period was Somalia, where food vouchers were used. Based on interviews and project documentation from Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Côte d'Ivoire, interviews with beneficiaries and other stakeholders in Somalia and on Guillemois and Mohammed (2012), the team has identified the following main advantages and disadvantages:

	<b>Food Ration</b>	<b>Unconditional Cash</b>	<b>Cash Voucher Local merchants</b>	<b>Cash Voucher Market day</b>	<b>Food Voucher</b>
<b>Advantages</b>	Local and international procurement ensures beneficiaries get food	Beneficiaries have the choice to purchase what is most important to them	Beneficiaries have the choice to purchase what is most important for them	Beneficiaries have the choice to purchase what is most important for them,	Ensures beneficiaries get food through conversion of the voucher
	Local procurement favours local traders and market	NRC can manage food supplier contracts or relationships	Better security than cash	Better security than cash	Lower level of risk for beneficiaries and NRC staff
	International procurement widens tender choices	Light administrative processes	Beneficiaries free to shop when convenient	Merchants can be drawn in from larger area	Supplier networks support access and in-country logistics

as the latter requested, and preferred to re-orient its activities to assisting those who were able to reach Mogadishu. This is also explained in document: EFSD Activity Overview, NMFA, SIDA, NRC South Central Somalia, 2011- 2012, P.16.

<sup>74</sup> See: NRC South Central experience-based methodology: dry food kit distribution.

	Useful if markets are not functioning well or not close to beneficiaries	Assumes markets sufficient to avoid price increases	Food storage challenge falls on merchants, not beneficiaries		High chance that voucher is used for essential food purpose
Disadvantages		Supports local market	Supports local market	Supports local market and producers	Supports local market
	Difficult administration: requires substantial in-country logistics and access	Unclear risks to staff and beneficiaries	Difficult administration	Difficult administration Needs to be organised	Most difficult administration Choosing suppliers is complex
	Limited choice Sale of food reduces value; i.e. a US\$100 sack of rice is sold for US\$ 50.	Presumes markets are functioning and close to beneficiaries	Presumes markets are functioning and close to beneficiaries		Limited choice for beneficiaries
	Does not stimulate market in villages/ IDP settlements	High chance that cash is used for non-essential purchases	High chance that voucher is used for non-essentials	High chance that voucher is used for non-essentials	Not appropriate for longer-term - other items needed to supplement diet
	Slow delivery	Rapid delivery	Somewhat rapid delivery	Somewhat rapid delivery	Slow delivery
	High transaction costs	Low transaction costs	Medium transaction costs	Medium transaction costs	Transaction costs higher than cash voucher, lower than food ration

Figure 10: Comparison of methods for food distribution. Table adapted from p.4, Guillemois and Mohammed 2012.

### Voucher Finding: The food voucher methodology used in Somalia was successful due to several important features

- 1) It depends on local traders' ability to cope with demand, but has the advantage of keeping a contractual link between NGO and local traders. Re-negotiation of price can occur when needed (must be pre-agreed with supplier and stipulated in contract);
- 2) Price variation of food items is dealt with at the level of NGO/trader and doesn't affect the content of the food voucher at beneficiary level (ie. losses due to price fluctuation are absorbed by NGO and not by beneficiaries);
- 3) Diverting dry food requires selling of food items to generate cash and is more complicated than diverting cash or cash vouchers;
- 4) Ultimate goal of diversion is to get cash. Food vouchers are less attractive than cash or cash vouchers to actors of diversion;
- 5) NRC food voucher methodology does not allow any choice for beneficiaries but the items listed in the food voucher represent the main type of food traditionally consumed at household level. It is important to ensure the items in the food voucher are tailored to this highly contextual requirement;
- 6) Benefits accrue to local traders who import food and set price; overall benefit to local economy;
- 7) Accountability: significant documentation to show that beneficiaries received food.

## 1.2 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)

WASH is included in the evaluation both as a core competency that shall be evaluated against relevance, effectiveness and efficiency, and as an area where the team shall make recommendations for making it a core competence. WASH was introduced as a core competency to NRC in June 2012, thus at the time of drafting the ToR, WASH was not a core competency, but at the time of implementing the evaluation, it was. We are thus in effect asked to give recommendations about how to do something that has already taken place.

At the time of the evaluation, NRC had taken three concrete steps to establish WASH as a core competency:

- 1) A WASH advisor was under recruitment – still to be identified.
- 2) A consultant had been recruited with the aim of elaborating a strategic approach to WASH as a programme area alongside Shelter, Education, ICLA, etc.
- 3) A separate WASH budget code had been created.

From a WASH perspective the selected case countries offered a rather limited insight into the capacities and undertakings to date by NRC. WASH activities were only actively pursued as a separate area of activity in Somalia. In Pakistan there were limited WASH activities as part of the Shelter programme with similar “add-ons” in South Sudan projects.

This section focuses on findings relating to WASH in the three case countries, and, as a basis for recommendations regarding WASH as a core competency, findings relating to the overall role of WASH in NRC.

### 1.2.1 Relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of WASH

#### **WASH Finding 1: WASH interventions have been relevant but insufficient**

During the field visits, beneficiaries in Somalia and Pakistan expressed satisfaction with the services provided in relation to WASH. In both countries design changes were made based on beneficiary feedback, including gender based preferences and access issues for people with disabilities. These efforts were recognised and appreciated by respondents. Not least from the 2011 Puntland evaluation (Fisher and Quanjer 2011) – it has been documented that the types of interventions selected and pursued have been very relevant to the demonstrated needs in settlements. This is confirmed by key informants met during the field visits. Such interventions were mostly hygiene kits, sanitation kits, hygiene promotion campaigns, provision of emergency and more sustainable safe water and solid waste management. Stated shortcomings relevant to these interventions have mostly been related to scale, and insufficient funds or insufficient access to equipment has been mentioned in the same evaluation.



Figure 11: Non-NRC unmaintained latrines in Bossaso (left) and NRC well-maintained latrines in Mogadishu (right). Photo by A. Davies.

### **WASH Finding 2: Effectiveness was compromised by poor implementation in some WASH activities in Somalia and in South Sudan**

In Somalia the evaluation team identified challenges related to Sphere standards in WASH interventions.<sup>75</sup> Insufficient numbers of latrines were constructed in relation to number of beneficiaries. In connection to this, it needs to be mentioned that the dwelling area was very crowded, offering limited space for latrines to be constructed. Meanwhile, the latrines in Bossaso were found to be clean and well maintained by the users. Other challenges that the evaluation team came across were related to insufficient solid waste handling and overflowing waste dumps in close proximity to the shelter areas. Since it appears that the affected people will remain for the foreseeable future, arrangements need to be developed for managing the situation or there is a heightened risk for adverse health effects.

In South Sudan the programme was less well conceived and included implementation methodology un-adapted to the local context and inadequate preparatory work.

### **WASH Finding 3: Baseline data needs to be collected and documented in order to assess impact and outcome of WASH activities**

In Somalia, the evaluation team found that impact was reported on without reference to, or use of, baseline data. Within many groups where NRC operates, it can normally be assumed that safe WASH facilities and practices were lacking among the populations now served in the camps.<sup>76</sup> While crowding of populations in denser areas exposes individuals more to potential health risks, access to WASH facilities is nevertheless an improvement. Despite this, baseline data is a requirement in order to be able to measure impact and effectiveness as services are provided - even more so in order to demonstrate the relevance of a core intervention.

### **WASH Finding 4: Efficiency of some WASH activities has been compromised by poor planning and implementation**

As illustrated by WASH findings in Case Country Reports, some WASH interventions have not been adapted to local conditions or have been poorly planned. This has negatively affected efficiency.

The structure of budgets and financial reports, with little separation between various activities, makes it difficult to use these to assess the efficiency with which WASH has been pursued in various programmes.

## **1.2.2 The role of WASH in NRC**

### **WASH Finding 5: NRC's WASH activities have to date mainly been part of the shelter programme**

During interviews with the shelter advisors, it was made clear that to date, WASH had essentially been pursued in connection with Shelter activities (and to lesser degrees also in the sectors of Education, ICLA and EFSD programming). Activities have included ensuring that latrines are constructed, that waste management systems and water are provided in connection with the establishment of shelter. Examples of WASH encountered by the evaluation team include latrines in Somalia and South Sudan, provision of water in all three case countries and hygiene training linked either to NFI distributions, water provision or latrine building. NRC WASH activities have gradually increased in importance, and lately

<sup>75</sup> Somalia Case Study, WASH section.

<sup>76</sup> See e.g. UNDP development index for visited countries.

around 40%<sup>77</sup> of the shelter funding was geared towards WASH. Sanitation kits have also been provided as part of relief support to beneficiaries, and as indicated in the evaluation report on Temporary Shelter and Hygiene Promotion Project in Galkayo, Puntland (Fisher and Quanjer, 2011),<sup>78</sup> the activities related to WASH were found to be both appropriate, relevant and appreciated. The report's findings were supported by beneficiary feedback during our field visit. Only the scale of support was mentioned as being inadequate as a result of the vast needs. However, implementation quality appears to vary greatly. For example, during the South Sudan visit the team found that project design was not matched to local conditions.<sup>79</sup>

### **WASH Finding 6: NRC has taken on WASH activities when other actors were not available**

To date, the approach of WASH interventions has been more in line with providing support if no other actor was doing so. Hence, NRC has on occasion taken on WASH activities as an actor of “last resort” (such was the case in e.g. Bossasso in Puntland). Meanwhile, it should be noted that the three case countries visited by the evaluation team represent three highly challenging environments and there were few, if any, alternative actors in the area able to provide support to the beneficiaries. The three case countries also represent a large portion of the global total operational budget of NRC.<sup>80</sup> That said, interviewees<sup>81</sup> remained uncertain as to whether establishing WASH as a core competency will resolve existing shortcomings. On the other hand, interviewees noted that designating WASH as a core competency would give due recognition to the level of operational support that is needed.

As part of the background, it is necessary to note that NRC is undergoing profound changes in its structure with consequences also on ambitions – while overall goals remain the same. NRC is removing Camp Management, an established core competency for which the organisation is known and well respected, and engaging in WASH, a new core competency. Such change requires significant investment in building technical competence as well as some organisational restructuring. The changes that NRC is pursuing are very much in line with humanitarian sector trends at a time when key phrases such as: “remain/become relevant”, “provide added value” and “result based management” guide institutional change processes. Similar to many other organisations – for example actors within the Red Cross Movement and various UN agencies – the WASH sector has been identified as a major opportunity as it offers i) clear(er) indicators to measure achievements against and ii) reduces relative transaction cost levels, in particular as infrastructure investment is undertaken. WASH represents a relatively concrete area of engagement and set of activities, in particular as the scene of engagement is well defined, and very much so in relation to the mandate of NRC. That said, in order to perform in line with minimum quality standards and the expectations that come with offering WASH as a core competency, there are a minimum set of skills and qualities that need to be established and organisationally maintained.

One aspect that is somewhat of a contradiction is that many other agencies today aim to orient their programmes to be more integrated or at the very least more harmonised in regards to activities. Here, NRC has structurally opted for moving in the opposite direction by structurally separating areas of programming. This can of course be overcome through the strategy pursued in bringing together separate components to meet collective demands of a group. There was consensus that establishing WASH as a separate competency was appropriate – with reference to the fact that WASH as an area is growing and increasingly relevant for other activities apart from shelter – such as food security, education etc.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>77</sup> Interview with Jeroen Quanjer.

<sup>78</sup> Fisher and Quanjer, 2011. NRC Evaluation Report: Temporary Shelter and Hygiene Promotion Project in Galkayo, Puntland.

<sup>79</sup> South Sudan CC report, 3.3, Finding Wash 1 and 2. In comments to the draft report, NRC has pointed out that the specific design was demanded by the donor.

<sup>80</sup> Interview with Jake Zarin.

<sup>81</sup> Interviews with Jake Zarin, Austen Davis and Jeroen Qanjer.

<sup>82</sup> Interview with Mr Austen Davis.

Operationally, the structural reorientation corresponds to the structure of the Humanitarian Reform, with separation into clusters. An important part in recognising WASH as a separate competency also relates to the need to raise recognition of the importance of hygiene practices. When WASH was a sub-component of shelter, there was a tendency that hygiene and preventive health care were given lower priority, in comparison to the high-investment, technical focus of shelter projects. There was consensus in that the softer knowledge around hygiene practices would be given better attention as a stand-alone core competency. On the other hand, by separating operational areas into separate budget lines along core areas, NRC increasingly runs the risk of becoming a pawn to donors as these earmark funding to specific areas, potentially reducing NRC's power to pursue defined needs. There is a distinct risk that challenges may arise in tensions between technical managers – with increased powers – and programme/ geographical managers when budget lines are separated.<sup>83</sup>

## Camp Management

Camp Management amounts to no more than 4 per cent of NRC's total spending. It is being phased out as a core competency and there were no Camp Management activities in any of the three case countries selected for this evaluation. The team had originally planned to assess Camp Management activities in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya. However it emerged that NRC has never been involved in Camp Management per se in Dadaab either.

The team therefore has no information about Camp Management from the three case countries to build findings on. However, the experience of the evaluation team is that NRC has been appreciated for its Camp Management activities overall.

The team was informed that Camp Management activities are being handled by inclusion of persons with camp management experience in NORCAP and camp management training to other agencies who have taken up the role, supplying support to Camp Management this way instead.

## Cross-Cutting Issues

### 1.2.3 Environment

It has been shown from countless refugee and camp management operations that an environment that harbours a large influx of people will undergo profound and often irreversible changes. NRC subscribes to the “Do No Harm” principles, and during the field visits examples were found where programmes were oriented around ideas of reducing impact on the environment – such as the provision of corrugated iron sheets and iron bars as an alternative for wood in Somalia or the distribution of seedlings in South Sudan.

There is one NRC evaluation of the ecological impact of NRC refugee/returnee programmes in Burundi (Proact Network, 2009) and NRC's Policy Paper states that “We promote environmental sustainability and climate adaptation in our activities...”. However, according to the list of staff at the NRC homepage, there is no advisor on Environment.

While it is not realistic to pursue a “zero-impact” on the environment, it is suggested that a broad consensus across programmes on a strategic level be pursued related to so called Green Response, which essentially combines the efforts of “Do No Harm” and “Good Enough” in a green context. In WASH terms, this translates into ensuring the use of appropriate and sustainable technologies, yet allowing for the selection of solutions that is

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<sup>83</sup> Interview with Mr Jeroen Quanjer.



potentially more costly in its initial investment, but implies greater sustainability of the solution related to the use of natural resources and with lower operational/maintenance costs. It also translates into a more sustainable use of water and provision in tune with the environmental carrying capacity.

Similarly the management of latrine wastes and sewage water management needs to identify more constructive solutions and not accept temporary solutions involving dumping. In this lies also the ambition of involving the surrounding population in the solution/intervention, ideally with systems and solutions that may continue to offer a service even after the immediate emergency is resolved. This potentially reduces the frictions that often/normally arise between the displaced and host populations, but also offers outcomes of an intervention that generate improved living conditions for both groups.

### **Environment Finding: NRC staff is aware that their programmes should respect the environment and there are examples that it is being practised**

NRC Somalia staff is sensitive to environmental issues in designing its projects and procurement. In Mogadishu, rather than using locally sourced wooden poles for tent construction, NRC uses metal poles – imported but available on the local market - which are less onerous on the environment. This is a cost consideration that is also more efficient in the longer term since the metal poles last longer than wooden ones and can be recycled by beneficiaries for other uses. The move to use CGI shelters in Mogadishu also reflects an attempt to save the environment by using more sustainable materials (corrugated iron sheeting instead of locally-harvested wood).

In South Sudan the record is somewhat mixed: beneficiaries expressed preference for use of local materials with which to complete their tukuls (grass matting and poles) but NRC decided to provide standardised plastic sheeting instead. Plastic sheeting is not as environment-friendly as grass-matting and could end up as environment polluting waste once it is no longer useable. Grass matting is biodegradable and, as such, more environmental-friendly. In Pakistan local materials were used for permanent shelter production, procured by contractor tender processes. NRC did not conduct an environmental impact study to ascertain the extent to which use of these local materials may have impacted the environment.

In South Sudan, some activities designed to mitigate environmental damage are included in the country programme. For example, awareness raising and tree sapling distribution are components of the food security and livelihood program. However, environmental impact assessments are made neither in needs assessments nor in reporting.

## **1.2.4 Gender**

In their review of Norwegian humanitarian organisations' awareness and practical implementation of gender, Moen and Wiik (2009) state on p.3 that "The NRC Policy paper, which lays out the guiding principles of the organisation, does not reflect any thoughts on gender or women." It also compares the shelter and ICLA handbooks, and finds difference in gender integration. Note that the report is dated 2009. The present evaluation, however, found several examples where NRC was paying attention to gender issues, and these issues are referred to in the revised Programme Policy of 2012.

### **Gender Finding 1: NRC is addressing gender issues in several programmes**

The team noted that the South Sudan project design commonly includes gender based targets for both activities and beneficiary selection. Reports are broken down by gender. The team encountered several examples of project adaptation due to gender-based feedback, such as including a limited number of males in trainings that initially were reserved exclusively for females, and negotiating temporary land "user's rights" for females when

confronted with rigid traditional-law based resistance to formal land tenure to female headed households.

In Somalia, latrine constructions had been changed so that doors now open inwards allowing the occupant to block intruders as well as avoid the door being opened "as a joke". Geographical placement of latrines has changed at the request of women who felt that previous placement was too open.<sup>84</sup>

### **Gender Finding 2: ICLA has difficulties reaching potential female claimants in some areas and are withdrawing from some activities targeting women**

A key challenge noted by Pakistan NRC staff and UNHCR is access to female potential claimants in some areas. In FATA, female staff cannot travel and females are not allowed to talk to men. This negates the possibility of conducting women beneficiary consultations to reach programme relevance and of obtaining women's feedback to assess programme effectiveness, meaning that the views of more than half the target population are missing. In South Sudan, NRC staff and the ICLA advisor's report indicate that, due to resource restraints and potential threats to the security of staff, the project was in the process of withdrawing from engaging in gender based violence cases.<sup>85</sup> It was felt that staff lacked the training to intervene effectively, perhaps even placing potential clients at greater risk.

### **Gender Finding 3: NRC projects and institutional policies aim to achieve greater gender balance**

All shelter projects have benefited women given that a majority of beneficiaries are women and children. NRC project documents show that female-headed households are targeted as vulnerable beneficiaries and efforts made to secure them land tenure for permanent housing. This is not always easy in countries such as Pakistan where women do not have land rights but NRC has advocated – at times successfully - for their inclusion. In some cases females interviewed were more positive to the contents (of NFI kits) or targeting (of mobile phone distribution) than male interviewees.

Given the predominant beneficiary preference for boundary walls in Pakistan permanent shelter projects, NRC could have considered different intervention modalities such as providing materials or cash vouchers for the house owner to use according to his or her preference. If women become 'prisoners' in their own houses due to the lack of a boundary wall, unable to get fresh air or sunlight and unable to conduct their daily chores<sup>86</sup>, more imaginative responses need to be identified. In Pakistan all-female ICLA workshops are organised and female clients are represented in court. Where possible, NRC refers its clients, many of whom are female (no breakdown given in project documents), to other service providers. Beneficiaries said that many internally displaced widows and female-headed households have been able to gain access to their return and property rights through ICLA's diligent research in tracking down male relatives who could vouch for them.

In Somalia, NRC is making great efforts to overcome the cultural sensitivities surrounding women in work and education. The NRC global policy on Gender is used by field staff as a guiding document, according to interviews with staff, and efficient procedures are in place to include women where necessary and possible: 2010 and 2011 beneficiary tracking sheets show attention to beneficiary breakdown by gender and age. Female beneficiaries are included in assessments and monitoring: the Director of the Regional Office in Nairobi maintains that it is the women who speak up the most in individual households and NRC can be sure to get their views, essential to getting inputs and activities right.

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<sup>84</sup> Interview with NRC regional WASH adviser

<sup>85</sup> In comments to the draft, NRC has emphasised that gender based violence interventions were never part of the intended project activities. From interviews in the field it was clear that requests for support in these issues were common and absorbing staff time, motivating the ICLA advisor to intervene and emphasise that this should not be part of the mandate.

<sup>86</sup> Beneficiary and staff interviews.

Project design in South Sudan commonly includes gender based targets for both activities and beneficiary selection. Reports are broken down by gender. The evaluation encountered several examples of project adaptation due to gender-based feedback, such as including a limited number of males in trainings that initially were reserved exclusively for females, negotiating temporary land “user’s rights” for females when confronted with rigid traditional-law based resistance to formal land tenure to female headed households.

#### **Gender Finding 4: NRC is striving to employ more women**

While the NRC market research team in South Central Somalia was all-female, women were not employed to do post-distribution or regular field monitoring. This risks compromising the effectiveness of interventions: beneficiary women’s views and specific problems may go unnoticed since they cannot be raised with male monitors. NRC is looking at innovative ways to address gender imbalance in its staff such as by recruiting local female staff that may not be fully literate but, through training and mentoring, have the potential to become efficient.

In Pakistan, NRC has ensured that gender mainstreaming is reflected in its ICLA staff component, recruiting an equal number of male and female employees for project activities. The ICLA Project Manager is a woman and a significant number of female staff is deployed in the field in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Female staff is a particular asset because they can access both male and female beneficiaries.

### **1.2.5 Disabilities**

#### **Disabilities Finding 1: WASH programming was sometimes adapted to disabled**

Interviewees said that wash rooms constructed under NRC Shelter projects in Pakistan had no facilities or ease of access for disabled and elderly individuals. In Somalia, on the other hand, latrine design has changed by including stools and better handles for those with difficulties squatting.<sup>87</sup> Also in South Central Somalia, special provisions were made for disabled and sick beneficiaries to cash in their food vouchers and have their food transported to their homes. In South Sudan, school latrines had ramps. However, NRC needs to include more assistance to the disabled by, for instance, providing ramps to a broader selection of latrines and homes, where necessary, and conducting focus group discussions specifically aimed at the elderly and disabled to better assess their needs.

### **1.2.6 Corruption**

In all three case countries, and many other areas NRC works in, there is a high risk of corruption. The evaluation team found staff in all three case countries and at head office to be well aware of this. The management findings on financial issues above attest to some of the efforts taken to mitigate the risk of diversion of funds.

#### **Corruption Finding 1: NRC staff were sensitive to potential diversion of funds or assets whether project or administration-related and took efforts to avoid it**

NRC Pakistan project proposals and reports all carry the statement:

“NRC operations are generally vulnerable to corruption due to the fact that they are located in some of the most corrupt countries in the world. To counter this threat, NRC undertakes active anti-corruption work. NRC has developed guidelines on finance, logistics and Anti-Corruption. All staff signs a Code of Conduct and staff trainings are undertaken”.

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<sup>87</sup> Interview with NRC regional WASH adviser.

Staff members interviewed in all three case countries described the elaborate system of checks and balances in NRC procedures. Staff is guided by NRC's logistics, procurement and ethics guidelines, both at the Country and Field levels. The tight procedures and system of checks and balances between offices at different levels of the organisation reduces the risk of corruption, according to project and finance staff interviewed, but it cannot be completely ruled out. Likely sources are suppliers and 'gatekeepers' (community leaders). According to finance, logistics, procurement and administrative staff, all are involved to a degree in tracking payments. Suppliers receive training and regular awareness talks that sensitise them to NRC's zero tolerance policy on corruption.

In South Sudan interviews with staff confirmed a strict code of conduct which has been consistently followed. It is backed up by the fact that management has shown a willingness to manage significant conflict arising from such a principled stance, including with selected local authorities and suppliers. For example, at the time of the evaluation, the relationship between NRC and local authorities in Warrap State was poor. Some key informants attributed this to conflicts of interest arising from local authorities' high expectations to benefit from tendering opportunities and recruitment of local staff.

### **Corruption Finding 2: In Somalia, there is a risk of beneficiary "taxes"**

In Somalia diversion of project inputs by 'gatekeepers' and other figures of authority and 'beneficiary taxes' are a known but unquantifiable risk to NRC along with other international humanitarian organisations working in Somalia (Guillemois, 2012). NRC undertakes a number of measures to reduce the risk of diversion of funds such as having in place complaints mechanisms, community sensitisation, a presence in the field and repeated reminders to all stakeholders of its 'zero tolerance' policy on corruption, which may minimise it. There are few other tools available to combat the generalised level of corruption that do not put staff and beneficiaries at risk.

### **Corruption Finding 3: In South Sudan, NRC staff had encountered both systemic and specific problems indicating corruption risk**

The Finance Manager in South Sudan said that NRC staff has experienced corrupt practices or attempts at corruption by some vendors/contractors seeking favours. Some staff implied that it is difficult to provide evidence due to weak legal machinery and to a fear of 'whistle-blowing' by people who have information or evidence. A specific issue brought to the evaluation team's attention by both national and expatriate staff members referred to tenders. In the vast majority of cases, the competitive tenders NRC received quoted a price that was very close to the amount specified in the internal purchase request. This indicates either an exceptionally good knowledge of prevailing market prices or a likely leakage of "willingness to pay" information to bidders. Inflating quotation prices and changing or presenting fake invoices has also been experienced among staff and service providers.

## **1.2.7 Accountability and Quality**

### **Accountability Finding: Beneficiaries were in general consulted but complaints mechanisms were lacking in many areas.**

Through interviews with staff and beneficiaries, the team found that in general, beneficiaries in all three countries are consulted throughout project implementation and are able to air any grievances, either directly or through community leaders. NRC has put in place a phone hotline in Mogadishu – mainly for the benefit of Food Distribution beneficiaries although it can be used by beneficiaries of other projects. The hotline is monitored but calls are not registered and follow-up is not documented. This needs to be corrected. An innovative beneficiary feedback mechanism in Mogadishu is to invite community leaders to the NRC Mogadishu office once a week in order to discuss emerging problems. According to NRC

staff who attend the meetings, results have been positive: not only are issues discussed in an open and cordial atmosphere, the discussions generate confidence in the leaders from NRC's transparency and openness to discuss any issue, with the result that NRC security is greatly enhanced in the communities. This mechanism could be usefully employed in Bossaso where 'accountability to beneficiaries' tools are less prevalent, apart from regular site monitoring. In Pakistan a complaints box system is used. NRC has opted not to put in place a planned hotline based beneficiary complaints mechanisms – apart from regular monitoring – until a decision has been made on how to address them responsibly and meaningfully. In South Sudan the team did not find evidence of a systematic mechanism to ensure accountability to beneficiaries.

### **Quality Finding: Alignment to Sphere standards, cluster guidelines and beneficiaries' preferences is high**

Alignment with Sphere standards is sometimes problematic in Somalia where IDP settlements (especially in Mogadishu and some in Bossaso) are so over-crowded it is impossible to adhere to standards of housing size and spacing between shelters. With UNHCR, NRC proposed that cluster guidelines adopt the 'appropriate standards' model of shelter which is more in line with contextual realities. Newly constructed transitional shelters in Bossaso and permanent shelters in Burao are in compliance with Sphere and in all three countries, Shelter policies and practices conform to cluster guidelines. Indeed, NRC has been closely involved in drawing up cluster guidelines in Pakistan and Somalia.



*Figure 12: A crowded IDP settlement in central Mogadishu where NRC plastic sheets complement traditional buuls. Photo by A. Davies.*

NRC has demonstrated adaptability to Shelter design and implementation in Somalia where transitional and permanent shelters have been modified to align more closely with beneficiary preferences, for example, the options provided to beneficiaries of the 'community development' Shelter project in Bossaso and the expansion of housing space in permanent shelters in Burao.

## **NORCAP**

The NORCAP roster is managed under the Emergency Response Department, another of the five departments. NORCAP, Norwegian Refugee Council's (NRC) stand-by roster was

introduced in 1991 and is an instrument for building UN and civilian capacity. NORCAP is funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA) and operated by NRC. In 2009, NMFA and NRC entered for the first time into a three year agreement concerning NRC's operation of NORCAP with a financial frame of 240 million NOK. A new framework agreement was signed on March 9, 2012.

15% of NORCAP's budget is allocated to NRC's overall budget and any requests related to the core cost of NORCAP, including request for staff, will need to be negotiated and approved by NRC senior management. According to interviews with NORCAP management and NRC contact list, NORCAP is managed by a ten-person team.<sup>88</sup> Since 2012 NORCAP is witnessing a restructuring, improvement in processes and re-definition of team members' roles and responsibilities in order to increase the efficiency of NORCAP and its quality of response.

NRC aligns itself closely with Norway's humanitarian policy as expressed in parliamentary report no 40. Support for the UN humanitarian reform process, launched in 2005, lies at the core of this policy. As the majority of NORCAP's contributions are channelled through UN agencies, NORCAP sees the reform process as an important term of reference for its activities.

In line with the ToR, this section presents a description of some areas of NORCAP's work, and findings regarding quality, focussing on relevance and efficiency. Other headings in the section refer to specific questions or topics specified in the ToR.

## **Selection and Utilisation of Secondees**

Main tasks assigned to NORCAP secondees are in line with the thematic areas and expertise offered by NORCAP: rule of law and legal affairs; peacekeeping; civil affairs and democratisation; protection; social affairs and livelihood; administration and finance; logistics and supply; engineering; information management and technology; health and nutrition; coordination and leadership; communication; and camp management. Out of the above, the largest deployments are in the areas of coordination and leadership, protection, social affairs and livelihoods. Future emphasis is on camp management (which is being phased out as a core competence in NRC), human resources and capacity building.

The internal recruitment and selection process leads to NORCAP deployment of secondees once accepted into the roster. The Competency panel and a NORCAP team conduct needs analysis prior to recruitment. Potential candidates are screened and shortlisted by a Recruitment Officer who invites candidates for face to face interviews and updates the overview and planning documents. After interviews and reference checks, the recommended candidates are presented to the Competency Panel for approval. Successful candidates are then informed of their acceptance and categorised in the NORCAP database. NORCAP's annual recruitment plan includes 4 rounds, targeting around 100 new roster members each year.

The requesting or host organisations (at headquarters and/or field office) identify the need for seconded personnel in the field. Using the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) as base the focal person from the requesting organisation will confirm which professional categories with funding are available through NORCAP. The deployment will take place once the specific agreement relating to selected candidate is made and visa is granted (See Annex 2d: Recruitment and Deployment Flow Chart).

## **Professional Performance**

<sup>88</sup> However, in comments to the draft report it is stated that over 20 persons work full time with NORCAP.

### **NORCAP Finding 1: The quality of NORCAP secondees is considered high**

Across all UN agency staff interviewed, the quality of NORCAP roster members is considered generally to be excellent. The secondees are well trained and often have specific agency expertise. Overall, the diversity and quality of the profiles deployed by NORCAP is seen by host organisations as a major advantage to the UN partners.<sup>89</sup>

### **NORCAP Finding 2: Performance management tools are not fully utilised and linked to one another**

NORCAP management team focuses on three aspects of performance: competencies; actual performance; personal development. Mechanisms that are used to gauge performance include the following:

- ⌚ Performance Evaluation Review (PER) - *completed by secondee's supervisor*. It is the responsibility of the secondees to ensure that the PER is discussed with their respective supervisors at the start of the assignment. The understanding within NORCAP is that the first 'poor' performance can be acceptable and a second chance may be given especially if the poor performance was influenced by factors beyond the control of secondees. More importantly, according to NORCAP advisors PERs are not seen as a priority by the host organisation and often PERs are not provided by the host organisation despite reminders. A judgement call is made by the advisor on the performance level of the secondees. The sample Performance Evaluation Reviews analysed (16 PERs reviewed) show that different formats are used (the host organisations', NORCAP's and NRC's) for the performance evaluation, resulting in lack of consistency when evaluating secondees.
- ⌚ Internal evaluation feedback in the absence of PER – *developed and facilitated by NORCAP team*.
- ⌚ Mission Reports - *produced by secondee as per requirements*. The evaluation team reviewed sample mission reports produced by secondees. These reports suggest that a standardised format or emphasis on desired content vary from secondee to secondee. 18 of the 23 follow up interview respondents claim not to have received any formal feedback on the mission reports submitted to NORCAP. NORCAP is currently in the process of standardising all the reporting formats.
- ⌚ Field Visit Reports – *produced by NORCAP management team*. An interview guide to be used during field visits is being developed that will match the new reporting format.

## **Changing Needs and Context**

### **NORCAP Finding 3: Non-emergency work and long term assignments increase secondees' dependence on NORCAP.**

The initial mandate to provide surge capacity within 72 hours during emergencies has broadened to include long term development support. The long term nature of the deployments is evident from the extensions of the assignment. Secondees are in positions for 18 months or more in some cases. Longer term posts naturally do not allow secondees (especially non-Norwegian) to hold permanent positions elsewhere, thus increasing their dependence on NORCAP for future assignments and opportunities for their own capacity development. Approximately 45% of the respondents to the online survey have been sent out as a secondee three times or more and 13 % more than five times, indicating that to a substantial share of secondees, secondments are part of their career.

### **NORCAP Finding 4: NORCAP is pro-active in identifying and meeting changing needs**

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<sup>89</sup> Interviews with UN agency staff.

NORCAP is seen by all the host organisations interviewed as strong in moving into new sectors and build the capacity of their roster accordingly. They regularly consult with their UN partners on the specific profiles needed and jointly identify likely skills gaps arising in the future from the changing nature of emergencies. As a result of regular consultations with UN-HABITAT, NORCAP is in the process of boosting their land and housing experts as well as their capacity to deploy urban planners. NRC is therefore considered to be open to not only discuss emerging needs, but also to commit resources and time to development<sup>90</sup>.

## Sense of Purpose and Usefulness

### **NORCAP Finding 5: Secondees are highly motivated and see a strong sense of purpose in the work that they do**

Online survey results and follow up interviews suggest that a majority of secondees are highly motivated and see a strong sense of purpose in the work that they do. Secondees are driven by the differences they make in the host organisation while providing their technical expertise. Follow up interviews with secondees suggest that those whose assignments have direct and regular contact with host populations are highly motivated, citing acceptance by the host populations and the improvements the projects bring into their lives.

### **NORCAP Finding 6: Some secondees are poorly treated but this does not deter them from going on other missions.**

Interviews with returning secondees and follow up interviews with online survey respondents suggest that some secondees are poorly treated: some have to cope with an unsupportive supervisor, inadequate access to basic amenities and equipment for personal and professional purposes and lack of access and opportunities to attend relevant briefing, training or meetings. Despite these frustrations the secondees are still motivated to be deployed. For many secondees this is their only job and they depend on being deployed continuously. This has been the big change from having a primarily Norwegian roster whereby fully employed members of the roster would take a 3-12 month sabbatical from their regular employment to go on a NORCAP mission. This, potentially, affects the independence of the secondee and their ability/willingness to bring problems to the attention of NORCAP in Oslo.

### **NORCAP Finding 7: Several secondees feel that host organisations are not prepared to fully utilise their expertise**

Several respondents to the online survey and 70% (15 of 22) of secondees from the follow up interview state their expertise is not fully utilised. Examples provided are that host organisations often do not make time to draft detailed ToR (especially for emergencies) and instead 'recycle' old ToRs that are often generic to a specific posting. There are sometimes discrepancies in what is expected of a secondee by the host organisation and what the secondee expects to be doing based on the ToR received. NORCAP can only pass on the information the agencies give them. According to interviewees, often communication is only between Oslo and the UN agency headquarters, so direct information from the field is rarely available.

### **NORCAP Finding 8: There is some discrepancy between the host organisations' assessment of the professional performance of NORCAP personnel and the secondees' sense of purpose and usefulness**

Although all UN agency staff interviewed consider the quality of NORCAP roster members to be generally excellent, some secondees interviewed feel that their usefulness could be even

<sup>90</sup> Interviews with UN agency staff



higher. The secondees' sense of purpose is generally high and thus in line with the host organisations' assessments of their performance.

#### **NORCAP Finding 9: Inadequate mechanisms for secondees to voice concerns without being apprehensive about not being seconded again**

A large part of the negative comments about host organisations that were provided by respondents to the online survey relate to problems with host organisations not treating them like other personnel and not knowing or living up to the MoU.<sup>91</sup> Some of the respondents to the follow-up interviews perceived that there were inadequate mechanisms for secondees to air their concerns that require attention and formal action. Even though secondees may contact the next level advisors in case of any unresolved concerns, a more neutral and independent platform is perceived as lacking. In comments to the evaluation report, NORCAP has pointed out that whistle blowing is available on the NRC intranet and that there is a staff care advisor who provides follow-up to secondees.

#### **NORCAP Finding 10: There are inadequate measures to ensure continuity of efforts put in by secondees**

Some respondents of the follow-up interviews with online survey respondents view the extensions requested by host organisations as not always justified but requested purely for filling a financial gap. Host organisations are requested to provide a formal request of extension. However, some secondees (as expressed in responses to online survey and in follow-up interviews) feel there are no justification or preparedness efforts to ensure continuity of the work done and state there is a lack of a formal mechanism to provide their own justification of the extension.

### **Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT)**

Annex 2f provides a table of what the evaluation team considers to be NORCAP's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats and Annex 2e a comparative table of standby rosters. The comparison of standby rosters covers the areas of organisational set-up, budget, size of roster, standby agreements, services offered, trainings, monitoring and evaluation aspects, deployment process, length of deployment, cost sharing efforts, number and cost of deployments was carried out, based on previous work by team members in the evaluation of the Swedish Civil Contingency Agency.<sup>92</sup> The rosters listed in the comparison include RedR, SDC,<sup>93</sup> NORCAP, Danish Refugee Council and Irish Aid.

#### **NORCAP Finding 11: Long term deployment allows strategic skills transfer and capacity building**

The fact that NRC allows deployments for 18 months is seen as a clear advantage in relation to some of the agencies that deploy maximum 3-6 months. This allows for more strategic skills transfer and potential capacity building within the UN agencies. NORCAP secondments are also considered fast as secondees can be in the field within weeks of the request having been made. NORCAP is the only agency who can both deploy fast and for up to 18 months, as the selection process for the secondees from agencies such as SDC who provide longer terms experts can take 6 months to a year.

#### **NORCAP Finding 12: NORCAP has a large roster, a good relationship with NMFA and is pro-active to meet changing needs, which makes it an efficient roster**

<sup>91</sup> In total, 109 comments were given about host organisations in the online survey. Of these, 27 were assessed as positive, 46 as negative and 34 were suggestions.

