



NORWEGIAN
REFUGEE COUNCIL

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT NRC ECHO PROJECTS PAKISTAN KP AND FATA, 2010 AND 2011



**Traditional mud houses destroyed by
conflict and floods in KP and FATA**



**Disaster-resistant one room concrete
shelters provided by NRC**

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Executive Summary

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) has been present in Pakistan since 2002, primarily assisting the earthquake and flood-affected population in Northern Pakistan and supporting the UNHCR in the voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees. NRC is implementing activities in Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA), shelter, education and Emergency Food Security and Distribution.

Pakistan is currently facing multiple socio-economic, political, security, and climatic crises that have led to massive humanitarian disasters. Large-scale internal displacement resulted in KP (Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) province due to military operations in FATA in 2008-09. Nearly 800,000 people are still displaced as a result of on-going hostilities in several areas of FATA and KP, and further displacement of civilians continues. In July 2010, Pakistan witnessed one of the worst floods in over 50 years, which affected 18 million countrywide. In August 2011 and 2012, more devastating floods hit Sindh and Balochistan affecting 5+ million people each year. Shelter, NFI, health, water, protection and livelihoods were identified as the main needs in the post-relief phase. Security issues, bureaucratic hassles, logistical challenges and insufficient local capacities further added to the challenges faced by aid agencies in addressing the needs of the people.

Between 2010 and 2012, NRC implemented two back-to-back ECHO-funded projects in KP and FATA with the objective of enhancing relief and recovery among conflict and flood-affected families in KP and FATA through shelter, NFI distribution, hygiene promotion and ICLA activities. NRC commissioned a final evaluation of these two ECHO projects in October 2012 to capture lessons learned and to provide clear recommendations that will enable NRC Pakistan to improve its program planning, design and implementation in future. The main findings of the evaluation are as follows:

- NRC has detailed global guidelines for country offices in the area of gender, shelter and four other sectors. However, the guidelines for monitoring and assessments are still being processed. These strengths and weaknesses are one of the many reasons for the weaknesses in NRC Pakistan's quality of work in monitoring and assessments
- NRC's quality of assessments in the recovery phase is weak and the process not well-documented. This has led to problems in NRC's geographical and, to a lesser extent, sector selection. This is unfortunate **since the distributions of goods and services geographically are financial transactions just like the procurements of goods and services by the agencies themselves and involve as much risk of wrong-doing as procurement itself. Thus, such decisions should be documented better.**
- With respect to geographical selection at the provincial, district, sub-district and village levels, there is little information on file to show how and whether NRC made its decisions based on objective and systematic information and criteria. The selection at the district level looks particularly inappropriate since easily accessible and/or less-affected districts like Nowshera, Charsadda and Kohat in KP have been selected while isolated ones like Kohistan and Swat have been neglected where

information provided by NRC itself shows comparable damage to Nowshera and Charsadda and which are not as insecure as FATA where NRC now works.

- The problems in sector selection and design are less serious. In particular, the selection of shelter and the particular design selected for the rooms is highly appropriate. However, kitchens seem less of a priority, attached latrines seem inappropriate due to cultural and hygienic reasons and wall plastering has not been included as part of the design consistently. The construction modality of working through multiple contractors seems appropriate since it would be difficult to find contractors who could work across all of NRC's widely dispersed regions and appropriate contracts are signed between each contractor and NRC. However, bills of quantities have not been shared with beneficiaries and no three-way MOUs signed among the beneficiaries (or village committees), contractors and NRC outlining the roles and responsibilities of each party, resulting in some misunderstanding within communities, e.g., about whether beneficiaries are required to contribute labour and whether contractors should pay beneficiaries if they contribute labour.
- Within NFIs, the convenience items like kitchen and household ones seem less necessary for the recovery phase (the entire second project NFI distribution and FATA one in first project was for recovery phase). While the hygiene-related items are important, they are not distributed with the hygiene promotion training, resulting in a lack of synergies between the two activities. Tents are also seen as extremely helpful by communities during the displacement phase and even after people return home and have still not reconstructed their houses.
- The ICLA component does not seem to be based on proper assessments nor delivered coherently and clearly with the result that impact at the community level is minor (NRC is trying to improve this with the development of case guidelines and an ICLA manual for Pakistan, which will cover both KP and FATA. This manual will be available by end Dec 2012).
- DRR flood wall construction activities are technically important but geographically improperly located in FATA, where floods are less serious, instead of KP, where floods are more frequent and intense and where they would provide protection to the shelters constructed
- No formal monitoring plan for the projects that were shared with us, which identifies clearly the role and responsibilities in monitoring starting from the CD right down to the field workers, the aspects and indicators that each position would monitor, and the mode and frequency. NRC undertakes several internal evaluation surveys such as KAP and ICLA studies. However, most of the results of the ICLA surveys for the second project were not immediately available for review for the evaluation team as the raw data had not been processed.
- While NRC is a HAP-signatory, accountability practices within these two projects were generally weak. Communities were at best provided the telephone numbers of local junior staff but not that of senior staff in the field or in Peshawar. In 2011 NRC on trial basis started introducing suggestion/ complaints boxes on public places (Mohmand, Bajaur & Nowshera)

- NRC should improve communication with external stakeholders (which is quite good even now) more so that it can address their organizational grievances more promptly. It should also increase its attendance in Islamabad coordination meetings since such coordination generally seen by other INGOs in Pakistan to be extremely helpful in overcoming political and bureaucratic challenges in Pakistan as well as gender meetings as suggested by the NRC Global gender policy.
- Despite these issues, the project activities at the ground have been effective and relevant and have had considerable impact within communities as revealed by field-level data given in Chapter 3. This is especially true of shelter, hygiene promotion and tent distribution but less true of ICLA and DRR activities which though constitute a small proportion of the total budget. The field data reveals that incorporation of gender-sensitivity, protection and rights-based approach is weak.
- Overall, there are only three issues where there are major problems in NRC programs in our opinion: NRC's assessment quality and documentation of evidence that it selected the most deserving geographies and households (some work is in progress with regard to developing clearer guidelines); gender sensitivity within projects; and incorporation of rights-based principles to address deeper causes of vulnerability, such as lack of disaster preparedness and response by the government. The rest of the issues identified here generally represent areas where good work could be made even better with some changes.

The main evaluation recommendations are as follows:

- Develop detailed global guidelines to help country offices undertake thorough and rigorous needs assessments in the recovery phase, clear and comprehensive monitoring (this is already under process) and accountability
- Develop more comprehensive assessments processes within NRC Pakistan for the recovery phase which provide clearer information for geographical, sectoral and delivery modality decisions. **Properly document the basis on which decisions about provincial, district, sub-district and village selection are taken since they represent financial transactions like procurement**
- Focus less on easily accessible and well-serviced districts like Nowshera and Charsadda and more on isolated and under-served places like FATA, Kohistan and Swat in future work from donors willing to fund these areas
- Develop clearer and SMART criteria for selecting families within villages using factors for which information can be easily collected and analyzed, and which include not only vulnerability dimensions such as disaster-related losses but also resilience factors like socio-economic status. Document the process of selection properly for future evaluations and audits.

- Post the provisional list of selected beneficiaries within each village and give people time to file objections at a subsequent meeting where the final decision is taken in the presence of village committees and the community
- Develop clear monitoring plans which clearly lay out the dimensions, indicators, roles and responsibilities for everyone from CD down to the field workers and the modalities of monitoring. Develop a strong MIS (Management Information System) which collects information from the monitoring and allows easy analysis and rapid decision-making. The MIS system can also collect information for the common evaluation criteria, e.g., DAC (the Development Assistance Committee of Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) so that the country SMT reviews the progress on each criterion and takes remedial action well before evaluators “break the news”.
- Develop gender-sensitivity plans to show how the project will address the different needs of men and women to the extent possible in the conservative culture and ensure that gender aggregated information is collected during assessments and guides gender-appropriate delivery of services
- While NRC clearly already assigns considerable effort to this, improve communication with external stakeholders further so that misunderstandings do not fester with government departments, coordination agencies and donors. Ensure greater participation in gender networks (as suggested by the global gender policy) and Islamabad-based critical meetings which are generally seen as highly useful generally by INGOs based in Pakistan in dealing with bureaucratic and political hurdles
- Drop kitchen from future housing designs or make it a beneficiary contribution feature since it does not address any critical humanitarian needs and detach latrines from the rooms in all designs since attached latrines are culturally and hygienically inappropriate (since germs can travel more easily into the bedroom) and reduce easy access for other extended family courtyard members. Include wall plastering on all future designs or include it as a required beneficiary contribution since it increases shelter durability considerably. Review the possibility of using bamboos in roof instead of metal beams to increase earthquake safety. Share bills of quantities with beneficiaries so that they can monitor contractors adequately to ensure that the right quantities are used. Sign three-way contracts among beneficiaries, families and NRC which clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of each party to avoid misunderstandings or at least MOUs with each village committee if individual contracts with each beneficiary are difficult
- Persist with current contractor modality until the results of the self-build pilot projects are clear. However, if the experiment is successful, it is strongly recommended to move to the self-build model due to its manifold benefits, such as lower costs, flexibility and community participation
- Drop the convenience items for the NFI package completely or substitute a small cash grant in their place in the recovery phase while persisting with them in the relief phase. Persist with the hygiene-related items in the NFI package in the recovery phase too but distribute them on the day of the hygiene promotion class to enhance synergies between the two activities