<sup>92</sup> Baker et.al., 2012, Study of Sida's Support to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) 2006-2011.

<sup>93</sup> Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation.

The NORCAP roster has over 700 members, which means a lot of resources and expertise to pull from. NRC's relationship with the NMFA is also seen as contributing to the efficiency of the roster overall. NRC does not have to struggle and haggle with the NMFA, unlike some of the other secondment agencies, and does not have to constantly convince the NMFA of their direction and priorities. It is a relationship built on trust which is confirmed from the interviews with NMFA.

NORCAP is considered both patient and flexible in terms of administrative issues, which is appreciated by UN agencies with notoriously cumbersome bureaucracies. NORCAP will actively recruit and headhunt when made aware of new needs arising amongst its partners. They are seen as agile with 'an ear to the ground', covering both long-term policy makers and short term emergency respondents on their roster.

### **NORCAP Finding 13: Being a secondee gives the courage to do work in UN and to do it well, without the institutional biases**

There is a specific appreciation for having NORCAP secondees representing the UN agency staff, specifically in the role of cluster coordinator. The cluster coordinator position is seen as 'double-hat roles' where the agency staff member constantly has to represent the agency itself as well as representing the whole sector. There can sometimes be a conflict of interest (such as, for example, when cluster coordinators are in charge of prioritisation for CHF<sup>94</sup> funding within the cluster).

### **NORCAP Finding 14: Increased cost sharing is not an option for most host organisations**

There is some concern amongst donors that misuse of the standby partner arrangements by the UN agencies may be encouraged by the fact that secondees are generally a free resource. NORCAP secondees are as a rule paid 100% up to 18 months of deployment with the UN agency possibly paying for rest and recreation if the secondee is posted at a hardship posting,<sup>95</sup> and other minor costs such as providing equipment and office space. It is the view of the evaluation team that while free personnel make sense in the first few months of an emergency as a cost-effective bridging mechanism whilst an agency secures funding, beyond that, it may result in the complacency of UN agencies to recruit or find internal staff and create disincentives for country offices to prioritise.<sup>96</sup> However, while cost sharing and paying the full costs of the secondee, whether from NORCAP or another partner, should in theory cut down on possible abuse of the secondment system, it is often not feasible for many UN agencies to do so.

Firstly, many agencies would be unable to reach out to specific rosters such as NORCAP in order to secure specific expertise needed, as this would be seen as giving preference to one supplier over another<sup>97</sup>. Any request to be fully paid for by the agency would therefore have to be put out to open tender in order to comply with UN audit procedures. Secondly, all UN agencies interviewed agreed that the value of the standby partnership agreements is that secondees bring new views and new capacities, not found internally within the UN, and that these are available immediately without having to invest time and resources in additional training. Finally, all UN agency staff interviewed underlined that the relationship with the roster agencies, in particular with NORCAP, goes far beyond simply providing an in-kind donation in the form of an expert, and it is therefore not relevant to compare with the UN's ability to attract adequate staff on its own. It is fundamentally a partnership with the aim of bringing in the right expertise for the right initiative, strengthening the UN agency in question

<sup>94</sup> Common Humanitarian Fund

<sup>95</sup> UN-Habitat in Iraq, UNHCR in some instances but not always.

<sup>96</sup> Also raised in DFID Standby Partner review, August 2012, p.22

<sup>97</sup> This is the case for UNICEF, UN-HABITAT, FAO, UNRWA and OCHA. Only UNHCR is different in that it can use Danish Refugee Council to acquire specific profiles fast without having to go through the entire public tendering system.

but also at times contributing to the wider response.<sup>98</sup> Therefore, increased cost-sharing may also fundamentally change the nature of these partnerships, moving to a transactional relationship – focusing on the value for money – between the UN agencies and the secondment agencies. See Annex 2f for a brief overview of the strengths and weaknesses of NORCAP in relation to their service provision.

## Quality

### **NORCAP Finding 15: An informed and highly motivated NORCAP management team contribute to increased quality of response to actual challenges**

The NORCAP management team has the relevant and appropriate background (including UN background) and own field experience as secondees to appreciate the needs of both the partner organisations and the secondees. NORCAP team members demonstrated high motivation and positive spirit to be part of NORCAP and demonstrate willingness to respond quickly and be available to the secondee when needed (one stop shop<sup>99</sup>). Each team member, especially the senior members, is well informed of their positions and possesses the necessary institutional memory of NORCAP.

### **NORCAP Finding 16: There are adequate policies, procedures, processes and practices but these are not sufficiently supported by quality control mechanisms**

NORCAP has developed, or adopted NRC's, required policies, procedures, processes, checklists and practices to ensure that the recruitment, selection, briefing, deployment, performance management and capacity building of secondees occurs as per procedure. However, some procedures are clearly missing, such as, emergency procedures during critical incidents.<sup>100</sup> NORCAP relies on host organisations to follow the MoUs, but still has a responsibility to ensure this is done. Comments provided in online survey give several examples that the MoUs are not followed. This means that in practice some procedures are missing. For the Norwegian secondees, the labour law and Norwegian court of law applies, however it is unclear which court of law will apply for non-Norwegian secondees. Despite all the checklists and spread sheets to keep track of secondee management the team still rely on Agresso, the financial system, to get accurate and updated data on requests, deployment and capacity development of secondees.

### **NORCAP Finding 17: Inconsistent practices due to inadequate systematisation may lead to lack of transparency in recruitment and deployment processes**

The growth and expansion of NORCAP and NRC is not in proportion to the growth of systems and formalisation of processes and practices. The NORCAP team has a strong oral and verbal culture, with lesser priority for documentation and structure. The evaluation revealed a few inconsistencies in practices due to inadequate systematisation and this may negatively affect NORCAP's image and the quality of response.

While the policy is to hire only Norwegians and secondees from parts of MENA, Africa and Asia, other nationals such as British and Canadian nationals were hired and deployed through NORCAP upon recommendation and request from host organisations. In addition at least two of the follow up interview respondents claimed to have approached the UN first who

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<sup>98</sup> For example, when a secondee is placed in the UNICEF Rapid Response Team thereby bringing the resources together for the entire WASH and nutrition sector, not only UNICEF. Similarly, when UN-HABITAT and UNHCR share the expertise of a land rights secondee, or when a NORCAP secondee to UNICEF with DRR expertise works on cross-agency related issues, thus benefitting more than just UNICEF.

<sup>99</sup> The "one stop shop" approach refers to the ambition that a secondee should have the same contact person at NORCAP, irrespective the nature of the errand.

<sup>100</sup> Based on document review, interviews with NRC staff and comments by secondees.

then requested NORCAP to fund the candidate. In another example, the candidate was already working with the UN as a consultant and UN then requested for this candidate to be funded and deployed under the banner of NORCAP.

NORCAP's policy is to ensure that secondees have adequate break (at least a month) in between missions, however, the secondment statistics provided by NORCAP team suggest there are instances where secondees have been on several missions in a row with less than 1 month break in between.

## Relevance

### **NORCAP Finding 18: Secondees and host organisations find NORCAP highly relevant**

79.1% of online survey respondents strongly agree while 15.2% agree that their work has a positive impact on the host organisations. Further, 68.2% strongly agree while 23.1% agree that their work has a positive impact on the target population implying that NORCAP is highly relevant. The feedback from host organisations regarding NORCAP's contribution also suggests that NORCAP is highly relevant. 68.3% of the online respondents strongly agree that NORCAP inspires commitment among its secondees.

### **NORCAP Finding 19: Secondees feel NORCAP's support to the UN could alleviate pressure for UN to strengthen its own capacity**

According to secondees interviewed in the case countries, support provided to the UN could alleviate the pressure for the UN to strengthen its own internal HR<sup>101</sup> challenges and gaps. Some of the secondees deployed held UN core positions. NORCAP also carries out deployments to headquarters and intends to provide HR experts to support the UN in the future. A secondee being 'an expert on Mission for the UN' and not a staff member or UN official has his/her limitations especially when it comes to decision making. Secondees act as 'technical experts' expected to play an 'advisory' role rather than a 'decision making role' thus the extent to which secondees can make a difference and influence decisions are subject to the 'profiles and expertise provided'.

NORCAP is providing core functions and core positions for longer term postings, including at headquarter level. Host organisations request candidates with specific competencies increasingly in operations where there is no funding for the positions within the internal system or there is a delay in the hiring process. The NORCAP team strives to balance between the humanitarian needs and 'gap filling needs' of host organisations which are more financially driven.

### **NORCAP Finding 20: Capacity development of roster members could be more strategic**

Career development of secondees is supported by provision of trainings and support for various modules of studies which depends on the availability of funding. Neither NORCAP nor partner organisations carry out a systematic follow up or training effectiveness. It is unclear if and how the capacity building investment on secondees is yielding results or strengthening the competencies in the roster. Subsequently analysis of the training list provided by NORCAP team suggests that only selected secondees avail or request for training opportunities.

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<sup>101</sup> Human Resources.

## Efficiency

### **NORCAP Finding 21: The recruitment and selection process has become more efficient in recent years**

Overall, NORCAP has no problem in attracting potential candidates. However, in the past 'open recruitment' was practiced where generic advertisements to attract potential candidates to be part of the roster resumes were posted, following which random and untargeted Curriculum Vitae (CVs) were received. 400-500 CV's may have been received at one point where half of the profiles were not in line with the needs at the moment. Screening, shortlisting and sorting out these profiles were time and energy consuming. The introduction of a targeted recruitment process including reference to specific ToR or job descriptions have yielded more appropriate and relevant CV's.

### **NORCAP Finding 22: Recruitment and selection processes miss key steps to ensure quality**

Although the recruitment and selection process has been better streamlined the evaluation finds that there is inadequate quality control of these processes, particularly in view of trends to exaggerate experiences and skills in CV's combined with difficulties to track the career of a mobile workforce such as the secondees. While reference checks are conducted verbally and in writing, the more time consuming formal background check, verification of facts and validation of certificates, degrees, and other vital information stated in the CV is not routinely carried out. No language test is carried out or no request for proof of language ability is sought prior to the interview process conducted in Norway or other locations.<sup>102</sup>

### **NORCAP Finding 23: There are gaps in the practical implementation of safety and security responsibility**

NORCAP provides and expects all secondees to sit for an online basic and advance security training. However, the NRC security manager does not monitor or ensure if the online security training is completed. An emergency phone number that the secondees can call in case of emergency is outsourced to the insurance company. Personal security briefing is provided to those who attend the induction or briefing in Oslo, i.e. mainly Norway based secondees. NRC offers a "hostile environment training" which is limited to those secondees from Norway who have done multiple assignments, for cost reasons. Furthermore, the NORCAP management team does not assume full employer responsibility regarding incident management. Unless it is found by chance by NRC's Security Officer, advisers or when informed by the secondee, there are no formal records of safety and security related incidents or breach of code of conduct incidents by secondees.

The memorandum of understanding between NORCAP and host organisations states that safety and security of secondees is the responsibility of host organisation in the field.<sup>103</sup> However, there is an inadequate preparedness mechanism in NORCAP, with an assumption that the division of responsibility specified in the memorandum of understanding regarding the safety and security of secondees implies that they are in the 'good and efficient hands of the partner organisations'. The online survey and secondees interviewed indicate that this is not always the case. In interviews and comments to the online survey, several secondees state that host organisations are not always aware of the content of, or follow, the MoUs. Not all secondees are provided with security briefing upon arrival and several secondees comment that they feel insecure not having security briefing before departure, especially if they are arriving in a conflict environment. Furthermore, it is not evident that host organisations have systems to ensure 'proof of life questions' or 'next of kin information' or 'specific medical needs' for secondees, whether these are requested and kept. It is unclear if partner organisations will link up with the secondee's family in case of a hostage situation or

<sup>102</sup> In comments to the draft report, NORCAP has pointed out that language is checked when regarded relevant, and for some missions language tests are made. The timing of the checks referred to in the comment is unclear.

<sup>103</sup> As expressed in Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) between NORCAP and its partner organisations.

wether that would be the responsibility of the NORCAP management team. Thus, in practise, there are shortcomings in safety and security responsibility, as NORCAP does not follow up whether host organisations fulfill their obligations.

#### **NORCAP Finding 24: NORCAP's aim to deploy secondees in 72 hours has become less relevant**

NORCAP aims to deploy secondees in 72 hours, this is seen by NORCAP team as a strength of the roster and added advantage of NORCAP. Roster members are obliged to formally sign up for availability in 72 hours. In order to be the preferred partner, NORCAP has to respond quickly and effectively with qualified and available staff.<sup>104</sup> It sounds good to get the right person in the right place in 72 hours, but with increasing rates of deployment of secondees to non-emergency contexts, this speed is in reality rarely warranted and poses restrictions on roster eligibility.

In summary, the NORCAP management team's response rate (initial confirmation of willingness to respond) is very fast, where over 90% of requests in 2011 were responded to within three days. In 59% of the cases, NORCAP responded that they did have a candidate and in an additional 29% the request was referring to an extension. In about 34% of the requests a NORCAP secondee was eventually deployed. However, the sense of urgency is not reciprocated by the partner organisations. The duration it took for deployment ranges from days to weeks and in some instances months. Only 18% of the secondees were deployed within three days. Data is insufficient to analyse reasons for rejection and delay in deployment.<sup>105</sup>

#### **NORCAP Finding 25: Uneven utilisation of the roster members**

Secondments statistics from 2010-2012 provided by the NORCAP team were analysed to determine if secondments include the majority of roster members, or if only part of the members are participating. NORCAP team members informed that the UN sometimes inquires about specific individuals only, sometimes propose their own candidates to NORCAP for funding and are less open to accept "new" secondees. Analysis of statistics of secondments from 2010-2012 is presented below.

Collated data suggests that throughout 2010 – 2012, approximately 463 secondees were deployed for a total of 1,046 deployments, including extensions (each extension is here counted as one secondment). NORCAP thus has many dormant members. The de-rostering process is on-going. At the same time, NORCAP is recruiting new members to supplement the loss of 100 members to the Human Rights Centre. During 2010-2012 approximately 289 new members were accepted to the roster. NORCAP has a detailed three year recruitment plan where it targets to accept approximately 100 new members each year, leading to a roster size of 950 at the end of 2014.

#### **NORCAP Finding 26: The online database has so far failed to increase efficiency to the extent expected**

The online NORCAP database for roster management was launched in May 2011 with effective use starting in January 2012. The intent of the database is to maintain updated roster member data, monitor, track and analyse progresses, deviances and future needs in secondments. However, the final product has not turned out as expected by the NORCAP team members and glitches remained in the database even at the time of evaluation. The process of transferring data from the previous system to the current system, updating profiles and de-rostering process is still on-going at the time of evaluation. As the database is intended to be the foundation for NORCAP, NORCAP team members are still relying on a

<sup>104</sup> Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP), Recruitment Plan of Action (01.07.2011 – 31.12.2014) on Recruitment to NORCAP STANDBY ROSTER; For the Emergency Response Department and Recruitment Section, NRC, Norwegian Capacity Operated by NRC, Norway, 2011.

<sup>105</sup> Based on information in NORCAP's "Sekonderingsloggbook 2011". There were a number of faulty entries in the data, so the figures may not fully represent reality.

manual system to store and retrieve data pertaining to secondments, resulting in duplication of efforts.

### **NORCAP Finding 27: Varying degree of effectiveness with ‘one stop shop’ approach**

The majority of online survey respondents and follow up interviewees value and highly appreciate the support provided by NORCAP advisors. Advisors are expected to be involved and support all the processes ranging from recruitment, selection, briefing, debriefing, deployment, and performance management. Their quality and level of support depends from person to person but is overall considered to be very good. According to some interviews, there was monthly contact and follow-up by the NORCAP team and they would be aware, even if unable to do anything, about possible challenges in the field. On the other hand, there are secondees who felt the contact was limited and there was no follow up especially about future deployments.

## **Synergies between NORCAP and other activities**

This section assesses the existence of synergies between the activities of NRC and those of NORCAP and the value of interaction of personnel dealing with NRC humanitarian programmes and NORCAP activities at the level of the NRC HO. It also assesses the extent to which there is an exchange of information and experience that may be mutually beneficial. Finally it assesses to what extent there is in the field a corresponding exchange of information and experience.

In general the NORCAP management team see NORCAP as largely independent from NRC. NRC is seen by NORCAP management as having two main pillars namely Programme and Rosters and each one of these has its own mandate. NORCAP is working on ‘branding’ to increase its visibility and image. NORCAP produces and disseminates material such as publications, jackets, T-shirts, etc. that carry the logo of NORCAP. In publications, NORCAP logo is the main logo followed by that of NRC and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

### **Finding Synergies: Synergies were found in these areas:**

- ① Secondees, especially new secondees refer to NRC instead of NORCAP; NRC is the ‘employer’ that issues contract of secondees;
- ② NORCAP uses and is linked to NRC’s support services including administration, financial management system, human resources and recruitment systems and there is collaboration within some technical areas, hence, duplication of efforts can be decreased;
- ③ NRC is exiting from Camp Management as a core competency, while NORCAP is absorbing camp management experts into its roster;
- ④ When necessary NORCAP secondees rely on NRC in the field for administrative purposes such as transfer of salary; Some NORCAP secondees have informal contact with NRC in the field. According to the online survey 52% of the respondents communicate with NRC in the field on formal matters while 38% communicate informally.

## Conclusions

In this section, we first provide some overall conclusions regarding relevance, effectiveness and efficiency, and then follow the layout of the findings section to present specific conclusions regarding core competencies and NORCAP.

### Overall Conclusions

#### 1.2.8 Relevance

##### **Overall conclusion 1: NRC interventions were relevant**

Overall, NRC interventions in the three case countries were found to be relevant. They addressed real needs with appropriate goods and services. Where feasible, the organisation took pains to base planning and intervention design on joint assessment and coordinated efforts through the Consolidated Appeals Process and cluster system, complemented by close interaction with local authorities. There were several examples where beneficiary feedback had led to stepwise improvements in programming to adapt to beneficiaries' priorities. While there were multiple examples of interaction between core competencies, potential programming synergies were not fully exploited. The team noted that ICLA and Shelter issues often overlap.

NORCAP secondments were clearly demand driven and highly appreciated by the host organisations. Secondees reported that they felt that they contributed to the Host organisation's goals. NORCAP secondments were therefore found to be relevant in relation to NORCAP's purpose. Their overall relevance to people in humanitarian need depends on the relevance of host organisation programming and has not been assessed in this evaluation.

##### **Overall conclusion 2: In Somalia and Pakistan, NRC had unique access to displaced populations**

Good relations with local authorities or their equivalents gave NRC unique access to displaced populations in Somalia and Pakistan. This was achieved through a mix of conflict awareness, sustained investment in networking and coordination, high profile appointments of national staff and conflict sensitive recruitment.

##### **Overall conclusion 3: NRC contributed to the functioning of the humanitarian sector**

In all three case countries, NRC successfully contributed to improving the functioning of the humanitarian efforts overall. Organisational investments made ranged from active participation in coordination efforts (such as joint assessments and consistent attendance in the cluster system meetings), to piloting intervention methodology (food voucher system in Somalia, mobile phone distribution in Pakistan), to legal development (South Sudan Land Law), capacity building of local authority staff (multiple examples) and hands on coordination (co-lead of clusters, managing the NGO forum in Pakistan).



## 1.2.9 Effectiveness

### **Overall conclusion 4: NRC interventions were mostly effective in achieving output targets**

Overall, NRC interventions in the three case countries were effective in terms of delivering the output (goods and services) specified in project documents, on the time schedule agreed. This was done in very difficult operational environments.

### **Overall conclusion 5: NRC delivered agreed output in ICLA, Shelter, Emergency food and NFI distributions in parallel with rapid expansion**

NRC has implemented a very rapid expansion of its activities in the three case countries in the period evaluated. The organisation has managed to do this under extremely difficult conditions and has, in general, delivered output in ICLA services, Shelter, Emergency Food and NFI distributions on time and with the quality committed to in project proposals.

### **Overall Conclusion 6: NRC documentation lacked data to measure outcomes**

Project proposals and agreements were output oriented and NRC documentation lacked the necessary data to measure outcomes. There were examples of inappropriate design, of delays (affecting timeliness) and of support systems not keeping up with the rate of expansion (affecting quality). In several cases, the evaluation assessed that these shortcomings could have been avoided if there had been more focus on outcome and impact during the planning stage.

### **Overall conclusion 7: Potential welfare was lost due to output and project focus**

We have described NRC's project selection strategy as output focussed and based on opportunities given, rather than following a clear strategy. This entrepreneurial approach, combined with a demonstrated ability to deliver output as contracted, helped the organisation attract donor funding. However, it also led to country programmes that to a high extent were clusters of projects rather than integrated programmes. The country office level absence of programme level strategy, planning documents and follow-up reduced inter-project cohesion and learning. The output focus led to overdependence on quantitative indicators and underinvestment in assessments, baselines, documentation, follow-up and evaluation. Staff felt that if contracts were fulfilled, then they had done their job well. Management prioritised "what" ahead of "why" or "how" in project implementation. Quality suffered and potential welfare gains were lost.

The less successful examples that the evaluation team encountered, such as the food security and livelihoods project in South Sudan, could to a large extent have been avoided if the focus during planning and implementation had been on outcomes rather than outputs. The evaluation team assesses that several of the many projects that delivered the planned outputs, could have been even more successful had the focus on outcomes been stronger.

### **Overall Conclusion 8: Monitoring and evaluation functions are very basic and although improving need further expansion**

NRC is belatedly investing in establishing monitoring and evaluation functions in Oslo and in its country offices. The functions established to date are very basic and concentrating on getting output focused reporting functioning. Nevertheless, they are affecting the offices to which they belong, for example by centralising data processing in Pakistan, and innovating, for example by introducing mobile phone based data collection in Somalia. With greater monitoring and evaluation capacity, NRC staff will be able to get better feedback on results

which will contribute to learning concerning outcomes, thereby improving effectiveness. Continued expansion and integration of such capacities is crucial to maintaining quality and accountability in the future.

### **1.2.10 Efficiency**

#### **Overall conclusion 9: NRC interventions were efficient in Somalia and Pakistan**

Operations in the areas where NRC is active require logistics and security systems that are inherently expensive. In Pakistan and Somalia, NRC had the scale of operations, the procurement and financial systems in place to maintain reasonable efficiency under given conditions. There was cost awareness in the organisation but managers were not trained to utilise the information generated by the financial system for cost follow-up.

#### **Overall conclusion 10: In South Sudan support systems could not cope with the rapid expansion, NRC HO response to the situation was slow and efficiency was negatively affected**

Support systems in South Sudan could not keep up with the rate of expansion. This was allowed to persist to the extent that project implementation, especially efficiency, was negatively affected. At the time of the evaluation, amelioration efforts had been initiated but had yet to take full effect. NRC Head Office's relatively slow response to the Country Office's problems raises systemic concerns regarding whether NRC's ambition to decentralise real operational mandates is appropriately balanced with support and control functions.

#### **Overall conclusion 11: NRC systematically invested in staff development, improving effectiveness, efficiency, recruitment and retention**

Staff were highly appreciative of NRC's willingness to invest in staff development and empowerment. There were numerous examples of staff stating that they had applied for work with, or stayed on with, the NRC due to the organisation's personnel policies, commitment to staff involvement and attitude towards staff in issues related to fairness, gender, sanctions etc. Salaries, on the other hand, were regarded as fair more than generous.

#### **Overall conclusion 12: NRC's core competencies built identity and trust yet lacked definition**

Many stakeholders appreciated NRC's clarity regarding what types of activities they do and do not implement, citing the core competencies. The organisation's willingness to refuse funding offers when these were outside the core competencies were referred to as building trust. Meanwhile, while the activities included in the core competencies were clear, neither staff nor management could define what characterises a core competency. When asked, they did not refer to common standards such as minimum support structures, skills or similar that would make the organisation more effective or efficient at implementing projects within core competencies. Similarly, staff were not clear as to what taking up WASH as a core competency implied in practice.

#### **Overall conclusion 13: NRC has a strong financial support system in place, but there are some shortcomings on the human resources side of the system**

NRC has a strong financial support system in place. The Financial Handbook creates a solid foundation and the organisational structure with HO Controllers having both a support function to the country offices' finance staff, as well as an internal audit function. This is assessed as an intelligent design. However, structures, templates and policies have limited value unless compliance to policies and procedures are ensured and sufficient time is allocated to perform the duties in question. We note that systems have been under significant pressure due to rapid expansion.

## **Overall conclusion 14: Financial analysis is an area for improvement**

The financial focus of project monitoring lies on quantitative over- and under- spending rather than on qualitative “budget vs. actual analysis”, i.e. on analysing the reasons for discrepancies between budget and reality. The learning potential of proper budgeting and budget follow up procedures (e.g. understanding of cost structures) is therefore largely lost. The approach is oriented towards outputs and donor reporting rather than to internal learning and programme quality development.

## **Specific Conclusions**

### **ICLA Conclusion: ICLA is relevant to both beneficiaries and other stakeholders**

ICLA is a very relevant programme that is addressing important needs in conflict and post-conflict contexts. ICLA often fills a niche and is usually highly appreciated by donors, partners and other stakeholders. ICLA helps NRC to be recognised as an important actor. Part of the reason for this is the ability of the programme to have an impact on multiple levels (national, regional, local), within multiple themes (coordination, advocacy, legal development, practical advisory services etc.). This flexibility leads to highly contextualised, at times even individualised according to staff competencies, programme design. ICLA is especially relevant as as NRC is commonly the only provider of this service.

### **EFSD Conclusion 1: NRC's comparative advantage lies primarily in distribution of food and NFIs**

NRC has repeatedly proven itself competent in designing and managing distribution programmes or projects involving both food and non-food items. In this technical field, it has also proven itself able to innovate and adapt. Refer for example the inclusion of mobile phones in NFI kits in Pakistan and the design of the food voucher programme in South Central Somalia. Meanwhile, the organisation's experience with food security and livelihoods is limited and has produced mixed results, as in South Sudan.

### **EFSD Conclusion 2: The use of cash and food vouchers is a good alternative to general distribution, but certain criteria must be fulfilled**

In Somalia, NRC's approach of working through local suppliers and alongside local non-governmental organisations to secure access to communities was found to be particularly relevant. The use of food vouchers was also relevant, achieving greater dignity for beneficiaries and allowing them the choice of how to combine timing and quantity of distribution. In Côte d'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo, NRC's use of cash and food vouchers as an alternative to general distribution has also been successful. The methodologies require materially different skill profiles for staff, careful analysis of both financial and food market conditions and generate security issues which need to be managed. Financial and administrative support systems were periodically placed under significant strain.

### **Shelter Conclusion 1: NRC's shelter programmes were found to be relevant, effective and efficient, and showed examples of attention to sustainability**

Shelter is one of the largest and most consistently successful programmes of NRC. The team has seen several examples of adaptation to beneficiaries' priorities and durable solutions.

### **Shelter Conclusion 2: Shelter programs carry a large part of support costs**

Shelter programs are often crucial in order to fund support systems, such as local and regional offices. Key informants among staff recognised that a country programme without capital intensive projects, such as Shelter, would not be feasible in terms of covering support costs.

#### **WASH Conclusion 1: NRC has begun to address WASH needs but has limited WASH capacity**

NRC has taken up WASH activities under other programmes, such as shelter, when no other organisation has been able or willing to take up such activities. The organisation's success in implementing WASH projects has been varied. The team assesses that WASH activities could have been more relevant and effective with better preparations and adaptation to local conditions.

#### **WASH Conclusion 2: It is unclear to staff what will be the implication of making WASH a core competency**

WASH has recently been introduced as a new core competency. However, it was unclear to staff what would be the practical implications of this, and so far, there is relatively little competence on WASH within the organisation.

#### **Cross-Cutting Issues Conclusion: NRC is aware of cross-cutting issues. Overall, gender and corruption issues are well considered in project implementation.**

NRC staff is well aware of gender dimensions of programming. Quality control is not always sufficient to address gender issues, at times due to contextual limitations. Systems to address corruption risks are well developed. There are attempts to address environmental and disability issues but these are ad hoc and inadequate.

## **Conclusions regarding NORCAP**

#### **NORCAP Conclusion 1: Secondees' sense of purpose and usefulness is high but could be further increased**

The secondees' sense of purpose and usefulness is generally high. By improving some aspects relating to seconding and work environment, this could probably be further increased and their skills could be better utilised.

#### **NORCAP Conclusion 2: There is high satisfaction with the performance of secondees, but this is not documented**

Overall, interviews indicate that the NORCAP team and the host organisations are highly satisfied with the professional performance of secondees. There are various performance management tools that should present sufficient data and evidences to measure professional performance of secondees. However these are not fully linked and utilised, hence there is no documentation to support or illustrate this satisfaction.

#### **NORCAP Conclusion 3: NORCAP has several comparative advantages to other rosters**

The strengths and opportunities of NORCAP suggest it has several comparative advantages to other rosters, including secure funding, established systems, procedures and reputation, rapid decision-making processes and mostly appreciative secondees. If the weaknesses and threats are managed and minimised, NORCAP will remain as one of the largest and most efficient rosters.

#### **NORCAP Conclusion 4: NORCAP's broadening scope and long-term secondments**

### **create expectations among secondees that NORCAP need to relate to**

Increased commitment towards NORCAP inherently will increase the expectations towards NORCAP as an employer. Non-Norwegian secondees expect terms and conditions (pension, sick leave payment, family posting, per diem, etc.) and capacity development opportunities at par with Norwegian secondees. To what extent NORCAP is aware of these changing expectations and is ready and willing to meet or manage these expectations remains to be seen. This may lead to mismatched expectations if not managed.

### **NORCAP Conclusion 5: The cost-sharing debate is not simply about the UN taking advantage of a free service but rather inherently against the original purpose of the standby partnership agreements**

In order to ensure that abuse of the in-kind system is minimised and cost-sharing is applied when appropriate, clear criteria should be developed by NORCAP in collaboration with the MFA as to when cost-sharing should be requested. The issue is not merely related to cost but also to organisational impact on UN agencies of having access to a resource such as NORCAP.<sup>106</sup>

### **NORCAP Conclusion 6: Further investment in resources and quality control mechanisms is required to maintain and increase efficiency, improve quality and reduce future risks**

It will be a challenge to maintain and increase efficiency with the existing size of the NORCAP management team and the gaps in the systems coupled with the ambitious targets on response time and bigger roster size. Until and unless further resources are dedicated in terms of staff, formalisation and systematisation, efficiency levels may remain stagnant or be compromised.

The shortcomings in quality control mechanism and practices, such as insufficient documentation, not following up on MoUs, inadequate security routines and reliance on financial support system for updated information on secondments etc., may not have been a problem when the roster was smaller, but with an expanding and more internationalised roster, the risks are higher. A stronger quality control mechanism will help to continuously improve quality, reduce future risks and assure higher return on investment.

Another area for improved quality control is the 'one-stop-shop' approach. Letting the secondees have the same NORCAP contact person for all types of inquiries contributes to strengthening the rapport and building trust between secondees and advisors. However, it is already a challenge for the advisors to pay 'equal attention' to all secondees and pay 'equal attention' to all the different functions expected of them. Unless NORCAP finds a way to ensure quality of this approach, it will affect the quality of NORCAP response.

### **NORCAP Conclusion 7: The secondees' safety and security is compromised as the transfer of safety and security responsibility to host organisations is not followed up**

Given that some secondees work in highly volatile and insecure environment, the transfer of responsibility for safety and security measures without ensuring that this is carried out in practice by the host organisation compromises the safety and security of secondees. As NORCAP is the legal employer of the secondees, this also increases the risk and liability of NORCAP.

### **NORCAP Conclusion 8: NORCAP is highly relevant but needs to formalise, systematise and stay focussed in order to maintain relevance**

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<sup>106</sup> In comments to the report NORCAP rejects cost sharing as not compatible with their mandate. If this is the case, based on key informant comments that secondees are being used to stop-gap and to compensate for bad planning and/or cumbersome recruitment in UN agencies, the NORCAP mandate risks delaying UN reform. NORCAP should discuss such potential side effects with the NMFA.

The fast pace of secondment management and increased scope has made some of the practices and processes initially designed for a much smaller organisation insufficient. A risk is that NORCAP becomes a victim of its own success, as the host organisations take full advantage of "free" expertise for extended periods. As NORCAP is expanding in scope and mandate, lack of formalisation and systematisation may lead to more exceptions than rules. Key informants mention being recruited by name, not by function, or being contacted individually before NORCAP is contacted. Roster statistics show very uneven utilisation of members. Over time this may risk NORCAP being perceived as a roster that lacks transparency in managing its secondees.

Similarly, the purpose of NORCAP may be diluted if the focus, as alleged by some key informants, is shifting towards "gap-filling" to keep the UN rolling rather than to enhance the capacity of the international community to prevent and to respond to on-going and future humanitarian challenges. Such risks may be accentuated by otherwise healthy competition as NORCAP may focus on being the fastest and biggest roster, instead of focusing on enhancing capacity of the international community. Focus on volume and speed of deployment goals indicates that this risk may become a reality.

## **Recommendations**

The Terms of Reference of the evaluation specifies that the team shall provide general recommendations and in addition specific recommendations for each core competence. As the evaluation team has not encountered any camp management activities we cannot make any recommendations regarding this core competency. Furthermore, several of the most important findings and conclusions are common for all core competencies, thus several recommendations are valid for all core competencies. We do, however, differentiate between recommendations regarding NRC's humanitarian activities and the activities of NORCAP. We also differentiate between general recommendations, which will take longer to implement, and specific recommendations, that can be implemented within 18 months.

## **Recommendations regarding NRC core competencies**

### **1.2.11 Recommendations towards increased relevance**

#### **Recommendation 1: NRC should maintain its positive attitude towards external coordination**

To remain as a highly relevant player on the international humanitarian aid arena, NRC should continue to invest in active participation in overall coordination efforts, such as playing an active role in the cluster system, innovating, investing in research and lobbying on broader issues affecting refugees and participating actively in joint assessments feeding the Consolidated Appeals Process. NRC already does these things, is appreciated for it and should continue to do so. Meanwhile, NRC should strive to make its donors recognise that this has resource implications.

### **1.2.12 Recommendations towards increased effectiveness**

#### **Recommendation 2 (General and Specific): NRC should expand focus beyond Project**

### **outputs towards Programme outcomes (valid for all core competencies)**

**General Recommendation:** NRC should maintain its ability to deliver materials and services on time and to agreed specifications. Never the less, the organisation would raise quality and affect its beneficiaries more positively if it were to redesign systems with a focus on outcomes, rather than activity outputs. This would require new skills in assessment, planning, budgeting, design, implementation, documentation, monitoring, reporting and evaluation. In short a comprehensive reorientation of organisational culture from fulfilling quantitative goals to understanding the needs of target groups and the drivers for and against change oriented to address such needs.

We are aware of the scale of such a change and do not give this recommendation lightly. However, we believe the NRC staff and systems are fulfilling most of the standards of planning, budgeting and reporting that an output focused organisation needs to attain. We also believe that systems, staff professionalism and donor support are sufficient to make such a reorientation to focus on outcomes possible. The potential increase in learning and subsequently in quality and results would be profound.

**Specific recommendation:** NRC should, during the next twelve months (in time for use in planning for 2015) revise its standardised Logframes to include realistic and measurable outcome targets and indicators for these.

### **Recommendation 3 (Specific): NRC should continue strengthening the systems for Monitoring and Evaluation in order to be able to show documented evidence of achievements**

The Monitoring and Evaluation function needs to develop ways to collect baseline data and to link baseline data to monitoring reports for 'before' and 'after' comparisons of progress tracking. NRC has developed - and continues to refine - useful monitoring tools such as post-distribution monitoring surveys, Knowledge, Attitude and Practice surveys (KAPs) and random spot-checks. However, only when such tools are linked to baseline evidence of intervention rationale, further developed and put to systematic use, will the organisation be able to provide evidence of project effectiveness and build on lessons learned.

NMFA, Norad and Sida (jointly representing a large proportion of NRC funding) regularly strongly emphasise results based management and there is a trend among donors towards focussing on outcomes rather than outputs. The evaluation team assesses that in order to maintain its position on the humanitarian aid arena, NRC has to develop its capacity to show documented results, especially outcomes. NRC is seeking to use the results based management methodology, which is commendable. However, measuring outcomes requires a base value or comparison group. The difficulties with implementing and funding baseline studies in humanitarian operations require a more flexible approach by which staff gathers the best quality of data in the circumstances.

The monitoring and evaluation functions should develop methods for collecting baseline data and linking it to monitoring reports within the next twelve months and such systems should be in use before the end of 2014.

### **Recommendation 4 (General): NRC should maintain and selectively expand its capacity to deliver output by investing in support systems**

NRC is constantly faced with the strategic choice of adjusting its scale of operations to needs and capacity. The organisation has expanded rapidly over the past few years, both overall and in the three case countries, and further expansion would imply increasing support costs. Despite cost implications, NRC should continue to invest in support systems. Selected expansion should be considered both to address unmet needs and to achieve further economies of scale. If such expansion is undertaken attention to maintaining balance between operational and support systems is crucial.

### **Recommendation 5 (General): NRC should continue its strategy towards a high level of national staff empowerment and development**

NRC's national staff is key to the organisation's ability to produce results. The organisational roles and responsibilities given to national staff in recognition of their capacity and professionalism should continue to be expanded. Continued investments in staff empowerment and development are recommended. In order to further enhance staff commitment and capture field experience, NRC should consider national staff representation on the board.

#### **1.2.13 Recommendations towards increased efficiency**

### **Recommendation 6 (Specific): NRC should develop clear criteria for what constitutes a core competency and then prioritise core competencies into different categories**

The evaluation team has noted that beyond content, it is not clearly defined what constitutes a core competency. We believe that such definition would improve programming and increase efficiency by clarifying what is required and what can be expected if a core competency activity is to be implemented. Head office support, access to support systems in terms of expertise, local administration, logistics, minimum staffing, etc. are areas that could be included in the definition. Clear definitions of what constitutes a core competency should be developed before the end of 2014.

In order to further increase efficiency and contribute to organisational learning NRC should during the year 2014 review its core competencies and prioritise them according to organisational ambition level:

**Global lead competencies** should imply that the NRC has, and intends to maintain, both theoretical and practical global lead in a particular area. This would involve investing in research, disseminating best practice and actively contributing to both innovation and maintaining quality of implementation in a particular field. All NRC projects in such an area would strive for excellence. Management and support systems would need to be dimensioned for that purpose. ICLA would be a candidate for such a role.

**Preferred supplier competencies** should imply that NRC has, and intends to maintain, good to excellent implementation capacity in a particular area. This would involve investing in management and support systems capable of keeping up with (but not leading) developments in the field and implementing projects in line with agreed standards and best practice. This could also entail maintaining surge capacity and actively seeking locally adapted and cost efficient solutions. All NRC projects in such an area would strive for on time delivery of contracted output, according to quality standards agreed with funding partners. Management and support systems would need to be dimensioned for that purpose. Shelter and Distribution activities would be candidates for such a role.

**Pilot competencies** would imply that NRC intends to develop organisationally and practically in an area. In such fields the organisation would actively seek to partner with more experienced organisations, be willing to run smaller pilot projects and invest in systematic documentation for learning. Food Security and Livelihoods, WASH and Urban issues might currently be candidates for pilot status.

For example, NRC could, by budget 2014, select two settlements where the organisation is running shelter projects for a pilot project. Such a project would focus on partnering for urban planning. NRC's ICLA, camp management, shelter and WASH experience would be combined with partnering skills and capacity building expertise to explore durable solutions for displaced people in urban settings.

### **Recommendation 7 (Specific): NRC should introduce further checks and balances to**



### **ensure that support systems keep up in periods of rapid expansion**

The fact that support systems in South Sudan did not keep up with the expansion of activities is troubling. Even more serious is the NRC HO lack of rapid response. A series of unfortunate events led up to the situation yet none of these triggered organisational alarm bells in time. NRC should, as soon as possible, review and revise its organisational "early warning systems" for capturing similar events in the future. As part of such a system, NRC should consider creating a deputy Secretary General level position focused on "Support, Quality and Follow-up".

## **1.2.14 Recommendations regarding specific core competencies**

### **Shelter and ICLA Recommendation (Specific): NRC should build comparative advantage through joint ICLA - Shelter projects**

In practice, ICLA and Shelter have multiple interconnections which field staff is addressing for the benefit of displaced people (see Core Competencies Finding 1 and Overall Conclusion 1). NRC should by 2014 prepare at least two project proposals for selected donors where these interconnections are highlighted, supported with outcome indicators.

### **ICLA Recommendation 1 (Specific): NRC should clarify country level programme ambitions**

Overall, ICLA's policy is clear in its approach and scope. However, as is evident from findings relating to ICLA, the national ICLA programmes are highly contextualised, leading to variations in content and scope. The need to re-focus national programmes has been identified some years ago and efforts are underway to maintain ICLA's policy focus on conflict related legal needs.

### **ICLA Recommendation 2 (Specific): NRC should highlight comparative advantages of multi-level support**

ICLA staff invests significant time in support of advocacy, legal development and overall coordination (co-leading clusters etc.). NRC should highlight the resource implications of this further in their communication with donors. Annual reporting should, from 2014, include assessments of how many person days are invested in such activities as well as a discussion of how this supports displaced people.

### **EFSD Recommendation 1 (Specific): NRC should evaluate its mobile phone distribution activity to create a knowledge base for possible replication**

This evaluation has identified the distribution of mobile phones in Pakistan as a successful component of that programme. At the same time, it is a new component of NFI distributions, at least to NRC. NRC should therefore, by the end of 2014, separately evaluate the outcomes of that intervention choice to document experiences and the potential for replication and linking to other programming.

### **EFSD Recommendation 2 (Specific): NRC should document and refine its food voucher programming**

This evaluation has identified food voucher based distribution in South Somalia as a successful component of that programme. DRC and Côte d'Ivoire projects based on food vouchers and cash distributions have also shown potential. NRC should, by mid 2014, do a desk based assessment of these interventions, documenting experience to date. Using that material as point of departure, NRC should initiate, or participate actively in on-going, discussions to develop guidelines and standards for such programming.

### **EFSD Recommendation 3 (Specific): NRC should avoid direct implementation of food security and livelihood projects<sup>107</sup>**

NRC implements three types of EFSD projects: Emergency food distribution, distribution of non-food items and activities aiming at increasing food security. Food security, or Food security and livelihood, programming is highly context specific and requires a completely different set of professional skills than that which NRC has built up over the years.<sup>108</sup> The experience from the food security and livelihood project in South Sudan included distribution of inappropriate seed, lack of timing in relation to seasons and livelihoods projects where youth trained were not able to exploit markets. These are examples illustrating that food security and livelihoods programming requires specialised skills. The skills needed are as complex as any of the core competencies of NRC. Currently NRC has not developed the support structures for such programming, there is, for example, no NRC HO advisor for this type of programming. Given the challenges the organisation already faces we recommend that NRC adopts a strategy where the organisation's involvement in such projects is based on qualified implementing partners, not independent NRC implementation.

### **Cross-Cutting Issues Recommendation (Specific): Monitoring and evaluations should include follow-up of especially vulnerable individuals**

We have found that most interventions deliver standardised commodities and services according to project agreements. The needs of especially vulnerable individuals are non-standardised and at times not met. Follow-up of especially vulnerable individuals should therefore be a focus of the monitoring and evaluation systems that are being established (as suggested above). This will allow NRC to improve quality of targeting and address the specific needs of such individuals.

### **Specific Accountability Recommendation: NRC should clarify its ambition level for information sharing with partners, local authorities and beneficiaries**

Budgets and budget implications of partner contributions to activities are not shared with those involved. The value of in kind contributions should be estimated and included in budgeting and reporting. This may be sensitive as costs for staff, security and logistics may be discussed if known to target populations. Sharing such data will have implications for empowerment and accountability and may lead to displaced individuals demanding a greater say in how resources are utilised. NRC should clarify its ambition level in this regard. We recommend greater openness combined with a preparedness for strong reactions.

## **Recommendations relating to WASH as a core competence**

The recommendations in this section are not based on findings and conclusions in the same way as other recommendations, as they are based mainly on an assessment of what is required as WASH is becoming a core competency. We have therefore chosen to present recommendations in text rather than as one-sentence statements, as prescribed by the ToR. The recommendations that are presented should however not be seen as less "formal" than other recommendations. We have highlighted, in the text, key components of our recommendations.

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<sup>107</sup> We here refer only to the aspects of Food Security and Livelihoods that NRC is not experienced with. We have elsewhere noted that NRC successfully implements voucher programming. We regard this as primarily food distribution – not the food security and livelihoods interventions we refer to here.

<sup>108</sup> For an indication of the complexities involved see for example: Hedlund et.al. 2011 or Jaspers and Maxwell 2009.

As a key strategic entry point to establish a respect in WASH as a core competence, it is advised that **ambition levels should be based on a “Good Enough” principle** as opposed to seeking excellence and frontline innovation. NRC is recognised as a delivery-focused organisation and as such performance should pay higher respect to delivery needs in quantity rather than dwell over details in the margin. Such an approach will allow for adequate attention be paid to a broad group with potentially special needs related to cross cutting issues rather than risk achieving larger goals in favour of testing new techniques.

NRC is currently undergoing profound structural changes, similar to many other organisations. It is advisable that the establishment of the core competency of WASH be aligned with the over-all ambitions of NRC and pursued in close reference to changes that are also pursued in other sectors and departments. This includes:

- ⌚ **Utilise theories of change to map and establish clear linkages to other core competencies**, such as education and shelter. Then design management structures to ensure complementarity and effectiveness of service delivery.
- ⌚ **Establishing strong coordination mechanisms between core competencies** in the field in order to ensure an effective delivery of services including attention to cross-cutting issues.

As the new core competency is developed, the delivery strategy should be based on **clear minimum standards** for services delivered and linkages to the other sectors where NRC is active.

From a human resource point of view, it is suggested that **skill-set qualifications for WASH staff should be defined**, and career opportunities be elaborated on for national and international staff.

While the concept paper related to the WASH as a core competency outlines WASH relevant topics to be pursued, **a clear set of indicators needs to be developed** for each area of WASH activities **with appropriate monitoring to assess achievement against goals**.

As a core competency level is pursued, it will be expected by peers that NRC will excel in this field by demonstrating to others how high performance shall be pursued. **The NRC WASH strategy should stress that a high level of quality performance is expected** together with a broad understanding of linkages of WASH to other sectors such as i) environmental health and protection, ii) ecological services and sustainable resource utilisation, iii) violence prevention and protection aspects, iv) crosscutting issues such as gender, age groups, people with disabilities etc.

Where feasible, **the strategic approach for engaging in WASH in a particular setting should, be based on an assessment of “best placed actor”** as opposed to “only actor” or “by default”.

**A roster of recruitment for various sub-sectors in WASH should be established**, in particular for international staff, which focuses on recruiting experts in respective technical fields. Persons in the roster should then undergo induction training during which **minimum NRC WASH intervention standards should be clearly defined**. This will enable for a better track-record within a sector and across geographical interventions, and thus enhance staff exchanges and gap-filling between outgoing and incoming staff.

As part of the training in “minimum standards” among staff in general, including WASH, it is recommended that a greater **use of participatory approaches** – including discerning needs and designing solutions with beneficiaries – be promoted.

Also, during global workshops, it is suggested to **put integration/harmonisation issues on the agenda** in order to generate consensus on how WASH interacts with EFSD, ICLA, Shelter and Education.

## **NORCAP Recommendations**

### **NORCAP Recommendation 1: NORCAP should develop a strategic approach to secondees' capacity development**

To remain relevant and to ensure that secondees maintain their sense of purpose and usefulness, a strategic approach to capacity development of secondees' in the roster should be developed in order to fulfil the changing requirements, international needs and context. Such a strategic approach should take e.g. costs of training into consideration. The new online database should assist in streamlining the capacity building efforts thus undertaken for the secondees, either through NORCAP, partner organisations or secondees' own efforts.

### **NORCAP Recommendation 2: NORCAP should consider providing specific briefing in addition to induction training**

Specific briefing on the country context and the culture of the host organisation would prepare the secondees better for their deployment and shorten the time it takes before they become operational. If possible, secondees should be linked with host organisations well before deployment to create contact and connection. Skype discussion with the potential supervisor on the ToR may assist for both parties to articulate and clarify expectations. NORCAP should develop a plan for this by mid 2014, and implement it from December 2014.

### **NORCAP Recommendation 3: The required speed of deployment should be adjusted to the nature of deployments and communicated to secondees**

Deployments should be identified according to their nature, and effort and sense of urgency should be distributed accordingly to minimise frustration by requesting secondees to be ready to deploy in 72 hours when this is in reality not going to happen due to other processes taking longer time. Partner organisations should be given a deadline for response; this deadline could be the same as the one given to NORCAP in terms of number of days to respond to request.

### **NORCAP Recommendation 4: Strengthen and formalise the process for extensions and continuity**

It is not uncommon for secondments to be extended, or for consecutive secondments to the same position. In order to ensure that such extensions are within the mandate of NORCAP, NORCAP should pay more attention to the continuity of secondment positions, especially in cases where extensions are requested and in cases where several secondees are successively provided for the same position. NORCAP and host organisations should discuss exit strategies and continuity of the position or the work done by secondees. A formal mechanism to receive the secondee's justification for the extension should be included in the extension process. These justifications should be reviewed by the team in Oslo, following which a decision can be taken about the extension.

### **NORCAP Recommendation 5: The relative strengths of NORCAP should be enforced by ensuring that secondees are used in accordance with NORCAP's mandate**

Secondments to core functions within the UN should be carefully assessed for their longer term benefit prior to deployment. Clear criteria should be developed to deploy secondees in core functions, such as cluster coordinators, in protracted emergencies where the need is more long term and more predictable in terms of recruitment. NORCAP should identify different types of secondments such as: emergency, non-emergency, civilian observations and protracted emergencies. This will allow NORCAP to better monitor the trends, needs and the changing context. It will also assist in matching the assignment type and NORCAP's mandates.

In order to ensure that abuse of the in-kind system is minimised and cost-sharing is applied when appropriate, clear criteria have to be developed by NORCAP in collaboration with the

NMFA as to when cost-sharing should be requested and when, for example, a request for a fully paid extension is valid. This should be done by the end of 2014. In cases of extensions, host organisations should be asked to make more effort to absorb costs. This would also help fill positions based on felt and real needs while increasing the host organisation's level of commitment and ownership towards NORCAP secondees.

#### **NORCAP Recommendation 6: NORCAP should establish complaints response mechanisms**

NORCAP should set up an independent and confidential 'access point' for secondees to raise concerns easily and freely. It may be in a form of an electronic complaints mechanism using the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) principles, which requires a response (unlike a feedback mechanism which does not necessarily warrant feedback). The complaints response mechanism should be made accessible to secondees as well as host organisations by the end of 2014.

#### **NORCAP Recommendation 7: Unsatisfactory professional performance should be referred to a panel for review and further decision**

If feedback on poor performance is received on a secondee it is recommended that the poor performance is reviewed by a panel. The panel could review the recruitment and selection process of the said individual leading to deployment and his/her performance. NORCAP team should effectively use all the existing mechanisms and tools for performance appraisal to formulate a holistic performance assessment of a secondee.

#### **NORCAP Recommendation 8: Ensure legal compliance in relation to secondees**

All key documents that have legal implications must be periodically reviewed for legal compliance that applies to the secondees. For the Norwegian secondees, Norwegian labour law applies whereas for the non-Norwegian secondees standards used in the International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal (<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/tribunal/>) may be used as reference. A system for regular review of legal documents should be up and running by end-2014.

#### **NORCAP Recommendation 9: NORCAP should strengthen mechanisms for ensuring that strategies, policies, rules and regulations are followed, especially when related to managing risk**

In order to ensure that NORCAP's mandates and targets are on track and achieved, and to maintain and benefit from the positive image it has, the internal quality control mechanisms need to be strengthened. As mentioned above, NORCAP has developed several tools but these are not fully used (examples are insufficient documentation, MoUs not followed-up, inadequate security routines). The senior management of NORCAP should promote a more quality control conscious environment and ensure each team member understands his/her role in the control functions. The online database system should be effectively used to assist in monitoring quality of services provided by the NORCAP team and the quality of service delivery by secondees.<sup>109</sup>

Changing international contexts, especially threats of safety and security of aid workers require a systematic, thorough and strategic approach to managing risk. The present memorandums of understanding (MoU) between NORCAP and host organisations should be reviewed and if needed clarified. NORCAP must ensure that the agreement is followed and if not, NORCAP needs to take own efforts to compensate for this, by e.g. providing locality-specific security briefings to secondees that do not receive them from their host organisations. All breach and/or incidents of safety and security must be recorded and reported accordingly, by who so ever the responsibility lies in. This is of special urgency, and should be attended to before the end of 2013.

<sup>109</sup> In comments to the draft report NORCAP has noted that as of March 2013, an online database is being used to monitor secondee's achievements.

# Annexes

## Annex 1: Definitions, data and survey instruments

### Annex 1a: Data Collection Sources and Methods

Method	Source	Nature of Source	Reason for selection
Document review	Documents from internet research	General policy papers, humanitarian evaluations, humanitarian issues	To verify the general and sectorial conditions in case countries according to reports and issues papers (funding appeals, previous interventions and methodologies). To learn from humanitarian evaluations concerning case countries or specific issues (e.g. Gender, ICLA) providing insights for questions needing to be asked.
	Documents from NRC Oslo	Policy papers, handbooks, guidance notes, country strategies and programmes, logframes, project reports etc.	To assess the tools that guide staff in their activities and triangulate the degree of their usefulness
	Documents from NRC Country Offices	As above	Detailed review of project proposals, reports, logframes etc. to assess and triangulate in stakeholder interviews
Individual interviews	NRC staff at HO	Individual staff interviews	To learn how NRC works: programming, project design, procurement, monitoring and evaluation, admin, human resources, interaction with staff in country offices; to triangulate
	NRC staff in Regional, Country and Field Offices	Individual staff interviews: project managers, admin, finance/ procurement, human resources, monitoring and evaluation	To learn how NRC works at field office level as above, plus relations/interaction with RO Nairobi and capacity-building; triangulate HO/regional perspectives
	External partners	Senior representatives of UN agencies and local authorities	To assess NRC's coordination, contribution to Clusters, information-sharing, pro-activity (e.g. WASH, returns, durable solutions), cooperation, and for triangulation
	Beneficiaries	Committee members and individual beneficiaries	To triangulate; assess results, levels of satisfaction, capacity-building
	NORCAP Secondees	Individual interviews in person and via Skype	To learn about secondees' perceptions, tasks, secondments
	Host organisations	Individual interviews in person and via Skype	To learn about host organisations' views on secondments and secondees
Group Interviews/	Implementing Partners	Representatives of Implementing Partners	What they did, how they did it, interaction with NRC and capacity-building

Focus group discussions	Community leaders	Beneficiary representatives	To triangulate, assess satisfaction results, feedback, training
	Beneficiaries	Beneficiaries in different projects	To triangulate, assess results, satisfaction, capacity-building
	NORCAP Secondees	Group interview with returning secondees	To learn about secondees' perceptions, tasks, secondments
Online Survey	NORCAP Secondees	Persons seconded by NORCAP during 2010 – 12	To learn about secondees' perceptions, tasks, secondments
PETS Surveys	Field staff and Beneficiaries	Survey to sample of beneficiaries and to staff	To collect info for PETS
Observations	Visits to project sites	To verify physical components of outputs.	To triangulate information collected from other sources – but time was too short to do this comprehensively
Data sharing and joint analysis sessions	NRC staff	NRC staff at different locations and levels	To triangulate data collected at respective organisational unit and discuss findings. To contribute to learning
Participation at regional meeting	NRC Staff	NRC Staff from Horn of Africa Region	To contribute to learning

## Annex 1b: About the Evaluation Questions Matrix

The evaluation Questions Matrix is an Excel document covering ten Excel worksheets, one for each specific main area of the evaluation. It contains evaluation questions, broken down into separate, "one-question" statements or questions. For each such statement or question, one or several questions and methods are listed, to serve as a "smorgasbord" to the consultants. Different questions were developed to adapt to different stakeholder groups, countries and levels of analysis. In total, the document covers a large number of pages (approx. 60, depending on size of font). The team will share the evaluation questions matrix in electronic version with interested readers on demand.



## Annex 1c: NORCAP Key Results Areas and Indicators

(Developed with reference to Sphere and HAP standards and input from NRC)

### NORCAP'S MANDATE

<p>Enhance the capacity of the international community to prevent &amp; to respond to on-going &amp; future humanitarian challenges</p>	<p>Support efforts to ensure that international operations are carried out without consideration to religion, race, nationality &amp; political persuasion</p>	<p>Support international capacity, &amp; in particular the UN, in all stages of crises; from prevention/early warning &amp; response, to monitoring, reconstruction, conflict resolution, sustainable development &amp; democratic governance</p>	<p>Ensure that people in emergencies receive protection &amp; assistance according to their needs &amp; rights, with particular emphasis on the protection of civilians &amp; the implementation of relevant Security Council Resolutions</p>		
<b>Standard 1</b>	seconded personnel (SP) to have the knowledge, skills, behaviours & attitudes to plan & implement an effective humanitarian response with humanity & respect.				
<b>KEY ACTIONS</b>	Provide SP with adequate training, familiarity with relevant key policies & the resources to manage their tasks effectively	Establish systematic, fair & transparent recruitment & selection procedures to attract maximum number of (how many) appropriate candidates	Hire SP with a balance of women & men (ratio?), ethnicity, age & social background so that the SP's diversity is appropriate to the required context & culture & needs.	Provide SP with adequate & timely inductions, briefings, clear reporting lines & updated Job descriptions/ToR to enable them to understand their responsibilities, work objectives, organisational values, key policies, system & country context.	Ensure SP have access to medical care & psychosocial support
	Establish codes of personal conduct for SP that protect disaster-affected people from sexual abuse, corruption, exploitation & other protection issues.	Promote a culture of respect towards the disaster-affected population	Establish grievance procedures & take appropriate disciplinary actions against SP following confirmed violation of the agency's Code of Conduct	Carry out regular appraisals or performance review & provide feedback in relation to work objectives, knowledge, skills, behaviour & attitudes	Enable SP & NORCAP management to jointly identify opportunities for continued learning & development
<b>KEY INDICATORS</b>	Updated ToRs/partner agreements, recruitment & briefing & debriefing procedures, code of conducts, contracts; etc	NRC has clearly defined & documented knowledge, skills, behaviours & attitudes that SP needs to meet NORCAP's commitments	SP's who breach codes of conduct are formally disciplined	The incidence of SP's illness, injury & stress related health issues remains stable, or decreases over the agreed period	

	SP's performance reviews indicate adequate competency level in relation to their knowledge, skills, behaviour, attitudes & responsibilities described in their ToR/ Job descriptions		Examples & records of staff training & development activities, including training reports; training effectiveness (impact of training) report;	SPs are deployed within 72 hours of request from partner organisation?
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## Annex 1d: NORCAP process, procedure, system's review checklist

Description	Does this exist?	Is it up to date?	Is it clearly communicated ?	Is it consistently applied?
<b>Strategy, Policy, Plan and Structure</b>				
NORCAP Strategy				
NORCAP Action Plan (2010, 2011, 2012)				
NORCAP Key Results Areas; Indicators				
Competencies Framework				
Partner Agreements				
NORCAP Structure				
Legal review of existing policies, procedures, etc.				
Written terms and conditions of employment				
Staff Regulations				
Code of Conduct				
Recruitment and Selection Policy and Procedures (flow chart)				
<b>Recruitment and Selection</b>				
Forecasting Plan				
Job descriptions/ToR				
Advertisements (samples)				
Contracts for all NORCAP management staff & NORCAP secondees				
Interview package (tests, questionnaires, scoring sheets)				
Offer Letters/Deployment Letter				
Profiles & competencies of seconded personnel				
List of Seconded Personnel (name/designation/sector/location/period/date of deployment/cost of deployment/)				
Analysis of Seconded Personnel Data				
<b>Induction/Orientation &amp; Debriefing</b>				
Pre-departure briefing; security briefing; cultural briefing; technical briefing by NORCAP/NRC				
Induction program by partner organisation				

Orientation Checklists				
Debriefing by NORCAP				
Debriefing by Partner Org				
<b>Management Support &amp; Appraisals</b>				
Follow up support				
Performance review by Partner Organisation				
Performance review by NRC				
Mission Reports of Secondees (who reads; analysis; feedback on report; etc.)				
Personnel Files				
Disciplinary Procedures; Grievances				
On-going Information & Communication (type; mode; frequency; outcome)				
<b>Reward &amp; Retention; Staff Care</b>				
Health, Insurance, Staff Care Benefits				
Harmonious salary scale				
Psychosocial Support				
Secondee Survey				
Talent Management mechanism				
Lessons Learned Exercises				
<b>Training and Development</b>				
Training and development mechanism				
Training Needs Analysis				
List of trainings provided (training type/sector, cost of trainings, location, duration, etc.)				
Follow-up after training (training effectiveness)				

**Method and Questions for the online survey: See Annex 2g: NORCAP online survey report.**

## Annex 2: Other information

### Annex 2a: Distribution of Roles and Responsibilities in the Team

The overall composition of the Evaluation team remains as proposed in the inception report, i.e. there is a Core Team, Case Country Teams, a NORCAP Team, Technical Experts and the Quality Assurer. However, following the presentation of the Inception report the Lead Consultant for Somalia and International consultant for South Sudan, Mr Abdishakur Othowai, had to significantly reduce his contribution to the evaluation due to a family health emergency. The country teams were adjusted and the Team leader took on the role as Lead Consultant for Somalia and International consultant for South Sudan, an additional research assistant was hired for field work in South/Central Somalia and Puntland, the number of consultant days for Lead and Local Consultant South Sudan were increased and Mr Othowai's focal point duties were redistributed within the team. Mr Othowai retained a role as additional quality control for Somalia.

Further changes had to be made as two field team members, Ms Anne Davies and Mr Charles Byamugisha, did not receive visas for Pakistan. The role as Lead Consultant Pakistan remained with Ms Davies, as all preparatory work had already been completed, with Mr Ternstrom as "field team leader Pakistan" and the local consultant and research assistants were given additional tasks. Furthermore, due to Ms Mattson leaving for maternity leave before the end of the evaluation, her responsibilities were somewhat changed, and Ms Ternstrom took over the majority of Project Manager tasks. The members of the Core Team and their respective roles and responsibilities are as follows:

Core Team	Role/Responsibility
Björn Ternström	<u>Team Leader</u> Client contact, overall responsibility Facilitation of meetings and key feedback sessions Visits to all countries Lead, learning and overall analysis Co-author final report
Uma Narayanan	<u>Lead NORCAP</u> Team focal point: accountability Responsible for HR related methodology Overall analysis of NRC with special focus on synergies
Ingela Ternström	<u>Lead, Methodology and Internal Quality, Project Manager</u> Backup for client communication Coordination of cross-cutting issues Responsible for statistical overview, additional surveys Co-author final report, editor of all reports
Annina Mattson	<u>(Project Manager)</u> Backup for client communication (field focus) Coordination of resources Comparison NORCAP/other secondment systems

Anne Davies	<u>Field methodology</u> <u>Lead Consultant Pakistan</u> International consultant Somalia Team focal point: EFSD, Camp Management, Gender, Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Overall analysis of NRC
Charles Byamugisha	<u>Co-Lead Consultant South Sudan</u> Team focal point: Shelter, Corruption
Abdishakur Othowai	Team security advisor Quality Control Somalia case country report Supervised adaptation of PETS methodology to emergency contexts
<b>Case Country Teams</b>	
Somalia	Country Lead: Björn Ternström International Consultant: Anne Davies PETS Consultant: Japhet Makongo Local Consultant: Liban Hassan
South Sudan	Country Co-Lead: Charles Byamugisha Country Co-Lead: Björn Ternström PETS Consultant: Japhet Makongo Local Consultant: Leben Nelson Moro
Pakistan	Country Lead: Anne Davies Field work country lead: Björn Ternström PETS Consultant: Japhet Makongo Local Consultant: Abid ur Rehman Research Assistant: Nowsheen Khan
<b>NORCAP</b>	
Uma Narayanan	Lead NORCAP
Ewa Ericsson	Secondment systems
Annina Mattson	Comparison of secondment systems
<b>Financial Issues and PETS</b>	
Hampus Pihl	Lead, Financial issues Integration of the PETS into overall analysis
Japhet Makongo	PETS Lead Planning, implementation and analysis of PETS
<b>Technical Experts</b>	
Bo Göransson	Team focal point: policy and context Overall analysis
Patrick Fox	Team focal point: WASH, Environment Backstop country teams Lead, recommendations on making WASH a core activity
Ralf Otto	Team focal point: ICLA Advise country teams on ICLA data collection ICLA analysis

Quality Control	
Hugh Goyder	Quality Assurer

Field Enumerators for the PETS		
Pakistan:	South Sudan:	Somalia
Muhammad Huda (Male)	William Tong Atak (Male)	Ahmed Jama Hussein (Male)
Ajmal Khan (Male)	Atak Deng Atak (Male)	Omar Yusuf Hussein (Male)
Suleiman Khan (Male)	Piol Lueth Agany (Male)	Abdirahman Awil Faraah (Male)
Ismart Aral (Female)		Muna Yusuf Hassan (Female)
Noursheen Khurshid (Female)		Saynab Bashir Libah (Female)
		Mohamed Ali Farah (Male, Interpreter/ supervisor of enumerators)

## Annex 2b: Literature review

Background information on NORCAP and on NRC's operations in the three case countries was drawn from various NRC documents, e.g. the NRC Fact Sheets for Pakistan, Somalia and South Sudan and the NRC website [www.nrc.no](http://www.nrc.no), which gives an overview on NRC's mission, standards and policies. Multi-year and annual strategy proposals and annual progress reports covering the years under review gave additional information about activities planned and implemented. Annual reports for NRC and NORCAP, applications for funds, budgets, project logframes, various country reports (quarterly, annual, project- and donor wise) provided further detail, as did a number of evaluations, both external and internal.

A large number of project documents were made available to the evaluation teams by NRC Oslo, Nairobi, and country and field offices. A sample of these include: concept papers, assessment reports, logframes, consolidated project portfolios, power-point presentations of area strategy, as well as internal checklists to follow funding, reporting and financial data inputs. The internal documents reviewed were mainly project specific and provided the team with insights into how NRC staff use guidelines, policies, activities, reports and monitoring for project activities. The evaluation uses NRC's internal project reference numbering, where the first two letters refer to country (SO, SD and PK), the second two to the type of activity (food = FK, shelter = FS, FM = framework programme, etc.), the first two digits indicate year and the last two refer to the individual project number.

The team reviewed a number of documents describing and analysing the general situation in the case countries, or thematic reports of relevance, such as the UN Consolidated Appeals, the Somalia Food Insecurity Integrated Phase Classification, by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU 2012), and the "Gender-Sensitive Response and Recovery" report by OXFAM (Oxfam 2012), all of which provided valuable background information for the evaluation.

A number of evaluations provided background information on thematic areas. External evaluations include the Norad synthesis evaluation on Gender (Norad 2006), Moen and Wiik's (2009) review of Norwegian humanitarian organisations' awareness and practical implementation of gender, and the IASC<sup>110</sup> Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response in South-Central Somalia 2005 – 2010 (Polastro, undated).

An evaluation by Fisher and Quanjer (2011) provides information on temporary shelter and hygiene promotion in Puntland, Somalia and a food security evaluation by Guillemois looks at NRC's 2011-2012 famine response (Guillemois 2012). Several NRC evaluations of ICLA activities gave valuable information about this core competency (see e.g. Thomas and Szabo, 2011; Wyckoff and Sharma, 2009; Pierce, 2009; Asiimwe, 2008).

The list of internal NRC evaluations also includes several reviews of Shelter (e.g. Ferretti and Ashmore 2010 and Kvernrod et.al 2009). Food distribution is reviewed by Larssen, 2008 and Das and Nkutu, 2008. There are two organisational reviews: Bain and Sørum, 2009 (which is quite brief) and the organisational performance review by Strand et.al. (2007). There is also a review of the ecological impact of refugee/returnee programmes supported by the Norwegian Refugee Council in Burundi (Proact Network, 2009).

Several reports point to a need for improving systems for monitoring and evaluation, and for making evidence-based needs assessments. Many conclude that NRC manages to deliver under highly difficult working conditions. The need to look closer at the transition from emergency to development, and how to target the most vulnerable beneficiaries, are other common topics.

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<sup>110</sup> Inter-Agency Standing Committee

## **Annex 2c: Statistical Overview of NRC's International Humanitarian Assistance 2010-2012**



## Statistical overview of NRC's activities 2010-2012

### Introduction

This paper presents a brief overview of NRC's activities, partner organisations and geographical coverage for the years 2010 to 2012. The basis for the data presented below is the reported cost of activities undertaken.<sup>111</sup> The reason for this is the nature of NRC's activities: the alternative would have been to use budgeted costs, but as these are (still, in September) not fully confirmed for 2012, and as NRC's activities may rapidly change in response to emergencies etc. it was judged most correct to use actual expenses. This means that for 2012, only the first six months are included. The percentage distribution of costs is used as a way of enabling comparisons across the three years. Throughout the document, costs are in Norwegian Kroner (NOK) and where nothing else is mentioned, items have been sorted in decreasing order of cost in 2010.

During the three years covered, NRC has had activities in 88 countries, funded by 32 partners and divided into a number of different areas of activities and projects. The total cost for 2010 was 1 030 MNOK<sup>112</sup>, for 2011 the total cost was 1 188 MNOK and for the first six months of 2012 the total cost was 545 MNOK.

### Activities

NRC presents its core competencies as being Camp management, Education, ICLA (Information, counselling and legal assistance), Shelter and EFDS (Emergency food distribution and security). In addition, NRC has several multicomponent programmes, a number of emergency rosters and carries out information activities. The costs of NRC's different activities are presented in the table below, in decreasing order of cost in 2010.

	2010		2011		2012	
Cost per Activity, NOK	Cost	%	Cost	%	Cost (6 months)	%
Shelter programme	318 549 690	30,9	353 633 745	29,8	127 836 429	23,4
Legal aid programmes	167 348 791	16,2	195 175 472	16,4	75 104 584	13,8
Emergency Rosters	164 380 177	16,0	174 727 744	14,7	100 106 108	18,4
Education and Teaching	153 680 768	14,9	171 846 268	14,5	72 322 914	13,3
Direct distribution of food and/or other items	71 261 458	6,9	137 524 860	11,6	59 367 831	10,9
Multicomponent/Integrated programmes	52 734 023	5,1	15 668 251	1,3	51 347 593	9,4
Other activities	43 988 688	4,3	63 668 550	5,4	31 486 394	5,8
Camp Management programme	32 063 161	3,1	51 133 993	4,3	19 488 367	3,6
Various field administration	20 769 581	2,0	22 717 901	1,9	7 433 287	1,4
Election related activities	2 507 424	0,2	-614 295	-0,1	-70 233	0,0
Information, Norad-projects	2 003 992	0,2	1 398 259	0,1	274 018	0,1
Information, NMFA- projects	1 011 750	0,1	972 748	0,1	684 243	0,1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 030 299 504</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1 187 853 497</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>545 381 535</b>	<b>100</b>

Figure 1: Cost per activity and percentage distribution of costs for the period 2010 - 2012.

The Shelter programme is the single largest component. This includes some of the school construction projects and Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) activities. The latter is being

<sup>111</sup> Source: Financial Overview of NRC 2010-2012, supplied by NRC Head of Finance.

<sup>112</sup> MNOK indicates Million Norwegian Kroner.

introduced as a new core competence and Camp Management, with the lowest cost, is being phased out.

Legal aid programmes (ICLA), Education and teaching and Secondments are at about the same level of expense, with around 15 % of total costs. However, while the share of costs for Secondments is increasing in 2012, the shares for Education and Legal aid are decreasing slightly. This picture may change, though, after the final numbers for 2012 become available.

Distribution of food and other items covers around 10 % of the total cost. This includes e.g. Emergency food distribution (with less than 5 % of the total cost for Emergency food distribution) and distribution of NFI-kits (non-food item kits).

The percentage distribution of costs over time is illustrated below. The total cost per activity over time is illustrated in Figure A1 in the Annex. Please note that in all line charts, legends are presented in the order of appearance, from top to bottom, of the lines in 2010.




Figure 2: Percentage distribution of cost per activity

### Partners and funding

NRC's activities are funded by a total of 32 different partners or sources, illustrated below.

Norwegian Contributions	2010		2011		2012	
	Cost	%	Cost	%	Cost (6 months)	%
NMFA (HUM)	353 240 964	34,29	380 987 194	32,07	181 810 923	33,34
GAP (Norad and NMFA)	68 628 190	6,66	59 907 718	5,04	3 173 342	0,58
Norwegian Embassies	54 039 555	5,25	26 065 131	2,19	13 733 448	2,52
NMFA other	24 871 408	2,41	26 475 481	2,23	6 960 305	1,28
Norad (non GAP)	23 818 829	2,31	55 636 130	4,68	35 700 421	6,55
NRC own funds	11 327 381	1,10	8 597 069	0,72	2 726 630	0,50
NRC Telethon Funds	792 917	0,08	24 350 641	2,05	14 832 009	2,72
Norwegian Directorate of Immigration	489 989	0,05	0	0,00	0	0,00
Other Norwegian Companies/Organisations	198 617	0,02	955 594	0,08	259 615	0,05
<b>Total Norwegian</b>	<b>537 407 851</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>582 974 957</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>259 196 694</b>	<b>48</b>

Figure 3: Norwegian contributions, cost and percentage of total costs.

The single largest donor is the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA). In total, half of the funds come from Norwegian sources and all but a few percent origins at the Norwegian

Government. Looking at all donors, it is obvious that many of them contribute very small shares of the total funding. About half of the donors contribute with less than one percent each, a handful with more than five percent.

NRC has limited access to non-earmarked funds. Part of the "NRC own funds" are not earmarked. 17 MNOK per year is received from Norad for core funding, with budgets to be approved annually. Other funds seem to be earmarked for specific activities or purposes.

Cost Per Partner, NOK	2010		2011		2012	
	Cost	%	Cost	%	Cost 6 mths	%
NMFA (Hum)	353 240 964	34,3	380 987 194	32,1	181 810 923	33,3
UNHCR	91 817 651	8,9	135 687 154	11,4	31 256 421	5,7
ECHO	89 947 479	8,7	117 177 181	9,9	72 300 219	13,3
Sida	88 802 607	8,6	83 407 977	7,0	45 905 837	8,4
GAP (Norad and NMFA)	68 628 190	6,7	59 907 718	5,0	3 173 342	0,6
Norwegian Embassies	54 039 555	5,2	26 065 131	2,2	13 733 448	2,5
EC <sup>113</sup> (Non-ECHO)	42 966 307	4,2	19 973 746	1,7	9 608 271	1,8
Other Foreign Organisations	29 370 312	2,9	36 724 056	3,1	13 119 909	2,4
UNICEF	28 328 870	2,7	35 269 158	3,0	6 834 383	1,3
OCHA	27 673 113	2,7	52 531 531	4,4	28 743 270	5,3
NMFA Other	24 871 408	2,4	26 475 481	2,2	6 960 305	1,3
Norad (Non GAP)	23 818 829	2,3	55 636 130	4,7	35 700 421	6,5
BPRM <sup>114</sup>	17 214 572	1,7	17 683 823	1,5	10 068 292	1,8
Danida <sup>115</sup>	15 991 670	1,6	21 870 509	1,8	8 083 584	1,5
USAID <sup>116</sup> (OFDA <sup>117</sup> )	12 486 291	1,2	11 487 040	1,0	7 962 082	1,5
NRC Own Funds	11 327 381	1,1	8 597 069	0,7	2 726 630	0,5
UNDP	9 792 195	1,0	1 863 794	0,2	291 508	0,1
CIDA <sup>118</sup> Canada	8 560 037	0,8	8 976 168	0,8	3 612 757	0,7
Other Official Foreign Organisations	8 240 604	0,8	18 734 626	1,6	7 567 489	1,4
World Food Program	6 991 751	0,7	9 933 443	0,8	3 361 261	0,6
World Bank	6 861 678	0,7	0	0,0	0	0,0
DFAIT <sup>119</sup> Canada	2 816 017	0,3	0	0,0	0	0,0
Other UN Organisations	2 257 118	0,2	6 359 198	0,5	2 167 420	0,4
DFID <sup>120</sup>	1 844 430	0,2	24 923 700	2,1	34 264 588	6,3
NRC Telethon Funds	792 917	0,1	24 350 641	2,0	14 832 009	2,7
Qatar Charity	647 407	0,1	0	0,0	0	0,0
Norwegian Directorate of Immigration	489 989	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0
Other Norwegian Companies/Organisations	198 617	0,0	955 594	0,1	259 615	0,0
Statoil	140 781	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0
Other EU Organisations	140 764	0,0	18 792	0,0	0	0,0
NRC Earmarked Funds	0	0,0	1 954 128	0,2	754 781	0,1
American Jewish World Service	0	0,0	302 516	0,0	282 770	0,1

<sup>113</sup> European Community.