- Communities and our observations suggest the need to include nutritional (educational issues only since nutritional interventions are not normally part of WASH and that too through a local partner) issues, disease causation/control, and kitchen smoke hazards in hygiene classes besides the personal and environmental hygiene issues presently covered. Strengthen the role of the Village Committees in relationship to hygiene promotion so that they can organize village cleanliness campaigns with the help of villagers and negotiate the delivery of services from government departments
- Undertake flood wall construction-related DRR activities in more flood-prone areas, especially where shelters are provided so that there is mutual linkage among these activities and where each monetary unit of such work will protect much greater value than in FATA. Consider including Community-based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) work, which consists of helping communities develop disaster contingency plans, in future projects in flood and earthquake prone areas by delivering these services directly or through local partners as done with the hygiene work.
- Undertake a proper assessment and develop a clearer and coherent ICLA program which **focuses more on access to government compensation**, and court/government department structures and procedures. Strengthen the role of Village Committees in negotiating with government departments on common ICLA-related issues affecting large number of families within villages
- Enhance the incorporation of protection and rights-based concerns by strengthening village committees so that they can lead community self-help work and negotiate with government for services, undertake policy work on issues relevant to disaster affected people (e.g., increasing access to government compensation for such people), strengthen ICLA activities by developing a clear program vision (please see third chapter for details) and accountability measures (such as complain and transparency mechanisms) so as to address the deeper causes of vulnerability such as lack of services by government. Develop a strong accountability strategy encompassing consultation, transparency and feedback mechanism in project work.
- Consider additional sectors, especially water and livelihoods for future recovery-phase work (which to some extent have already been done in water area)

HAPTER 1: BRIEF BACKGROUND

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) has been present in Pakistan since 2002, primarily assisting the earthquake and flood-affected population in Northern Pakistan while supporting the UNHCR in the voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees. NRC Pakistan became an independent country program in early 2010. In cooperation with UN agencies and other partners, NRC currently assists IDPs and Afghan refugees in two provinces: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan. Additionally, NRC assists the returnee and displaced populations in FATA, including Bajaur, Mohmand, south Waziristan and Kurram agencies. The Country Office is based in Peshawar, with field offices in Kohat, DI Khan, Nowshera/Charsadda, Naseerabad, Bajaur, Mohmand, and Quetta and a liaison office in Islamabad. NRC is implementing activities in Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance, shelter, education and Food Security.

1. THE NORTHERN PAKISTAN CONFLICT AND FLOODS CRISES

Pakistan is currently facing multiple socio-economic, political, security, and climatic crises that have led to massive humanitarian disasters. Responding to large-scale internal displacement in KP (Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) province due to military operations in FATA in 2009, the UN and humanitarian organizations initiated emergency responses. In KP, nearly 800,000 people are still displaced and vulnerable as a result of on-going hostilities in several areas of FATA and further displacement of civilians continues. The largest groups were from Bajaur (350,000), South Waziristan (273,000) and Mohmand (245,000), but large numbers of unregistered IDPs from Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, FR Kohat and FR Peshawar were also living either in KP or other parts of Pakistan.

In July 2010, Pakistan witnessed one of the worst floods in over 50 years, which affected 18 million countrywide. UNOCHA estimates that almost 2000 people were killed, over 1.7 million homes were destroyed and almost 18 million people were seriously affected. The floods submerged 17 million acres (69,000 km²) of Pakistan's most fertile crop land, killed 200,000 heads of livestock and washed away massive amounts of grain. At the worst point, approximately 20% of Pakistan's total area was underwater. In August 2011 and 2012, more devastating floods hit Sindh and Balochistan affecting 5+ million people each year. This further weakened the coping mechanisms and resulted in the depletion of already scarce resources amongst the country's most impoverished populations. Shelter, NFI, health, water, protection and livelihoods were identified as the main needs in the post-relief phase. Security issues, bureaucratic hassles, logistical challenges and insufficient local capacities further added to the challenges faced by aid agencies in addressing the needs of the millions affected by conflict and repeated floods.

2. NRC ECHO PROJECTS, 2010 AND 2011


Between 2010 and 2012, NRC implemented two back-to-back ECHO-funded projects in KP and FATA with the objective of enhancing relief and recovery among conflict and flood-affected families in KP and FATA. The details of the two projects were as follows:

	Project 1-PKFS 1002	Project 2-PKFS 1107
Overall Objective	To provide protection and integrated humanitarian assistance to the conflict/flood affected population of KP and FATA – Pakistan	To contribute to a better and safer living environment for conflict and flood affected population of Pakistan
Duration	September 1, 2010 to August 31, 2011	October 1, 2011 to September 30, 2012
Budget	Euro 3,291,708	Euro 5,400,000
Locations	Swabi, Mardan, Nowshera, Charsadda and Peshawar Districts, Kohat, Hangu, Bajaur and Mohamand	Peshawar Valley (Nowshera, Charsadda and Peshawar Districts), Kohat, D.I.Khan, Bajaur, Mohmand
Targets	-Shelter & NFIs: 2, 200 IDP HHs -Hygiene promotion: 2,000 people -Tents/NFIs: 2,350 Flood-affected HHs	-One Room Shelters: 2,000 families -NFIs: 7,000 families -Hygiene promotion/Kits: 2,000 families -DRR: 10 communities -ICLA: 7,000 families

3. EVALUATION APPROACH

NRC commissioned a final evaluation of these two ECHO projects in October 2012 to capture lessons learned and to provide clear recommendations that will enable NRC Pakistan to improve its program planning, design and implementation in future. The main purpose of the evaluation was to review the effect and relevance of programs for beneficiaries, analyze implementation strategies and efficiency based on the situation on the ground, and identify best practices and areas of learning opportunities.

a. Analytical Model



According to this model, the quality of NRC's global program and program support guidelines affect the quality of program and program support functions in the ECHO projects in Pakistan, which in turn determine the quality and final outcomes of the projects. External factors also affect the quality of NRC Pakistan functions as well as the success of the project in achieving impact, relevance etc. Thus, the evaluation starts by briefly reviewing the quality of NRC's global program/support guidelines through documents review. The evaluation then reviews more deeply the quality of NRC Pakistan's program

(planning, assessments, implementation and monitoring) functions for these projects through documents review and interviews with NRC Pakistan staff. Finally, the evaluation reviews the quality of ECHO projects in terms of the six evaluation criteria in the TORs. The evaluation also looks at how external factors beyond the control of NRC affected program quality. The evaluation report provides findings on the quality of the ECHO projects and give recommendations for improving program functions within Pakistan and more briefly globally to enhance the quality of future projects.

b. Sources of Information**i) Review of Relevant Documents:**

The detailed list of documents is provided in the appendix. The list includes NRC global documents, project documents and documents on NRC program and support functions related to these projects.

ii) Interviews with NRC Pakistan and Key External Stakeholders

The internal staff members were selected to get a thorough overview of the program functions. The external stakeholders provided an overview of external challenges and a comparison base. Please see work plan in the appendix for the details of the people interviewed.

iii) Field Data Collection

The field site data collection plan was designed so as to cover the widest range possible of sectors and districts in the 7 days of field work allocated in the budget and keeping in mind logistical practicalities. Hence, the field data collection focused mainly on families which received the one-room shelters. This had several advantages. First, the recipients of NFI and tents only were difficult to trace now while those who received the houses were easier to locate. Secondly, the one-room shelters were the most expensive line item within the budget. Thus, focusing on them helped maximize the percentage of the project budgets covered in the evaluation. Thirdly, since the families who received the one-room shelters also received the NFIs (and legal services under the second project), it also ensured that the evaluation covers almost all the project sectors. Finally, focusing on families which received the high-value and durable shelters (plus NFIs) minimized recall issues compared with recipients of smaller-value NFI items. The disadvantage is that the perspectives of those who only received NFIs and tents could not be incorporated. NRC provided one-room shelters in Bajaur, Charsadda, DI Khan, Kohat, Mohmand and Nowshera. Except DI Khan, these districts were within driving distance of NRC's country office in Peshawar. Thus, we dropped DI Khan and focused on Bajaur, Charsadda, Kohat, Mohmand and Nowshera for the field visits. During the field visits, we covered 2 shelter locations in a day. In addition, FGDs with a total of 44 people were conducted in 2 locations where tents only were distributed. In each shelter location, we undertook:

Household interviews: The household interviews focused on the perceptions of individual families related to Impact, Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency and Cross-cutting issues criteria based on closed-ended questions (please see appendix for details).

Focus group discussions: Separate FGDs with 15-20 males and 15-20 females (only in KP) were conducted in each location which focused on the perceptions of communities related to Impact,

Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency and Cross-cutting issues criteria to collect richer qualitative information through open-ended questions.

Physical observations/transect walks: 3-4 shelters were physically inspected for quality (criteria are appended) in each location which were identified during household interviews by families as having problems. One DRR project (flood protection wall) out of 10 projects was also inspected. Since all the other projects were similarly designed, the general points made later about such projects carry high validity despite the small size for DRR projects.

c. Evaluation Constraints

Security was the biggest constraint in the evaluation, particularly in FATA. While the international Team Leader from the USA was originally from Pakistan and as such was able to visit field sites in both KP and FATA, the Shelter expert on the evaluation team, a Canadian, could not visit the field sites and provided technical support online from Canada. However, due to the security situation, some areas in FATA could not be visited. Time was also a constraint as the NRC budget allowed only 7 days of field work and as such D.I. Khan had to be dropped. Budget constraints also meant that the sample size was small, especially for KP and Project 1, resulting in a higher Margin of Error than for FATA, Project 2 and overall samples. Finally, women could not be interviewed in FATA due to local customs as well as security threats since militants target female staff visiting FATA with NGOs.

d. Project Constraints

Before evaluating NRC's work it is also crucial to appreciate the constraints faced by it in program delivery, which include the increasing bureaucratic restrictions faced by NGOs in Pakistan, in particular in relation to visas, project permissions, reporting requirements etc, the precarious security situation in KP and FATA which restricts access and operational freedom, the restrictions on expats field visits, particularly in FATA, the restrictions on hiring female workers and accessing women in FATA, and the shortage of skilled staff due to extensive hiring by all agencies during the emergencies.

4. REPORT OVERVIEW

This chapter has provided an overview of NRC's work in Pakistan, the current emergency context in Pakistan, the projects being evaluated and the evaluation approach. The next chapter reviews the quality of NRC's program cycle processes, including program assessments, designs, targeting, monitoring, evaluation and external coordination. Chapter three then reviews the nature of impact and beneficiary satisfaction at the ground level. Finally, the last chapter provides recommendations.

CHAPTER 2: QUALITY OF NRC'S PROGRAM CYCLE PROCESSES

This chapter focuses on the quality of NRC's internal program processes in line with the evaluation framework which asserted that the final program outcomes are heavily influenced by the quality of the program processes of the agency. Thus, the chapter first looks at the nature of NRC's global program systems and resources provided to NRC Pakistan. It then looks at the quality of various program cycle processes of NRC Pakistan for these two projects. In terms of the evaluation TORs, this chapter largely focuses on the following dimensions of the TORs which all focus on program processes rather than field-based outcomes:

- Part of the effectiveness dimension--Were there any gaps related to planning, management, monitoring and implementation that influenced the results?
- The coordination dimension---To what extent was the assistance provided undertaken in coordination with other stakeholders (ex cluster) to avoid duplication of activities?
- The efficiency dimension--To what extent could program cost have been reduced/made more efficient without sacrificing the quality of the results?

This chapter is almost entirely based on staff and external interviews and documents review. The next chapter then focuses on the remaining TORs dimensions which all focus on community-level outcome based largely on the field data collection.

1. EFFECTIVENESS OF PLANNING, MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

a. NRC's Global Programming Resources

In recent years, NRC has developed several program policy papers and handbooks to help enhance the quality of the program processes of its country offices. The following are the main documents available for support to NRC Pakistan in implementing the ECHO projects:

Gender policy and package: The gender policy is a five-page document which outlines the scope, objectives, approach and areas of action for NRC's gender-related programming and the gender-related international legal mandates and policies. The document says that all country offices ensure that gender is mainstreamed into all policies and strategic plans (including the Annual Plan of Action at Global and field levels) with concrete objectives, actions, indicators, activities, monitoring/evaluation and reporting. It also encourages country offices to develop a specific document/guideline on how to include gender in the project cycle management, impart gender-related useful training modules, increase participation in inter-agency gender networks and carry out an annual gender evaluation/review. The gender learning package is more detailed and includes detailed discussions, strategies and examples for incorporating gender in different programs.

Evaluation policy and handbook: The NRC has a very detailed and systematic evaluation policy and handbook, reflecting standards that the evaluation team has seen in few other INGOs. The policy was also applied well in practice during this evaluation, leading to a very well planned evaluation process. Such thorough evaluations will be very helpful in enhancing the quality of future projects globally. However, the gap here is that the document does not provide any guidelines to country offices for developing and implementing systematic and strategic monitoring plans, which could help enhance the quality of a current project before it ends. NRC is developing such guidelines presently.

Program Policy Document: This 20-page document outlines NRC's overall programming principles as well as the overall approach and principles for its five global core program competencies, i.e., Education, Food Security, Information, Counselling, and Legal Assistance, Shelter and Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene. However, as with the gender policy, the document is a brief policy document rather than a handbook which would provide detailed guidelines on the different project management phases or each sector.

Shelter handbook: This is a 78-page handbook which provides detailed guidelines of all phases of the project management cycle for shelter work, linkages and references to other shelter-related sources and shelter's complementarities with the other four NRC programming competencies, though the discussion on them is understandably brief given that the handbook focuses mainly on shelter. This is a comprehensive program document developed by NRC globally and is a useful template for handbooks for other topics. NRC also has similar guidelines for its other core program areas.

In brief, NRC has detailed guidelines for country offices in the area of gender, shelter and other program sectors. However, the guidelines for assessments and monitoring are still in the pipeline. These strengths and weaknesses are reflected in the quality of NRC Pakistan's quality of work in different program processes, as seen in the next section. Thus, there is a need for NRC to review the possibility of developing more detailed handbooks in these remaining areas, without re-inventing the wheel anywhere given that detailed guidelines are already available in most of these topics. As such, it may mostly be a matter of providing greater linkages and references within existing policy documents to more detailed existing guidelines in each area. Of special importance are guidelines for assessments, monitoring and accountability. Though NRC is not implementing programs in the other sectors in the present projects, there is clear need for water and sanitation in the project areas and the presence of such guidelines can provide useful tips for country staff to starting these sectors too.

b. Quality of NRC Pakistan's Program Processes for the ECHO Projects

i Assessments

The quality and depth of assessments that any agency can undertake varies considerably between relief and recovery phases. In a large-scale, life-threatening, emergency, there is little time for agencies to undertake individual, in-depth, community-level assessments and the focus is usually on using secondary information from the UN and government and/or participating in rapid area-wide surveys. Since the life-saving needs are well-known in advance, this rapid, unsystematic approach works fine for the relief phase. However, in the recovery phase, agencies are not faced with such time-

compressed, life-saving crises and focus generally on providing higher-quality inputs, such as permanent shelter, to returnees. Thus, it is important to conduct more in-depth, community level, individual-agency assessments to identify the most priority sectors, populations and delivery approaches.

The 2010 ECHO project combined the relief phase in the flood-affected and conflict-affected IDP areas in KP and the recovery phase in the conflict-affected-areas of FATA, while the 2011 project was largely focused on recovery phase for both flood-affected and conflict-affected areas in KP and FATA. Thus, in view of the discussion in the last paragraph, one would expect NRC to have relied largely on secondary information and rapid area-wide surveys rather than in-depth community-level assessments for the relief phase component of the 2010 project and to have conducted more in-depth assessments for the recovery phase component of the 2010 project and all components of the 2011 project.

The needs assessment section of the 2010 ECHO proposal says that NRC conducted several assessments and tens of FGDs and also participated in a joint assessment mission, organized by UNHCR and OCHA, in the Mohamand Agency. However, none of the reports from these assessments were provided to the evaluation team. NRC did share the report of the interagency Pakistan Flood Emergency Response Plans (August and September 2010) based on joint rapid assessments undertaken by the government, UN and NGOs (NRC being part of it) and other related UN and government documents. This in itself would seem adequate information to guide the relief phase response for the floods areas, as mentioned above. However, since the NRC did mention several other individual assessments in the proposal, it would have been good to review their quality and the extent to which they affected decision-making. Additionally, the more in-depth assessments for the recovery phase in FATA that one would expect also have not occurred and the agency seems to have largely relied on secondary information from the UN and the government even here. However, this was due to the fact that access to FATA was still limited at the time that the 2010 proposal was written.

For the 2011 project, the NRC proposal mentions that it conducted several assessments in the proposed intervention areas including DI Khan (May 2011), Kohat (May 2011), Mohmand (May-June 2011), Bajaur (May-June 2011) and Kurrum (July 2011). In addition, the ICLA team also conducted visits and assessments and the NRC also collected secondary information from the government and UN agencies. However, of all these assessments mentioned in the proposal, the evaluation team only received a brief 3-page assessment report by the ICLA team. The report only mentions the findings, one of them being that access to official documents and land disputes are serious issues. This finding seems to have been the basis for the development of the ICLA program. However, the report mentions neither the methodology nor the geographical focus of the assessment exercise, though it talks more about FATA than about KP. Thus, it is difficult to judge the validity of the findings, especially since the much more thorough UNDP-led FATA Interagency Early Recovery Needs Assessment (IAERNA) December 2011 report states that almost 75% of the respondents did not consider access to official documents and land disputes as serious issues. We will discuss the utility of the ICLA program as perceived by the NRC respondents in more detail in the next chapter.

The evaluation team also received assessment reports for Kohistan, KP and for Sindh, which were used by NRC to decide against working there. However, the assessment reports neither mention the methodology nor do an adequate job of presenting a compelling case for not working in these areas. Finally, NRC also shared an assessment form for NFI and shelter work. The form is essentially only an information-extracting tool acceptable perhaps for the relief phase but not a preference-gathering tool suitable for the recovery phase. In summary, while the limited nature of formal primary assessments conducted by the NRC for the first project are understandable given time and access constraints, the assessment processes for the second project, where the agency had more time as well as greater access in FATA to be able to conduct more systematic assessments, seem inadequate. This is partially due to the fact that NRC's global program resources do not provide much assistance to country offices for detailed assessment work for the recovery phase though clearly many country-level factors, e.g., lack of assessments skills among staff, have also caused this outcome. We next discuss the impact of this quality of assessments on the selection of the most deserving populations and priority sectors--the two most important decisions that good-quality assessments should facilitate.

ii Appropriateness of Selection of Populations

Careful selection of beneficiaries and the proper documentation of such efforts is important for NGOs for two reasons--firstly to ensure that the people in most need are helped in recovering from the effects of the disaster and secondly to be able to demonstrate clearly to external stakeholders (e.g., donors and host governments) that the agency is providing services according to objective needs and not political, ethnic or monetary considerations. We review the appropriateness of the NRC's targeting of provinces, districts, sub-districts and villages for both the floods and conflict-affected populations here and the targeting of households within villages in the next chapter.