<sup>114</sup> US Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration.

<sup>115</sup> Danish International Development Agency.

<sup>116</sup> United States Agency for International Development.

<sup>117</sup> Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

<sup>118</sup> Canadian International Development Agency.

<sup>119</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

<sup>120</sup> Department for International Development, UK.

Figure 4: Distribution of costs per funder, cost and percentage of total costs.

Figures A2 and A3 in the Annex show contribution by partner, in cost and as percent of total cost. The diagrams below show the trend in the share of different sources of contributions over the period 2010 – 2012.




Figure 5: Largest partners excluding direct NMFA contributions, percent of total costs.

From this diagram, we see that ECHO, Norad and OCHA have been increasing their shares, while the share of non-ECHO EC funding, UNHCR and GAP funding has decreased. The diagram below shows the development for the second-largest group of donors.




Figure 6: Second-largest partners, contributions as percent of total costs.

NRC was the charity selected for the Telethon in 2010, hence the increase in this source of funding. USAID and BPRM<sup>121</sup> are the only other two sources in this category that are increasing.

**Countries**

During the three years covered by this overview, NRC has been present in 88 countries. Figure A4 in the Annex shows the distribution of expenditure for each country. The figure below shows expenditure in countries receiving at least four percent of NRC's total funds.




Figure 7: Cost per country, countries with above four percent of total costs.

NRC's activities in different countries can be grouped by type of support – project or program funding, including e.g. Shelter, ICLA, etc. and secondment of personnel to other organisations. Regarding secondees, it may be argued that the recipient is not the country where the secondee is placed, but rather the organisation to which he/she is seconded.

**Countries with Project Funding**

Focussing on countries with project funding (PF), the picture becomes less scattered. Of the total 88 countries, NRC has had project activities in 39 countries. The diagram below shows the cost of projects per country:

<sup>121</sup> US Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration.




Figure 8: Cost per country, countries with project funding.

By grouping the countries into regions, it is obvious that NRC has most of its project activities in Africa, followed by Asia, MENA and Eastern Europe.

Countries with Project Funding		2010		2011		2012	
		Cost	%	Cost	%	Cost (6 months)	%
Horn of Africa	Somalia	115 880 949	13,5	163 438 719	16,2	51 582 253	11,6
	Kenya	58 940 017	6,9	75 172 717	7,4	32 113 203	7,2
	Uganda	48 560 621	5,6	38 630 253	3,8	14 460 643	3,3
	Sudan/ South Sudan	41 966 800	4,9	77 989 903	7,7	37 144 594	8,4
	Ethiopia	0	0,0	25 042 129	2,5	20 103 031	4,5
Total, Horn of Africa		265 348 387	30,9	380 273 722	37,6	155 403 724	35,0
West and Central Africa	Democratic Rep of Congo	87 661 938	10,2	75 978 080	7,5	36 370 756	8,2
	Burundi	37 617 086	4,4	31 803 076	3,1	1 522 138	0,3
	Liberia	37 573 913	4,4	50 758 747	5,0	18 133 521	4,1
	Ivory Coast	29 779 961	3,5	18 432 143	1,8	9 513 365	2,1
	Central African Republic	92 022	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0
	Burkina Faso	0	0,0	0	0,0	288 204	0,1
	Mali	0	0,0	0	0,0	435 294	0,1
Total, West and Central Africa		192 724 920	22,4	176 972 046	17,5	66 263 277	14,9
Rest of Africa	Zimbabwe	3 270 085	0,4	11 129 415	1,1	7 320 868	1,6

	Africa – unspecified	771 291	0,1	902 441	0,1	282 770	0,1
Total, Rest of Africa		4 041 376	0,5	12 031 855	1,2	7 603 638	1,7
Afghanistan Pakistan Iran	Afghanistan	107 365 849	12,5	78 741 990	7,8	50 249 826	11,3
	Pakistan	48 425 632	5,6	99 090 262	9,8	49 519 736	11,1
	Iran	0	0,0	414 373	0,0	1 474 892	0,3
Total, Afghanistan Pakistan Iran		155 791 481	18,1	178 246 625	17,6	101 244 454	22,8
Rest of Asia	Sri Lanka	24 873 277	2,9	22 888 720	2,3	8 015 789	1,8
	Myanmar	23 068 240	2,7	21 249 381	2,1	4 980 491	1,1
	East Timor	12 083 307	1,4	164 024	0,0	0	0,0
	Philippines	1 982 193	0,2	2 248 277	0,2	0	0,0
	Nepal	89 991	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0
Total, Rest of Asia		62 097 008	7,2	46 550 402	4,6	12 996 280	2,9
MENA	Lebanon	25 043 279	2,9	18 161 610	1,8	11 182 827	2,5
	Occupied Palestinian Territories	22 226 520	2,6	35 860 819	3,5	20 403 708	4,6
	Iraq	4 488 787	0,5	11 271 504	1,1	7 549 357	1,7
	Yemen	0	0,0	0	0,0	249 308	0,1
	Libya	0	0,0	497 503	0,0	-3 382	0,0
Total, MENA		51 758 585	6,0	65 791 436	6,5	39 381 818	8,9
Europe and former Soviet States	Georgia	38 397 228	4,5	30 206 073	3,0	9 008 656	2,0
	Russia	6 098 263	0,7	14 941 339	1,5	-570 854	-0,1
	Kyrgyzstan	1 772 831	0,2	1 312 293	0,1	4 105	0,0
Total, Europe and former Soviet		46 268 322	5,4	46 459 705	4,6	8 441 907	1,9
EU and USA	Geneva	28 983 756	3,4	29 358 076	2,9	14 521 671	3,3
	Belgium	2 184 413	0,3	2 642 321	0,3	6 535	0,0
	USA	183 341	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0
Total, EU and USA		31 351 510	3,6	32 000 397	3,2	14 528 206	3,3
Total, Americas (Colombia)		34 157 320	4,0	27 685 375	2,7	20 529 537	4,6
Total, Unspecified Country		16 094 127	1,9	41 536 817	4,1	15 998 930	3,6
<b>TOTAL, Countries with project funding</b>		<b>859 969 606</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>1 011 355 240</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>444 387 398</b>	<b>100,0</b>

Figure 9: Countries by region, total project funding and percent of total project funding. NB! Only Jan - June for 2012.

The development over time of the shares of project funding going to countries in the different regions is illustrated below:




Figure 10: Project funding by region, percent of total project funding.

The Horn of Africa region peaked in 2011 but is still the largest recipient region with about 35% of total project funding. West and Central Africa, Europe and former Soviet States and Rest of Asia have been steadily decreasing over the three years, while Afghanistan/Pakistan/ Iran and the MENA region have received increasing shares.

The following is the percentage spent in the ten largest recipient countries:




Figure 11: Ten largest recipient countries, percent of total project funding.



Somalia, DRC, Uganda, Georgia and Burundi show decreasing trends, Afghanistan decreased in 2011 but is again increasing in 2012. Pakistan is the only country with a steadily increasing share of funding over the three years.

Looking at the second largest group of recipient countries for project funding, we see increasing shares for Ethiopia, Colombia (the only country in the Americas receiving project funding) and Palestinian areas.




Figure 12: Group of second largest recipient destinations, percent of total project funding.

Zimbabwe and Iraq, although receiving very small shares, are also showing increasing trends. The shares of project funding going to Russia, East Timor, Myanmar and Sri Lanka have been decreasing during the period.

### Countries and Host Organisations of Seconddees

NRC has financed secondments to a total of 78 countries over the past three years. Figure A5 in the Annex provides details, but it is obvious that most countries have very small shares of the total cost. The diagram below shows the 25 countries receiving the largest shares of costs. Occupied Palestinian Territories, Haiti and South Sudan are the main recipients, apart from the share not specified. Interestingly, this share has increased dramatically to 17 % in 2011, and seems to be reaching similar levels in 2012.




Figure 13: 25 countries with largest shares of secondment costs (SE). NB! Only Jan - June for 2012.

Note that in the diagram showing secondment costs, the first entry “Beredskap” (preparedness) is the cost for administration. This is different compared to the reported cost for project funding, where administration and HO costs are included in the cost for each country.

Looking at the distribution of costs by host organisation of secondees, we find that UNICEF and UNHCR are the largest recipients of secondees. However, large amounts fall under headings that do not specify the host organisation.




Figure 14: Cost of secondments by host organisation.

Excluding the unspecified secondments, UNICEF accounts for between ten to twelve percent of secondment related costs, UNHCR has increased from eight to ten percent and the other host organisations account for less than five percent each.




Figure 15: Percentage distribution of secondment cost per host organisation.

The above statistical overview has presented the distribution and development costs per activities, countries and partners of NRC. The section below links this to the global emergency trends over the same period.

### The Context of NRC's Activities: Global emergency trends<sup>122</sup>

The period 2009-10 saw no major new trends in number of disasters: They remained at a level of around 600 reported incidents, slightly below the longer trend. The geographical distribution also remained fairly consistent with Asia accounting for around 40% of the number of cases. Natural disasters (droughts, floods, tsunamis, earthquakes) were almost constant, whereas technologically caused disasters (industry, transport) fell slightly.

The number of people killed in natural disasters had peaked in 2010 in the Americas, because of the Haiti Earthquake, which had a similar death toll to the 2004 tsunami in Asia. Both account for more than 80% of all people killed by natural disasters in these years.

The reported costs in a particular year do not reflect only the number of disasters or the number of affected or killed people but also the level of development.

Countries labelled as having Low Human development according to UNDP's<sup>123</sup> Human Development Index had around 1 800 reported disasters for the period 2001 to 2010. Those labelled Very High development had 1 100.

The estimated cost of the damages for the low level countries was 22 000 million dollars. For the high countries the damage was estimated at 626 000 million, suggesting costs thirty times higher per disaster; but the evidence for this is not precise.

<sup>122</sup> Sources for this section:

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2011, World Disaster Report 2011.  
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2011, UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2010.

<sup>123</sup> United Nations Development Project.

### *Refugee trends: Where?*

In 2010 to 2012 there have not been any major changes in the global refugee context. In many cases there was a continuation of crisis situations caused by internal strife over power and resources, such as Ivory Coast, Afghanistan and Somalia. In Libya the changes were dramatic, as they were in Sudan, albeit planned.

In 2011, Pakistan received the highest number of refugees, followed by Iran, Syria, Germany, Jordan and Kenya. Developing countries continued to receive the majority of refugees, hosting around 80%, a figure that also reflects their proximity to the country of origin, normally another developing country, notably Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

This can also be seen from the figures measuring number of refugees in relation to the GDP per capita in receiving country: Pakistan is the highest, followed by DRC, Kenya, Liberia and Ethiopia.

Where is NRC in this picture? It is active in 88 countries with Project funding in 39. The seven largest from a cost perspective were Somalia, Afghanistan, DRC, Kenya, Pakistan, Uganda and Sudan/South Sudan. Together they account for more than half. Somalia, DRC and Uganda show a small decrease, while Afghanistan and Pakistan are increasing.

NRC had secondments in 78 countries; their geographical distribution is different from those with project financing. Palestine, Haiti and South Sudan were at the top. Secondments are short term and reflect different programming mode and parameters where dramatic emergencies (such as Haiti) are immediately reflected in the data.

### *Some tendencies that have an impact on the environment in which NRC operates.*

Below some tendencies that have an impact on NRC and other humanitarian actors are described. To what extent are they seen to be relevant and have been integrated in thinking and planning by NRC?

*More protracted crisis I.* We have witnessed a financial crisis and a food crisis in recent years. The costs of basic food items have doubled in 10 years. Compensations to those living on food or cash for work have not matched price hikes. The effect will be various forms of malnutrition. This will clearly have repercussions on refugee and IDP camps or settlements.

*More protracted crisis II.* Emergencies caused by unrest or conflicts dominate, but climate change and environmentally-related emergencies increase. The flow of IDPs and refugees might be slowly rising, but one should not exclude sudden changes in behaviours. Which are the refugee prone areas, and is NRC forecasting capacity sufficient?

*Competition for scarce resources.* Energy production and food production compete, globally regionally and locally. Power struggles over land and water resources have been major factors behind conflicts in Somalia. Cash transfers to poor around refugee camps are difficult to maintain in periods of stagnating aid budgets and higher food prices. How does NRC, and other actors, link settlements with production?

*New patterns and challenges I.* Urbanisation. Refugees from developing countries are often rural, and the receiving neighbouring environment is predominantly rural. But conflicts, lack of resources as well as increasing numbers of IDPs mean that refugees are tending to live in more urban settlements, as seen in Sudan and Somalia.

*New patterns and challenges II.* Local authorities, communities, individuals, civil society are often the fastest to respond. How can NRC build on that capacity even for the longer term challenges?

*New patterns and challenges III.* Need for new competencies. Agencies take on a whole series of services, with increased demand for competence in management, information, language, culture

*Old challenge revisited.* Strengthen links between humanitarian responses and interventions that address underlying constraints to development. This challenge has been more essential given the protracted nature of many emergencies.

The period (2010-12) chosen is far too short to see any statistical evidence of trends. It gives an overview of partners, of funding, of geographical distribution but not of tendencies and developments. The data does, however, generate questions, for example:

- Ⓟ In the NRC portfolio, are the increases in multi-component projects an attempt to meet some of the challenges above?
- Ⓟ Are the decreases in Shelter allocations a consequence of actively bringing in new actors such as local government and civil society, or are shelter activities increasingly being included in multi component projects?
- Ⓟ Is NRC spreading its resources too thinly with activities in 88 countries, project funding in 39, secondments in 78, and offices in 22 countries? Is there a risk in not having the capacity to monitor contributions or respond to changing circumstances? What are the benefits of being a small player in many places with little clout to change the design of the overall operations, versus being an important player in fewer situations?

Having said, or asked this, it is clear that NRC's operations and funding do reflect the emergency and refugee patterns, and emerging patterns, measured as money received and allocated. The Horn of Africa has received larger attention, as well as Pakistan after the floods. From that simple analysis one can conclude that NRC clearly operates in areas of need – thus NRC's geographical focus is relevant. It is more difficult to draw conclusions about NRC's choice of activities and partners. The risks and costs of having many projects and working with many different partners should be balanced against the issue of relevance.

Statistical Overview Annex: Figures A1 to A6




Figure A1: Cost per activity for 2010 (blue), 2011 (red) and first six months of 2012 (green).




Figure A2: Cost per partner for 2010 (blue), 2011 (red) and first six months of 2012 (green).




Figure A3: Percent of total cost covered by each partner for 2010 (blue), 2011 (red) and first six months of 2012 (green).






Figure A4: Cost by country for 2010 (blue), 2011 (red) and first six months of 2012 (green). This graph is included mainly to give an overview of the spread of costs over countries. Different breakdowns of this information are available in other graphs.














Figure A5: Secondment Cost by country for 2010 (blue), 2011 (red) and first six months of 2012 (green).




## Annex 2d(a): NORCAP Recruitment and Deployment Flowchart







## **Annex 2d(b): NORCAP Proposed Recruitment and Deployment Flowchart**





## Annex 2e: NORCAP: Comparative Table of Standby Rosters.

(Based on interviews with standby partner representatives, compiled in the following revised and updated version of Baker J. et. Al., Study of Sida's Support to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) 2006-2011, Sida Decentralised Evaluation 2012:22 Sida, Annex 9).

	NRC/NORCAP	Danish Refugee Council	MSB (Sweden)	RedR (Australia)	Irish Aid	SDC (Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation)
<b>Organisational set up, budget</b>	<p>NORCAP exists since the mid-1990s. Part of NRC, so NGO, and not directly attached to MFA but work closely with them. Get funding for 3 years at a time. NOK 90 million/year. Can ask for additional money if end of year crisis.</p> <p>NRC operates 4 additional thematic rosters: GenCap, ProCap, Mediation support Unit (MSU), NORDEM (special roster on human rights and democracy).</p>	<p>Have 3 year framework agreement with DANIDA but have to apply for funding every year anyway. It is DKK13 million/year with an additional DKK1-2 million on top. In addition, funding from the UN for those positions they do have the funding but not the person &gt; DRC takes 7% overhead.</p>	<p>A division of the Ministry of Defence with specific duties for MFA. International operations core funding SEK 115 million/year. Operations funding including secondments funding on case-by-case basis from Sida or through cost sharing. Average annual operational budget 2009-11 SEK 200 million.</p>	<p>Registered as an NGO. Have a 3 year funding agreement with AusAID for AUD 18 million with a goal of field months/year. Can ask for additional funding if go beyond due to two or more crises in the same year</p>	<p>A division of MFA so Government entity. Budget comes from Parliament. The Rapid Response Initiative sits in the Emergency and Recovery section in the Hum Assistance dept. Rapid Response has EUR4.3 million out of total EUR60 million Hum Ass budget. Of this, Standby partnership gets 1.8 million &gt; the rest is for stocks in UNHRD<sup>124</sup> in agreement with WFP. Additional budgets announced at times (e.g for famine in East Africa last year). Can spend money from other budget lines if necessary.</p>	<p>A division of the MFA. Principles of secondments &gt; have to be strategic and linked to political priorities. All divisions and geographical desks can finance secondments if it fits within the strategy. No specific budget related to secondments &gt; each desk decides and money comes from overall division budget.</p>
<b>Standby partnership agreements</b>	Serve 15 UN Agencies + IOM. Primarily UNICEF, UNHCR,	UNHCR (oldest and biggest, 20 years), UNICEF, WFP, OCHA,	UNICEF, OCHA, ICRC, UNOPS, UNHCR, WFP, UNDP, CADRI	UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, OCHA + WHO new. FAO, IOM and UNOPS	OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP + UNHRD network for stocks. Testing new	WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNRWA, OCHA, WHO (but not regular),

<sup>124</sup> United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot

	NRC/NORCAP	Danish Refugee Council	MSB (Sweden)	RedR (Australia)	Irish Aid	SDC (Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation)
	WWFP, FAO, OCHA, UNESCO, UNFPA <sup>125</sup> , UNDP.	UNRWA (one per year), UNDP, UNFPA (none in past 4 years), IOM (not active), FAO (since 1 Jan 2012). Have been approached by OHCHR and World Bank, but DRC ALWAYS short in funding so not keen on taking on more partners.		in negotiation.	partnership with UNMAS.	Separate agreement with ICRC.
<b>'Bouquet' of services</b>	Individual deployments only. No equipment, but considering this. Offer most profiles, but NOT pure medical. Mainly: logisticians, ICT, <sup>126</sup> warehouse management, education, protection, WASH, health, nutrition, humanitarian affairs officers. Have several niche profiles, such as land and property rights experts, DRR <sup>127</sup> experts, information managers and cluster coordination experts. Prioritise field based. If HO, must also cover field.	Individual deployments only, no equipment. Key profiles: Protection and WASH, logisticians, emergency managers, camp managers. Do NOT do: ICT, Public health + nutrition, education (although thinking about it), telecoms, information management. Many strategic deployments: e.g. global protection support cell + UNDP and UNICEF HO. However, increasing number of non-emergency postings > want to reduce, revert back to original idea of field based, emergency.	Individual deployments in a broad range of technical capacities. Also 'Global Service Package', where 'turn-key solution' teams are provided along with needed equipment; commonly base camps, trucks and fleet management, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Information & Communications Technology	Individual deployments only, no equipment. All profiles except for medical. Includes HO roles (e.g. Donna Carter at WFP Rome). HO positions very much in line with AusAIDs humanitarian objectives.	Personnel and equipment (through UNHRD and WFP). Roster established in 2007. Used to do mainly logistics, ICT, telecoms, but now also offer humanitarian affairs officers, nutrition experts, public health and GBV <sup>128</sup> . Liaise actively with partners on where the gaps lie.	Individual deployments, sometimes part of project. Have search and rescue packages. Technical profiles like construction/reconstruction, DRR (SDC general priority). Humanitarian Affairs officers, generalists with good emergency and good UN knowledge. Child protection. Some medical/ public health experts but limited. Some IT but limited. Strength – French speakers.

<sup>125</sup> United Nations Population Fund

<sup>126</sup> Information Communication Technology.

<sup>127</sup> Disaster Risk Reduction.

<sup>128</sup> Gender-based violence.

	NRC/NORCAP	Danish Refugee Council	MSB (Sweden)	RedR (Australia)	Irish Aid	SDC (Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation)
<b>Size of roster</b>	Over 700 members on roster: Norwegians, Africans (since 2006), Asians (since 2009). MFA and UN partners pushed for bring on Africans and Asians. Now deploy most Africans.	350-400 before 'clean up' later in 2012. Have over 700 applications pending. Can be any nationality.	1250+ members; mixed nationals, largest groups in emergency response, logistics, construction, UNDAC <sup>129</sup> team leaders, Info + communication technology and management.	Only Australian nationals.	Officially 192, but only half are active. Must be EU nationals, must have a tax -clearance from Irish Revenue if Irish.	Par of internal SDC staff roster (Swiss Core for Hum Aid) > 650 persons. Also advertise for specific postings. All Swiss citizens, although working on the possibility of adding people who have work permits in Switzerland.
<b>Request process</b>	Have just reorganised this process. Until April, requests divided geographically. Now, one focal point who sends out requests to advisors who have sectoral responsibilities. Take up to 3 weeks for finalisation if not emergency. Discuss each request, especially at the end of the year when budget is tight. Certain categories and regions prioritised based on need and Norwegian politics. E.g yes to South Sudan, no to Botswana. Also discuss relevance vis-à-vis the agency requesting (do they really need this or	3 person team registers and responds to each request. Aim to give final response within a week (although also have 72h goal, but do not keep track). Decide based on a)Funding, b)Who is asking, c)Available experts, d)Emergency or not. DRC does not have to do to the MFA for approval for any deployments, only if they have run out of money.	Process is under review. Currently MFA sets overall policy, partner makes request to MSB, MSB makes preliminary assessment of whether possible to respond in relation to policy and available resources - human and logistical, request to Sida which assesses in relation to country strategy and funding available, then takes formal decision. MSB operationalises and deploys.	RedR can deploy without approval from AusAID anywhere in Asia Pacific. Used to have to 'ask permission' for outside Asia Pac and for non-urgent emergencies. Have really worked on relationship over past years, now based on trust. RedR can now decide but have informal chats twice/week and send weekly report.	2 person team. Circulate request to relevant candidates same day ideally. Definite response to UN within same week. Know roster staff well, have interviewed all of them and seen on training. Have political element - Irish Aid government agency. Political consideration always there when deciding on deployment.	Request comes to focal point who forwards to relevant geographical desk. If geographical desk deems that it fits with strategy and Division priorities, prepares a 'case' with financial and technical aspect. The specific section gets together and decides based on budget and priority.

<sup>129</sup> United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination.

	NRC/NORCAP	Danish Refugee Council	MSB (Sweden)	RedR (Australia)	Irish Aid	SDC (Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation)
	just using free service?). Last few years seen an increase in these non-relevant requests. MFA not consulted and has never questioned NRC on specific deployments. Norad not at all involved.					
<b>Average cost and average length of deployments</b>	<p>65,000-100,000 NOK/month</p> <hr/> <p>Average cost of 6 month deployment of Norwegian to South Sudan or similar: NOK500 000-600 000. Other countries around NOK500 000. Average cost for 6 month deployment of African/Asian: NOK350 000-400 000. All Norwegian deployees have to pay taxes.</p> <p>Length: Only accept 3 months if real emergency. Otherwise prefer 6 months with possible extension up to 18 months. This is normal. Sometimes even longer.</p>	<p>57,000 NOK/month</p> <hr/> <p>Average cost of 3 month deployment: DKK175.000</p> <p>Average length of DANIDA funded deployments in 2011: 3.5 months (196 man-months for the year).</p> <p>UN funded deployments longer, vary depending on type of posting.</p>	<p>117,000 NOK month (based on 6 month deployment)</p> <hr/> <p>2006-2011; most common deployment 31-180 days with a total average length of deployment of 77 days</p>	<p>94,500 NOK/month</p> <hr/> <p>Average cost per 4 months deployment: AUD 64,767. Includes all expenses.</p> <p>Field: 6 months ideal length, 9 months max. Exceptionally 12 months. HQ: 12 months non-renewable.</p>	<p>35,500 NOK + accomodation + per diem/ month</p> <hr/> <p>Average annual deployment cost+ EUR58400 which will be subject to 41% income tax. But Irish Aid withholds 20% for Inland Revenue as credit against their income tax return (except for residents outside Ireland). But all payments not directly to deployee not taxed (insurance, flights, etc). Average cost: EUR160/day + subsistence (varies per country) + cost of accommodation.</p> <p>Length: Used to be 3 months, now average more or less 6 months with often extension of</p>	<p>90,300 NOK/month</p> <hr/> <p>(Very fluffy) Average cost: CHF90 000 for 6 month deployment which includes all expenses, including salary, accommodation, travel, insurance etc.</p> <p>Length: Depends per agency. For OCHA can only be max 6 months. Average overall is minimum 6 months, but prefer longer. No maximum length, contracts are always renewable, but the extension has to be requested by the partner.</p>



	NRC/NORCAP	Danish Refugee Council	MSB (Sweden)	RedR (Australia)	Irish Aid	SDC (Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation)
					another 6 months.	
<b>Number of deployments</b>	2010: 1503 person-months 2011: 1659 person-months (figures for NORCAP alone, not including GenCap, ProCap, MSU and NORDEM).	2011: 115	2006-2011: 1200 person-months per annum on average	The first year (2011) of the FWA required RedR to support the deployment of 200 field months; 250 months in year two; and 300 months in year three. In the first year, RedR failed to reach its target. In 2012 they will support over 400 field months. This has been achieved by better processes, improved practices and more commitment from RedR to achieving its objectives.	2008: 27 2009: 26 2010: 44 2011: 47 (but for 2010-2011 also deployed to NGOs as they asked for assistance. Will not do this again as deployment cost so different).	
<b>Cost-share</b>	NRC does encourage cost-sharing with its partners but it is not common.	In 2011 more than 50% of deployments were paid by the UN. The total cost of deployments (including overhead) for 2011 = DKK32 million. DANIDA funded 55 deployments, UN agencies funded 60 (often more in the end of the year when DRC has run out of DANIDA money).	In principle some cost sharing is assumed for all "package" interventions, negotiations follow.  For individual secondments, no hard and fast rules. Normally brought up by MSB if host organisation requests contract extension; if post does not fall in surge capacity framework included	Try to negotiate cost-share with UN agencies, especially for extensions where the partners have the money but not the expertise (and take 6 months to recruit).	No. Once by accident > deployment to Iraq where ECHO ended up paying for the post > got money back. If not paid up-front by UN agency, no use as have annual budget and if money returned in following tax year > will go to overall budget, not to department.	None.

	NRC/NORCAP	Danish Refugee Council	MSB (Sweden)	RedR (Australia)	Irish Aid	SDC (Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation)
			in partnership agreements.			
<b>Trainings</b>	<p>Yes</p> <p>Free 4 days training and 4 days induction &amp; 4 days security for all field roster staff.</p> <p>Selected staff: education and election process.</p> <p>NRC do not host trainings for UN partners. However, send roster staff onto UN trainings regularly.</p>	<p>Yes.</p> <p>DRC has a free 3.5 day compulsory basic training plus specialised options (protection, early recovery, camp management) for their roster members</p>	<p>Hosted over 200 trainings or exercises (including simulations) during 2009 – 2011. MSB was responsible for planning, delivery and evaluation for just over half of these, while OCHA or the EU mainly facilitated the remainder. The most common types of training topics were induction courses, operational management, and Search and Rescue.</p>	<p>Yes</p> <p>2 compulsory courses for all secondees, and specific sector/agency trainings.</p> <p>Induction training paid by the individual roster member (@\$4,000)</p> <p>5 days training on essentials &amp; 4 days security for all roster members.</p> <p>Plus selected by post: WASH &amp; logistics.</p> <p>RedR has internal training team of 5 people. Provide joint trainings with the UN partners.</p> <p>In 2012 will spend AU\$60,000 on capacity development training for existing Register personnel (those already on the RedR Register). Next year this will increase to AU\$80,000.</p>	<p>Yes</p> <p>Free for all roster staff: a full week induction course: 3.5 days induction</p> <p>3.5 days security.</p> <p>Hosted 2 trainings in 2012: GBV in emergencies for UNICEF &gt; open for all standby partner rosters. Internal surge training for OCHA &gt; only for OCHA internal roster. UN trainings for own roster staff crucial for deployment &gt; opens doors. Purposefully pay their roster staff to attend UN trainings &gt; investment in the future.</p>	NA
<b>M&amp;E function</b>	<p>Carry out field visits several time/year. Very important for NRC and for secondees. Secondees also have to report 3</p>	<p>Do not require regular reports from deployees in the field. Use the shared UN end of mission report + internal DRC report</p>	<p>Secondees expected to produce short weekly reports.</p> <p>Field visit undertaken 'as needed' (mostly related to number of</p>	<p>Debriefing upon returning from the field, but also proactive while in the field. If hear things are going poorly,</p>	<p>Nothing formal in place. Use the UN common end of mission report format. Debrief deployees upon return. Have several repeat</p>	<p>Use the UN common end of mission report. Longer term deployees write reports regularly while in the field. Have</p>

	NRC/NORCAP	Danish Refugee Council	MSB (Sweden)	RedR (Australia)	Irish Aid	SDC (Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation)
	<p>times in 6 months, 1-2 pages. Also encourage them to keep informal control with 'base'. NRC asks secondees NOT to be NRC but to represent fully the UN agency in question. But the choice is theirs. MFA not pushing for visibility through logos but want to read all reports. Send annual report &lt; financial and narrative.</p>	<p>asking them to rate their mission. Also do a phone debrief upon return and offer psychosocial counseling. Carry out field visits 1/year. Follow up with line-managers in the field only if problems but normally only contact with HQ level.</p>	<p>simultaneous secondments in the same country.</p> <p>Mid term reviews of 'package' secondments.</p> <p>Standardised survey in connection with return. Mostly also a debriefing meeting.</p> <p>Thematic experience sharing seminars.</p> <p>Budgets for two evaluations per annum; managers decide object of these on case by case basis.</p>	<p>intervene.</p>	<p>deployments &gt; indication of success.</p>	<p>active discussions with the partners and get regular feedback from agencies. Lesson learnt sessions for missions that were less successful. Involves desks but also the multi-lateral division in charge of partner relations. E.g. SDC collaborating closely with UNICEF on WASH and education in emergencies. WASH proved very successful, but education in emergencies do not see the impact and have discontinued.</p>
<b>Other</b>	<p>Sometimes MFA requests for certain persons to be deployed to specific positions &gt; strategic. They then use the NORCAP system of recruitment but not the roster. Very convenient for MFA. Can do quick recruitment process on the basis of UN request, but normally prefer not to. Precious about the quality of NRC brand.</p>	<p>Internal DRC review done in 2009 and DANIDA did an external review in 2010. DRC has external roster for UN agencies to use to bypass their own recruitment policies. The UN comes with their own candidates and DRC incorporates these onto this separate roster. The UN then recruits them through DRC, paying fully for them. These do not have quite the same</p>	<p>Review 2012.</p>	<p>Pro-active with deployments in priority sectors e.g. DRR. Have DRR expert at UNICEF in Geneva for 9 months. Want to see DRR incorporated into all TORs. RedR would encourage much more closer cooperation and coordination between the different standby partners &gt; everyone would win.</p>		

	NRC/NORCAP	Danish Refugee Council	MSB (Sweden)	RedR (Australia)	Irish Aid	SDC (Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation)
		rights as DRC members. Tricky, as part of DRC' brand, but do not go through DRC recruitment process.				



## Annex 2f: NORCAP SWOT

	HELPFUL TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES	HARMFUL TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES
INTERNAL	<p><b>STRENGTHS</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>⌚ Large roster with 700 members</li> <li>⌚ Diverse roster in terms of expertise (ranging from niche to generalists) but also ethnicity, geographical background and linguistic skills such as French and Arabic</li> <li>⌚ Fast, flexible deployment for up to 18 months</li> <li>⌚ Good relationship with MFA with significant resources which allows it to constantly respond to needs arising among the UN agencies it aims to serve</li> <li>⌚ Strategic approach to partnership with UN agencies; aims to understand their needs and maps their skills gaps, thereby being able to respond to specific requirements by recruiting proactively rather than reactively</li> </ul>	<p><b>WEAKNESS</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>⌚ Large roster expensive to maintain and train</li> <li>⌚ Diverse international roster dilutes the “Norwegian component”<sup>130</sup></li> <li>⌚ Limited oversight of secondees in the field; challenging for NORCAP to ensure consistent quality of secondees provided</li> <li>⌚ 18 month deployments that are fully paid for by NORCAP is expensive especially when value for money not clear as no real post-deployment impact assessment is carried out</li> </ul>
EXTERNAL	<p><b>OPPORTUNITIES</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>⌚ Good standing with UN agencies allows for real partnership and a chance for NRC/NORCAP to influence UN agency policies in the sectors they deploy staff in &gt; really strategic position Diverse roster in terms of expertise (ranging from niche to generalists) but also ethnicity, geographical background and linguistic skills (French and Arabic key)</li> <li>⌚ Proactive recruitment of specific agency-requested profiles ensures roster relevance for foreseeable future</li> <li>⌚ 18 month deployments, especially in strategic positions at HQ level, allows for fully understanding how a specific UN agency functions and what the staffing needs are</li> </ul>	<p><b>THREATS</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>⌚ Strategic, proactive approach to recruitment can be costly if needs suddenly change as they do in the ever changing complex environment of emergencies</li> <li>⌚ Survival of roster and threat of competition from other rosters becomes primary aim of recruitment and rapid deployment, as opposed to supporting UN agencies. &gt; Independent analysis of requests in terms of relevance and need becomes secondary or non-existent</li> <li>⌚ Increasing the roster size reduces oversight of roster members and the image and overall quality of the NORCAP roster can be damaged &gt; risks are increased</li> <li>⌚ Being the ‘go-to’ partner for many UN agencies leads to competition for key profiles and skills, and the need for more coordination by NORCAP, especially in large sudden onset emergencies where several experts may be seconded under different agencies</li> <li>⌚ Too much flexibility with UN agencies can lead to abuse of the in-kind system (deployments not always needs based)</li> </ul>

<sup>130</sup> Mentioned as a weakness as several key informants (non-Norwegian) emphasized that Norwegian secondees had higher quality and greater usefulness than other secondees.

## **Annex 2g: NORCAP Online Survey Analysis Report**

## 1. Overview

The purpose of the online survey is to conduct an independent, confidential, simple and targeted survey to understand perceptions of secondees so to contribute to continuous learning and improvement. The survey used the Survey Monkey tool.<sup>131</sup> The target audience of the survey is secondees that have been deployed by NORCAP to all countries, including case countries of evaluation (Pakistan, South Sudan and Somalia) from 2010-2012. NRC headquarters provided an email list of all secondees who have been seconded from 2010-2012. Having removed a few duplications in the email entry, the total number of secondees deployed during the evaluation period is 463.


An email invitation was sent out to all the secondees through the Survey Monkey tool. In the responses received, the name of the secondee is not evident ensuring that confidentiality of responses is maintained. Each respondent is identified with a number. Out of the 463, 5 secondees claimed there were no longer members of NORCAP and requested to be removed from the survey, leaving a final total of 458 secondees. Reminders were sent to those who have yet to respond. The online survey remained active for 3 weeks. The response rate was 63.1% with 289 response hits, higher rate than originally expected.

This report outlines the analysis of the online survey. Accuracy of the data and analysis may be slightly affected due to the following limitations:

- ⌚ Respondents did not complete the survey and skipped a few questions
- ⌚ Respondents' answers are based on their own interpretation of the question. For example a respondent stated there is communication with NRC in the field on formal matters. However during the follow up interview it was found the respondent had understood NRC to be NORCAP team in Oslo and not NRC country office team.
- ⌚ Respondent accidentally clicked the wrong response. Verification during the follow up interview suggests at least one respondent appeared to have clicked the wrong age range.

## 2. Background Information

### Q2. Gender




64.3% of the respondents are male while 35.7% are female. Three respondents skipped this question.

<sup>131</sup> [www.surveymonkey.com](http://www.surveymonkey.com)




### Q1. Age

Majority of the secondees are between the ages of 36-45 years old while 2.4% of secondees are aged above 65 years old.




### Q3. Where is your home country?



The largest percentage of respondents is 47.0%, from Norway followed by 29.6% from Africa. 9.8% of respondents are from Asia while others constitute around 13.6%. Home countries stated include Middle East, Canada, Sweden, Germany, and America.

#### Q4. What are your main areas of expertise?




The main areas of expertise include Coordination and Leadership; Programme Management; and Protection. This is followed by Social Affairs and Livelihood; Gender; Camp Management; Logistics and Supply; and others.

### 3. Secondment History

#### Q5. Are you registered with more than one organisation's emergency roster?


66.3% of secondees are only registered with one organisation's emergency roster, which is NORCAP while 30.7% are registered with more than one. 3.2% are not aware of how many they are registered with.



### Q6. When was your first secondment (for any organisation)?


Some secondees were sent on their first secondment as early as in year 1992 with a handful assigned between 1995 and 1999. The majority of secondees had their first secondment in the last 5 years.

### Q7. How many times have you been sent out as a secondnee in total?



Most secondees have been sent out between 1 to 5 times in total, with only 1.1% who have never been on any secondment and 14.1% who have been sent out as secondees more than 5 times.