Province-wide damage assessment for the 2010 Pakistan Flood-UNOCHA		
Province	Houses Damaged	People Affected
Balochistan	75,261	1,060,162
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	192,605	4,365,909
Punjab	500,000	8,200,000
Sindh	470,910	4,158,160

With respect to the floods population, the table here from UNOCHA provided by NRC to the evaluation team says that the initial damage assessments as on September 1, 2010 had shown that Punjab and Sindh were the most badly affected provinces in terms of houses destroyed (In fact, the damage assessments for Sindh went up later also in terms of total population affected to around 6 million), while KP, the province that NRC focused on, was much less affected. However, given the fact that NRC did not have its head office in Islamabad but in Peshawar and was working mainly in KP at the time the floods hit the country, its decision to not venture into Sindh and Punjab and remain confined to KP seems defensible to the evaluation team, especially given the fact that NRC specializes more in

dealing with conflicts rather than pure natural disasters globally and within Pakistan. Thus, KP combined both elements while Punjab and Sindh faced largely natural disasters only.

However, the choice of districts within KP for the flood response seems less defensible. The Table entitled “KP - Flood Affected Population” (provided by NRC) in the appendix reveals that Charsadda, D. I. Khan, Kohistan, Nowshera and Swat were the most badly affected districts in terms of number of people affected and houses destroyed. The NRC selected Charsadda, D. I. Khan, and Nowshera but not Kohistan and Swat for the evaluated or even any other projects. However, in the opinion of the evaluation team, Kohistan and Swat should have been selected ahead of Charsadda and Nowshera since the latter two are situated along the main Islamabad-Peshawar freeway and can be serviced even by smaller agencies with fewer resources than NRC while Swat and Kohistan are much more isolated with very few if any established NGOs working there and were also affected more by conflict (NRC’s area of specialization) than Nowshera and Charsadda. The number of people affected by floods in Kohat is also very small. Thus its choice is also not clear. NRC staff argued that their selections were guided by what other agencies were doing in different areas. However, there are two problems with this argument. Firstly, NRC is not able to provide any documented evidence in support of this argument which would show that Kohistan and Swat were already well covered while Kohat, Nowshera and Charsadda were not when NRC was taking its geographical focus decisions. The KP government disaster officials interviewed by us also felt that Nowshera and Charsadda were serviced much more than Kohistan and Swat by agencies. Secondly, this argument implies that NRC was reactive rather than proactive as it waited for other agencies to decide first and decided and started last. Clearly, an agency with NRC’s capacities and expertise should be among the first to decide and respond (while of course coordinating properly) in the most needy and isolated areas. On the other hand, the decisions for regional and district-level targeting for the conflict-affected population are clear and appropriate. FATA was the main area affected by the conflict and NRC is working in all the conflict-affected districts there, either as part of these two projects or projects funded by other donors.

At sub-district and villages levels, NRC provided almost no evidence to demonstrate that it selected the most deserving ones in the floods or conflict areas. Unfortunately, it is at these two levels that charges and possibilities of favoritism and monetary inducements are the highest since these decisions, in the absence of clear selection criteria and objective assessments, are taken by junior, local staff. NRC has a policy of recruiting the Head of Offices from outside the district to avoid such occurrences. However, since much of the selection of villages and actual beneficiaries within villages is done by local staff and the involvement of Office Heads in this stage seems minimal, such risks still exist. NRC’s selection criteria include the following ones:

NRC Selection Criteria
Be conflict/flood affected
Be shelter-less or residing in overcrowded living facilities (house, tent, shelter, etc...)
Low or no income
Be a vulnerable family (women/child/elderly/disabled headed families, families with no or sufficient income, large family size (8 or more family members), and conflict affected returnees)

However, there is no documented evidence on file with NRC to show that these criteria were applied systematically and objectively in practice. Moreover, there is no guidance for field workers on how to summate the status of different regions or families on the different criteria into a final score. Some of the criteria, e.g., low income, are also very difficult to measure accurately. For Bajaur district in FATA, the district disaster officials interviewed confirmed the sub-districts selected by NRC as being the most affected ones. However, the village selection in Bajaur and the sub-district and village selection in other places remain unsubstantiated. Unfortunately, the evaluation team had no time to conduct field work to corroborate the validity of such decisions.

Thus, given the rudimentary nature of its assessments processes, the NRC is not in a position to provide documented evidence that its district, sub-district and village selection is based on objective criteria. In the experience of the Team Leader, who has evaluated more than 20 INGOs in recent months in Pakistan, this is a problem not confined to just NRC but widespread within the sector. **This is unfortunate since the distributions of goods and services geographically are financial transactions just like the procurements of goods and services by the agencies themselves and involve as much risk of wrong-doing as procurement itself.** Thus, as in the area of procurement, it is important for agencies to be able to provide documentary evidence that their distribution of financial values geographically was transparent and based on objective criteria. This would include developing clear selection criteria, collecting a reasonable level of secondary and primary assessment information to be able to apply the criteria objectively to different locations and finally having the country SMT or other appointed committee discuss such evidence as well as the gaps therein and take the final decisions with the proceedings properly documented as with purchase committee decisions. Having such systematic information on file will help NRC in being able to rebut charges of favoritism and corruption in geographical targeting that are often leveled against INGOs, including NRC. NRC Pakistan has an internal auditor reporting directly to the CD. It would be advisable to have the review of these aspects included as part of the regular job responsibilities of this position so that the agency can ensure the accumulation of adequate documentation in this regard.

iii Sector Selection and Designs

This section reviews the appropriateness of sectoral work based on interviews, documents review and the knowledge of the evaluation team members. The appropriateness of sectoral work in light of community needs and perspective will be reviewed in the next chapter.

Shelter (Evidence of community satisfaction is presented in chapter 3)

Shelter is identified as among the top-most priorities in almost all government, UN and NGO assessments for the floods and conflict. Houses, generally made of mud in the case of families which lost them, were the biggest loss incurred by the majority of the affected families. As such, NRC's focus on shelter makes eminent sense even in the absence of primary NRC assessments. The NRC constructed 14ftX14ft one-room shelters (ORS) to house a family of 7 members (average family size) with tile roofs and burnt brick walls and steel doors and windows along with a pit latrine/pour flush based on water availability locally. The second project also included kitchens with a view to providing a complete package. Shelters were constructed largely with indigenous materials such as quarry stones

for foundations and red burnt bricks for walls. Sand, a main ingredient in all concrete and CSM (Cement Sand and Mortar) works, is also readily available locally from dried river beds. Wood was deliberately avoided due to durability and environmental concerns though fired bricks also create pollution. However, these materials and such concrete construction are less common in FATA where mud construction is common. Attached to the shelters are kitchens of similar construction. They too have random stone masonry foundation, brick masonry walls and roof of same construction as the shelter; the size of kitchens is 5ftx8ft with same steel doors as the shelters. Entrance to kitchens is from the outside of the shelter due to fire and smoke inhalation hazards. However, surveys from already completed projects have revealed that kitchens (without chimneys) are not appropriately designed for the kind of cooking stoves used by the villagers. Firewood emits a lot of smoke and the ventilation is not adequate enough to displace smoke quickly and thereby creates smoke inhalation hazard. Villagers have abandoned them, currently using them as storage space and cooking outside in makeshift stoves. Toilets are also of brick masonry on stone masonry foundations. With separate entrance from the shelters and kitchen in most cases; they consist of an Indian pan/WC and a septic tank. The septic tank with RCC cover is very hygienic as it minimizes chances of airborne transmission of diseases and is adequate in size to service 7-people family.

The construction of foundations was designed to take full advantage of the natural rock strata of the region. Since the stratum has an average load bearing capacity of 1.25tons/ft², a 3.5ft high foundation sufficed for the shelters. The foundations sit on a 24inx24in footing constructed of local materials, i.e. natural stones with 1:6 CSM (1 part cement and 6 parts sand). The 3.5ft foundations of stone masonry type were also constructed with natural stones with CSM but with the stones being of conveniently bigger and random size than those used in footings. At plinth level, a 2in DPC (Damp Proof Coating) was applied to protect the superstructure, i.e. walls, from damage due to dampness; which usually affects any plaster on walls over time. The floors were 4in thick concrete of 1:3:6 ratio (cement, sand and coarse aggregate), constructed over well compacted soil. The walls have a clear height of 10ft and are constructed of brick masonry, using burnt bricks of minimum strength of 1500 psi (lbs/in²) bonded by CSM of ratio 1:6. The width of walls is 9in, the normal width of walls in the region, and consists of 2 bricks laid side by side bonded with cement mortar. The floor was elevated from the ground level to protect inhabitants from the ingress of any low surface water. The roof is designed from local materials to be cost effective (an alternative to reinforced concrete roof or corrugated iron roof often used in self-construction in Pakistan though not in humanitarian projects) and also to provide good insulation from local weather patterns. The main materials used were brick tiles, mud and straw. Two steel girders, known as I-beam, were placed on the walls at ceiling level directly on top of the 3in ring beam. Perpendicular to the girders, T beams, also of steel, were placed at regular intervals. Then, brick tiles of 12inx6inx2in size, were placed on top of this grid and all joints were sealed with 1:6 CSM. Two layers of polythene/tarpaulin sheets were placed on the brick tiles with a 1in layer of mud plaster. On top of the mud plaster lie a 3in thick layer of mud and straw mixture, graded to ward off rain water. This type of roof only requires yearly maintenance if there is a lot of rainfall, but even less maintenance if there is less or no rainfall, as in FATA. Shelter construction was undertaken by private contractors and supervised by NRC's field engineers at all stages of construction. To enforce supervision, representative construction material samples were taken to testing facilities at the Pakistan Water & Power Development Authority and the University of Engineering and Technology

Peshawar for brick, steel and sieve (for sand and coarse aggregate) tests. However, concrete tests should also have been done. The levels of compliance to the design and evaluation of the construction quality found across the implementation sites is presented in Chapter 3.



The seismic resistance of these shelters is an issue mainly because the affected areas lie within 2 seismic zones, Zone 2 which experiences low to moderate seismicity and Zone 3 which experiences high seismicity. This region has endured severe earthquakes between 6 to 7.8 in the Richter Scale over the last 200 years. These shelters will not survive any earthquake of that magnitude but any seismic activity of scale 5 or below is unlikely to create much damage because of the 3in ring beams at roof level. However, the roofs of the current shelters also have I beams, steel T beams and brick tiles of size 12inx6inx2in. These components, falling as debris on the inhabitants, in the event of an earthquake, would be detrimental.

These masonry structures may resist flood to some extent provided they are not in the path of water currents. If riverbanks overflow and human habitations are engulfed with slow moving water, these shelters will likely survive. However, in the wake of fast flowing water and the type of debris that the waters may carry during flash floods in hilly areas, such structures may get demolished. Ultimately, there is a limit to how disaster-proof such shelters can be in areas where high-intensity floods and earthquakes occur. The important thing is whether agencies follow the disaster-resilient guidelines provided by governments. The appendix provides a comparison of NRC's shelter with the government's flood-resistant guidelines for shelters, which shows that NRC has complied with almost all the guidelines. For earthquake resistance, the PDMA preferred another design over the NRC one, although the evaluation team does not find the government preferred one to be any more earthquake-resistant, except for the fact that it contains bamboos in the roof instead of metal beams.

Pakistan is sub-tropical in nature with a few months of hot weather with the rest of the year milder or even colder during the winter seasons. 80% of heat exchange in buildings occurs through the roof. Corrugated iron (CI) roofs heat up during the summer days and can drastically cool in colder winter nights. The climatic conditions inside a house with CI roofs are not always pleasant. RCC roofs are also not great insulators of heat. However, the bricks, soil and straw roof used by NRC is an excellent and innovative alternative to CI or RCC roofs. They are cheap, natural, easy to replace and also act as good insulators from heat loss, providing comfortable interior climate. The brick masonry walls used by the NRC are also common all over South Asia and suitable for the climate of the region though less so than mud walls. However, the main drawback of mud walls is their high vulnerability to even medium-scale floods and regular maintenance requirement even otherwise while brick masonry structures are more flood-resilient and even otherwise durable provided the CSM is properly cured during the construction period. This aspect was regularly tested by NRC. They will last even longer if 1/2in CSM plaster is applied to the walls, which has been done in some though not all places since it was not included in the first project budget due to cost considerations. In summary, the shelter program is well selected and designed, partly due to the detailed guidelines available from global NRC resources for implementing such programs.

NFIs (Evidence of community satisfaction is presented in chapter 3)

NRC distributed NFIs to families immediately after the floods in the relief phase and also provided NFIs to all families who received the one-room shelters. The items in these packages can be divided into two types—household convenience goods such as kitchen items and hygiene and health promotion items, such as blankets (in the winterized NFI package only), mosquito nets and soaps. Both types of items seem to be appropriate for the relief phase where NRC was helping people had recently lost all their household belongings, markets were not functioning properly for a few weeks and people had little resources in any case to purchase the items themselves. However, the household convenience items seem less essential for the recovery phase where the people that NRC helped had been living in their original villages for several months and would naturally have made some arrangements on their own. The hygiene-related items, such as mosquito nets etc. would still serve the important purpose of helping people change their health and hygiene-related habits. Viewed so, it may have been better to just focus on the hygiene-related goods in the recovery phase and to

distribute the package at the end of the hygiene promotion sessions instead of linking it with the shelter completion as done currently. This would have helped increase attendance in the hygiene promotion classes and also made people more attuned to using the advice provided in the hygiene sessions with the help of the items given as part of the NFI package.


Tents

NRC also provided tents to people who had lost their houses due to the two disasters. The evaluation team finds this to be a critical input given the large-scale destruction of housing after the floods and the conflict in Pakistan. Unlike NFIs, it is an input which families may not be able to access on their own. The tents were helpful not just for displaced families but also returning families until they reconstruct their shelters. In the view of the communities interviewed, these tents were adequate for a family of 7 people. The evaluation team received the following specifications for the tents distributed by NRC though the country logistics team did not clarify what specifications were used in tendering for the tents though the evaluation team requested this information.

NRC Tent Specification	
<u>Dimensions</u> Usable Floor Area 16.00 m ² Central Height 2.20 m Wall Height 1.25 m <u>Frame</u> Standing & Ridge poles of 31 mm dia & wall canopy poles of 19 mm dia <u>Material</u> Outer Tent 320 g/m ² cotton/polyester blend water proof & rot proof fabric Inner Tent 190 g/m ² cotton fabric <u>Color</u> Outer Shell Natural Inner Shell Natural	<u>Ground Sheet</u> Sewed in bathtub ground sheet of PVC fabric <u>Windows</u> 2 with easily operable flap covers <u>Accessories</u> All required tools and accessories for ready use. Hammer, steel pegs and assembly instructions <u>Shipping Information</u> Packing Tent + Inner Tent + Accessories in one bundle Weight 60.00 Kg (approx) Volume 225 x 30 x 30 cm / 0.20 cbm (approx)

Detailed information about how rapidly the tents were distributed after the disaster was also not made available to the evaluation team. However, the two communities interviewed by us confirmed that they received the tents in time in line with their needs and that there were no cases of selling tents since they were such a critical input for the communities. In terms of the timeliness of the distribution of tents, it should be noted that earlier may or may not necessarily be better as this would depend on the situation of each family. Many families went to camps where they would have immediately needed tents. However, a large number of families after the floods went to government schools and buildings for a few weeks where they would not have needed tents. But both types of families would have needed tents once they returned to their villages and before they built or received transitional or permanent shelter. Even when they received either type of shelters, the tents would still continue to be useful as secondary space since the other shelters provided by NGOs consisted generally of one room while larger families would need additional space which the tents could provide. Thus, the team

saw cases where families were using the tent as a second room or kitchen even after they got more durable shelter. Finally, when the tents were too old to stand on their own, many families were using them to provide extra coverage to the transitional shelters that they were building themselves. All in all, the tents are very useful. However, there is a need for NRC to maintain more systematic information in the form of a strong MIS on distribution and other aspects which can help evaluate the quality of response easily along different dimensions.



.....NRC tent after a year+ in field

Hygiene promotion (Evidence of community satisfaction is presented in chapter 3)

Health and hygiene issues were identified as critical in the aftermath of the floods by UN and government assessments and other reports. Even in normal times, health and hygiene issues are rampant in Pakistan and child morbidity and mortality high. Thus, the choice of hygiene promotion is an appropriate one. NRC's hygiene promotion program is well design and comprehensive. It uses a wide variety of practical exercises and participatory tools to reinforce the contents. A KAP survey undertaken by NRC's local partner shows that there is significant improvement in hygiene practices among communities and 10% to 50% of the respondents show improved knowledge and practices along dimensions related to personal, water, food and latrine hygiene.

The main gap in the opinion of the evaluation team in this program is that it focuses on individual household hygiene strategies. It may be appropriate to include a section on the importance of community participation and cooperation in keeping the entire community clean through periodic voluntary work as well as a section on the community advocating and lobbying with local government departments to provide environmental health services. A section on what causes common diseases within communities, such as diarrhoea, malaria and skin diseases, and how to reduce their frequency through hygiene promotion may also be helpful. It may also be useful to emphasize the dangers for women and children from kitchen smoke and ways to reduce it, e.g., by using energy-efficient stoves. Though nutrition work is normally not part of WASH, it may also be useful to include a section on nutritional educational awareness-raising (through local partners as with hygiene work since NRC itself

does not specialize in this area) since several recent surveys in Pakistan have revealed child malnutrition as a major problem. While some of this may be due to low-income, the lack of knowledge about nutrition is also a major factor leading to children not being given nutritional food.