### Q8. How many times have you been sent out as a secondnee for NORCAP/NRC?




A similar pattern as in the previous graph is seen in secondees sent out specifically for NORCAP/NRC. Most secondees have been sent out between 1 to 5 times in total, with 1.8% who has never been on any secondment and 8.5% who have been sent out as secondees more than 5 times.

**Q9. Which country are/were you seconded to during your most recent post of secondment for NORCAP/NRC? Please enter name of country.**

Some of the countries of secondment included Jordan, Kosovo, Palestine, Pakistan, Sudan, Lebanon, Italy, Iraq, Italy, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Somalia, Mauritania, Colombia, Switzerland, Philippines, Zimbabwe, Afghanistan, Yemen, Nigeria, Kenya, Senegal, Netherlands, Venezuela, Egypt, France, Chile, Kyrgyzstan and others, which indicated a large variety and spread across the globe.

**Q10. Which host organisation are/were you attached to during your most recent post of secondment for NORCAP/NRC?**

The highest host organisation attached to was UNICEF for 25.9% of secondees, followed by 19.8% with UNHCR. Scattered responses showed that secondees were attached to FAO, WFP, IOM<sup>132</sup> and others during their most recent post of secondment for NORCAP/NRC.




**4. Questions about your most recent post of secondment for NORCAP/NRC**

<sup>132</sup> International Organisation for Migration.


**Q11. Upon arrival at the post of secondment, the duration it took me to fully operate in my position was**

15.4% agreed that the fastest it takes for secondees to settle in and operate upon their arrival is 1-2 days. 16.1% respondents required 3-5 days to operate while 17.1% required 1 week to operate in their new assignment. 15% required 2 weeks to operate. A large number of respondents, 19.6% required 1-2 months to operate. 8.9% required 1-2 months to settle in the job while 5% took more than 2 months to be fully operational.




**Q12. I received thorough briefing by NORCAP/NRC**

37.2% strongly agreed that they received thorough briefing by NORCAP/NRC while 24.7% agreed to the statement, with a general acceptance of 61.9%. Only 12.8% disagreed to this and 18.2% remained neutral.




**Q13. I received thorough briefing by the Host Organisation**




In comparison to briefing by NORCAP/NRC, more disagreed to have received thorough briefing by the host organisation, with only 32.8% strongly agreeing to the above statement. Approximately 31.4% can be said to disagree on receiving thorough briefing by their hosts, and 24.3% not giving a distinctive feedback.

**Q14. I know how to get the information I need to fulfill my role as a secondee**

More than half of the secondees, 66.1%, strongly agreed to knowing how to get the information needed to fulfil his or her role as a secondee, with only about 1.8% disagreeing so.




**Q15. It is clear to me what the Host Organisation expects me to deliver in my job**




It was largely clear to the secondees what the host organisation expects him or her to deliver in their jobs, with 56.3% strongly agreeing so, 23.3% agreeing, and only 5.3% disagreeing.

**Q16. On mission, I have been treated fairly just like any other staff members in the Host Organisation**




While 60.7% felt like they are treated fairly just like any other staff in the host organisation, 19.3% disagreed and 17.9% remained neutral with the statement.

**Q17. I believe there is sufficient communication between me and the relevant people in the Host Organisation**



The majority believes that there is sufficient communication between them and the relevant people in the host organisation (65.8%). However there is a handful of 13.7% who believe there is lack of communication and 19.8% who do not take a clear stand on the matter.

**Q18. On mission, I communicate with NRC personnel in NRC programmes or projects in the field**




More than half of the interviewed secondees, 51.8%, communicate with NRC personnel in NRC programmes or projects in the field on formal matters and 37.7% communicate informally. 29.1% communicate once in a month, 14.7% weekly, 19.4% rarely establish communication and 12.6% do not communicate at all. (Note that respondents have checked more than one answer.)




## 5. Questions about your most recent post of secondment for NORCAP/NRC.

### Q19. When on secondment, I see myself as a secondee of




52.4% of the secondees regard themselves as representatives of both NRC and NORCAP. 24.4% see themselves as a secondee of NRC while 18.2% see themselves as a secondee of NORCAP only.

### Q20. On mission, I regard myself as representing




Primarily, 79.6% regard themselves as representing the host organisation. Secondarily, almost half regard themselves as representing NRC (46.4%) and NORCAP (45.1%), with lesser representatives regarding themselves as representing Norway.

### Q21. I am proud to tell people I am part of




60.7% of secondees are proud to tell people that they are part of the host organisation, while a larger percentage of 75.6% are proud to say they are part of NORCAP and almost equally 77.6% are proud to say they are part of NRC.

### Q22. NORCAP/NRC inspires commitment among its secondees



83.4% feel that NORCAP/NRC inspires commitment among its secondees.


### 23. The Host Organisation inspires commitment among its secondees



As opposed to NORCAP/NRC inspiring commitment, a much lower percentage of 54.7% feel that the host organisation inspires commitment among its secondees. This is 28.7% lesser than the previous graph. While 19.1% disagree that host organisations inspires commitment among them, 24.4% remain neutral.


### 6. Questions about your most recent post of secondment for NORCAP/NRC.

#### Q24. It is clear to me how my role contributes to the Host Organisation's goal




86.6% of secondees are clear on how their role contributes to the host organisation's goal.

**Q25. It is clear to me how my role contributes to improving the situation of the target population**




Similarly, 87.8% know how their role contributes to improving the situation of the target population.

**Q26. I feel the work I do has a positive impact on the Host Organisation**



Almost all secondees, 91.4%, feel that the work they do has a positive impact on the host organisation.

## Q27. I feel the work I do has a positive impact on the target population



Secondees also feel their work has a positive impact on the target population in general. However only 83.4% agree with this statement, which is 8% lesser than those who feel that their work have a more positive impact on the host organisation (as seen in the previous graphs 91.4%). There is a 11.1% who remain neutral on the matter.

### 7. Comments by the respondents.

70.8% of online respondents indicated their availability to be contacted for further discussions via skype, by leaving their contact numbers and skype IDs.

The respondents were asked to give their comments and suggestions on a number of topics, such as the host organisations, other rosters, NORCAP and about being a secondee. The comments under each category were sorted into positive comments, negative comments and areas of improvement. Below is a list of the comments. Apart from sorting them and ensuring there are no obvious threats to anonymity, they are listed as given by the secondees.

## About Host Organisations

### POSITIVE COMMENTS

- 1 The staff are open minded and understand our support to reach the common goal.
- 2 The Representative for UNESCO was very excited about the work and my evaluation was very positive.
- 3 Senior staff at Country Office level made me feel more like one of them, not at junior levels in the field.
- 4 Am satisfied by the way my UNICEF supervisor relates with me professionally.
- 5 Host organisations have in general been grateful for the secondment. Knowledge about the secondment arrangement varies a lot in the field.
- 6 Always had great experiences, worked with high professionals and was regarded as an equal in their teams. Full support by management and space / trust to work!
- 7 Can be tough working for the AU but I also work with some really fantastic people and my work is valued.
- 8 My skills were very relevant to the nutrition emergency response and UNICEF provided a favourable working environment.
- 9 UNICEF office in Juba was pleasant place to work at.
- 10 I got a good preparation before secondment, paid by NRC and trained by WFP and attended 2 courses in Cash and Voucher.
- 11 Thank you for the great work of helping others.
- 12 I was very well welcomed at UNFPA Sanaa in YEMEN and got great responsibilities to set up a GBV sub-cluster. I had great interaction with other secondees from NORCAP and ProCap. We mutually supported each other in protection cluster chaired by ProCap, child protection cluster chaired by a NORCAP fellow and GBV sub-cluster chaired by myself.
- 13 Although I have issues sometimes with the management and leadership in the host organisation, when I speak to other secondees, I feel I have a decent time. I never am made to feel different from the host organisation employees.
- 14 Host Organisations usually respect secondees from NORCAP/NRC.
- 15 Most of the time they are fine.
- 16 The organisation is unique for specific reason in a particular place.
- 17 The Host organisation has been very fair to me and offered me a contract.
- 18 Huge in operations and the areas I was involved in are not the main priority. So it seems a bit difficult to bring a lasting change to the program operation. But still have a great opportunity and a chance to contribute to the program.
- 19 Host Organisations have become better at integrating secondees.
- 20 First time for UNDP but so far it's ok, no bad feelings, but system is big and slow.
- 21 It has been mostly friendly and appreciative of services given. My familiarity with UN as an agency helped me fit within rules and regulations of the agency.
- 22 Over the years I have learned that host organisations differ, although they are UN agencies they are not the same in the way they treat staff on secondment. Also, personality comes into play; there are those with leadership skills and those with none. In the spirit of the latter I have learnt to adjust accordingly and find my way of coping and proving that I can make a difference especially in the lives of beneficiaries. Putting beneficiaries first has helped me to overcome most obstacles.
- 23 Interesting experiences.
- 24 However, when I was seconded by UNDP to support SSDDRC I found that SSDDRC had a better understanding of my work and a need for it and I felt welcome and better used by that organisation for my skill set.
- 25 The job and the task of my secondment were interesting. Host organisation dealt with me as being an equal member of the organisation; learned a lot despite the context being difficult to work in.
- 26 Being a former UNICEF staff I am always seconded to UNICEF positions. It is much more relevant and easy for me to adapt into the activities due to the previous knowledge in the organisation.
- 27 The entire UN family was in a mess in Haiti following the earthquake early 2010 and the WFP was no exception. Our arrival was hardly foreseen, I had to order three of my team-members - out of five - to remain in Santo Domingo, DR. It was all a mess for approximately six weeks. Finally I chose to work for a catholic community in Port Au Prince. This after being presented with nearly impossible projects by the WFP. We prepared hot meals for approx. 2000/1500 children and with no soldiers present! This was the key to our success. Our project was chosen among many others to the WFP Donor presentation in New York in March 2010.

### NEGATIVE COMMENTS

- 28 On one secondment I felt mistreated and suffered some mental distress, but the other two I felt like they were grateful to have me, even though it is never easy situations.
- 29 No clear communication about my role.
- 30 UNICEF had a communication problem in Liberia on all levels.

- 31 It happens that some managers/supervisors in the fields of host organisations don't master the MOU signed between the NORCAP/NRC and their institutions.
- 32 Host organisation should be oriented in details about how to view the secondee, what is their position (staff-non staff, etc) and what does that mean to the organisation. In my case, this was never clear to the host organisation.
- 33 OCHA in this case did not have any Head of Office until just before I left which made it take much longer to fully operate in my post.
- 34 Knowledge about the secondment arrangement varies a lot in the field.
- 35 UNESCO has no money, they had my supervisor who was insecure and not particularly happy with me as her assistant. She was making it difficult to even leave the office.
- 36 Host organisation could do much more in integrating the secondees into the office as well as involving them in the important forums and program structures; often it happens that we are not perceived as a part of the organisation, sometimes this can impact on very practical issues (ie. as a secondee you will often not have an access to the same/standard quality of the IT equipment)
- 37 Have been posted to the same host organisation twice.
- 38 UNICEF office in Juba was pleasant place to work at though my supervisor was difficult to work with. He totally lacks supervision skills and has unpredictable mood.
- 39 The host organisation considers us as consultant, so there is some services that we are not receiving, because they are not aware of the MoU between NRC and UNICEF.
- 40 As a secondee you are not treated as an international staff, e.g. you are denied an opportunity of driving while a national staff is allowed to use organisation's cars. You are also not given an opportunity to represent the host organisation in high profile meetings e.g. SMT meetings.
- 41 My experience with my last host organisation was not as good as the previous (no phone, difficulty to get a laptop and sometimes no vehicle for field visit).
- 42 I have issues sometimes with the management and leadership in the host organisation.
- 43 My line manager was expecting someone else, not I. He noticed that upon my arrival. There was an impact on our work relation.
- 44 Most of the time they are fine but sometimes it is very difficult to accommodate as they show that you are different from them - that we are not working in the same organisation.
- 45 Many times even the local staff create problems for the secondees and the Head also listen to them.
- 46 Usually host organisations do not treat us as full staff in rights and obligations. This comes from considering us a surge, short term and free staff, inaccessibility to agency's financial and administrative system. Implementing emergency programs which has certain complexities in term of remote duty stations, less monitoring and follow up.
- 47 So it seems a bit difficult to bring a lasting change to the program operation.
- 48 Less so for UNHCR, lots of politics and back-stabbing and change in management changed my remit and purpose.
- 49 But system is big and slow.
- 50 Host Organisations should treat secondees better than they do. I was not pleased when I heard one of the managers saying that I am on "some sort of consultancy".
- 51 Although they are UN agencies they are not the same in the way they treat staff on secondment. There are those with leadership skills and those with none.
- 52 Sometimes the logistics capacity of the host organisation is limited and that will affect the work of the secondee.
- 53 I felt the host organisation wasn't prepared to host me, they did no orientation and even lost my papers and asked for things NORCAP had provided them to begin with, making it appear that I wasn't prepared, as I was forced to repeatedly phone my NORCAP and NRC contacts to furnish the same papers again. However, when I was seconded by UNDP to support SSDDRC I found that SSDDRC had a better understanding of my work and a need for it and I felt welcome and better used by that organisation for my skill set. It was a pity I couldn't go back due to policies governing how long one can remain in a mission. UNDP can do a much better work to prepare for Secondees. Makes no sense to have secondees still having to find out what they need to do to get from point 'a' to point 'b' months into placement. Sometimes they act like they really don't need you, partly because you are not 'part of UNDP'. I even had staff refuse to fetch me from hotel to work, I had to walk. Eventually, while they were required to take me to the market on Saturdays when requested, the driving staff did not show up, I walked or took local taxis in the last few months of my stay, this wasn't necessary at all. Example how sometimes Host organisation seems to work against Seconding organisation: When NORCAP contacts visited Juba, UNDP refused to provide me a vehicle to attend a meeting for it was 'after hours' (they did this regularly) as it was not 'official'. I found out when my vehicle didn't show up, so I didn't go to that meeting, I found myself having to apologise for not making it! Petty things can sour one's desire to remain in the host country or organisation.
- 54 The job and the task of my secondment was interesting; however, the extra-work life could become boring in the context I was in; Host organisation dealt with me as being an equal member of the organisation; learned a lot despite the context being difficult to work in; however, some modalities of work of the host organisation were difficult to adapt to; there was a high turnover of my supervisor position which became frustrating for me and some of my colleagues.

- 55 Channels of communication not very clear and no baseline is set for performance evaluation, leaving secondees at the mercy of supervisors irrespective of achievements.
- 56 I just feel that the MoU between NRC and UN Agencies needs to be updated and also most of the HR units in the agencies do not know all the commitment of their agencies towards secondees.
- 57 The present one is more or less in total disarray and suffers from inertia and incompetency.
- 58 When Host Organisation doesn't treat you as one of their own staff, the assignment becomes difficult. One has to have a proper place to stay in order to work well. We are normally under high pressure and with pressure on housing that takes a lot of energy. In this assignment I slept on floors sometimes because there was no bed.
- 59 The treatment I received from IOM in my last assignment was very poor and abusive. I will have serious reservations about working for IOM again.
- 60 Being not part of the organisation, certain decisions even affecting your sector (eg. staff hiring etc) are made without your knowledge.
- 61 Some do not fully understand the MOU in detail.
- 62 Some don't take their part of the MOU seriously.
- 63 Host Organisations should have trust and faith in secondees especially when it comes to decision making. Some secondees are better and far better managers than what the Host organisation would be having. Conflicting ideas in most cases when someone tells you that he is to supervise a secondee when that someone is just a fool.
- 64 UNICEF and UNHCR very, very weak impressions; IOM much better, but saw them off balance in Haiti, TIPH a special mission/organisation and does what it can within very limited framework (and in essence just a political statement of an outdated Oslo Process); SLMM was an interesting entity coming out of a political an historical reality which eventually was bypassed by a new political and historical reality. It did however have, until the conflict reached a point of no return, an important role as a formal and informal channel of communication for the parties to the conflict.
- 65 They are not aware of the agreement they have signed with NRC when it comes to our rights.
- 66 Host organisation is well familiar with NRC. I don't think they have clear image of NORCAP as a distinct entity within NRC.
- 67 In this particular case, the host office was not prepared for receiving me (it took 2 weeks for me to have a UNICEF e-mail address and access to internet and a printer), and they had no plan for what to do when I left.
- 68 There was misunderstanding between UNHCR head office and country office regarding my TOR. Hence, I was asked to work on different task instead of my initial TOR. This has created some problem in contributing to my mission to the best of my capacity.
- 69 It was the biggest emergency operation in 2010 and the host organisation was overwhelmed and staffed with a lot of inexperienced camp management employees.
- 70 My experience in the host organisation was not very good, caused mainly by a terrible office manager (who I was warned against before deployment).
- 71 Some staff of the host organisation do not care for the secondee.
- 72 The feeling that I am a secondee leaves me out of the privileges other staff members have. I have to take care of myself in a foreign country completely on my own.
- 73 They regard the seconded staff as secondary.
- 74 There is a lack of debriefing.

#### **SUGGESTIONS, ETC**

- 75 WFP could do better to ensure the secondee feels more at home.
- 76 Sponsor relevant training, events for secondees.
- 77 Host organisations should request secondees when really needed and staff demands cannot be met in other ways.
- 78 Treat the standby partners staff and the regular staff as equal in terms of to spend in the field if we have to organise technical mission from the country office.
- 79 Host organisation should be oriented in details about how to view the secondee, what is their position (staff-non staff, etc) and what does that mean to the organisation.
- 80 May know well NRC /NORCAP rule and principle.
- 81 Information from HQ to the field office that receives a secondee should be improved in most cases.
- 82 To consider secondees as partners in delivering same goals.
- 83 Host organisation could do much more in integrating the secondees into the office as well as involving them in the important forums and program structures.
- 84 Host institutions should use Secondees for only tasks in the ToRs.
- 85 Filing the documents related to performance evaluation and propose officially to NORCAP/NRC the promotion of secondees in case of new responsibilities.
- 86 They need to understand that we are not an outsiders, but rather colleagues working together for the same purpose.



- 87 Plus de respect du staff de soutien. revision des accords entre NRC et UNICEF et le HCR. nous faire beneficier de formation a l'interne et nous considerer comme des staffs surtout avec UNICEF
- 88 Better get to know about secondees capacities.
- 89 They should give full responsibility to secondee to carry out their tasks and same chance as other staffs for opportunities such as post/vacancy, trainings.
- 90 While secondees are host organisation staff agencies should endeavour to ensure their full integration into the host agency. Introductions such as: this is so and so a secondee from NRC although essential should be minimised to ensure full integration and acceptability.
- 91 At the field level, be sure to receive and understand the MoU in order understand the secondees statue in the organisation.
- 92 Need to brief the secondee on the whole internal practices at the arrival: Who? Where? What?
- 93 Host organisation is to provide a comprehensive briefing and authority to the secondee.
- 94 HOs need to ensure most privileges are given to secondees just as their own staff.
- 95 To contribute to the improvement of working conditions of the secondees.
- 96 Improvement of treatment to secondees.
- 97 The receiving agency should undertake to respect the terms and conditions of the MoU, facilitating the employee's needs in these activities during his mission, and clarifying.
- 98 In general I think it could be done much more from the host organisations to accept the secondee as the equal member of the team since often we are not there only on very short assignments but end up being seconded for quite long time in the same office (based on the request of the office)
- 99 Host Organisation should treat secondees equally as their staff. You can read in between the line that this is not so.
- 100 Should be advised to consider secondees came to serve the people, and do not divide secondees or their own staff.
- 101 I just feel that the MoU between NRC and UN Agencies needs to be updated.
- 102 Can be focused on community institution strengthen through vertical and horizontal expansion of Government organisation.
- 103 One has to have a proper place to stay in order to work well.
- 104 May know well NRC /NORCAP rule and principle.
- 105 Host Organisations are not bad, however they need to improve on the arrangements to receive secondees, especially accommodation.
- 106 Variable with organisation, country and personnel how much is possible to implement and how to integrate.
- 107 Need to improve the way secondees are handled in terms of work responsibilities and decision making.
- 108 Host Organisations should have trust and faith in secondees especially when it comes to decision making.
- 109 Other than HQs, country offices (especially HR and Admin) need to know about standby partner agreement with WFP on entitlement and alike.

## About Other Secondments

### POSITIVE COMMENTS

- 110 A positive and direct way to contribute in helping the target population. A strong force in the field.
- 111 It is a great team of NRC secondments and we help each other.
- 112 Happy to continue - however NRC need to explore training and rewarding opportunities based on PER.
- 113 I feel good to work with anybody as usual so that everywhere, I am; things are ok (personal and professional relations).
- 114 Secondment exposes one to different situations in different countries which are both positive and negative.
- 115 Good team work and friendly environment.
- 116 Would have given a better review if asked about my first secondment (to the same organisation in another country).
- 117 I am with UNICEF, oPt since Dec, 2010. Before that I was seconded to UNHCR in Liberia (2007 - 2009). Related to one of the survey's question: in Liberia I have direct/ formal contact with NRC programme, since I was working on the transitioning of Protection monitoring project which has been implemented by NRC.
- 118 I would be very interested to keep going on other secondments for different organisations.
- 119 Other secondments haven't always been as successful as this one.
- 120 Secondment to MONUSCO was one of the best professional experiences I had.
- 121 I like being seconded because it makes me feel safer than when I am just with the UN. When crisis-type situations have occurred, I've felt cared for by NRC vs. my UN colleagues who did not receive the same. This is important in such intense environments.
- 122 I have been on other secondments and I think UNICEF has being one of those organisations where you feel like you are one of them, which to me is important.
- 123 UNICEF lovely organisation to work with from my point of view.
- 124 Have enjoyed them all.
- 125 Tough but satisfying especially when one's contribution (secondees contribution) is realised and appreciated.

- 126 I am a GenCap member of the roster since 2009. There are a number of other secondments from different organisation, however i still feel NRC/NORCAP has better conducive terms.
- 127 Would gladly accept one if offered by NRC, taking into account also how much the job would be interesting; but as an organisation, would definitely work again for NRC.
- 128 I am seconded to countries Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar and Philippines and taken assignment as Emergency WASH Specialist. All are great.
- 129 I have had interesting posts and tasks and learned a lot, improving my general performance and widening skills.
- 130 Very good eye opener.

#### **NEGATIVE COMMENTS**

- 131 This was my first secondment.
- 132 My previous secondment was with a UN-organisation, there I experienced that gratis personnel as NORCAP were treated as second rate compared to UN personnel.
- 133 However NRC need to explore training and rewarding opportunities based on Performance Evaluation Review (PER).
- 134 All the UN host organisations field management behave with all the secondments in the same like they are outsiders.
- 135 Secondment exposes one to different situations in different countries which are both positive and negative.
- 136 My last secondment is not typical of my experiences as it lasted only 3 months, and as the situation in the country of secondment was very chaotic.
- 137 Never been on any other.
- 138 This was/is my first mission and was extended as requested by host organisation to the maximum time offered by NRC. May share more with others. It normally takes too long to receive other secondments.
- 139 Host organisations delay deployments by providing invitation letters (for a visa) or a terms of reference late, even when the secondee is ready to leave earlier.
- 140 Other secondments haven't always been as successful as this one.

#### **SUGGESTIONS, ETC**

- 141 Avoir une plateforme pour le partage d'information
- 142 More respect for the secondees. Revision of agreement between NRC and UNICEF and UNHCR, let secondees benefit from internal information and most of all, consider us at equal terms as UNICEF staff.
- 143 I am available for other secondments and hope it will be with good supervisors of hosting agencies and supportive local staff.
- 144 When will I be redeployed again?
- 145 The contract extension periods should be viewed in relation with the assignment.
- 146 I think there is need to cooperate with host organisation to give secondees a UNLP (UN passport) for them to use for travelling to avoid harassment at the airports.
- 147 Never been on any other secondment.
- 148 Is it possible to increase the duration of deployment from 6 months to 1 year in order to reach some quantified achievements for the organisation?
- 149 I would be very interested to keep doing on other secondments for different organisations.

### **About Being A Secondee**

#### **POSITIVE COMMENTS**

- 150 Enjoyed it very much.
- 151 I like this job and appreciate being a member of the NRC/NORCAP roster. However would like to see more efforts in advancing the capacity of secondees (i.e. support to relevant trainings).
- 152 A chance to work in an international organisation. It built my capabilities and I gave my own experiences and knowledge in the service of others.
- 153 Very interesting experience, but also frustrating.
- 154 Is like being part of a family, strengthens unity, community of practice, coordination.
- 155 As a secondee, we may know that we are consultants so we can't have the same advantages like the host organisations staff.
- 156 Being a secondee makes you more or less free in terms of advice and observations beyond institutional biases.
- 157 It is a great privilege to be a secondee and to see that the work you do is being appreciated by the host organisation.
- 158 It is a good experience, but with challenges of being an accompanied position, even in countries not at risks.
- 159 Interesting, have enjoyed the independence that I have as I am not looking for a career with my host organisation.
- 160 Am proud of being a secondee, the only problem I have with the Host Organisation is the fact that in the field you work under a national staff.

- 161 I'm proud of my achievement as secondee.  
 162 Great opportunity.  
 163 Have got good and great experience.  
 164 Life is easier, as I fully control my flexibility and availability and I work all over the world and in so many institutions.  
 165 Worthy experience that I was assistance to the disaster victims.  
 166 Proud to be NRC/NORCAP member.  
 167 It is my great pleasure to be a secondee and more so with NRC/NORCAP. I get the support I require in all issues from my coordinator which is not the situation with other employers.  
 168 Has advantages and disadvantages.  
 169 I like the flexibility of the programme.  
 170 It is rewarding and fulfilling to use my skills and knowledge to contribute in the response to the person in need of protection and assistance through NORCAP/NRC.  
 171 Was the highlight of my UN career of 20 years, working with NRC, working for UNHCR, despite the challenges.  
 172 As a first time secondee, I think it went better than I thought/expected and I might enjoy being in the roaster.  
 173 Very proud to share my experience with other humanitarian workers, and help those who are in need.  
 174 Being a secondee is critical in my career as it allows me to deliver timely services wherever and whenever I am required. It is an opportunity for me to continue learning and develop in my career path as a humanitarian worker.  
 175 Being a secondee gives you courage to do your work and to do it well. In most organisations the leadership can sometimes be very hard on their employees to report positively on what might be negative. Being a secondee one can stand on what one means and what is right because you are there on limited time. And coming from Norway gives you that right, many workers seem to like our Human rights stand. That one is not looking for a job gives you more freedom, to do what is right.  
 176 I am happy for being secondee with NORCAP.  
 177 Happy about being a secondee as it personally and professionally suits my career and personal life.  
 178 I am proud being a secondee for NRC first and Norway second.  
 179 I only think about the people for whom I am there to help them and I am happy that I can do something for the people whom it is not the matter I am secondee or whoever, they just need help.

#### **NEGATIVE COMMENTS**

- 180 Since we are not the staff of the organisations we are secondeed to, they will not include or send us on the trainings or even include into seminars/ workshops (unless they are happening in the duty stations) even when they are relevant to the work we are doing.  
 181 I feel a bit uncertain about my future career path.  
 182 Frustrating.  
 183 Host organisations need more awareness on how to treat secondees. Sometimes they regard us with less regard. Some incentives are not given to us such as phone credit or even a newspaper just because we are not staff.  
 184 As a secondee, we may know that we are consultants so we can't have the same advantages like the host organisations staff.  
 185 As a secondee, other staff within the host institution or other organisations may not very much value a secondee and his/her decisions.  
 186 To be a secondee, it is a hard job because we have to conciliate the rules of Host Organisations and NORCAP/NRC and report to 2 organisations.  
 187 Challenges of being an accompanied position, even in countries not at risks.  
 188 Not entitled to DSA payment when on missions. It is believed that NRC/NORCAP already covered it in the salary package.  
 189 In the field you work under a national staff.  
 190 Very challenging and un-predictable life as mostly to work in emergency situations.  
 191 Difficulties with conflicting information between host organisation and NRC/NORDEM on administration (payment, coverage) and layers of contacts. Host organisation (OSCE HCNM) raised this several times with the Norwegian MFA.  
 192 Difficult sometimes, especially when the decision to continue a contract has to be taken. Sometimes it is very frustrating for the secondee as it takes time to make decision whether the secondee will stay or not.  
 193 Even though it is very important, it is not sustainable type of employment for the secondee.  
 194 Particularly in UN operations, secondees are treated as inferiors to regular personnel.  
 195 Some break rules and endanger their host organisation, other secondees and themselves.

#### **SUGGESTIONS**

- 196 Would like to see more efforts in advancing the capacity of secondees (i.e. support to relevant trainings).

- 197 On another note, as indicated above, more should be done to include/integrate secondees in the office and relevant structures /meetings etc. This would not only contribute to higher satisfaction for us as the employee in the particular organisation but would contribute very much to the efficiency and our output (this is particularly relevant in the beginning, before we 'found our way' to get relevant information etc).
- 198 I wish that NRC can create a system whereby a secondee have the opportunity to continue working with NORCAP/NRC and be in different missions without disruption of financial matters.
- 199 Host organisations need more awareness on how to treat secondees.
- 200 Being a secondee changes with every secondment and/or leadership of the host organisation.
- 201 I wish the contract conditions of NRC be similar as the Host organisation. I.e. pension and benefits.
- 202 Plus de formations et de soutien psychologique**
- 203 There should have been some questions about NORCAP behaviour when there are problems with the secondment.
- 204 Secondees should be paid according to both the standard of living in their country of origin (country of residence) and level of study (bachelor, master, PhD).
- 205 Be ready for hard work in the field level.
- 206 May have more time to interact with host/targeted populations.
- 207 It's okay, but when we are out for longer period tax must be reduced, UN employed are better off that way.

## About NORCAP / NRC

### POSITIVE COMMENTS

- 208 Very supportive.
- 209 I am proud to be the member of NORCAP/NRC.
- 210 I have always used these terms interchangeably.
- 211 Great system, just the tax system not really clear and not competitive for European Non Norwegian.
- 212 The NORCAP/NRC contributes a lot to the host organisation, but rarely appreciated at mission by host organisation.
- 213 Am satisfied with the way my coordinator helps me in case of my needs, he responds immediately.
- 214 I appreciate the opportunity given me to share my skills and contribute to emergency response. There was always support whenever it was required from Oslo coordinator.
- 215 My NRC representative has been thorough and accessible.
- 216 Great roster, highly abused by UNHCR - use it to cover up their inability to recruit from outside so when they need skilled people, they use the roster.
- 217 Secondment program is very suitable to support Host organisation which sometimes lacks financial resources for the recruitment of specialists required for specific assignment.
- 218 Professional in admin support, but very personally dependent on their advisers. Some make a great difference, few lack social skills, contextual understanding and pro-active.
- 219 Very professional people to work with. The secondment is generally handled extremely well.
- 220 Make you feel that they are reachable and ready to help if needed.
- 221 Is a nice structure but many things need to be improved.
- 222 Very interesting organisation on international personal deployment.
- 223 Very good roster and reputed among host organisations.
- 224 Hope they will have more opportunities to assign as soon as possible. All the members of NRC did like it that I was recruited and thought I was actually not NRC qualified although my evaluation was very positive.
- 225 Very professional and they do care about their staff while on deployment.
- 226 NORCAP/NRC brings precious support to its secondees in terms of advice, visits in the fields and living conditions.
- 227 Communication between NRC and secondee is very good, timely responding. What I see missing is the physical follow up either with Host organisation or secondee.
- 228 NRC/NORCAP motivated me considerably despite job insecurity.
- 229 The organisation debriefed me well for the mission. As a person who has worked in different countries I was fine with my placement. Later, I was able to attend a follow up in Norway and that helped with my trips second leg.
- 230 Very responsive to secondees' needs and welfare.
- 231 NORCAP/NRC is very supportive for secondees when they have an assignment, and before and after an assignment. Between assignments there should be more follow-up on emergency matters.
- 232 MFA in Norway had outsourced my budget to NRC for the seconded period 2008 - 2012 (4.5 years). One of the best organisations I have ever worked for, with people at heart.
- 233 Is a competent organisation that deals with all kind of situations around the world.
- 234 I am grateful for the NORCAP/NRC opportunity and support.
- 235 Excellent organisation to work with.
- 236 Wonderful support from HQ.
- 237 I came to learn about NRC in 2007, and since that time, there have been a lot of development in the arrangements.

- 238 I got a good preparation before secondment, paid by NRC and trained by WFP and attended 2 courses in Cash& voucher.
- 239 Good employer - takes care of secondee well.
- 240 I feel comfortable working with NORCAP/NRC and feel supported by them when needed!
- 241 I am and I will always be very grateful for the opportunity that NRC provided me to work as a secondee.
- 242 It is a great arrangement that support and assist other Organisation to provide assistance to the population in need.
- 243 Excellent working with NRC, was treated very well.
- 244 I feel proud and honored to be part of the team.
- 245 Excellent initiative and dedicated organisation.
- 246 Very experienced organisation and the coordinators for the secondment are very collaborative.
- 247 I've been happy with NORCAP/NRC and have good relations with the NRC staff, especially in my last secondment location. Several of them have become good friends.
- 248 Sponsor relevant training, events for secondees.
- 249 NRC communicates official matters to members and to me they are seen as fully in charge of secondee.
- 250 NORCAP/NRC provides timely interventions by deploying humanitarian specialists where they are needed most. This is a noble humanitarian intervention that contributes immensely to saving human lives and stopping human suffering.
- 251 It is a great organisation.
- 252 Very professional organisation to fulfill specific tasks.
- 253 Very good at following up before assignments, during and after assignment, at least in my experience.
- 254 Very well organised, supporting their employees, very good when needed.
- 255 Best, considerate and most organised body to work for.
- 256 Was local staff with NRC Pakistan for the emergency response of earthquake 2005, Pakistan. During those years and later NORASIA (Now NORCAP) groomed me. What I am today is because of their trust and intention to polish their staff members. Wherever we are, whether with NRC/NORCAP or not, our performance is the token of support / interest of NRC/NORCAP in their staff for their capacity building.
- 257 Doing a great job.
- 258 We are doing a remarkable job in difficult situations in emergencies.
- 259 UNHCR seems to be very satisfied with NRC secondees. One of my colleague even implied that NRC has higher recruiting standards than UNHCR itself.
- 260 Great experience working for them; very professional and respectful; one of the best I have worked for; supportive when needed.
- 261 NRC prepared us for the mission with post deployment briefing and that helped me a lot during my mission.
- 262 I am very much satisfied being an emergency roster member and secondee of NRC/NORCAP. I have frequently visited Oslo Office on many occasions and found NRC/NORCAP staff very friendly and assisting in all of the requirements for the secondments.
- 263 Pleased with NORCAP/NRC follow up.
- 264 Thank you so much for your great support.
- 265 Generally good support and follow-up in the field.
- 266 Is one of the best agency seconding staff to other organisations.
- 267 Dedication, professionalism, impartiality, commitment, transparency.
- 268 Has become much more professional lately, and follows up secondee.
- 269 During assignment I have received full support from the coordinator.

## **NEGATIVE COMMENTS**

- 270 My experience is that NRC's name is better recognised, NORCAP is only understood by secondees.
- 271 My arrival was not planned, because nobody was at the airport, I suffer to have a hotel, and nobody was expecting to arrive that day.
- 272 Tax system not really clear and not competitive for European Non Norwegian.
- 273 Rarely appreciated at mission by host organisation.
- 274 NRC an organisation with ideological and economical potential. Its strength is its focused mandate and at times good field operations (though weakened being linked up to a normally ineffective, at best, UN in the field). Weakness in lack of NRC culture and overall strategy: difficult to get sense of an organisation which existing since the 1940s - it could just as easily have been established last year. Not rooted in its own history and tradition - not having its own unique historical, cultural identity despite being around so long.
- 275 My impression is that for years (closing in on decades) the feedback from the field has been very negative, but no new policies or change of attitude comes out of it: continue as before, get the numbers of secondees, improve the statistics. A bit unfair, I know, but an edge of seriousness and idealism would be appreciated.
- 276 NORCAP comes off as a bit of an "administration hub" sending people out on missions - does not feel it is very involved with the effect of those missions; a feeling that their hearts are not in it "hear nothing, see nothing, do nothing" attitude.

- 277 Highly abused by UNHCR - use it to cover up their inability to recruit from outside so when they need skilled people, they use the roster.
- 278 Although the briefing was thorough at the HQ of the NRC, the practical preparations for the mission was chaotic. Logistically, nothing was prepared. Furthermore we were forced to leave for Haiti due to political reasons. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs - MFA - was financing the operations and wanted action. NRC is totally dependent of the MFA by all means and they jump when they are told to.
- 279 Very personally dependent on their advisers. Some make a great difference, few lack social skills, contextual understanding and proactive attitude.
- 280 There are a lot of technicalities ignored by the NRC and they are crucial to deliver and influence. The salaries are much lower than the staff members in the same level as the host organisation.
- 281 I still don't understand if I can be part of NORCAP or not because of my Canadian nationality.
- 282 Too long time between secondments and very little interest from NRC/NORCAP to reply on questions, etc.
- 283 They rotate their own administrative staff too often, which creates confusion and BIG misunderstandings / errors.
- 284 Lacking in the survey: the communication between NRC/NORCAP and the secondee in the field: the need for support from NRC.
- 285 Why NORCAP/NRC? I'm a NORCAP roster member. I have never worked for NRC.
- 286 Could generate some frustration.
- 287 The total duration of my secondment with NRC is two months. The contracts were transferred to NORDEM afterwards.
- 288 My contact person at NRC is very slow to deal with my administrative issues and because of that, I have been getting short term contracts, which affects my personal and professional life.
- 289 I previously said that I do not "feel" NORCAP or NRC while in the field, I first of all see myself as the technical resource person.
- 290 What I did not like, and I think NORCAP needs to think seriously about, was that one of the colleagues (a secondee) who is Norwegian was offered a vehicle through the local NRC office to drive, while two other secondees in addition to myself, did not and this is not a good example of treating all secondees fairly and equally. It just leaves a bad taste in one's mouth. If they are going to do that they must do it for everybody, and or provide ability for everybody to do it.