Contents of NRC Hygiene Promotion Program	
Personal Hygiene	Hand washing (with soap and clean water) Brushing teeth Wearing clean clothes Trimming of nails
Food Hygiene	Usage of clean and safe edible items Food storage management. Proper Cooking of food
Water Hygiene	Clean Water Physical, Biological and Chemical Properties Protection of wells Purification of Water at HH level (treatment)
Latrine Hygiene	Latrine usage; Latrine cleaning; Hand washing
Environmental Hygiene	Solid Waste Management (Collection and final disposal of garbage)

ICLA (Evidence of community satisfaction with the intervention is presented in chapter 3)

ICLA is a core and free NRC activity to assist the target groups in accessing their rights through the provision of reliable information, counselling (advice) and assistance with regard to civil documentation issues, housing, land and property issues, access to government compensation services and rights, as well as free legal assistance and capacity building trainings. The specific topics covered by the program include the definition of rights and duties, human rights under international law, Pakistan's constitution and Islam, procedures for obtaining critical government documents (e.g., identity cards, land deeds, birth, death and marriage certificates etc) and information about the main government poverty reduction and disaster relief compensation programs. The program also provides individual assistance to shelter-program-beneficiary families facing legal problems due to the emergencies. On the face of it, the program seems to be relevant and useful and as seen in the next chapter feedback from communities was generally positive. However, NRC has to provide greater evidence of its relevance, especially in FATA since, as mentioned earlier, the much more thorough UNDP-led FATA Interagency Early Recovery Needs Assessment (IAERNA) December 2011 report states that almost 75% of the respondents did not consider access to official documents and land disputes as serious issues. The remaining 25% could still constitute a large pool of people needing assistance. However, NRC has to undertake greater analysis of who those 25% are and the target them specifically. NRC currently has three ICLA packages—a one-day training; a three-hour session and individual information for shelter beneficiaries. Thus, shelter beneficiaries, with whom NRC has the longest and most extensive engagement, receive the lightest package, which seems inappropriate since it may be more important to ensure that they do not face any legal issues with the shelter provided and also since presumably (if they have been selected as shelter beneficiaries), they must also be the vulnerable in the opinion of NRC. It may also be useful to include information about basic court procedures which tend to be complex and tedious in Pakistan as well as information about the local government structures and the services that each department provides since these structures tend to

be confusing and bureaucratic in Pakistan. This should be fine-tuned for each region since the governance system in FATA is very different from the one in KP.

DRR

NRC also implemented DRR activities in 10 locations in FATA and KP, consisting mainly of building flood protection walls. Clearly, these walls will have some beneficial impact for recipient communities by reducing agricultural land erosion and reducing the risks of floods. However, the question in the mind of the evaluation team is whether these were among the most important needs in FATA and how they fit in with the overall objectives of what NRC is hoping to facilitate in FATA, i.e., return and resettlement of people who fled the area due to the conflict. The one DRR location in FATA that the team visited was a village which had not been affected at all by the conflict and the people in the village had not been displaced or lost property and NRC staff did not provide a clear explanation of why it was selected. While NRC aimed to help 'stayees' besides returnees, the 'stayees' should at least be affectees. If people stayed on because they were not affected at all, they would not seem to be priority candidates for help. The main problems discouraging return and resettlement in FATA are the lack of housing, income and water, and not floods since FATA is not a highly flood-prone area. Thus it is difficult to see how the DRR activities will help facilitate return and resettlement. Such DRR activities would have been much more appropriate in KP which was badly affected by floods recently and remains flood-prone in the future. Such work there would have also provided synergy to the other work that NRC is doing there, such as shelter construction, by making a village or a cluster of village less-prone to flood waters. This would have helped protect households and villages who did not receive shelters from NRC. Clearly, given that such work even in FATA will help poor communities, it cannot be considered a waste of money. However, value for money would be higher if the same money is used for shelter or water purposes in FATA or for DRR activities in KP where each monetary unit of such work will protect much greater value than in FATA. It would also be advisable for NRC to consider engaging in Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) programs which help communities develop disaster contingency plans.



NRC flood protection wall, FATA



The soil erosion it will help control

In summary, shelter, tents, NFIs and hygiene promotions are good selections and also well designed, requiring relatively minor changes. There are larger questions marks in the minds of the evaluation team for ICLA and DRR work, which fortunately constitute a small proportion of the overall budgets. However, more in-depth assessments could have led to some changes in the specific designs of both categories of programs in line with community needs, as we see in the next chapter

iv. Implementation

Shelter work modality

- NRC is presently constructing the shelters through multiple contractors where each contractors constructs around 100-200 houses. This approach has the advantage of increasing the chances of ensuring minimum technical standards and on-time completion. The disadvantage is the higher costs imposed by the contractors' profit margins, potential corruption, assumption the work is being done properly, little or no participation, and one size fits all (or most) shelter. This approach can be compared with several other construction modalities. The first alternative is to give cash to beneficiaries for constructing houses. The main advantage of this approach is that it would give maximum flexibility to each family. However, it also has several draw-backs if the process is not managed very closely. Families may divert the cash to other more pressing subjectively-perceived needs and many of the houses may not get completed, leading to issues of non-achievement of the project indicators agreed with the donor. Secondly, the work may not get completed within the project duration. Third, families may not comply with the flood and earthquake-resistant requirements of the government. Finally, it may be difficult for the most vulnerable households, such as disabled and female-headed households, to undertake the construction on their own. A second alternative could be to have NRC manage the whole construction itself. However, while this would eliminate the profit margins of the contractors, there is no guarantee that the per unit costs will be lower as NRC would have to hire a lot of its own staff whose salaries according to its scales may be higher than what contractors pay to their employees. It would also have been difficult for NRC to undertake the construction with its own stringent security rules for its employees since security risks even for national staff of western NGOs are higher than for contractors. Working with a single contractor is another option. This may help in getting cheaper rates and ensure greater uniformity, but it would be very difficult to find a single contractor able to work in all of NRC's operational areas. A final alternative is to give the construction material to the families and ask them to complete construction with a cash grant for the labour work. This will reduce the chances of diversion, although families may still sell the materials. It would also require NRC to monitor each individual family almost continuously rather than each contractor responsible for around 100-200 houses and each house once or twice during the whole construction. This approach may or may not reduce costs because each family will still have to hire a local contractor to complete the house. Local contractors may be cheaper but may not follow technical standards, while NRC may be able to get cheaper rates for 100-200 households than each family may be able to negotiate for individual houses. NRC is experimenting with this approach on a pilot basis in another project. Until this approach is validated, the current multiple-contractor approach appears to be the best option.

However, if the experiment is successful, it is recommended to move to the self-build model due to its manifold benefits, such as lower costs, flexibility and community participation

Monitoring

NRC did undertake regular monitoring, especially of the house construction, according to the staff. Regular monitoring reports were also shared with the evaluation team. However, there is no formal monitoring plan for the projects, which would identify clearly the role and responsibilities in monitoring starting from the CD right down to the field workers, the aspects and indicators that each position would monitor, and the mode and frequency. The plan should also provide a template for summarizing and analyzing the results from the monitoring of each position and the follow-up strategies. Such a formal plan would make the NRC's monitoring much more meaningful, rigorous and strategic. These weaknesses in monitoring are partly due to the fact that NRC's global evaluation policy does not include a section on project monitoring. NRC also undertakes several internal evaluation surveys such as KAP and ICLA studies. However, their results are sometimes not immediately available for review, e.g., those related to ICLA impact for the second project. NRC has a policy of having field-based monitoring staff reporting directly to the Peshawar office, which is a good policy. While NRC is a HAP-signatory, accountability practices within these two projects were generally weak. Communities were at best provided the telephone numbers of local junior staff but not that of senior staff in the field or in Peshawar. NRC is now planning to set up a hotline, which is commendable. However, it is advised to be more pro-active and instead of waiting for people to call in, have a policy as part of its monitoring plan to make regular calls itself to the village committees and even families, where cell phones are available.

Direct Implementation Modality

The NRC is currently implementing most of the project activities directly, with the exception of hygiene promotion activities which are implemented through local NGOs. In general, the evaluation team recommends that INGOs should implement their activities through local partners to enhance local capacity-building and reduce costs. However, given the fact that NRC is working in some very difficult areas, such as FATA and the work related to the main activity, i.e., shelter, is highly technical, this direct implementation modality seems less inappropriate. However, NRC is advised to review the possibility of working through local partners in the future wherever possible.

2. EXTERNAL COORDINATION

We focused on three main dimensions of external coordination: NRC leadership role in coordination structures; its attendance record in coordination meetings and its extent of coordination and clear communication with government and lead UN agencies. With respect to leadership, Grievance Desk SOPs have been developed by NRC recently which provides an example of how it is successfully coordinating with other stakeholders to improve protection for IDPs. NRC also worked on developing SOPs and guidance in relation to return-related grievances prior to the Grievance Desk SOPs. It is similarly involved in advocacy on matters related to civil documentation through the Protection Cluster and PHF. NRC has also been invited to join the Technical Working Group of Shelter Cluster in KP, a

fact demonstrating its active engagement in Cluster. In Balochistan, it has assumed Co-Lead responsibilities in this sector. There was serious discussion to make NRC as Shelter Cluster Co Lead for KP/FATA as well. The fact that it is the only INGO currently able to operate in Kurrum, S. Waziristan, Bajaur and Mohmand also highlights its strong reputation with the government.