#### **SUGGESTIONS, ETC**

- 291 I am proud to be the member of NORCAP/NRC however given the size and importance of the roster in responding UN needs, I think that there should be more strategic approach in secondments (or if there is a strategy it should be introduced to the members).
- 292 Should communicate with its roster experts often.
- 293 Should have the attitude of a Norwegian employer towards the secondee.
- 294 Very good to be a neutral voice and not be mired in the interests of the UN organisation.
- 295 An edge of seriousness and idealism would be appreciated.
- 296 Before departure to the assignment, provide enough information on the destination country.
- 297 There should be motivation for those who perform well on missions by elevating them to higher levels.
- 298 Increase the trainings for secondees; Give opportunities to NORCAP secondees to switch the programs within NRC staff when they want to do that according to competencies and expertise; Harmonise the status of NORCAP secondees to ProCap and GenCap secondees status in terms of salaries and advantages.
- 299 It is important that NRC implements monitoring mechanisms to ensure that the MoU is followed because it is misleading. Should clarify some terms and conditions of the MoU that creates a problem to understand.
- 300 Keep supporting the secondees by asking the host organisations about the working environment as well as the living conditions in the field.
- 301 NORCAP should keep in closer contact with its secondees.
- 302 Many things need to be improved.
- 303 Linking emergency to development can be one of the area.
- 304 Lacking in the survey: the communication between NRC/NORCAP and the secondee in the field: the need for support from NRC.
- 305 In some questions I have an impression that you are talking about two different organisations, (NRC/NORCAP), I was thinking that NORCAP is a part of NRC?
- 306 Review the salary scale of secondees taking into consideration UN Salaries. Could generate some frustration.
- 307 To improve in contact with secondees.
- 308 Communication between NRC and Secondee is very good, timely responding. What I see missing is the physical follow up either with host organisation or secondee.
- 309 I think NRC should pay the same scale to citizens other than Norwegians.
- 310 NORCAP/NRC could have established a pension fund for the secondees.
- 311 NORCAP/NRC is very supportive for secondees when they have an assignment, and before and after an assignment. Between assignments there should be more follow-up on emergency matters.

- 312 NORCAP/NRC should insist that their secondees should be treated equally, not to be looked down upon.
- 313 **Plus de soutien et suivi de la part de NRC. un fort besoin de renforcement de capacites. depuis 2008, je n'ai aps recu de formation de NRC. je dois negocier avec l'organisation hote pour avoir acces a une formation**
- 314 They should create a link where secondees can chat online exchanging their ideas, experiences to improve their field works. Secondees should be grouped according to their field of work, country of origin. All deployments reports should be posted there as resources.
- 315 Make sure in the field level host organisations have information on how to treat secondment staff in reference to the MoU signed at HQ. Be sure to organise a briefing session prior to deployment.
- 316 NRC/NORCAP may give more visibility materials to secondees.
- 317 NRC need to communicate/talk to its secondee at least once a month if not fortnightly.
- 318 NRC should clear with the host organisation not to change the ToR once the secondee joins the position and provide all kinds of support and good behaviour as team member.
- 319 NRC/NORCAP should provide us with country specific information before being deployed (dress code etc.). I would also like to receive the UN security report for my country of deployment before leaving.
- 320 Let NRC/NORCAP explore the possibility of assisting the secondees with a separate cut away money of 25% of the net salary, saved into an account in Oslo and paid to the secondees at the end of their assignment. It will help the secondees upon returning home with our last salary received.

## Others

### POSITIVE COMMENTS

- 321 The filed visits and support by NRC and the Director are tremendous.
- 322 Working in Kakuma I also was exposed to conflict resolution in the office and now have gone in a totally different direction, inspired by this experience and have just been accepted to a one year PHD programme on analytical psychology in Zurich. Would like to work in psycho-social support and mental health in future, if possible with NRC.
- 323 In fact, I am so happy and proud to be a member of NORCAP - worked in 3 African and 1 South Asian Countries in 3 years time.
- 324 Working as a secondee for NRC helped me preserve somewhat of an Esprit of NGOs while at the same time working for the UN; it was a good balance for me, in which I could highly perform.
- 325 Thank you!

### NEGATIVE COMMENTS

- 326 Currently I am not registered on the NORCAP roster nor NRC.
- 327 It is rare that you are given the chance to decide on upgrading courses.
- 328 The NRC is mostly used to send individuals to their missions. To handle a team and heavy material/machinery was too much for them. I wrote a very critical evaluation with the approval of the entire team. The result was that I was taken out of the NORCAP list, also for election observations. The NCR is not involved in these missions, this is the task of the SMR. However, the NCR at that time handled practical issues like travels, salaries etc.
- 329 I am not seconded anywhere at the moment.
- 330 Main problem with NRC/NORCAP: HR policy - lack of support/communication with the secondees when in the field.
- 331 Although I am on roster of DRC as well but have never been seconded by them to any organisation.
- 332 Using our African national passports does not give easy access and same treatment as when you have the UNLP.
- 333 I have been seconded to a variety of agencies in different types of emergency settings, and each secondment has been a very different experience, so I found it rather difficult to answer some questions.
- 334 I think maybe they forgot that I qualify for receiving the TIPH medal.
- 335 Salaries to be reviewed. NOK - USD fluctuating exchange rate also affecting our salaries. Would not have been without this experience.
- 336 If there would have been an NRC office in the country, I would have contacted them, but I have never been deployed to a country with an NRC office.
- 337 Am still in Syria and Skype or other communications is difficult. Other agencies like MSB, they do provide their secondees with necessary and modern tools from PC, Modem, smart Telephone set, without taking the risk of not being available in country offices.
- 338 My mission statement is to work with the people and not for them.

### SUGGESTIONS

- 339 One practical suggestion (related to the documents) NRC/NORCAP could request from UN (if possible) to issue the UNLP for secondees. While I was working in Liberia I did not feel that matters a lot but given the complexity of the political situation in the Middle East, it would be useful to have that document when working there.

- 340 Would like to work in psycho-social support and mental health in future, if possible with NRC.
- 341 NORCAP should do more to help the UN to reform its recruitment system.
- 342 I am sorry I can't be much of help in providing you with information about secondee's experience. I was an UNHCR Intern and offered me a consultancy contract. Organisation had to "outsource" my contract because of internal HR policies regarding Interns becoming Consultants. I have been therefore contracted through a partner agreement between UNHCR and NRC/NORCAP.
- 343 With time you get used to things and that is the reason why better treatment should be granted to long term members.
- 344 Being a female humanitarian expert, being bi-national (French and Cameroonian) taking advantage of both cultural environments. It will be too much to put down here.
- 345 Amelierer l'accès aux soins médicaux en donnant 1 mois de suivi médical après la fin d'un contrat.
- 346 My status is a bit unusual and therefore my comments may not apply to a standard NORCAP/NRC secondment.
- 347 It would be better for NORCAP/NRC to consider some advantages for the family of the secondee and provide the pension fees to the secondees as they do in host organisations for their staff to secure the secondee at the end of mission.
- 348 Salaries to be reviewed.
- 349 I personally feel that there is a definite need to provide further protection and commitment from the organisations to the secondees.
- 350 After at least five years of being a secondee, the person should become NRC staff completely (Job / career).
- 351 Capacity building.
- 352 Submit survey both in English and French.
- 353 The project target should not be only population as it should be others (i.e. local authorities, institutions, etc).
- 354 I strongly request and hope that NRC will provide us trainings in order to train us with internal logistics systems of all UN agencies who hire or need secondees in the field of logistics so that they will be thoroughly familiar with how to run their jobs when deployed to the field.



## Annex 2h: List of Documents

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NRC 2012 Somalia Fact Sheet

NRC 2012 South Sudan Fact Sheet

Programme policy final june 2012 incl ICLA.doc (279084)

Budget Proposal Overviews – BPO (several versions)

NRC Exit Handbook (L)(120208)

Controller's Checklist at Country Office visits (Guideline and filled out example)

Financial Handbook

ICLA Handbook

Flowcharts depicting current vs. Future structure of Agresso

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Project Information Forms - P-info (several versions)

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ICLA Assistance – Client Survey for Closed ICLA Assistance Cases

Monitoring Report - ICLA Training and Information Sessions

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## **Pakistan Documents**

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NRC 2012 Quarterly report Pakistan 201202

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Pakistan CST Assessment (118502)  
PK document Assessment South Waziristan (268706)  
PK document Balochistan assesement report (268703)  
PK document Field mission South Waziristan Agency (268705)  
PK document NRC Access strategy FATA (268704)  
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AFFL1002 Danida Final narrative report 2012 (268409)  
AFFM1001 Final Report to donor.pdf (L)(280838)  
AFFM1001\_NMFA\_proposal to donor (L)(200831)  
FW PKFK1003 - final draft UNHCR annual report  
NRC-153113 - PKFM1001 NMFA Proposal to donor\_revised 14 03 2011  
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PKFM1001 NMFA Proposal  
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PKFS1002 ECHO Final report to donor Nov 2011 (L)(260664)  
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PKFS1003 - SIDA proposal to donor (L)(218602)  
PKFS1003 SIDA Final report to donor (L)(236774)

PKFS1004 Private donors Final narrative report (L)(252265)  
PKFS1005 ERF Final report to donor (L)(234706)  
PKFS1005 ERF Proposal to donor submitted 16 Aug (L)(218809)  
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PKFS1007 NMFA Revised Final report  
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120627 PKFL1106 Final Annual Report (Telethon).doc (L)(281308)  
NRC-145924 - PKFM1102 MFA Proposal to donor  
NRC-152763 - 6XFM1102\_Framework Agreement Sida\_Annual plan template 2012 and 2013 - ICLA Baloch (279393)  
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PKFL1106\_6XFM1104 project outline FINAL (L)(241660)  
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PKFM1101, PKFS1101, PKFK1101 log frame (L)(236606)  
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PKFS1104 DFID logframe (234699)  
PKFS1104 DFID PPA narrative (234698)  
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PKFS1107 ECHO INTERIM REPORT\_Nov2011 - 31 May clean version.doc (276883)  
PKFS1107 ECHO Project proposal\_submission22.08.2011 (L)(251160)  
PKFS1109 German Embassy Proposal to donor.pdf (L)(263570)  
PKFM1102 – Final Report to NMFA  
PKFS1108 – Project Proposal to NMFA

#### Projects 2012 (Only proposals)

20120424 Annex\_A\_ PKFT1204 PKFL1203 UNHCR\_\_ICLA\_Education\_Proposal\_Refugees  
NRC-152763 - 6XFM1102\_Framework Agreement Sida\_Annual plan template 2012 and 2013 - ICLA Baloch (284810)  
NRC-188387 - PKFM1206 SIDA Rapid Response KP Submission.pdf (L)(284832)  
PKFK1201 Proposal to donor Feb. 2012 (268085)  
PKFL1203 Proposal to donor Feb. 2012 (270731)  
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PKFM1201 Sida Proposal to donor Annual Plan 2012 (284918)  
PKFM1202 – Project Proposal to NMFA  
PKFM1202 PKFS1202, PKFT1202 Revised proposal to NMFA March. 2012 (271645)  
PKFM1203 PKFS1203 proposal to donor UNHCR Feb. 2012 (266268)  
PKFM1203 PKFS1207 Proposal to donor UNHCR May 2012 (274892)  
PKFM1204 PKFS1208 PKFL1205 SIDA Rapid Response KP Submission (L)(271946)  
PKFM1206 ECHO project proposal  
PKFT1203 Proposal to donor ALP Unicef Feb. 2012 (268239)  
PKFT1204 PKFL1203 UNHCR\_\_ICLA\_Education\_Proposal\_Refugees

### Documents PETS Pakistan

NRC-145924 - PKFM1102 MFA Proposal to donor.doc  
NRC-145925 - PKFM1102 LFA.doc  
NMFA - PKFM1102 final report (2).doc  
Standard Basic Selection Criteria for NRC project (2011)  
Disaggregated project activity for PKFP 1102-NFI and Mobile phone  
NMFA - PKFM1102 Final report  
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COMMENTS TO FINANCIAL REPORT  
NRC-145924 - PKFM1102 MFA Proposal to donor  
NRC-145925 - PKFM1102 LFA  
PAKISTAN,\_LOGISTICS\_INFRASTRUCTURE\_MAP,\_23\_MAY\_2011  
Pakistan Procurement Authorisation Process

1. Procurement Checklist
2. Tender Notice
3. Client Tender Application
4. Tender opening Record
5. Purchase Order
6. Goods Receiver Note
7. Stock request form
8. Quality Check

Adendum to Contract  
Dispatch Authorization memo  
Tax exemption certificate  
Way Bill

### Financial Reports:

Financial audit of Project PKFM1102 including observations and management's responses.  
Project Audit PKFM 1102  
Financial report PKFM1102  
Management Letter  
Pand-PKFM1102(1)  
PKFM1102 transactions  
PKFM-1102 NFIs, Mobiles  
PKFM1102 Transaction Report  
Project Audit PKFM 1102  
PS 20201109 20(256722).xls(1)

Transaction Report 2  
Work Status Pakistan Nowshera permanent shelter

Job descriptions for Finance Staff:

Deputy Finance and Administration Manager  
Finance Assistant-Archive  
Finance Assistant-cash  
Finance Assistant- Banking  
Finance Assistant support to field  
Finance Coordinator  
Finance Officer- Agresso  
Finance Officer Banking  
Finance Officer Data control  
Finance Officer-Taxation

Attachments 20121117

Standard beneficiary selection criteria  
Summerised NFI kits  
Winterised NFI kits  
NRC-145924 – PKFM1102 MFA Proposal to donor  
NRC-145924 – PKFM1102 LFA  
PKFM-1102 NFIs and Mobiles, distribution lists

**Monitoring tools**

Adendum to Contract  
Client Tender Application  
Dispatch Authorization memo  
Goods Receiver Note  
Standard Beneficiary selection criteria for NRC projects  
Monitoring of the NFI Distributions

## **Somalia Documents**

### **Somalia Documents Received from NRC, Oslo**

Assessments

NRC 2011 Somalia Food Security Context Report  
NRC 2012 Programmatic Assessment Report Sanaag Region Somaliland 19 to 22 June 2012

Background

WASH Cluster 2012 Strategic Operational Framework 2012 Somalia  
NRC 2012 Program Overview Somalia August 2012  
NRC 2012 Shelter Presentation Puntland  
NRC 2012 Project Tracker Somalia Updated June 2012  
Return Consortium 2012 Standard Operating Procedures for Voluntary Return in Somalia  
NRC 2012 Somalia Fact Sheet Updated March 2012  
NRC 2012 Program Overview Somalia presentation 12 Aug  
NRC 2012 NRC Puntland 2007 2012 Shelter Presentation Puntland PoA 2012  
NRC Africa and HO Contact List as at May 2012

Country Strategies

NRC 2008 Country Strategy Somalia - Kenya 2009 – 2010  
NRC 2010 Kenya-Somalia Strategy Map 2010 - 2012  
NRC 2010 Country Strategy Somalia - Kenya 2011 - 13 Final Draft  
NRC 2011 Strategy Horn of Africa 2012 - 2014



### Monitoring and Evaluation

NRC 2011 Management response - Shelter evaluation in Puntland  
NRC 2011 South Central Food Access Program Operational Plan 15 August 2011  
NRC 2011 Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, NRC Horn of Africa  
NRC 2012 Monitoring and Evaluation Implementation Plan Format Draft 12-01-2012  
NRC 2012 Monitoring and Evaluation Framework v10 Annex 2 Standard Methods and Tools Draft 12-01-2012  
NRC 2012 Monitoring and Evaluation Framework v10 Annex 3 NRC Logical Framework Format 12-01-2012

### Plans and Reports

NRC 2011 Horn of Africa Annual Report 2011  
NRC 2011 Somalia Kenya Country Programme 2009 - 2010 Report  
NRC 2011 Annual Report Somalia Kenya 2010  
NRC 2011 Somalia Kenya Strategic Map and Annual Plan of Action 2011-13 - Final draft  
NRC 2012 Budget Proposal Overview 2012 Somalia  
NRC 2012 Horn of Africa Plan of Action 2012 – 2014  
NRC 2012 Horn of Africa Annual report 2011

### Quarterly Reports to HO

NRC 2010 Somalia Kenya Quarterly Report Q3 2010  
NRC 2010 Somalia Kenya Quarterly Report Q1 2010  
NRC 2010 Somalia Kenya Quarterly Report Q2 2010  
NRC 2010 Somalia Kenya Quarterly Report 2 Q3 2010  
NRC 2011 Somaliland Quarterly Report Q3 2011  
NRC 2011 Combined Horn of Africa Quarterly Report Q2 2011  
NRC 2011 Somalia Kenya Quarterly Report Q4 2010  
NRC 2012 Combined Horn of Africa Quarterly Report Q1 2012  
NRC 2012 Combined Horn of Africa Quarterly Report Q4 2011  
NRC 2012 Combined Horn of Africa Quarterly Report Q2 2012  
NRC 2012 Somalia Quarterly Report Q2 2012

### General Projects

NRC 2009 NRC Sida SOMALIA Budget 2010  
NRC 2011 Accelerated Primary Education Support Programme in Somalia 3rd Interim Narrative Report + Final  
NRC 2011 Results report for 2009-2010 SOFK1002 SIDA 06 06 2011 Final Report  
NRC 2011 Results report for 2009-2010 SOFK1002 SIDA Final Report 13 June 2011  
NRC 2011 Education and School Construction Support in Somaliland SOFM0901 NMFA Final Report 16May2011  
NRC 2011 Annual Progress Report Somalia Kenya 2010 NMFA-NRC Framework Agreement Humanitarian Assistance and Protection to People Displaced in Africa  
NRC 2011 Results Report Somalia 2009-2010 to Sida SOFM1004 SIDA - SOFT1004 SOFS1004  
NRC 2011 Final Report to ECHO Provision of Shelter and NFI Kits in Burco Region of Somalia SOFS1006 Final Report 20110127  
NRC 2011 Final Report to OCHA Support to IDP alt basic education and transition to formal school Puntland Bulo Elay Bossaso SOFS1114  
NRC 2012 NMFA-NRC Framework Agreement Humanitarian Assistance and Protection to People Displaced in Africa SOFM1203  
NRC 2012 Final Report IDPs Somalia UNHCR 2011  
NRC 2012 Final Report to ECHO Emergency Assistance to Displaced people in Somalia SC, Puntland & Somaliland 31jan12 NBO Response  
NRC 2012 Final Report to ECHO Emergency Assistance to Displaced people in Somalia South

Central, Puntland & Somaliland SOFM1006

NRC 2012 Final Report to OCHA Support to drought affected displaced populations through improved access to food Banadir SOFK1104

### Specific Project Documents for Possible Focus Projects (names and order as received)

#### General agreements for focus projects

6XFM1003 HAPPDA Annual Plan 2012 - Sent to Donor  
6XFM1003 HAPPDA Annual Progress Report 2011 - Sent to Donor  
6XFM1102 SOFM1104 Somalia Annual Plan 2011 (234548)  
20111026 MG IFTI C-152763 - PUNTLAND SHELTER 6XFM1102\_Framework Agreement Sida\_Annual plan template 2012 and 2013  
NRC-126859 - 6XFM1003 - Framework Agreement NMFA 2010-2012\_REVISED Annual Plan 2010\_20 05 2010  
NRC-128380 - 6XFM1003 - Signed Framework Agreement NMFA 2010-2012 + annexe 1  
NRC-150738 - 6XFM1003 SOFM1003 Somalia Annual Progress Report HAPPDA.pdf  
NRC-150739 - SOFM1103 Annual Plan to NMFA pdf  
NRC-155989 - 6XFM1003 Submitted revised Annual Plan 2011 HAPPDA  
NRC-175135 - 6XFM1202 Sida Annual Plan 2012 proposal to donor  
NRC-175277 - 6XFM1202 SOFM1204 SIDA Annual Plan 2012 Somalia  
NRC-184564 - 6XFM1003 HAPPDA Annual Plan 2012 Final  
NRC-184566 - 6XFM1003 HAPPDA Annual Progress Report 2011 Final  
SOFM1104 SIDA - Annual Progress Report 20Mar2012

#### Food Security and Distribution

##### SOFK1104 CHF Food Vouchers Mogadishu

SOFK1104 CHF - Final Report Submitted to Donor 13.03.2012 (269828)  
SOFK1104 Proposal OCHA CHF Submitted (253787)

##### SOFK1105 UNHCR Food Vouchers Lower Shebelle

SOFK1105 Application UNHCR (253782)  
SOFK1105 Budget UNHCR (253781)  
SOFK1105 UNHCR - Final Financial Report  
SOFK1105 UNHCR - Final Report Narrative

##### SOFK1107 CHF Food Vouchers Lower Shebelle

SOFK1107 - CHF final report (272978)  
SOFK1107 CHF Voucher Lower Shabelle 827k 11 August2011.pdf (250839)  
SOFK1107 Proposal CHF OCHA Submitted (253766)

##### SOFK1108 ECHO Food Vouchers

ECHO SOFK1108 - PDM Report.pdf (284279)  
NRC-166518 - SOFK1108 Grant Agreement with ECHO  
SOFK1108 Amendment ECHO - Signed (267508)  
SOFK1108 ECHO Intermediate report (261044)  
SOFK1108 Final Narrative Report. 7th August 2012.doc (284269)  
SOFK1108 Map of the Action Location (249295)  
SOFK1108 Revised work plan 30.12.2011 (263114)

SOFK1108 Single Form ECHO (249292)

SOFK1108 Single Form Interim Report (260814)

##### SOFK1109 NMFA Food distribution/livelihoods

6XFM1003 SOFK1109 SC LFA Revision 07Mar12 (269298)  
SOFK1109 ETFS1101 Cover Letter Countersigned Addendum (258258)

SOFK1109 NMFA proposal Food Access SO SC (249271)  
SOFM1106 HAPPPDA EFSD SOFK1109 -15 -16 Pinfo 2011-2012  
SOFK1110 SIDA Food vouchers L Shebelle  
6XFM1102 SOFK1110 Emergency Food Assistance SC SIDA REVIS 27Feb2012  
SOFK1110 Answer on questions Proposal SIDA drought Somalia (251606)  
SOFK1110 Cover Letter Project Proposal to Sida (250710)  
SOFK1110 Emergency Food Assistance to South Central Somalia SIDA (250604)  
SOFK1115 NMFA Food Vouchers  
6XFM1003 SOFK1115 SL LFA Revision 07Mar12 (269299)  
SOFK1115-01 P-info SOFM1106.xlsx (270573)  
SOFM1106 HAPPPDA EFSD SOFK1109 SOFK1115 SOFK1116 P-info 2011-2012 split (269350)  
SOFK1116 NMFA Food Voucher  
6XFM1003 SOFK1116 PL LFA Revision 07Mar12 (269300)  
SOFM1106 HAPPPDA EFSD SOFK1109 SOFK1115 SOFK1116 P-info 2011-2012 split (269350)

Puntland shelter and school construction

SOFS1002 NMFA GAP

Copy of SOFM102\_Variance explanation+MB\_SOFT - zedek 24-11-10  
Final Approved Jan 2011 NRC-145659 - SOFM1002 Approval of Budget Revision  
NRC-160104 - SOFM1002 Final report Education and School Construction in Puntland  
SOFM1002-00\_Puntland\_20100831 (REVISION -from field)  
SOFS1002- NRC PL LFA school construction Annex 2 2010831 (REVISION)  
SOFS1002\_School construction\_20101023  
SOFT1002 - NRC PL LFA\_Education Annex 1 20100515  
SOFT1002\_ABE\_20101023  
SOFZ1002\_Admin\_20101022

SOFS1004 SIDA

NRC-76770 SOFM1004- 2010 PL-SL\_20100919 (REVISION)  
SOFM1004 SIDA - SOFT1004 SOFS1004 Final Report  
SOFM1004 SIDA - SOFT1004 SOFS1004  
SOFS1004 NRC 2010 SIDA\_PL Shelter \_LFA\_Annex 1\_20100831 (REVISION)  
SOFS1004-SIDA temporary shelter\_PL\_20100828 (REVISION)

SOFS1005 UNHCR

SOFM1005 UNHCR Final Report  
SOFM1005 UNHCR Cover Letter  
SOFM1005 UNHCR Final Report  
SOFM1005 UNHCR IPFMR  
UNHCR SOFM1005 IPFMR  
UNHCR SOFM1005 Inventory Report  
UNHCR SOFM1005 Revised budget Vs initial budget  
UNHCR SOFM1005 Staffing List  
Final SOFM1005 SOFS1005 Puntland Interim Report 20100707 (2)  
NRC-114810 - SOFM1005 SOFS1005 Puntland Sub-Project Description 20101217  
SOFM1005-01\_UNHCR S\_20101217  
SOFS1005\_Shelter Workplan PL 20101217

SOFS1009 ECHO

Annex 1- NFI's, Sanitation and Hygiene kits  
Annex 2 - Revised Latrines BoQs

NRC-135452 - SOFM1006 SOFS1009 PL 20100920  
 SOFK1108 2011\_01040\_MR\_01\_02\_26-Jan-12 revision request  
 SOFM1006 ECHO Progress Report 9 March 2011  
 SOFS1009\_PL ECHO 20100902  
 Summary Sheet ECHO- 20100902  
 110428 ECHO SOFM1006 Final Report Annexes v2  
 Single Form SOFM1006 - final report  
 SOFM1006 Payment request  
 090122+Latrine,+WB,+Garbage  
 ECHO Technical documents  
 ina igare-Model- Semi permanent Shelter  
 ina igare-Model.pdf1 - Semi permanent Shelter  
 ina igare-Model.pdf3 -Semi permanent Shelter  
 Latrine drawing-Model  
 NRC-165183 - SOFM1006 Single Form to ECHO - intermediate report (final)  
 Slab Designs samples  
 SOFM1006 ECHO Response to Donor Questions 17.09.2011  
SOFS1017 UNHCR  
 SOFM1005 UNHCR Final Report  
 NRC-114810 - SOFM1005 SOFS1005 Puntland Sub-Project Description 20101217.doc  
 NRC-114811+-+SOFM1005+SOFS1014+SL+Sub-  
 Project+Description+FINAL+now+with+Hargeisaco+revision 20101217.docx  
 NRC-114813 - SOFM1005 SOFK1001 SC Sub-Project Description 20101217.docx  
 SOFK1001\_Protection Workplan SC\_ 20101217.doc  
 SOFK1001\_Workplan Log & Emergency\_SC\_ 20101217.docx  
 SOFM1005-01\_UNHCR S\_20101217.xlsx  
 SOFS1005\_Shelter Workplan PL 20101217.docx  
 SOFS10014\_Workplan UNHCR SL 20101217.docx  
SOFS1102 NMFA  
 20120827 SOFM1102 NMFA GAP - Final Report  
 ABE learner drop out assessment in Galkaiyo-Mudug region  
 ABE Level 2 drop out assessment report  
 ABE NMFA AND APES SUPPORTED SCHOOLS  
 Annex 3 NRC TRAINING REPORT governance training  
 Annex 4 architectural drawings  
 Annex 5 summary of targets and accomplishments  
 Giribe school assessment report  
 Girls Education Campaigns posters  
 NMFA GAP Assessments Puntland 2011  
 School construction assessments and other documents  
 School needs assessment for NMFA project for classroom extensions  
 Workplan for curricular MoE and Agencies  
 NRC-177134 - SOFM1102 SOFT1102 LFA Education Puntland rev 30.11.2011  
 NRC-177148 - SOFM1102 SOFS1102 School Const Budget Revision  
 NRC-177149 - SOFM1102 SOFS1115 Shelter Budget Revision  
 NRC-177150 - SOFM1102 SOFT1102 Education Budget Revision  
 NRC-177151 - SOFM1102 SOFZ1102 Admin Budget Revision  
 NRC-177153 - SOFM1102 Puntland GAP Narrative Application rev. 02.12.2011

NRC-177167 - SOFM1102, SOFS1102 LFA GAP Puntland School Construction rev. 02.12.2011  
 NRC-177205 - SOFM1102, SOFS1115 LFA GAP Puntland Shelter and Construction rev. 02.12.2011  
 NRC-177428 - SOFM1101 GAP Addendum 3MNOK Somaliland Signed  
SOFS1104 SIDA  
 NRC-173590 - 6XFM1102 Annual Progress Report SIDA YEP COMPONENT- ed  
 nrc-187365 - 6XFM1102 SOFM1104 Final Financial Report\_20120325  
 NRC-187366 - 6XFM1102 KEFT1103 Final Financial Report (2)  
 SOFM1104 SIDA - Annual Progress Report 20Mar2012 (Autosaved)  
 NRC-143664 - SOFM1104 LFA SC PL SL DDB  
 NRC-149966 - 6XFM1102 SOFM1104 Somalia Annual Plan 2011  
SOFS1105 UNHCR  
 SOFM1105 UNHCR Final Narrative Report  
 SOFM1105 UNHCR Final Report  
 SOFM1105 UNHCR Interim Narrative Report - V1 15 July  
 SOFM1105 UNHCR IPFMR - July V1  
 SOFM1105\_ IPFMR 1\_20110101-20110331  
 20110928 SOFM1105\_EXTRA BUDGET FINAL  
 20111011 SOFS1105 Puntland Sub-Project Description  
 OPTION I PERMINENT SHELTER-Model  
 SOFM1105\_110216 Final Approved Budget Monitoring PL SOFS1105  
 SOFS1105 Puntland Sub-Project Description 20110210  
 SOFS1105\_Shelter+Protection Workplan PL 20110210  
 Staffing table UNHCR-staff cost comparison 20110110  
 UNHCR\_Permanent\_shelters[1]  
SOFS1110 CHF  
 SOFS1110 Agreement OCHA (257935)  
 SOFS1110 CHF PL Bulo Eelay Agreement (240344)  
 SOFS1110 CHF PL Shelter Submitted (247613)  
 SOFS1110 - Interim Report CHF - Submitted (255899)  
SOFS1202 NMFA GAP  
 SOFM1202 SOFS1202 School Construction Puntland GAP Proposal (285391)  
 SOFM1202, SOFS1202 LFA NMFA GAP PL School Construction (260499)  
SOFS1204 SIDA  
 6XFM1202 SOFM1204 SOFS1204 PL SIDA P-info (259178)  
SOFS1205 UNHCR  
 SOFM1205 UNHCR - Agreement.pdf, 14.06.12.pdf (278907)

Somaliland School Construction  
SOFM1201 NMFA  
 SOFM1201 Narrative proposal NMFA GAP SL Education and School Construction (260356)  
 SOFM1201 SOFS1201 Shelter Somaliland GAP Proposal (285372)  
 SOFM1201 SOFT1201 Education Somaliland GAP Proposal (285370)  
 SOFM1201 SOFZ1201 Support Somaliland GAP Proposal (285367)  
 SOFM1201, SOFS1201 LFA NMFA GAP SL School Construction (260362)  
 SOFM1201, SOFT1201 LFA NMFA GAP SL Education (260357)  
SOFS1001 NMFA  
 SOFM0901- Annex 4 SOFS1001 LFA Temp+shelter20081217 (169303)  
 SOFM0901 SOFS1001 Annex 4 LFA School Construction 20091209 (199749)

SOFM0901 SOFS1001 School Construction SL 29112009 (Revised).xls (199789)  
SOFM0901 SOFS1001 SL Budget revised 22.11.2010 (229443)  
SOFS1101 NMFA  
SOFM1101 SOFS1101 2011 LFA School Construction (226740)  
SOFM1101 SOFS1101 2012 LFA School Construction (226744)  
SOFM1101 SOFS1101 2013 LFA School Construction (226746)  
SOFM1101 SOFS1101 LFA School Construction Revised 30.211.2011 (260902)  
SOFM1101 SOFS1101 School Construction Budget (226752)  
SOFS1101 - Norad Addendum, Education and School Construction 01.12.2011 (268273)  
SOFS1101 SOFM1101 Somaliland School Construction Revised (260875)

## WASH

### SOFM1006 ECHO

SOFM1006- final report to ECHO (267219)  
SOFM1006 Single Form to ECHO - intermediate report (final) (249297)  
SOFM1006 Single Form to ECHO (220287)  
SOFS1008 ECHO Somaliland: SOFM1006 SOFS1008 ECHO SL 20100920 (220292)  
SOFS1009 ECHO Puntland: SOFM1006 SOFS1009 PL 20100920 (220294)  
SOFS1010 ECHO South Central: SOFM1006 SOFS1010 SC 20100920 (220297)

### SOFS0903 NMFA

SOFM0903 SOFS0903 Annex 2 LFA Shelter 23.04.2010 (210787)  
SOFM0903 SOFS0903 LFA (166272)  
SOFM0903 SOFS0903 Revised 2010 School Construction SC LFA (209118)  
SOFM0903 SOFS0903 revised LFA (184384)  
SOFM0903 SOFS0903 Revision 2010 SC School Construction 07.04.2010 (209134)  
SOFM0903 SOFS0903 Shelter Budget (166278)  
SOFS0903 revised SC\_Shelter\_20090604 (184432)

### SOFS1003 NMFA

SOFM1003 SOFS1003 Annex 2 SC LFA Shelter.doc (199228)  
SOFM1003 SOFS1003 SC Shelter 20100218 (199358)

### SOFS1007 CHF

CHF SOFS1007 Final Report Draft  
SOFS1007 CHF Final Report Submitted (255455)  
SOFS1007 CHF project sheet SC 20100625 (216865)  
SOFS1007 Interim Report 110324. (250117)  
SOFS1007 SC WASH Emergency Interim Report with Responses to OCHA 110324 (241010)

### SOFS1103 NMFA

SOFM1103 SOFS1103 LFA Shelter SC Annex 2 (229535)  
SOFM1103 SOFS1103 P-Info Shelter SC (229544)

### SOFS1107 CHF

SOFM1101 SOFS1107 LFA Shelter Revised 30.211.2011 (260906)  
SOFS1107 SOFM1101 Somaliland Shelter Budget (260872)

### SOFS1108 CHF

NRC-155690 - SOFS1108 CHF Agreement  
SOFS1108 CHF Interim Report Submitted (245606)  
SOFS1108 CHF Proposal to Donor (235036)  
SOFS1108 Final Report CHF (258262)

### SOFS1111 NMFA

SOFM1103 SOFS1111 P-Info Water Points Rehab (235790)  
SOFS1111 South Central MFA Drought Concept Note NMFA (233729)  
SOFS1208 ECHO  
SOFM1206 Revised Proposal (278958)  
SOFM1206 SOFS1208 P-info ECHO 13.01.2012 (271993)  
SOFM1206 SOFS1209 P-info ECHO 13.01.2012 (271994)

### **Somalia Documents Received During Field Visit**

NRC Somali - Kenya Fact sheet 2011  
NRC 2012, Somalia Project Portfolio - Current Projects Implemented by NRC, PDU Nairobi, NRC Horn of Africa, Last Updated 17 September 2012.  
NRC, 2012, Corruption Risk Mapping 2012 for PUNTLAND  
NRC Horn of Africa, 2011, Job Description Area Manager Puntland  
HCT-Somalia\_Evaluation\_2005-2010\_DARA\_Report  
NRC Somalia Project Tracker, Last updated: 28 September 2012  
NRC South and Central Somalia, Food security and livelihoods projects from 2010 to date  
Annexure I, 2012 Memorandum Of Agreement between the Municipality and IDPs relating to settlement.  
Annexure J, Memorandum Of Agreement For Land Use Donation Between Landowner/Representative of Landowner and The Municipality and the IDP community  
NRC, AYAH III Profiling Data analysis  
NRC, 2012, EFS Minimum Standard Training Presentation Apr 2012  
NRC, 2012, FSL 2012 Mid Year Review Presentation –Burao  
NRC, ICLA assessment report Somaliland Final  
NRC, ICLA Somalia - Guide for Needs Assessment (1)  
NRC Draft M and E framework v10 12-01-2012  
NRC, 2012, Report: Post Distribution Monitoring of Ayah III  
SOFS1107 Shelter PDM Jan-12  
Somaliland Shelter School Construction Grants Since 2010  
Shelter Permdaily Monitoring Form SL Sept 2012  
Updated Somaliland Organogram - Sept. 2012  
Financial Project Report Norwegian Refugee Council: Emergency Shelter Burco, Togdheer, SL, SOFS1011  
SOFS1011 First P-Info Budget (227458)  
Annex 3 Procurement\_Plan 2010) SOFS101- NMFA  
NRC-139007 - SOFS1011 LFA  
SOFM1103 SOFS1011 Proposal to Donor (223881)  
SOFS1011 Cover Letter Proposal submission (223879)  
Qurat Sadozai - NRC Somalia (document does not open)  
Somaliland grant since 2010 24 Sept 2012  
Presentation NRC PUNTLAND March 2012.pptx (284682)  
Protection and Other Concerns for the New Shelter Typology in Zona K Settlement (South Central), NRC, June 2012  
WASH Cluster Construction Materials Price Guide, Updated January 2010  
Somalia WASH Cluster Guidelines, Last updated May 2010  
WASH Cluster Somalia - regional and zonal focal points, September 2011  
WASH Somalia, 2011, WASH Strategic Operational Framework – 2011  
NRC Bosaso KAP survey FINAL Nov 2011  
Malile, Z., 2011, Knowledge, Attitude and Practise Survey, Galkaio Settlements, NRC

Malile, Z. and A. Muhamud, 2011, Knowledge, Attitude and Practise Survey, Bosasso Idp Settlements - Investigating Knowledge, Attitudes And Practice Of Displaced Persons On Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

WASH Baseline Survey Questionnaire GAROWE

Puntland Land tenture negotiations

Temporary shelter 11 07 25 Puntland

Puntland Corruption Risk Mapping Excercise - Final Draft

TS Workshop Report 2012 Puntland

CAP 2012 Somalia

HCT-Somalia Evaluation 2005-2010 DARA Report

EFS Minimum Standard Training Presentation Apr2012

FSL 2012 Mid Year Review Presentation –Burao

NRC 2012 Program Overview Somalia August 2012

SO ET KE - NRC Horn of Africa Regional Strategy 2012-2014 - Final draft to SMG 15-03-2012 (L) (269621)

SO-KEN Country Strategy 2011-13 Final Draft (230816)

### Mogadishu programme documents

FSL Assessment report, 2012 revised

6XFM1003 HAPPDA Annual Progress Report 2011 Final (268195)

SOFK1109 ETFS1101 6XFM1003 Addendum to HAPPDA (L)(258256)

12-09-25 Gredo Note For File (PO1006073)

CAD Report (SOFK1109)

EFSD Activity overview, (NMFA , SIDA)

HH Food Access Fair draft baseline report

NRC-172727 - SOFK1109 LFA Access to food and support to resumption of agricultural activities

Post Distribution Monitoring report, Food Voucher Program (Trends).