With respect to communication and coordination with government and UN agencies, our interviews with external stakeholders paint a largely positive picture. The evaluation team met four external stakeholders, the UNHCR, PDMA (Provincial Disaster Management Authority, KP), and FDMA (FATA Disaster Management Authority) in Peshawar and FDMA in Bajaur. FDMA Peshawar had a very positive view about NRC and felt that they always coordinated well and provided all needed information and support as requested by the FDMA. The UNHCR was also largely positive about NRC as an implementing partner, but mentioned that it had not submitted some of the requested information about project activities recently (which NRC maintains that it had submitted). PDMA was also overall positive but felt that NRC and in fact all NGOs should enhance coordination with PDMA. More specifically for NRC, it felt that it had not followed the shelter designs that it had earlier committed to adopting with PDMA and which were more disaster-proof than the ones NRC actually followed, although the evaluation team does not find the government preferred one to be any more earthquake-resistant. Finally, FDMA in Bajaur was largely critical and felt that NRC was not coordinating adequately with it, though things had improved somewhat with the appointment of a new Head of Office. PDMA staff in Bajur also reported that they had received complaints that NRC had not built any shelters in a particular village even though it was claiming to have built 18 houses there. Upon the request of the evaluation team, the PDMA called its source in that village on the spot. However, the source now reported that the houses had actually been built but that some of the houses were given to the friends and families of a local influential even though they did not lose their house during the conflict. This shifting stance clearly undermines the credibility of this source and its assertion in our eyes and also suggests that its remaining charges about houses being given under influence are also not credible. PDMA also reported that they had received complaints that NRC staff was taking bribes to allocate houses to families, although it provided no credible evidence in this regard. The evaluation team itself did not receive any such complaints within the villages that it visited, even in villages where communities made other complaints openly and frankly against NRC. Thus, while overall coordination is good, NRC should improve communication even further with external stakeholders so that it can address the occasional grievances more promptly.

Finally, the evaluation team also reviewed the minutes of 8 Protection cluster meetings and 4 shelter cluster meetings between April-September 2012 held in Peshawar and NRC appears as a regular and active participant in those minutes. The team also reviewed the database of 2012 Pakistan Humanitarian Forum meetings in Islamabad. NRC's participation in those meetings is 75% for the executive committee meetings, of which it is a member, and 89% in the regular members' monthly meetings which is good given that it does not have an office in Islamabad though clearly and understandably the percentages are lower than for Peshawar-based meetings. Since the PHF is the most important INGO forum in Pakistan and the distance between Islamabad and Peshawar is short, NRC is advised to maintain its attendance in PHF meetings. Agencies interviewed separately by the

evaluators for other evaluations have identified PHF as crucial in dealing with government hurdles in a collective fashion which does not expose any one NGO before the government.


3. COST-EFFICIENCY

Direct materials costs proportion comparison: The proportion of the project materials and services lines in the two budgets is 78% and 71% respectively, which compares favourably with those of the 20+ agencies that the Team Leader has recently evaluated in Pakistan. For example, in a recent review of 13 large INGOs in Pakistan, the Team Leader had found the average materials costs to be 75%, which is what it approximately is across the two NRC projects. In addition, NRC has been able to gain significant cost-efficiency on its NFI kits unit prices during the project lives due to the open competitive bidding process: it reduced from Rs. 3600 to Rs. 3300 initially and NRC is currently buying it for 2920 PKR per NFI kit without compromising on the quality of the NFI kits as suppliers have reduced their prices due to increasing competition.

Comparison of shelter costs with other INGOs in Pakistan: ECHO requested NRC to carry out a comparative shelter cost analysis with all major agencies undertaking shelter projects in Pakistan, e.g., UNOPS, UNHABITAT, Islamic Relief, Relief International, Swiss Red Cross and others. The analysis provided in the appendix highlights that NRC is offering a cost-efficient shelter package, which includes a one room shelter with a kitchen and washroom. Some other agencies have lower unit prices, but they are not providing kitchen or washroom as well as follow less durable structure design. The cost implications of different construction modalities were discussed previously.

Review of product components: NRC can save on costs by dropping the kitchen in the shelter and the convenience goods in its NFI packages in the recovery phase while still addressing humanitarian needs adequately. The kitchens are not culturally appropriate, as discussed in the next chapter while the convenience goods in the NFI package do not address major humanitarian needs in the recovery phase since people are likely to already have them.

No other major cost savings options seem obvious without sacrificing quality.



CHAPTER 3: PROGRAM OUTCOMES AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL

This chapter focuses mainly on the program outcomes achieved by NRC at the community-level in terms of addressing humanitarian needs and facilitating recovery and resettlement. The chapter is largely based on the field-level data collected by the evaluation during the field visits, in particular the household-level interviews which are the source for all the tables contained below within this chapter. It focuses on all remaining evaluation TORs components not covered in the last chapter as follows:

- **Relevance:** To what extent has the interventions undertaken been relevant to the local needs and priorities of the beneficiaries?
- **Effectiveness:** Was the assistance able to meet the needs in a timely manner? To what extent did NRC's acceptance strategies and approaches facilitate better access in reaching beneficiaries?
- **Cross cutting issues:** How has the ECHO project adapted a gender sensitive approach and ensured that protection concerns have been incorporated and rights based approach adopted?
- **Impact:** To what extent did the project impact the lives of beneficiaries?

1. RELEVANCE

This section reviews the extent to which the interventions undertaken have been relevant to the local needs and priorities of the beneficiaries. The table below provides an overview of some key dimensions related to the status of families before the crisis and the impact of the crisis on them. Nearly 80% of the families in KP and 100% of the families in FATA were displaced with those in KP displaced for around one-and-a-half months while those in FATA displaced for more than two years. Thus, the impact of the conflict in FATA was much more long-drawn than the impact of floods in KP.

Around 70% of the families lost their houses completely while another 26% lost them partially during the crises. Thus, housing was clearly a critical need for the communities and as the information collected by us shows, the NRC shelter intervention was a largely relevant and well-appreciated response. The table above shows that the average household size in both KP and FATA is very close to the seven size assumed by NRC in constructing its 14X14ft room. This yields a per capita space close to the 3.5m² per capita shelter space recommended by SPHERE. Since around 80% of the families lived in mud houses (the size of which varies from family to family) before the crisis, the NRC shelter is a significant improvement in their dwelling condition. However, the average number of rooms before the crisis was 2.4 and 3 in KP and FATA respectively. Thus, the families have not recovered that status from the NRC help. However, the intention of the NRC intervention was not to help families recover the full number of pre-crisis rooms but to give them one room to at least have some cover while


they re-build their houses on their own over time. In that sense, the intervention is helpful. People could build additional concrete rooms next to the NRC shelter to utilize one of its walls and save money or build additional mud rooms within the vicinity. Even if people are unable to build additional concrete rooms, having one such room, which is easier to maintain than mud shelters, is still reasonable protection against floods in the future.

According to self-reporting information provided by the families, almost 90% of the families are living in the NRC shelter now, and the evaluation team's physical observations of a smaller sample of houses (3-5 per village) reconfirms this self-reporting. As seen during physical observations, HH interviews and FGDs, the main systematic reason for non-occupation occurs in FATA where some families have not occupied the rooms because they have yet not been able to rebuild the traditional boundary walls of their extended family courtyards which are an important cultural requirement in FATA's conservative environment. Another systematic reason was that some houses in FATA had just been completed or were nearing completion when the evaluation team undertook its visits. However, in the physical observations, we noticed that most families were using the kitchen as storage space. In the FGDs, people explained that this is so since the NRC' small and closeted kitchen design does not match with the traditional large and open kitchens required to provide adequate smoke ventilation in areas where wood is the main source of cooking energy. The kitchen would be a health hazard for women and the young children who hang around with them since it does not provide adequate space and ventilation, and it is advisable to drop the kitchen in future construction since families are quite capable of rebuilding the traditional mud kitchens themselves

Impact of Crisis	KP	FATA	Total
Age of head of household (years)	47	42	44
Household size	7.4	7.3	7.3
Full concrete house before crisis (%-Yes)	5.6	7.3	7
Mud house before crisis (%-Yes)	78	84	82
Mixed house before crisis (%-Yes)	17	8	11
House had latrine? (%-Yes)	22	65	46
Old house-Number of rooms	2.4	3	2.8
Old House destroyed fully during crisis (%-Yes)	74	67	70
Old House destroyed partially during crisis (%-Yes)	24	28	26
Was your family displaced in the crisis? (%-Yes)	78	100	91
If, yes for how long? (months)	1.5	24	14

Around 80% of the families expressed satisfaction with the house design. The main complaints aired during the FGDs related to the room size, the height of the walls, and the lack of provision of storage space and electricity wiring. However, all of these obviously have cost implications and

none of them seem critical humanitarian gaps to us. People in FATA also mentioned that NRC had not provided the traditional boundary walls. However, again, this is a cultural rather than a humanitarian need. Families in FATA who lost houses due to the conflict are getting compensation from the government, which is providing one compensation package for reconstruction to one extended family courtyard rather than each individual nuclear family. Since the money is seen to be belonging to all relatives, it is commonly used to build this common traditional boundary wall rather than the living rooms of any individual nuclear family. Quality issues were also reported by only around 14% of the families, most of them located in KP and more specifically in Kohat. During the physical observations, the team found much greater quality issues in Kohat than in other places, especially with respect to small gaps in the roof and the incidence of missing items in the room or latrine. People in Kohat also reported during FGDs that they had to contribute around Rs. 8-10,000 since the contractors dumped the materials outside the villages and asked the families to pay for the cost of taking it to their individual construction sites. NRC does not share the bills of quantities with the families nor signs a three-way contract between the recipient family, contractor and NRC which would explain the roles and responsibilities of each party. Doing so could help in reducing conflicts and misunderstandings. While most people may have never lived in a brick house and would not know what they were supposed to monitor immediately, training them through initial sessions would help build their capacity in this area. It would also be useful to have wall plastering as part of the design in all cases since it increases durability considerably.