Report Project Info v1 (NMFA, SOFK1109)

Weekly output tracker (Template)

### Assessment reports

Assessment Report May

Assessment Sample

May Assessment

080520 OCHA Baidoa City Map A2

Baidoa Assessment- Updates

Baidoa Assessment- Updates1

Baidoa Mission TOR

Baidoa Needs Assessment Final

Assessment report (2)

Selection Criteria

Beneficiary Registration form

SC Beneficiary Selection Criteria (3)

### Co\_Implementation

Gredo-Baidoa May 09

Copy of The list of NFI Distributed IDPs camps

Distribution report

Gredo IDP Project Proposal Final

MOU with Gredo Distribution of NFIs May 2009

NRC-Gredo Project Report

Gredo-Baidoa 2011



Gredo Agreement-Baidoa  
 Gredo budget for Distribution of 4,000 Food Kits  
 Gredo logical framework  
 Gredo Project Proposal for Food Distribution for 4000 Baidoa  
 Gredo Workplan  
 Gredo Agreement  
 Gredo logical framework  
 Gredo Workplan  
 Gredo Agreement Walanweyn and A.corridor 3600HHs  
Gredo NFI distribution Baidoa  
 Agreement  
 Gredo logical framework  
 Gredo Project Proposal for 3,056 NFI kits Distribution  
 Gredo Workplan  
Hinna Ceel Ma'an  
 Concept Paper  
 Memorandum of Understanding  
 NFI Distribution Narrative Report  
 Payment Certificate  
HINNA Mogadishu  
 Concept paper for NFI\_Hygiene kit Distribution in Waberi district  
 Final certificate of completion NFI kits  
 Memorandum of Understanding for HINNA  
 NFI Distribution Report in WABERI and Wadajir districts of Benadir region  
Dayniile  
 16052011 MOU with HINA - NRC SC-Dayniile  
 Data capture form deynile  
 Final certificate of completion NFI kits  
 Hinna financial report for emergency response project in daynile  
 Hinna project proposal for NRC\_distribution of 5000 NFI in Daynile  
 Hinna report on emergency response in Daynile  
 Hinna workplan  
 Logical frame work  
 Project budget  
Food  
 Final certificate of completion 1175 Food in HwadaHjajab and Waberi  
Hinna FV Dayniile IDPs Nov 2011  
 Agreement 1500 Food voucher-Daynile  
 Hinna project proposal for distribution - Daynile  
 Hinna workplan for NRC for Food voucher Nov 2011  
 Project budget for NRC Oct 2011  
 Logical Framework for NRC Nov 2011  
Hinna FV  
 Agreement (3)  
 Hinna project proposal for aid distribution  
 Hinna workplan  
 Logical Framework for NRC Nov 2011  
 Project Budget

## Tailoring

6. Annex 2 a- implementing organisation budget template Agreement (3)

Tailoring training Materials

### Hinna skills training proposal

Annex 1 Project proposal template – NRC Somalia-Kenya

Annex 2a – implementing organisation budget template

Annex 6 Logframe NRC Som-Ken

Annex 7 Workplan NRC Som-Ken

### Somali Youth for Peace & Development (SYPD)

2009 folder: 23 documents

2010 folder: 27 documents

2011 folder: 21 documents

### Vardo

2010 folder: 18 documents

2011 folder: 44 documents

### Distribution Methodologies

Distribution (Food) - NRC Steps

Distribution - NRC Steps[1]

Emergency Food distribution

NFI distribution Methodology

NFI distribution Checklist B

Wadajir distribution site

### Food Voucher Projects

NMFA SOFK1109: 3 documents

SIDA SOFK1110: 3 documents

12-04-08 PDM, Food Voucher Program (Trends).

12-09-25 SC SOM Food Access Distribution and Registration Summary database

PDM Questionnaire (Food Voucher)

Price Monitoring Questionnaire

### Framework Agreements

NMFA: 3 documents

Sida: 2 documents

12-09-25 Carpentry and Masonry tool kit

### NFIs Distribution reports

Annual Program figures 2010 and 2011: 8 documents

Distribution Methodologies: 5 documents

Monthly Distribution reports: 28 documents

Standard NFI kit content: 3 documents

2007 and 2008 NRC NFI distributions

2009 NFI + Plastic sheets distributions

2010 NFI distribution

### **NRC site planning and maps**

Ajuran sims

Bula Minguis town IDP settlement

General Bariga Bossaso 2

General Bossaso NRC

Plot 1 shelters planned by donors

Somalia - General Geographic Map

**Mogadishu program docs 2**

Annex 2 SOFS1103 SC LFA Shelter 20101216 - rev TM 24.10.2011

Annex 3 SOFS1103 SC LFA School Construction 20101216 - rev TM 24.10.2011

Copy of SCZ Shelter + WASH Output and Beneficiary data \_ Jan to Sept 2012 ( 20120925)

Copy of SCZ Shelter +WASH Output & Beneficiaries Data 2011

HAPPDA report - revision 1030 -Sun 26 Feb - 16 00 (ED) + TM 26.02.2011 (SOFS1103 + SOFS1113)

Protection & Other concerns in Zone K Shelter Typology- Draft 20120907 (TM)

**Documents reviewed PETS Somalia**

SOFM1103 SOFS1011 Proposal to Donor (223881)

NRC 2011 Somaliland Quarterly Report Q3 2011

NRC-139007 - SOFS1011 LFA

Somaliland selection of PETS projects updated 20120925

Update of the Shelter Construction Report since 2012

List of Monitoring tools for NRC Somaliland

PETS - SOFS1011 transactions

Updated Somaliland Organogram - Sept. 2012

PETS - SOFS1011 transactions

Somaliland Shelter School Construction Grants Since 2010

Budget Tracking -SOFS1011 Burao

SOFS1011 First P-InfoBudget (227458)

SOFS1011 detailed transactions list

SOFM1003 SOFS1003 SC Shelter 20100218 (199358)

SOFM1003 SOFS1003 Annex 2 SC LFA Shelter.doc (199228)

SOFM1003 (KEFM1003) NMFA Final Report

SL Quarterly Report Q3 2011

NRC-150738 - 6XFM1003 SOFM1003 Somalia Annual Progress Report HAPPDA

NRC 2012 Project Tracker Somalia Updated June 2012

Combined HoA Q1 report final

6XFM1003 Submitted Annual progress report 2010 Framework Agreement NMFA 28 Febr 2011 (235437)

2011 EFSD Matrix

6XFM1003 HAPPDA Progress Report 2011 NMFA - Final, sent to donot (268308)

SOFS1011 SOFM1003 6XFM1003 Addendum to HAPPDA (230999)

487626e10 Map of Somalia IDPs

Project Tracker Somalia Updated June 2012

Somaliland shelter and school construction output updated 20120924

Somaliland shelter grants since 2010 updated 120920

Somaliland Shelter School Construction Grants Since 2010

**SOFS1101**

SOFM1101 (Controller Christine Nilsson)

SOFM1101 Final Report Somaliland - Submitted to Oslo 30.08.12.doc (287910) (Controller Christine Nilsson)

SOFM1101 SOFS1101 School Construction Budget (226752)

SOFS1101 SOFM1101 Somaliland School Construction Revised (260875)

SOFS1101 SOFM1101 Somaliland School Construction Revised (260876)

SOFS1101 SOFM1101 Somaliland School Construction Revised (260877)

SOFS1101 SOFM1101 Somaliland School Construction Revised (260878)

Burao-Monitoring and Evaluation Tools

Annex 1 M&E Indicator Matrix (updated) SOFS1206 UNHCR

Annex 2 Detailed Implementation Plan SOFS1206 UNHCR

Annex 3 Procurement\_Plan 2012 (2) SOFS1206 UNHCR

Annex 4 Beneficiary Registration Format

Annex 5 Daily Permanent-shelters CHECK LIST

Annex 6 Weekly Shelter Monitoring tool

Annex 7 Monthly Risk Monitoring tool

Annex 8 Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) Form

Annex 9 PDM Data entry form

Annex 10 Format for weekly sitreps

Annex 11 Weekly Output Reporting Format

Annex 12 Quarterly Report Format

Annex 13 Half-yearly Protection partners Monitoring form

Semi Permanent Shelter

UNHCR SOFS1206 M&E Implementation Plan Permanent Shelters

## **South Sudan**

### **South Sudan Documents Received from NRC, Oslo**

Agreements, Plans, Reports, Background

Quarterly Reports

SD Q2 status report 2011 (251370)

SD Q4 2011 report (265526)

SD Sudan Q2 Quarterly Report 2010 (218163)

Sudan Quarterly Report Q1 2011 (243528)

Sudan Quarterly Report Q2 2011 (251011)

Sudan SD Q3 Status Report 2010 (225176)

Sudan SD Q4 Status Report 2010 (233143)

Agreements

6XFM1102\_Letter from Sida confirming no need for time sheets (244949)

SDFL1001 DANIDA grant letter (203408)

SDFM1104 Grant agreement NRC AID-OFDA-G-11-00116 SUDAN (248131)

SDFM1204 Donor Funding Approval (275789)

SDFS1001 Signed Agreement (216303)

6XFM1102 - NRC-Sida - Framework Agreement 2011-2013 - Countries and budgets (222978)

6XFM1102\_Signed framework agreement contract 2011-2013 (259119)

Plans

6XFM1003 HAPPDA Annual Plan 2012 NMFA - Final, sent to donot (L)(268307).pdf (283543)

SDFM1202 Sida Annual Plan and RAF 2012 (283534)

SD Annual Plan of Action 2011 (234323)

SD Annual Plan of Action 2011 (234323)

Reports

SDFL1001\_SDFL1101 DANIDA Status Report-19 Nov 2010 (227044)

SDFM1102 Sida Annual Progress Report 2011 (268093)

Sudan annual report 2010 - (237137)

Sudan Quarterly Report Q2 2011 (251011)

Sudan annual report 2010 - (237137)

Background, Other

SD - NRC South Sudan Fact Sheet March 2012 (253480)

NRC 2011 Financial Handbook Sudan

Herd, C., Sharp, B. and A Crosskey, Evaluation of Food Security Programme 2010-2012 South Sudan, The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and partners

NRC, 2012, Rapid Response Team Assessment Mission Upper Nile, South Sudan 19th – 29th August

Country Strategies

NRC Sudan Strategic Map and PoA 2011-FINAL DRAFT-16Feb11

SD - Country Strategy South Sudan 2012-2014 - Final Draft April 2012 (271975)

SD Sudan Strategy Note 2010-11 (194770)

SD Sudan Strategy Note Presentation 2010-11 (194857)

**Projects**

Logframes

SDFL1001 ICLA NBeG Danida LFA (195600)

SDFM1001 SDFK1001 - LFA Emergency Food Security in NBeG - South Sudan (200408)

SDFM1101 SDFK1101 NMFA LFA Food Security in NBeG (240176)

SDFM1101 SDFL1102 NMFA ICLA LFA 06.01.2011 (229808)

SDFM1102 SDFK1102 Sida LFA Food Security in NBeG - South Sudan - CANCELLED (237645)

SDFM1102 SDFT1101 Sida Education Logframe (229843)

SDFS1201 Gap Shelter Logframe (284227)

SDFL1103 Submission to UNHCR (231080)

SDFL1103 UNHCR acknowledgement of submission and LoMI (231081)

Proposals

SDFL1001 ICLA NBeG Danida Proposal (224051)

SDFM1001 SDFL1002 Proposal 30.11.2009 (198516)

SDFM1101 SDFK1101 NMFA Proposal Food Security in NBeG (240177)

SDFM1101 SDFS1102 NMFA Proposal Emergency Shelter-April 14 (240338)

SDFM1102 SDFK1102 Sida Proposal Food Security in NBeG - South Sudan - DRAFT (228169)

SDFM1102 SDFT1101 Sida Education Proposal 2011 FINAL 02 02 2011.doc (233055)

SDFM1104 NRC OFDA Cost Budget Proposal 16.03.2011 (237444)

SDFM1104 NRC OFDA Program Proposal 16.03.2011 (237441)

SDFM1204 Project Proposal Danida (283500)

SDFS1001 Shelter Narrative Proposal & LFA - final (202864)

SDFS1201 Gap Shelter Proposal wlogframe (284224)

Budgets

SDFK1102 01 Improving livelihood in Warrap 13.12.10 (228971)

SDFK1201 01 HUM 27.02.2012 6.5 M NOK (283128)

SDFK1202 00 Improving livelihood in Warrap 21.11.11 (283144)

SDFK1203 00 DANIDA 15.12.11 (283113)

SDFL1001 (SDFL1101) DANIDA rev 22.11.10 (226975)

SDFL1001 ICLA NBeG Danida Budget (195604)

SDFL1004 UNHCR Legal Aid 09.12.10 (228799)

SDFL1201 00 DANIDA 15.12.11 (283112)

SDFL1201 00 DANIDA 15.12.11 (284132)

SDFL1202 00 HUM 05.12.11 (283132)

SDFM1001 NMFA ICLA-EFSD budget (212756)

SDFM1101 SDFK1101 SDFL1102 Donor Form MFA frame (233556)  
SDFM1101 SDFK1101 SDFL1102 SDFS1102 Donor Form MFA frame (240284)  
SDFM1203 SDFK1203 SDFT1201 Donor Form Sida 2012 (283177)  
SDFS1001 P-Info 16 Dec 09 (215837)  
SDFS1201 00 GAP 05.12.11 (284223)  
SDFS1202 01 HUM 27.02.11 3.5 M NOK (283130)  
SDFT1101 02 ALP in NBeG 26.11 (227543)  
SDFT1201 02 ALP in NBeG 22.11.11 (283143)

### **South Sudan Documents Received During Field Visit**

Annual Plan 2012 Framework Agreement between Sida and NRC

EFSD 2011 MASTER PLAN

NRC Strategy for South Sudan 2012-2014. (Final Draft\_March,2012)

NRC Budgeting and Planning Instructions for 2013

#### Surveys, baselines:

August 2012 Base Line Survey Report For NRC-Food Security Northern Bhar-el-Ghazal State

Copy of FS 2012 Baseline Survey DataBase - NBEG – 2012

#### Project Proposals:

DANIDA Project Proposal – Regions of Origin Initiative (ROI), 2010 – 2011

NRC-178484 - SDFM1204 Project Proposal Danida (FINAL 2012)

SHELTER \_2012-2013 (SDFS 1202)

Food Security in Warrap: \_2010 (SDFK1102 SIDA)

#### Reports

NRC 2011 HAPPPA Annual Progress Report ( 2011) NMFA

Annual Progress Report Sida ( 2011-2012)\_draft

WASH: OFDA Final Program Performance Report (May, 2012).

EFSD SITREP 2011 20111208

EFSD Livelihoods Trainee List

EFSD: Beneficiary General Database for SDFK1102 and SDFK1202 - Sida projects

Basic Adult Literacy Data Base March 2012

NRC, 2011, Impact Monitoring and Evaluation Report for ICLA NbeG December 2011

NRC, 2012, Efficiency end Term Impact Monitoring and Evaluation Report For Basic Construction Skilled Trainees Trained By Nrc-Shelter From 2007-2010

March-2012 Impact Monitoring & Evaluation narrative Analysis report For Basic Adult Literacy

May 2012 Evaluation Report For NRC-Food Security & Livelihood in Warrap State

NRC, 2012, ICLA Adviser Visit to South Sudan Report June 2012

ICLA Aweil ICU Weekly Report 17-21 Sept 12

ICLA Aweil Monitoring Unit Report September 2012

Impact Monitoring Questionnaire Data Base for FSL Warrap May, 2012

Legal Assistance-Output June 2012

March Core Activity Database to Upload

Shelter M&E Database

#### Logframes

SDFK1201 NMFA LFA FSL NBEG SS 120314

SDFK1203 DANIDA LFA Food Security in NbeG South Sudan 120608

SDFK1206 TELETHON LFA FSL NBEG SS 111208 - alt 1 240 new HH only

#### Documents South Sudan PETS

SDFS1001 Signed Agreement (216303)  
NRC-139006 - SOFS1011 Proposal to Donor 24 Nov 2010  
SDFS1001 Shelter Narrative Proposal & LFA - final (202864)  
SDFS1001 P-Info 16 Dec 09 (215837)  
SDFS1001 revised P-Info 13.09.11 (L)(254051)  
SDFS1001 Revised Budget sent to Norad (L)(254122)  
SDFS 1001 transactions list  
Monitoring tools for School Construction  
Financial Handbook Sudan  
Stock Report - NRC Aweil -August- 2012  
Financial Reports/Records  
SDFS1001 - Revised Budget (15 September 2011)  
SDFS1001 revised P-Info 13 09 11 (L)(254051)  
Project Summary SD 201113  
Annex 4 NRC Sudan procurement flowchart  
Annex 5 Bank Signatories list  
Signed Financial Statement  
Progress Reports  
Enrollment 2010 – 2012 in schools constructed  
NRC 2010 Quarterly Country Program Report Sudan Q1 2011  
NRC 2010 Quarterly Country Program Report Sudan Q2 2010  
NRC 2010 Quarterly Country Program Report Sudan Q2 2011  
NRC 2010 Quarterly Country Program Report Sudan Q3 2010  
NRC 2011 Quarterly Country Program Report Sudan Q2 2011  
NRC 2011 Quarterly Country Program Report Sudan Q4 2010  
NRC 2012 Quarterly Country Program Report Sudan Q4 2011

### **Documents reviewed PETS South Sudan**

SDFS1001 Signed Agreement (216303)  
NRC-139006 - SOFS1011 Proposal to Donor 24 Nov 2010  
SDFS1001 Shelter Narrative Proposal & LFA - final (202864)  
SDFS1001 P-Info 16 Dec 09 (215837)  
SDFS1001 revised P-Info 13.09.11 (L)(254051)  
SDFS1001 Revised Budget sent to Norad (L)(254122)  
SDFS 1001 transactions list  
Monitoring tools for School Construction  
Financial Handbook Sudan  
Stock Report - NRC Aweil -August- 2012  
Financial Reports/Records  
SDFS1001 - Revised Budget (15 September 2011)  
SDFS1001 revised P-Info 13 09 11 (L)(254051)  
Project Summary SD 201113  
Annex 4 NRC Sudan procurement flowchart  
Annex 5 Bank Signatories list  
Signed Financial Statement  
Progress Reports  
Enrollment 2010 – 2012 in schools constructed  
NRC 2010 Quarterly Country Program Report Sudan Q1 2011

NRC 2010 Quarterly Country Program Report Sudan Q2 2010  
NRC 2010 Quarterly Country Program Report Sudan Q2 2011  
NRC 2010 Quarterly Country Program Report Sudan Q3 2010  
NRC 2011 Quarterly Country Program Report Sudan Q2 2011  
NRC 2011 Quarterly Country Program Report Sudan Q4 2010  
NRC 2012 Quarterly Country Program Report Sudan Q4 2011

## **NORCAP documents reviewed**

Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP), An Important Actor In International Operations, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Norway.

Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP), Annual Report 2010, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Norway, 2010.

Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP), Annual Report 2011, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Norway, 2011.

Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP), Capacity Development Plan for NORCAP (01.01.2012 – 31.12.2014), Norwegian Capacity Operated by NRC, Norway, 2012.

Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP), NORCAP 2011 Final Report, Norwegian Capacity Operated by NRC, Norway, 2011.

Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP), Recruitment Plan of Action (01.07.2011 – 31.12.2014) on Recruitment to NORCAP STANDBY ROSTER; For the Emergency Response Department and Recruitment Section, NRC, Norwegian Capacity Operated by NRC, Norway, 2011.

Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP), Stand-by Partners: Assisting the UN with Personnel and Equipment, Norwegian Capacity Operated by NRC, Norway, 2012.

The Aid Worker Security Database (AWSDB), Project of Humanitarian Outcomes, <https://aidworkersecurity.org/>

NMFA, 2009, Norway's Humanitarian Policy, Report No. 40 (2008 – 2009) to the Storting, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009.

Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP), NORCAP Midterm Report January to June, 2011, NORCAP, 2011.

Contract between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Refugee Council on Norwegian Standby Capacity Programme, 2012.

Contract between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Refugee Council on Norwegian Standby Capacity Programme, 2009.

Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP), Final Report 2009 – 2011, Norwegian Capacity Operated by NRC, Norway, 2011.

Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP), Midterm Report 2010, Norwegian Capacity Operated by NRC, Norway, 2010.

Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP), NORCAP Annual Plan 2012, Norwegian Capacity Operated by NRC, Norway.

Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP), Annex 1: Agreed Project Summary, Norwegian Standby Capacity Programme NORCAP, Norwegian Capacity Operated by NRC, Norway.

Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP), Anniversary Conference Report: Building Partnerships for the Future, Norwegian Capacity Operated by NRC, Norway, 2011.

Scoping Study: Norwegian Standby Roster for Civilian Observers (NOROBS) – The Role and Position of NOROBS in the Context of Norway's Contribution to Civilian Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding.

Ernst & Young, 2011, Auditor's Statement on Project Accounts for The Norwegian Refugee Council.

Ernst & Young, 2012, Auditor's Statement on Project Accounts for The Norwegian Refugee Council.



## Annex 3: Field work itinerary and list of interviews

### Annex 3a: Field work itinerary

Pakistan: Where	When	Who
NRC Pakistan Country Office, Peshawar	Nov 15–22th	Björn Ternström, Japhet Makongo (left 21st)
Charsadda, KP	Nov 16 <sup>th</sup>	Björn Ternström, Nousheen Khan and Abid Rehman
Ghari Momin, Nowshera, KP	Nov 17 <sup>th</sup>	Björn Ternström, Nousheen Khan and Abid Rehman
Prang, Charsadda, KP	Nov 18 <sup>th</sup>	Björn Ternström, Nousheen Khan and Abid Rehman
Jalozai camp, KP	Nov 18th	Japhet Makongo with enumerators
NRC Pakistan Country Office, Peshawar	Nov 19 <sup>th</sup>	Field work cancelled for security reasons
Jalozai camp, KP	Nov 20 <sup>th</sup>	Enumerators
Bajaur, FATA	Nov 18th–20th	Enumerators
Expats evacuated	Nov 22 <sup>nd</sup>	NRC evacuated all expats to Islamabad due to security concerns

Somalia: Where	When	Who
Regional Office Nairobi	Sept 25–28th, Oct 13–15th	Björn Ternström
Mogadishu (South Central)	Sept 25–28th	Anne Davies, Liban Hassan
Bossaso (Puntland)	Sept 30th–Oct 4th	Björn Ternström (until 2 Oct) Anne Davies, Liban Hassan
Hargeisa (Somaliland)	Sept 30th	Japhet Makongo
Burao (Somaliland)	Oct 1–5th	Björn Ternström (arr. 2nd) Japhet Makongo

South Sudan: Where	When	Who
Regional Office Nairobi	Sept 25th	Charles Byamugisha and Björn Ternström
Country Office Juba	Oct 3 - 4th Oct 7th	Charles Byamugisha and Leben Moro Björn Ternström and Japhet Makongo
Aweil	Oct 5 – 7th	Charles Byamugisha and Leben Moro
Aweil	Oct 7 – 12th	Björn Ternström and Japhet Makongo
Alek/Warrap	Oct 9 - 12th	Charles Byamugisha and Leben Moro
Juba	Oct 12th	Feedback session Management team, Ternström
Juba	Oct 13th	Full team
Juba	Oct 16-22nd	Follow up interviews, Leben Moro
Juba	Oct 22nd	Feedback session with Country Director, L. Moro

## Annex 3b: List of interviewees

Acronyms: Ind = Individual interview, Gp = Group interview, M = Male, F = Female

### NRC Head office

No	Date	Name of Person	Sex	Program/Description	Organisation	Place	Interviewer
<b>Personal interviews NRC Head Office, Oslo</b>							
1	NRC Contact person: Several contacts	Ronny Rønning	M	Head, Strategic Management Support Unit	NRC	Oslo and Phone	Björn Terström, Ingela Ternström
2	Individual and group meetings	Patrik Ekløf	M	Head, East and Southern Africa Section	NRC	Oslo	Björn Ternström
3	17.08.2012	Espen Ruud	M	Head of Finance	NRC	Oslo	Ingela Ternström
4	17.08.2012	Andrew Wilson	M	M&E Coordinator	NRC	Oslo	Ingela Ternström
5	17.08.2012	Glenn Pettersen Patrik Ekløf Adam Combs	M M M	Head of Security Head of Horn of Africa Section Head of Asia Section	NRC	Oslo	Björn Ternström Group meeting/ interview, security issues
6	17.08.2012 11.01.2013	Stine Paus	F	Programme advisor Sudan	NRC	Oslo	Björn Ternström
7	17.08.2012	Tony Marchant	M	Programme advisor Somalia	NRC	Oslo	Björn Ternström
8	17.08.2012	Arild Karlsbakk	M	Programme advisor Pakistan	NRC	Oslo	Björn Terström, Ingela Ternström
9	17.08.2012	Austen Davis	M	Head of Technical Support Section	NRC	Oslo	Björn Terström, Ingela Ternström
10	17.08.2012	Nina Hjellegjerde		Head, NORCAP Section	NRC	Oslo	Ingela Ternström
11	11.01.2013	Andreas Björbak Alnäs		Controller South Sudan	NRC	Oslo	Björn Ternström
12	10.01.2013	Elisabeth Rasmusson		Secretary General	NRC	Oslo	Björn Ternström
<b>Group meeting, data sharing and joint analysis, NORCAP</b>							
15	130110	Benedicte Giæver		Director, Emergency Response Department	NRC	Oslo	Uma Narayanan, Björn Ternström
	130110	Nina		Head, NORCAP			

		Hjellegjerde		Section			
<b>Group meeting, data sharing and joint analysis, NRC</b>							
	11.01.2013	Ronny Rønning	M	Head, Strategic Management Support Unit	NRC	Oslo	Björn Ternström, Uma Narayanan
		Patrik Ekløf	M	Head, East and Southern Africa Section			
		Adam Combs	M	Head, Asia Section			
		Tony Marchant	M	Programme advisor Somalia			
16		Cara J. Winters	F	Monitoring & Evaluation Adviser			
		Benedicte Giæver	F	Director, Emergency Response Department			
<b>Skype interviews with Finance staff, by Hampus Pihl Sep 6-13, 2012</b>							
11	06.09.2012	Espen Ruud	M	Head of Finance	NRC	Skype	Hampus Pihl
12	11.09.2012	Christine Nilsson	F	Controller Somalia/Kenya/Ethiopia	NRC	Skype	Hampus Pihl
13	13.09.2012	Nicoline Foulon Nørgaard	F	Controller Burundi /DRC/Secondments NORCAP	NRC	Skype	Hampus Pihl
<b>Personal interviews, Financial Issues, Head Office, Hampus Pihl Sep 19-20, 2012</b>							
1	19.09.2012	Espen Ruud	M	Head of Finance	NRC	Oslo	Hampus Pihl
2	19.09.2012	Marcus Danbolt	M	Head of Controllers	NRC	Oslo	Hampus Pihl
3	19.09.2012	Karoline Bråten	F	Controller Pakistan/South-Sudan	NRC	Oslo	Hampus Pihl
4	19.09.2012	Heidi Berdahl	F	Chief Accountant	NRC	Oslo	Hampus Pihl
5	19.09.2012	Pål Waeraas	M	Head of Support and Services	NRC	Oslo	Hampus Pihl
6	19.09.2012	Ronny Rønning	M	Strategic Management Support Unit Head	NRC	Oslo	Hampus Pihl
7	20.09.2012	Jørgen Stag	M	Project Manager – Agresso Global	NRC	Oslo	Hampus Pihl
8	20.09.2012	Tony Marchant	M	Programme Adviser Somalia	NRC	Oslo	Hampus Pihl
9	20.09.2012	Arild Karlsbakk	M	Programme Adviser Pakistan	NRC	Oslo	Hampus Pihl
10	20.09.2012	Nina Hjellegjerde	F	Head of Section - NORCAP	NRC	Oslo	Hampus Pihl
<b>Skype interviews with Finance staff, by Hampus Pihl Sep 6-13, 2012</b>							
11	06.09.2012	Espen Ruud	M	Head of Finance	NRC	Skype	Hampus Pihl

12	11.09.2012	Christine Nilsson	F	Controller Somalia/Kenya/Ethiopia	NRC	Skype	Hampus Pihl
13	13.09.2012	Nicoline Foulon Nørgaard	F	Controller Burundi /DRC/Secondments NORCAP	NRC	Skype	Hampus Pihl
<b>Interviews with ICLA staff, by Ralf Otto, Sep and Nov, 2012</b>							
1	07.09.2012	Monica Sanchez	F	ICLA Adviser	NRC	Phone	Ralf Otto
	29.11.2012	Monica Sanchez	F	ICLA Adviser	NRC	Oslo	Ralf Otto
2	29.11.2012	Stine Paus	F	Programme Adviser for South Sudan	NRC	Oslo	Ralf Otto
3	29.11.2012	Arild Karlsbakk	M	Programme Adviser for Pakistan	NRC	Oslo	Ralf Otto
4-5	29.11.2012	Cara Winters Andrew Wilson	F M	M&E Adviser M&E Coordinator	NRC	Oslo	Ralf Otto
6-7	29.11.2012	Martin Suvatne Jake Zarins	M M	Shelter Advisers Shelter Advisers	NRC NRC	Oslo	Ralf Otto
<b>Interviews with WASH staff, by Patrick Fox, Sep 6-13, 2012</b>							
1	18.12.2012	Austen Davis	M	Head-Technical Support Section	NRC	Skype	Patrick Fox
2	17.12.2012	Jake Zarins	M	Shelter advisor	NRC	Skype	Patrick Fox
3	01.02.2013	Jeroen Quanjer	M	Shelter advisor	NRC	Skype	Patrick Fox
<b>Skype interviews with NRC staff in other countries, by Björn Ternström</b>							
1	08.02.2013	Chiara Gaburri	F	Program Manager Food Security	NRC	DRC	Björn Ternström

## Other Stakeholders

Personal interviews, Oslo							
No	Date	Name of Person	Sex	Program/Description	Organisation	Place	Interviewer
1	17.07.2012	Reidun A. Sandvold	F	Senior Adviser, Civil Society Department	Norad	Oslo	Björn Ternström Ingela Ternström
2	17.07.2012	Johan Kristian Meyer	M		Norwegian Foreign Ministry	Oslo	Björn Ternström Ingela Ternström
3	12.02.2013	Britta Ramberg	M	Programme Manager, Humanitarian and Peace Support Operations	MSB	Phone	Björn Ternström
4	07.02.2013	Barbro Wiberg	F	Senior Programme Officer, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance	Sida	Phone/Email	Björn Ternström

## Interviewees Pakistan

Name	Sex	Organisation	Title/Role	Date	Location	Type
Amjad Ali Khan	M	NRC	Head of FATA program	121119	Peshawar	Ind
Charsadda	M	IDP Committee and Community	Community members & representatives	121116	Charsadda	Gp 19M
Fawad Aamin	M	UNHCR	Protection Officer Protection Cluster Lead	121121	Peshawar	Ind
Ghari Momin	M	IDP Committee and Community	Community members & representatives	121117	Nowsheera	Gp 25M
Ibrahim Yar Muhammed	M	NRC	Program Development Coordinator	121116	Peshawar	Ind
Israr Ahmad Safi	M	NRC	Acting Finance Administration Manager	121117	Peshawar	Ind
Junaid Ghani	M	UNHCR	IT Associate responsible for digital registration	121121	Peshawar	Ind
Khalid Ilyas	M	Federal Disaster Management Authority	Director	121121	Peshawar	Ind
Khalida Akbari	F	NRC	HR Coordinator	121119	Peshawar	Ind
Masood Ahmed Jan	M	NRC	Project Coordinator Nowsheera/ Charsadda	121120	Peshawar	Ind
Muhammad Imran Muhammad Rafique	M M	NRC	Team Leaders	121119	Peshawar	Gp

Abdul Wajid Imran Khan Mustaq Ahmad Sadiah Rani	M M M F					
Muhammed Ahre Khalid Abbis Asif Taj Awan	M M M	NRC	Team leaders; Emergency response ICLA/Education ICLA	121118	Peshawar	Gp
Prang	M	IDP Committee and Community	Community members & representatives	121118	Charsadda	Gp 25M
Sadia Rani	F	NRC	Acting Program Manager ICLA	121119	Peshawar	Ind
Saeedullah Khan	M	NRC	Country Director	121115 121116	Islamabad Peshawar	Ind
Rokibul Alam	M	NRC	Program Support Manager	121117	Peshawar	Ind
Tom Otieno Otunga	M	OCHA	Humanitarian Affairs Officer	121120	Peshawar	Ind
Yodit Mulugata	F	NRC	Program manager Shelter (incl WASH)	121116 121120	Peshawar	Ind
Zartasha Qaisar Khan	F	NRC	Acting Program Director/ Program Manager ICLA	121121	Peshawar	Ind
Zel Mengistu Ubaid Ullah Sikander Azam	M M M	UNHCR	Shelter Expert Engineer Cluster coordinator	121119	Peshawar	Gp
Zia ur Rehman Waqar Maroof	M M	Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees	Commissioner Additional Commissioner	121120	Peshawar	Gp

### Interviewees, PETS Pakistan, November 15 - 21

Respondents-Pakistan			Male	Female	Total
NRC Staff: Peshawar Office			8	2	10
Ibrahim Yar Muhamad	PDU Coordinator	Male			
Israr Ahmad	Deputy Finance Manager	Male			
Ayaz ur Rehman	Finance Officer-Bank payments	Male			
Sajid Sarwar	Finance Officer-Data control	Male			
Tehmina Awan	Finance Assistant-Cash	Female			
Asad Jan	Finance Assistant - Field	Male			
Mohammad Hayat	Finance Officer	Male			
Sadia Rani	ICIA-Program Officer	Female			
Abid Ali	Finance Assistant- Archives	Male			
Hassan Manzoor	Finance Officer-Agresso	Male			
NRC Distribution officers: Jaloza Camp			6	0	6

Shahid Rehman	Distribution Officer	Male			
Amjad Khattak	Distribution Officer	Male			
Imtiaz Ahmad	Distribution Assistant	Male			
Shukaib Raz	Distribution Assistant	Male			
Changaiz	Distribution Assistant	Male			
Wajes Ahmad	Distribution Assistant	Male			
IDPs in Bajaur Agency, Zorbandar village			25	0	25
IDPs in Bajaur Agency, Delay village			18	0	18
IDPs in Rashakay village			22	0	22
IDPs in Jalozei Camp			45	22	67
IDP Committee members (elders council Jalozei)			18	0	18
Most Vulnerable Group: IDPs with disabilities			14	0	14
<b>Total Beneficiary Respondents</b>			<b>142</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>164</b>
<b>Total Respondents</b>			<b>156</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>180</b>

#### Interviewees Somalia, September 25 - October 5

Sn	Sex	Name	Organisation	Title	Location
1	Mr.	Hassan Khaire	NRC	Regional Director, Interviewed in both Nairobi and Mogadishu	Mogadishu
2	Mr.	Timothy Mutunga	NRC	Shelter and WASH Project Manager	
3	Mr.	Peter Opio	NRC	EFSD Project Manager	
4	Mr.	Sayid Ali Abdi Siyad	NRC	EFSD Project Officer	
5	Mr.	Hassan Mohamed	NRC	Senior Finance Officer	
6	Mr.	Abdul Hassak	NRC	Finance Officer	
7	Mr.	Mohamed Adam	NRC	Logistics and Procurement Officer	
8	Mr.	Ibrahim Ambar	Concern Worldwide	Assistant Country Director	
9	Ms.	Gwendolyne Mensah	UNHCR	Head of Office	
10	Ms.	Rose de Jong	UNHCR	Associate Protection Officer	
11	Mr.	Jose Antonio Leon Barrera	UNHCR	Associate Programme Officer	
12	Mr.	Dur Ali	UNHCR	Protection Cluster Coordinator	
13	Mr.	Marco Broccantini	UNHCR	GIS Officer (NORCAP Roster candidate)	
14	Ms.	Halimo Dahir	NRC	M & E Officer	
15	Mr.	Garane Yousuf Hassan		Chairperson – Community Committee	
16	Mr.	Nur Ali Abdulle		Deputy Chair – Community	

				Committee	
17	Ms.	Halimo Ali Ahmed	Camp Bosnia IDP camp	Member – Community Member	
18	Ms.	Salado Hassan Ahmed		Member	
19	Ms.	Maimuna Adam Isaq		Member	
20	Mr.	Ahmed Mohamed Adam		Member	
21	Ms.	Medina Adam Saney	Camp Bosnia	Beneficiary	
22	Mr.	Daud Abdirahman	NRC	APSC	
23	Mr.	Mohamed Mohud Nur	LNGO – Gredo	Admin	
24	Mr.	Bashir Moalim Hassan		Operations	
25	Mr.	Ali Mohamed Ali		Programme Manager	
26	Mr.	Said Ali Abokor	LNGO- Bani Adam	PM, WASH	
27	Mr.	Ahmed Omar Ibrahim		Programme Coordinator	
28	Mr.	Abdulkadir Mohamed Mohamoud	LNGO –Vardo	Director	
29	Mr.	Abdi Taxobow Mohamed		Project Officer	
30	Mr.	Frantz Mesidor	NRC	Area Manager	Bossaso
31	Mr.	Miguel Angel Gomez	NRC	Shelter/WASH Project Manager	
32	Mr.	Ariel Solari	NRC	Education Project Manager	
33	Mr.	Abdulla Musa Adam	NRC	Education Project Coordinator	
34	Mr.	Daoud Abdi Rahman	NRC	Admin, Security, Logistics, Procurement, IT, Human Resources Officer	
35	Mr.	Saeed Djibril	IDP – Ajuraan IDP Site	Senior Community Mobiliser	
36	Female	No name	Ajuraan IDP site	Beneficiary	
37	Female	No name	Ajuraan IDP site	Beneficiary	
38	Mr.	Victor Lahar	OCHA	Humanitarian Affairs Officer	
39	Mr.	Saeed Gayon	Bossaso Office	Mayor of Bossaso	
40	Mr.	Abdilatif Jama Hassan	Haji Yasin Primary School	Principal	
41	Mr.	Abdillahi		D. Principal	
42	Mr.	Dahir		CEC	
43	Ms.	Fagaad Abdi Ali	Bariga Bossaso IDP site	Beneficiary	
44	Ms.	Laila Sadiq	Las Qoray Concern LNGO	Executive Director	
45	Ms.	Hana Ibrahim Adam		Monitor	
46	Mr.	Mohamed Ahmed Mohamoud	Ministry of Interior	Regional Coordinator - IDP focal point	
47	Mr.	Said Siyad Ali	Private Sector	Agent- Landlord	Bossaso, Puntland
48	Mr.	Abdirahman Mohamed Yousuf		Landlord	
49	Ms.	Charlotte Ridung	UNHCR	Head of Office	
50	Mr.	Barnabas Asora	Danish Refugee	Area Manager	



			Council		
51	Mr.	Mohamed Ugahz	Min. Interior	Regional Coordinator and IDP Focal Point	
52	Mr.	Juan Jose Tejada	UN-HABITAT	Head of Office	
53	Mr.	Sveinung Kipelsund	UNICEF	GBV Officer, NORCAP Secundee	
54	Female	No name	Buulo Mingis IDP Site	Beneficiary	
55	Female	No name	Barriga Bossaso	Beneficiary	
56	Female	No name	Bariga Bossaso		
57	Ms.	Amina Moalim Yousuf	Buulo Mingis IDP site	Beneficiary	
58	Ms.	Khadija Adam Hassan		Beneficiary	
59	Ms.	Farhia Nur Mo'alim		Beneficiary and a member of the IDP committee	
60	Mr.	Mustafa Abdillahi Idow	Ajuraan IDP site	Chairperson	
61	Mr.	Abdilatif Abdow Abdalla		Member	
62	Mr.	Abdillahi Mualim Harun		Member	
63	Mr.	Mahad Hashi Duale		Member	
64	Mr.	Hassan Shaahi Isaaq		Member	
65	Mr.	Ainab Ali Mohamoud		Member	
66	Mr.	Mohamed Adam Hassan		Member	
67	Mr.	Isaaq Yarow Isaaq		Member	
68	Mr.	Abdiqadir Guhaad Adam		Member	
69	Ms.	Maryam Ibrahim Ali		Member	
70	Ms.	Kadijo Isaaq Buule		Member	
71	Ms.	Qurat Sadozai	NRC	Deputy Regional Director HOA region/CD Somalia/Kenya	Nairobi
72	Mr	Geir A. Schei	Norwegian Embassy Nairobi	First Secretary	Nairobi, Kenya
73	Mr	Ayaki Ito	UNHCR	Deputy Representative	
74		Pierre <i>NB! Incomplete – will be amended</i>	OCHA; CHF	Head, Head unit, internal auditor check names and titles	
75	Ms	Christine Nilsson	NRC	NRC Oslo based Controller, HOA region	
76	Ms	Marine Gevorgyan	NRC	Finance Admin Manager (FAM), HOA region	
77	Mr	Leith Baker	NRC	Regional Monitoring and Evaluation manager, HOA region	
78	Mr	Erik Demers	NRC	Programme Director, HOA region	
79	Mr	Richard Evans	OCHA	Shelter Cluster Coordinator	
80	Ms	Karoline Eckroth	NRC	Grants Coordinator/Programme	

				Suport, Somalia/Kenya	
81	Ms	Hafsa Hassan	NRC	Finance Coordinator, Somalia/Kenya	
82	Mr	Mr Frantz Mesidor	NRC	Area Manager, Puntland region	Bossasso, Puntland
83	Ms	Prudence Achirokop	NRC	ICLA Coordinator, Puntland	
84	Mr	Jillo Katelo Molu	NRC	Finance Coordinator, Puntland	
85	Mr	Mohammad Omar	NRC	Admin HR Officer, Puntland	
86	Mr	Abdiaziz Bashir Yusuf	NRC	Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, Puntland	
87	Mr	Said Abdirahman Mohammed	Local Government	Deputy Mayor, Bossaso	
88	Mr	Mohamud Hasan	Local Government	Mayor, Burao	
89	Mr	Osman Abdi Haid	Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (MRRR)	Regional Director	
90	Mr	Jama Hassan Roble		Assistant	
91	Mr	Boisy Williams	NRC	Area Manager, Puntland region	
92	Mr	Ibrahim Osman Ismail	NRC	Head of Sub-Office, Burao	

### Interviewees PETS Somalia, September 30 - October 5

List of Respondents, Somalia			Male	Female	Total
<b>Beneficiaries</b>					
Individual Interviews - Koorsaar Settlement			25	82	107
Individual Interviews - Aden Suleiman			32	76	108
IDP Committee interviews - Aden Suleiman			7	2	9
IDP Committee interviews - Koorsaar Settlement			8	3	11
<b>Total Beneficiaries</b>			<b>72</b>	<b>163</b>	<b>235</b>
<b>Local authorities' representatives</b>					
Abdo Ayir, Governor, Togdheer Regional Authority			1	0	1
<b>Project Staff</b>					
Office Staff – Hargeisa			5	0	5
Boisy William	Field Office Coordinator, Hargeisa	Male			
Steven Mutisya	Shelter Project manager, Hargeisa	Male			
Mohamed	M & E Officer, Hargeisa	Male			
Jama Yusuf	Accountant, Hargeisa	Male			
Mamadou Madioir Diallo	Finance Manager (visiting from Nairobi)	Male			
Field Office Staff – Burao			6	0	6

Ibrahim Osman Ismail	Head of sub-office Burao	Male			
Daud Ismail Abdi	Construction officer-shelter and WASH, Burao	Male			
Sharmaake Muse Yusuf	M & E assistant, Burao	Male			
Mustafa Hassan Ahmed	Food Security and Livelihood officer, Burao	Male			
Hamse Abdurrahman	Logistics officer, Burao	Male			
Muse Abdi Ahmed	Finance officer, Burao	Male			
<b>Total NRC staff</b>			<b>11</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Total Respondents</b>			<b>84</b>	<b>163</b>	<b>247</b>

### Interviewees South Sudan

No	Date	Name of Person	Sex	Program/Description	Organisation	Place	Interviewer
1	25.09.2012	Zedek Maille	M	WASH Coordinator	NRC	Nairobi	Bjorn & Charles
2	02.10.2012	Gregory Norton	M	Country Coordinator	NRC	Juba	Chalres & Leben
3	8.10.2012	Pierre Kadet, Phd	M	Program Manager NBeG & Warrap	NRC	Alek	Charles & Leben
4	8.10.2012	Derek Kyambadde	M	Project Coordinator for WASH/ Emergency Shelter/DRR	NRC	Alek	Charles & Leben
5	8.10.2012	Brimo Majok	M	Team Leader, ICLA Alek	NRC	Alek	Charles & Leben
<b>FGD: 1 BENEFICIARIES AT MAYEN GUMEL TRANSIT SITE WARRAP STATE</b> <i>Block 24 or Khartoum Gedida (Food Security group- Returnees), Kuajok</i> Translator: Ayul, Education Team Leader at NRC Alek							
6-18	9.10.2012		6M 7F			Mayen Gumel	Charles & Leben
<b>FGD: 2 BENEFICIARIES AT BLOCK 25 TRANSIT SITE, WARRAP STATE</b> Translator: Ayul, Education Team Leader at NRC Alek							
19-25	9.10.2012		5M 2F				Charles & Leben
<b>FGD: 3 BENEFICIARIES AT BLOCK 14 TRANSIT SITE, WARRAP STATE</b> <i>(ICLA group-5 persons), Kuajok (Conducted in Arabic).</i>							
26-31	9.10.2012		3M 2F				Leben
<b>FGD: 4 BENEFICIARIES AT MAJAK AHEER/TURALER PAYAM TRANSIT SITE, WARRAP STATE</b> <i>Majak Aheer, Turalei, Twic (Shelter Group)</i> Translator: Ayul, Education Team Leader at NRC Alek							
32-39	10.10.2012		4M 4F				Charles & Leben
40	10.10.2012	Fiona Mattick	F	Area Manager	NRC	Alek	Leben & Charles
41	11.10.2012	Stephen Lukudu,	M	Team Leader, WASH	NRC	Alek	Leben

42	16.10.2012	Jamesco Deng,	M	Dep.Direct. Plan. Aweil	GoSS	Aweil	Leben (by phone)
43	17.10.2012	Wilfred Iramaku	M	National Field Officer Kuajok/Warrap State, South Sudan	UNOCHA	Kuajok	Charles (by Skype)
44	22.10.2012	Lino Duk	M	Minister of local Govt.,	GoSS	Aweil	Leben (by phone)
45	22.10.2012	Gatwech Peter Kulang	M	D.G. of NGO Affairs, RRC Juba	GoSS	Juba	Leben
46	7.10.2012	Heidi Carrubba	F	Program Coordinator	NRC	Juba	Bjorn
47	7.10.2012	Siri Elverland	F	Protection and Advocacy Advisor	NRC	Juba	Bjorn
48	7.10.2012	Siri Elverland	F	Separate interview for role as ex-NORCAP secondee	NORCAP	Juba/missions elsewhere	Bjorn
49	8.10.2012	Ellen Dahl	F	Global Support Manager/ Surge team	NRC	Juba	Bjorn
50-57	8.10.2012	James Tong Dut Joseph Bel Awan Deng Mangok Kenyang Dau Mabior Jai Kuan Anyar Mou Atak Baak Joseph Deng	8 M	Group interview National staff M & E  Education  Logistics Shelter Training  ICLA EFSD Finance	NRC	Aweil	Bjorn
58-60	9.10.2012	Jai Kuan Anyar Kur Kur Kur John Piol Ngor	3 M	Group Interview ICLA staff	NRC	Aweil	Bjorn
61	9.10.2012	James Tong Dut	M	M&E Supervisor	NRC	Aweil	Bjorn
62	9.10.2012	Jamila El Abdellaoui	F	ICLA PC	NRC	Aweil	Bjorn
63	10.10.2012	Syann Williams	F	Head of Sub Office	UNHCR	Aweil	Bjorn
64	10.10.2012	Takeshura Mugawi	M	Head of Sub Office	UNHCR	Aweil	Bjorn
65		Taban Emanuel	M	Field Officer			
66	10.10.2012	Apicu Aric Ibrahim	M	Logistic/OIC	UNHCR	Aweil South	Bjorn
67	10.10.2012	Luka Deng Majuk	M	Pajam Administrator,	Local Authority	Njuluth Pajam, Aweil	Bjorn

						Centre Country	
68	11.10.2012	Mou Atak Baak	M	APC, EFSD	NRC	Aweil	Bjorn
69	12.10.2012	Emilie Welam	F	Swedish Embassy	Sida	Juba	Bjorn
70	11.10.2012	Laura Swift	F	Shelter Cluster Coord	NRC	Aweil	Bjorn
71	12.10.2012	Francesca XXX	F	PM ICLA	NRC	Juba	Bjorn
72-74	12.10.2012	James Arike Charles Jay Wilkes George Ombis	3 M	Progr Man Specialist  At. Progr Officer Reg Progr Officer	USAID/ OFDA	Juba	Bjorn
75	12.10.2012	Peter Trotter	M	Protection Cluster Lead	UNHCR	Juba	Bjorn
76	12.10.2012	Aasmund Lok	M	Child Protection Off	NORCAP/U NICEF	Juba	Bjorn
77	12.10.2012	XXX	M	Mr Lok's supervisor	NORCAP/U NICEF	Juba	Bjorn

### Interviewees PETS South Sudan, October 7 - 12

<b>List of Respondents South Sudan</b>					
<b>Respondent group</b>			<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>NRC Staff</b>					
NRC Staff Juba and Aweil			7	1	8
Beatriz Satizabal (Juba)	Finance Manager	F			
Nassreloin Eltigani	Roving Logistic Coordinator	M			
Danyiel, Taillon	Shelter Manager	M			
Kenyan	Program officer Shelter	M			
Deng Mangok;	Logistic supervisor	M			
Samwel Kuol Mawien	Ware house officer	M			
Joseph Wol Agorang	Procurement officer	M			
Joseph Deng,	Finance officer, Aweil	M			
<b>Government Representatives</b>			2	0	2
Akok Ngor Kuay	Acting DGI-SMOEGET/NBSG	M			
Jamesco Deng Deng	Director of Planning and Budget, Ministry of Education, Aweil.	M			
<b>TIARALIET PRIMARY SCHOOL</b>			<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Total</b>
Teachers			3	0	3
Parents and Teacher Parent Association			6	1	7
Pupils			21	10	31
<b>Total</b>			<b>30</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>WARAHER PRIMARY SCHOOL</b>					

Teachers	3	0	3
Parents and Teacher Parent Association	6	5	11
Pupils	16	4	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>MAPER WEST PRIMARY SCHOOL</b>			
Teachers	1	1	2
Parents and Teacher Parent Association	7	5	12
Pupils	23	12	35
<b>Total</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>Total Beneficiary Respondents</b>			
	<b>88</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>126</b>
<b>Total Respondents</b>			
	<b>94</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>133</b>

### Interviewees NORCAP

SECONDEES								
No.	Date	Name	Position / Work Station	Sex	Age	Interview Location	Interviewer	Mode of Interview
1	120830	Walton-Ellery, Sandra	Assessment, ACAPS, Indonesia	F	44	NRC HO, Oslo	Uma Narayanan and Ewa Eriksson	Focus group discussion
2		Inwani, Charles	C&V, WFP, South Africa / Bangladesh	M	42			Face-to-face
3		Aronsen, Even	Child Protection, UNICEF / UNHCR, Sudan / Indonesia / Sri Lanka / FRY / Bosnia / Iraq	M	61			
4		Valborg-land, Håkon	Construction, UNHABITAT / WFP / UNICEF, Sudan / Sierra Leone / Pakistan	M	54			
5		Spencer, Sonia Melisa	Education, UNICEF / NRC, Sierra Leone / Afghanistan / Pakistan / Yemen	F	57			
6		Holtan, Jan Hugo	Education + M and E, multiple secondments, Iraq/Lebanon/ Sri Lanka/Albania/Palestine	M	64			
7		Digernes, Arild	Field Officer, UNICEF, Angola / Iraq	M	60			
8		Kemokai, Mustapha Sulaiman	Logistics, IOM, Pakistan	M	44			
9		Reece, Robert Doyle	Logistics, OCHA, Haiti	M	50			
10		Næss, Kirsti	M&E, UNRWA, Jordan / Syria	F	50			
11		Nyasini, Evalyne	Nutrition, WFP / UNICEF, Somalia / Tanzania	F	39			

12		SAID, LIBAN	Protection, UNHCR / NRC, Tunisia	M	39			
13		Machangu, Jacqueline	Reporting, FAO, Philippines / Sudan	F	36			
14	120927	Gwendoline Mensah	UNHCR Sub-Office Delegation, Mogadishu			Moga- dishu	Anne Davies	Individual
15	121003	Sveinung Kiplesund	GBV Officer, UNICEF - NORCAP Secondee, NRC Office Bossaso			Bossasso	Anne Davies	Face to face
16	121012	Aasmund Lok	Child Protection Officer, UNICEF	M	30- ish	Juba, South Sudan	Bjorn Ternstrom	
17	120927	Richard Evans	Cluster Coordinator, Shelter Cluster, UN	M	40+	Nairobi	Bjorn Ternstrom	
18	121012	Siri Elverland	Protection and Advocacy Advisor, NRC	F	35- ish	Juba, South Sudan	Bjorn Ternstrom	

#### HEAD OFFICE STAFF

No.	Date	Name	Position / Work Station	Sex	Age	Interview Location	Interviewer	Mode of Interview
1	30-aug-12	Nina Hjellegjerde	Head of NORCAP	F	34	Oslo HO	Uma Narayanan & Ewa Eriksson	Individual Face to face
2	30-aug-12	Toril Skjetne	Deputy Director of Emergency Response Dev Dept	F		Oslo HO	Uma Narayanan & Ewa Eriksson	
3	30-aug-12	Glenn Pettersen	Global Security Manager	M	36	Oslo HO	Uma Narayanan & Ewa Eriksson	
4	31-aug-12	Nicoline Foulon Norgaard	Finance Controller, NRC	F	32	Oslo HO	Ewa Eriksson	
5	31-aug-12	Ingvill Frederiksen	NorCap Advisor	F	33	Oslo HO	Ewa Eriksson	
6	31-aug-12	Erlend Hvoslef	NorCap Advisor	M	45+	Oslo HO	Ewa Eriksson	
7	31-aug-12	Astrid Sween	NorCap Advisor, Competency Development	F	45+	Oslo HO	Uma Narayanan & Ewa Eriksson	

#### FOLLOW UP INTERVIEWS, online survey respondents

No.	Date	Mode of Interview	Sex	Age	Interviewer
1	10-dec-12	Skype	F	36 - 45	Uma Narayanan
2	03-dec-12	Skype	M	36 - 45	
3	06-dec-12	Skype	F	36 - 45	
4	06-dec-12	Skype	M	46 - 55	
5	07-dec-12	Telephone	F	36 - 45	

6	14-dec-12	Skype	M	46 - 55		
7	07-dec-12	Skype	F	36 - 45		
8	06-dec-12	Telephone	F	46 - 55		
9	05-dec-12	Skype	M	46 - 55		
10	03-dec-12	Skype	M	46 - 55		
11	03-dec-12	Skype	M	36 - 45		
12	05-dec-12	Skype	F	25 - 35		
13	09-jul-11	Telephone	F	46 - 55		
14	30-nov-12	Skype	M	46 - 55		
15	07-dec-12	Skype	M	25 - 35		
16	07-dec-12	Skype	M	36 - 45		
17	11-dec-12	Skype	F	25 - 35		
18	06-dec-12	Telephone	F	36 - 45		
19	06-dec-12	Telephone	F	56 - 65		
20	18-dec-12	Skype	F	46-55		
21	28-nov-12	Skype	F	46-55		Annina Mattsson
22	03-dec-12	Skype	M	36-45		
23	06-dec-12	Skype	F	36-45		

UN AGENCY INTERVIEWS							
No.	Date	Name	Position / Work Station	Sex	Age	Mode of Interview	Interviewer
1	19-nov-12	Julien Temple	Manager of Humanitarian Partnerships, UNICEF	M		Phone	Annina Mattsson
2	19-nov-12	Jaimee Skilton	Support Office, Humanitarian Partnerships, UNICEF (seconded from RedR)	F		Phone	
3	20-nov-12	Donna Carter	Stand-by Partner Officer, ALITE, WFP	F		Phone	
4	21-nov-12	Martina Buonincontri	Partnerships and Cluster Specialist, FAO	F		Phone	
5	15-nov-12	Dan Lewis	Chief, Urban Risk Reduction, UN-HABITAT	M		Email	
6	22-nov-12	Finnbogi Rutu Arnarson	Manager, Complementary Personnel, UNRWA	M		Phone	
7	22-nov-12	Marie-Sophie Reck	Stand-by Partnership Programme, Surge Capacity, OCHA	F		Phone	
8	29-nov-12	Ansa Masoud	Human Settlements Officer, UN-HABITAT	F		Phone	



## Annex 4: Terms of Reference

### Terms of Reference for the Evaluation of five Humanitarian Programs of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and of the Standby Roster NORCAP

#### 1. Background

The Norwegian Refugee Council is a non-governmental organization involved in refugee questions and refugee work in four continents. In 2010, the organization had program activities in 21 countries. NRC is the biggest Norwegian humanitarian organization, measured by the number of employees. It employs almost 3000 persons, most of whom work in the field offices. In 2011 it received altogether 537 million NOK in support from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). A significant part (118 million NOK) of its 2012 budget is financed by Sida (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency). NRC is an important partner for the United Nations Organizations and receives significant contributions over UN budgets. In addition to its practical humanitarian efforts in the field, NRC is an important advocate for humanitarian principles in international fora.

NRC's mandate is:

“To promote and protect the rights of all people who have been forced to flee their countries, or their homes within their countries, regardless of their race, religion, nationality or political convictions. This will be achieved by acting as an independent and courageous spokesperson for refugee rights nationally and internationally, by providing humanitarian assistance in emergency situations, and by strengthening the capacity of the UN organizations to offer and coordinate international aid and protection. NRC shall in all ways seek to provide viable, durable solutions with regard to both its spokesman activities and its emergency relief efforts” (NRC Policy Paper 2001).

MFA is planning a revision of the Government's Humanitarian Strategy, valid until 2013. As part of the existing strategy, the Ministry has entered into two framework agreements with NRC, an agreement about the NORCAP Standby Roster and another one concerning Humanitarian Assistance and Protection to Persons Displaced in Africa. The planned evaluation will be used as a relevant input for the revision of the strategy. In line with international best practice and the focus on the results agenda and aid effectiveness laid down in the Paris and more recent Busan declarations and Norad's strategy 2011-2015, as well as with recommendations made to the MFA by the Norwegian General Auditor, it is considered desirable to focus more strongly than before on *results* of humanitarian efforts.

As a major donor to NRC, Sida wants to participate in the evaluation and influence its preparation. The evaluation will benefit from a financial contribution from Sida, which is invited to participate in all meetings of the Reference Group for the evaluation and to comment upon all draft reports from the evaluation team.

NRC's main humanitarian programs addressing refugees, IDPs (internally displaced persons) and returnees include the following core activities:

- ⌚ ICLA (Information, Counseling and Legal assistance) – is to contribute to durable solutions for displaced persons and to fulfill their rights through the provision of information, counseling and legal services.
- ⌚ EFSD (Emergency Food Security and Distribution) – is to fulfill the immediate food needs and maintain people’s adequate nutritional status in emergency situations, immediate non food item needs in emergency situations, and to ensure schoolage children proper food intake.
- ⌚ Shelter – is to provide emergency shelter to meet both immediate and temporary needs, facilitate durable solutions by supporting the (re)construction of permanent shelter, and promote education through the provision of temporary and permanent school construction and rehabilitation.
- ⌚ Education – is to facilitate access to basic education and training, promoting education as a prime protection tool and providing training in, or information on, conflict management, human rights, reconciliation and peace building.
- ⌚ CM (Camp Management) – is to facilitate on-site coordination of all activities and services within a camp. CM management will be phased out as a core activity in 2012, but NRC will continue to contribute to CM through being tasked by the CCCM (Camp Coordination and Camp Management) Cluster group to deliver training in Camp Management.
- ⌚ Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) – is to provide emergency water , sanitation and hygiene solutions. Previously organized under Shelter, but will from 2012 be organized as a separate core activity in NRC.

The evaluation shall include ICLA, EFSD, Shelter, CM and WASH core activities.

NORCAP (Norwegian Capacity ), an emergency standby roster, was established in 1991, originally under the name of NORSTAFF, and has expanded over the years to become the world’s most frequently used emergency standby roster. In 2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NRC entered for the first time into a three year agreement concerning NRC’s operation of NORCAP. The agreement had a financial frame of 240 million NOK, and expenditures amounted to approximately 290 million by the end of 2011. A new framework agreement was signed on March 9, 2012.

Key elements of the NORCAP mandate are to:

- ⌚ “Enhance the capacity of the international community to prevent and to respond to ongoing and future humanitarian challenges.
- ⌚ Support international capacity, and in particular the United Nations, in all stages of crisis; from prevention/early warning and response, to monitoring, reconstruction, conflict resolution, sustainable development and democratic governance.”

- ⌚ “Ensure that people in emergencies receive protection and assistance according to their needs and rights, with particular emphasis on the protection of civilians and the implementation of relevant Security Council Resolutions.” (From NORCAP Annual Report 2010).

In 2011 NORCAP seconded staff to 311 assignments, accounting for 1659 person-months in the field. Most of the secondments took place in sub-Saharan Africa, followed by the Middle East and North Africa, Asia, the Americas and Europe.

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The retrospective evaluation outlined in these Terms of Reference, covering the case countries Pakistan, Somalia and South Sudan and the period 2010-2012, will be supplemented by a prospective impact evaluation of the use by NRC of food vouchers for IDPs in Somalia, covering the period 2012-2014. The prospective evaluation will start in late 2012, and is expected to carry out a baseline survey and process evaluation before the end of the year (the details on methodology, timing of the follow-up survey and qualitative work, suggested approach to establish credible attribution will be in the proposals by the bidding researchers).

The purpose of the impact evaluation is to evaluate the intended and unintended effects of the distribution of food vouchers to eligible Somali IDPs. In camps where rations provided to residents contain very limited quantities of fresh foods, such as vegetables or fruit, milk and eggs, vouchers may give recipients access to a larger variety of food items and choice over their consumption.<sup>133</sup> The study will among others look at the effect on food security (access and nutrition quality), consumption patterns, health effects, security effects, as well as the local market effects. Both evaluations will be commissioned by the Evaluation Department of Norad. The retrospective evaluation will be initiated ahead of the prospective impact evaluation. It is desirable to coordinate the visit by members of the retrospective evaluation team to Somalia with that of the team carrying out the prospective impact evaluation there, so that members of the two teams can exchange relevant information, and in order to avoid any possible duplication of efforts.

## **2. Purpose and objectives of the evaluation**

The purpose of this retrospective evaluation is to give insights and contribute to the improvement of important humanitarian programs of the Norwegian Refugee Council and of the activities of NORCAP in general. The evaluation will indirectly provide useful inputs to the planned revision of the Humanitarian Strategy of the Norwegian Government.

The evaluation has five major objectives:

- ⌚ To assess the relevance (the extent to which an aid activity is suited to the priorities of a target group), effectiveness (the extent to which objectives have been met) and efficiency (the relationship of results achieved to efforts made) of five humanitarian programs (core activities) of the Norwegian Refugee Council in each of the three case countries.

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<sup>133</sup> Most camps have a market where resident vendors sell a variety of items, including fresh foods. Residents' ability to access these foods is normally limited by the modest external support they get through remittances or through the sale of part of their general food ration.

- ⌚ To assess the quality of NORCAP responses to actual challenges, focusing on issues of relevance and efficiency in relation to actual and changing international needs.
- ⌚ To assess the existence of synergies between the above-mentioned activities of NRC and the activities of NORCAP.
- ⌚ To provide a learning exercise regarding program design and implementation for persons and organizations covered by the evaluation.
- ⌚ To provide recommendations for the development of a new core competency in WASH, and improvements in the design and implementation of existing core competencies in NRC and of NORCAP competencies.

### 3. Scope of work

The evaluation will focus on the Norwegian Refugee Council's international humanitarian assistance in five core activities, and on the assignments of NORCAP. It will concentrate on the period 2010-2012 and on the case countries Pakistan, South Sudan, and Somalia, covering all the mentioned five core activities of NRC in each country. As security conditions in Somalia and South Sudan may be precarious and present unacceptable hazards to evaluation team visits, it may be necessary to exclude one or both of them as case countries in the evaluation and to select the Democratic Republic of Congo and/or the Ivory Coast instead. The evaluation team shall be prepared to deal with such a contingency on a four-week notice. The evaluation shall cover the following issues:

#### (i) **Description:**

- ⌚ Provide a brief statistical overview of the international humanitarian assistance involving the Norwegian Refugee Council, broken down by countries of activity, types of activities, and partners over the study period (2010-2012).
- ⌚ Provide a brief overview of how this assistance is financed, with names of important contributors, and in particular by indicating to what extent contributions are open for core funding or earmarked for specific purposes.
- ⌚ Based on the two previous points, provide an overview of the trends in NRC's humanitarian work and priorities in light of larger international trends in humanitarian engagements and provide an overview of previous reviews, evaluations and possible baseline studies that may be useful for the evaluation.
- ⌚ Describe the institutional environment and the socio-political context of relevance to international humanitarian operations in the three case countries within the areas of ICLA, EFSD, Shelter, CM, and WASH, and to what extent international trends are reflected in the planning and implementation of NRC efforts in these areas.

- ① Describe the theory of change (program theory making all underlying assumptions explicit) that underlies the respective interventions and the evidence base for each of the assumptions made.
- ① Describe the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation mechanism, and termination procedures/exit strategies of projects within the mentioned core activities of NRC in each of the three case countries.
- ① Describe the main tasks assigned to NORCAP personnel, the selection process of persons for various assignments, and how they are utilized by the seconded organizations in the three case countries.

**(ii) Assessments:**

***NRC humanitarian programs***

- ① Assess to what extent NRC core activities to be covered by the evaluation and as described in project and program documents, represent and respond to the needs and priorities of target beneficiaries.
- ① Assess to what extent NRC demonstrates cost effectiveness, including an understanding of program costs, the factors driving those costs, and ability to achieve efficiency gains.
- ① Assess to what extent NRC has delivered results and improved efficiency due specifically to the receipt of funds from MFA, Norad and Sida.
- ① Assess the results of NRC projects and programs regarding ICLA, EFSD, Shelter, CM and WASH. As for such results, the focus will be on outcome-level results, though information on outputs will also be valuable. In addition to elements such as relevance and efficiency already indicated above, effectiveness and sustainability should be emphasized.
- ① The evaluation is also expected to “*follow the money*” by carrying out public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) and analysis. The team shall for each case country select one program (core activity) in consultation with the Evaluation Department that will be the object of public expenditure tracking surveys and analysis. Such studies shall preferably cover the programs of shelter and of emergency food security and distribution. The PETS will identify possible space for efficiency gains. It will look for evidence of significant losses due to administrative control difficulties, with possible discrepancies between payroll data and staff working in the programs, large variances in the prices of procured goods, and significant quantities of missing and stolen materials. Advantages and disadvantages of using cash transfers and food vouchers instead of direct food handouts shall be considered where relevant, and if Somalia and South Sudan remain case countries for the evaluation, the team shall in addition conduct a survey and have Skype/telephone interviews with NRC personnel in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Ivory Coast, where cash and vouchers are actively used. If DRC and the Ivory Coast become case countries, see page 5 (Scope of work), the assessment of using cash

transfers and food vouchers instead of direct food handouts shall be based upon person to person interviews instead of Skype/telephone interviews.

- ④ Assess how the transformation of WASH efforts into a separate core activity can best take place and how, as a separate activity, such efforts may continue linking with shelter and food security in a financially and time efficient manner.
- ④ Assess issues of fungibility of resources and whether NRC funding freed up national resources for use in other activities/sectors (by e.g. looking at developments in the expenditure for different sectors and sub-sectors prior to and after NRC started their support). Furthermore assess whether NRC activities may have contributed to a delay in local authorities taking charge of the situation. (This will be an assessment mainly based on expert and key informant interviews.)
- ④ Consider whether the humanitarian aid provided has been conflict sensitive in the sense that it has been planned and adjusted in relation to the environment of conflict in which it has been implemented, with a view to avoiding unintended negative effects and maximizing positive ones.

### **NORCAP**

- ④ Examine the degree of satisfaction with the professional performance of NORCAP personnel in seconded organizations, and the impression that their performance has left with the NRC headquarters in Oslo.
- ④ Compare assessments of such performance in seconded organizations with the sense of purpose and usefulness experienced by NORCAP seconded personnel serving in the same organizations.
- ④ Examine how an increasing complexity of emergencies impact on standby arrangements in general and the NORCAP Standby Roster in particular. Outline changes in the seconded organizations' expectations to the qualifications of roster members as a result of new international realities.
- ④ Outline the NORCAP Standby Roster's strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis other standby rosters such as the Danish Refugee Council Standby Roster, the Irish Aid Rapid Response Initiative and Canadem (Canada's Civilian Reserve).
- ④ Assess what are the key opportunities (external opportunities and internal strengths) and key obstacles (external threats and internal weaknesses) for the development of NORCAP into an increasingly efficient standby roster.

### **Synergies between NORCAP and NRC humanitarian programs**

- ④ Assess the value of the interaction of personnel dealing with NRC humanitarian programs and NORCAP activities at the level of the NRC *headquarters*. Consider inter alia to what extent there is an exchange of information and experience that may be mutually beneficial. Assess to what extent there is *in the field* a corresponding exchange of information and experience, in particular with respect to priorities,

communication of results and follow-up, through informal and possibly formal channels.

Cross-cutting issues of environment, gender, disability and corruption shall be covered by the evaluation of NRC and NORCAP when relevant.

### **Recommendations:**

- ⌚ Provide recommendations for the future management and development of the mentioned NRC core activities and for the development of the NORCAP emergency standby roster. In addition to general recommendations, the evaluation will for each specified core activity of NRC develop two or three recommendations that can be implemented within the next 18 months. For the NORCAP roster, there shall be a similar distinction between general recommendations and two or three recommendations that can be implemented within 18 months.

## **4. Methodology**

The approach of the study is to combine the need to obtain a general overview of initiatives undertaken and the need to research in more depth, looking more closely at separate projects and agreements in case countries. The evaluation shall both look at general agreements and follow selected projects down at country level. In its assessment of NORCAP secondments, the evaluation team shall relate closely to the objectives for the use of such secondees in relevant organizations, in particular UN organizations.

The evaluation of the Norwegian Refugee Council and NORCAP is to be carried out using at least the following methods:

- ⌚ The mapping and possible use of written material, including statistics and population surveys if available; and of archive material, baseline studies, evaluations, reviews, and completion reports, mainly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norad, Sida and the Norwegian Refugee Council. Within the limits of information access, non-public policy documents from MFA, Norad, Sida, UN organizations and the Refugee Council should be included. To the extent that essential information is not given in available material, the team shall itself gather primary data that are necessary for result assessments. In such cases, additional resources may be considered by the Evaluation Department upon written request from the team.
- ⌚ Interviews with relevant staff in the MFA, relevant international organizations including UN organizations, Norad, Sida and the Norwegian Refugee Council. Interviews with staff in MFA, Norad, Sida and NRC shall take place in meetings person to person. Interviews with staff in international organizations may be conducted by Skype or phone.
- ⌚ Field visits to a selection of Refugee Council projects and programs in Pakistan, South Sudan, and Somalia, and, wherever relevant, to NORCAP personnel on assignments in the same countries. For each selected project, the team will study available documentation in Norway and on location, interview relevant staff as well as

partners, key informants and in particular recipients of the aid provided. If at all possible for security reasons, such field studies of case countries shall be done.

- ⌚ For the PETS, the team will develop a survey which will be fielded to local level personnel and program beneficiaries (the team will suggest sample size in their proposal). Furthermore they will gather the necessary financial and procurement data from the central level all the way down to the local level implementers.
- ⌚ Key informant and expert interviews will be carried out for a number of the questions in the TORs.
- ⌚ Triangulation of results and of methodologies shall be actively used in order to increase the reliability of the evaluation.

The evaluation shall refer to the DAC criteria on evaluation of international development cooperation, and the Consultant should clarify the use of the criteria if at all necessary. Reference is made to the DAC “Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies”. Reports will be assessed against the DAC evaluation quality standards. All proposals must follow the DAC evaluation guidelines. The team should in its work explicitly address the issue of attribution, and how it will be assessed.

The Consultant will be responsible for developing a detailed methodological framework for the evaluation. The Consultant is free to suggest methods that have not been indicated above. New and little known methods should be duly explained. If the Consultant leaves some of the detailed elaboration of the methodology to the inception report, the methodological design shall be sufficiently developed in the tender for the client to be able to make a proper assessment of the offer. The evaluation report shall describe the evaluation method and process and discuss validity and reliability. Limitations and shortcomings shall be explained.

## **5. Organization and evaluation team**

The evaluation will be carried out by an independent team of researchers/consultants. The contract will be issued by the Evaluation Department (Norad), according to standard procurement procedures. Evaluation management will be carried out by the Evaluation Department, and the team will report to the Department. The team is entitled to consult widely with stakeholders pertinent to the assignment. The inception report, the field visit reports, the draft evaluation report and all other reports are subject to approval based upon quality criteria by the Evaluation Department. A group of stakeholders and possibly academic peer reviewers, a reference group, will be established, administered by the Evaluation Department, to advise and comment on the evaluation products throughout the process. Representatives of the evaluation team will normally be invited to participate in the meetings of the group, which shall take place in Oslo. 3-4 such meetings are foreseen.

The team shall involve stakeholders in the evaluation process with a view to making the process useful in improving their work. For each project visited in the field a debriefing shall be held with the main local stakeholders.

At least one team member must be able to read Norwegian without any problems of understanding.



At least one team member shall be able to read and speak important languages of beneficiaries in the case countries; alternatively, the team will be responsible for hiring the necessary translation services. It is desirable that the team includes team members from the case countries.

A system of quality assurance shall be in force, with ability to control both the formal and substantial aspects of the evaluation reports, including a high quality linguistic level for the reports. The system shall be carefully described in the tender, with a clear indication of the number of person days that will be allotted to the quality assurance functions.

## **6. Budget, work plan and reporting**

The tender shall present a total budget with stipulated expenses for field works planned and other expenses envisaged. There shall be room in the budget for seminars and debriefings for interviewed stakeholders in case countries, and for presentation of the final evaluation report in Oslo during a half-day seminar to be organized by the Evaluation Department. Two key members of the evaluation team shall be available in Norway for Norwegian stakeholders during a full working day at the end of the evaluation in order to discuss ideas for its follow-up with them individually.

The evaluation should start in June 2012. The final report should be submitted by the end of January 2013.

During the evaluation process, the Consultant shall submit the following reports in English:

- ① An inception report providing the background information described in the first three bullet points of section 3 (i), as well as a detailed methodological proposal for the three case-countries. In the case that the methodological proposal entails carrying out a field survey of a scale not foreseen in the original proposal, the inception report shall include any suggested budget-adjustments that this additional work will imply.
- ① Case country reports from the three case countries selected, including the PETS for the selected programs.
- ① A draft final evaluation report presenting findings, conclusions and recommendations, with a draft executive summary. Principal stakeholders will be invited to comment in writing, and feedback will be provided to the team by the Evaluation Department. The feedback will refer to the Terms of Reference and may include comments on all aspects of the report.
- ① A final evaluation report shall be prepared in accordance with the guidelines of the Evaluation Department. Upon approval, the final report shall become available in paper version and electronically to the general public in the series of the Evaluation Department, and must be presented by the team in a form that directly enables such publication.

The case country reports shall become available to the general public in electronic form, preferably at the same time as the final evaluation report, and shall be duly prepared for such publication.

It will be the responsibility of the team to deliver reports that have been proof read. Tables must be submitted both in word and excel, and all supporting material and evidence, including interview transcripts, must be collected by the team and be made available to Norad's evaluation department upon request.