**Traditional well-ventilated FATA kitchen****Traditional FATA house boundary walls**

Less than half the beneficiaries had latrines before the crises and most of those latrines were make-shift mud latrines. So that is another positive addition due to the NRC program. Latrines seemed generally in use during the physical observations. However, in two villages, the team observed that the latrines were attached to the room and accessible through a door within it unlike the detached latrine design in other villages. This former design seems inappropriate due to cultural reasons as families in

rural Pakistan generally prefer detached latrines. Attached latrines could also pose health hazards since it is much more difficult to maintain such latrines in villages and a latrine attached to the bedroom would increase germ flow into the bedroom. Finally, they will also reduce the access of other people living within the extended family courtyards. Thus, detached latrines are recommended for the future.

People's perceptions also revalidate the current contractor modality of shelter constructions since only around 20% families would have preferred to receive cash. During the FGDs and HH interviews, we noticed that the people who spoke in favour of self-construction by families seemed more self-confident and slightly better-off. This suggests that the poorer families may prefer to have the house constructed by NRC as they may find it more difficult to manage construction on their own. During FGDs, people also generally felt that they may be forced to divert the cash to other needs and may not be able to complete the house in time.

Relevance of services (%-Yes)	Pr 1	Pr 2	KP	FATA	Total
Are you living in NRC one-room shelter now?	92	86	88	86	87
Was the house design according to your needs?	92	77	67	90	80
Have there been any quality issues with the house?	17	14	25	6	14
Prefer NRC construct over self-building house	83	77	71	83	78
Is the latrine design ok?	94	93	88	98	94
Did you get NFIs from NRC?	31	100	100	75	85
Was the NFI package according to your needs?	55	82	82	70	80
Did you share NFI package with any other family?	5	13	14	8	10
Have there been any quality issues with the NFIs	0	6	5	6	6
Did you have to sell the NFI items for any reason?	0	2	0	4	2
Did you get hygiene training from NRC?	56	90	85	80	82
If yes, was the training according to your needs?	92	98	90	84	91
Is your family using the health advice?	98	94	85	96	93
Did you get legal advice from NRC?	22	37	54	19	33
If yes, Is your family using the legal advice?	98	94	98	96	94
Was the aid given to the most deserving people?	92	92	94	89	91

Almost 85% of the respondents received the NFI packages although the percentage was much smaller within FATA and the first project. Almost 80% people expressed satisfaction with the contents of the NFI package, though again the satisfaction was much lower under the first project and in FATA. The most popular item was the water cooler and in terms of additional items that they would prefer to

receive, people mentioned beds, beddings and stoves most. However, as mentioned in the last chapter, we do not find the convenience goods within the NFI package addressing any major humanitarian need in the recovery phase since people can obtain such items on their own. Rather than NRC becoming the shopper for people's kitchen and household items needs and transporting all these bulky goods across the region, it would be better to give equivalent cash grant instead or drop the idea totally. However, the hygiene-promoting items seem useful but should be distributed on the day of the hygiene promotion sessions to enhance the synergy between the two interventions. There were frequent quality complaints in Kohat about the NFI items. Overall, the incidence of NFI sharing or selling was very low. Tents were also seen as a very positive input by people in both villages where FGDs on tent distribution were held, both by men and women. They reported that NRC staff taught them how to erect the tents, which was easy and that the tents made a huge difference to their safety and privacy. Tents were also found to be large enough for 6-8 people and strong and resilient with adequate protection against dust, rain and sunshine. However, they were hot inside during the day, and women complained that the household size was not considered in distributing tents.

More than 80% people received the hygiene training although the percentage was only 56% under the first project. Of those who received the training, more than 90% people expressed satisfaction overall with the training while more than 90% people reported using the advice that they had received regularly. The section on personal hygiene was mentioned as the most useful one during FGDs and household interviews followed by water treatment. A small minority of the people expressed a desire for additional information on environmental hygiene though the vast majority was not in a position to mention any additional topic that they would have liked more information about. Malaria, skin diseases and cough/cold were mentioned as the most common diseases and it may be useful to include greater information about preventing these diseases in future hygiene promotion classes. Furthermore, even though it is normally not part of WASH, it would also be useful to impart awareness-raising and education on nutritional issues through a local partner since malnutrition is common among children in Pakistan. Only one-third of the people reported receiving the ICLA information which is very low even after catering for the fact that ICLA was not formally included in the first project. Both in FGDs and household interviews, it took considerable explanation for people to understand what we were asking about, even for people who ultimately mentioned receiving some advice on such topics. Thus, it is important to look at the extent to which this program is being delivered properly and the extent to which it helps people. While those who received the information reported it being useful, during FGDs people were frank in saying that they already knew about these topics. This finding links in with the finding of the UNDP assessments in FATA which reported that 75% of the people did not report facing legal or documentation-related problems. The percentage in KP may be even higher since government services are better established there and people there are also more educated and better informed. At the same time, high percentages (between 94 and 98%) of those who received legal advice confirmed that they have been using the advice. In addition, civic documents are particularly important for women, as women often do not have any form of identity documentation, which might then limit their access to assistance or in claiming rights. In fact the gender sensitivity section reveals that 30% more women than men reported that their access to official documents increased due to NRC's work. Thus, the training is important in our opinion but needs better targeting, content and delivery. There may be a need to place greater emphasis on counseling people about getting government compensations for

floods and conflict, since there were much greater complains about such issues during FGDs than about the lack of government documents. NRC normally establishes village committees to assist with implementing its project activities. While such committees were generally present in KP, their presence in FATA was much more uneven and out of the six villages visited there, only one seemed to have a village committee. Moreover, even in KP, the committees are largely being used for administrative purposes. However, it would be useful to enhance their scope further and provide them with adequate training so that they can play a larger role in enhancing the impact of NRC's work through follow-up, e.g., by undertaking village cleanliness campaigns to supplement the hygiene promotion trainings and advocating and networking with government departments on ICLA-related issues.

Finally, more than 90% of the people reported that the most deserving people in the village received the NRC assistance. While this is positive, the evaluation team was still not satisfied with the process of selecting people within villages and its documentation, in line with its weak documentation of selection of districts, sub-districts and villages mentioned earlier. With respect to intra-village selection, NRC files just contain information about the people who were selected and no information about the people who were rejected and the reason for their rejection. Referring again to our comparison with the procurement, process, this is equivalent to its procurement files just containing information about suppliers who were selected and no information about suppliers who were rejected. Obviously, such documentation will be considered inadequate by financial auditors. In the same way, the file information about selecting people within villages appears inadequate to evaluators. The files should contain information about all households surveyed and their status on each selection criteria, so that outsiders can easily see why some people were rejected. This information should then be posted at a central place within each village and people should be given opportunity to file objections at a subsequent meeting where the final list should be adopted after disposing of such complains. Where it is not possible to discriminate among the status of different families in a village it may even be appropriate to do a transparent draw in front of villagers and document and file its results properly. Thus, there is a need for NRC to improve its selection and documentation criteria at the village level.

Effectiveness (%-Yes)	Pr 1	Pr 2	KP	FATA	Total
Consulted about the types of services and their content?	81	84	76	88	83
Unintended harm resulting from this help for your family?	0	5	4	1	3
Did NRC treat you according to your cultural norms?	94	81	65	97	84
Did NRC keep in mind your work schedule?	94	84	75	93	88
Taught the procedure for making a complaint to NRC?	53	60	51	63	58
Were the shelter services timely for you?	97	90	86	97	94
Were the NFI services timely for you in light of your needs?	52	74	83	58	69
Were the hygiene trainings timely for you?	73	75	86	65	74
Were the ICLA trainings timely for you?	98	75	75	96	86

2. EFFECTIVENESS

This section looks at whether the assistance was able to meet community needs in a timely manner and the extent to which NRC's acceptance strategies and approaches facilitated better access in reaching beneficiaries. More than 80% each of the people reported that NRC had consulted them before starting its work, treating them according to their cultural norms and respecting their work scheduled in planning its project activities. However, the percentage was much lower in KP with regard to the last two aspects. In FATA, people generally mentioned that they were not really involved in a lot of every-day activities and thus NRC's meetings etc did not affect them much. On the other hand, KP is a more peri-urban area with a faster pace of life. So the lower percentage of people reporting that NRC kept in mind their work schedules there is understandable. However, the finding about the lower percentage of people finding NRC to be culturally sensitive in KP is more contra-intuitive since if anything the cultural norms in FATA are more rigid and traditional. There also seemed to be little unintended harm because of NRC's work. The bulk of the complaints in this regard came from Kohat as people had to make more self-contributions there for the shelter, as mentioned earlier.

The biggest gap in effectiveness relates to accountability measures. Less than 60% of the people reported being taught by NRC the procedure for making complaints and that too mostly consisted of making them to junior, field-level staff. NRC has not yet established any procedures for enhancing its accountability with more strategic measures related to transparency and complaint mechanisms linked to feedback to more senior staff in the field or Peshawar head office. There is a critical need to establish such measures at the earliest. NRC is planning to set up a complaint hotline, which is good. However, accountability includes consultation, transparency and feedback. Thus, NRC should look to develop and implement a comprehensive accountability strategy at the earliest. The shelter activities were seen as having been done in time, though understandably the percentage is lower under project 2 since that too was a response to the 2008 displacement and 2010 floods. The timeliness of NFI distribution and hygiene promotion training is lower at around 70% each, though this is also not alarmingly low. However, as mentioned earlier, these activities are best done as close to the relief phase as possible. ICLA activities were seen as more timely though the larger issues about the extent to which this program is actively reaching people and reflects community needs mentioned earlier undermine the value of this higher percentage.

3. IMPACT

The projects have both succeeded in realizing significant impact on the majority of respondents along a wide range of dimensions. The most widespread impact, felt by more than at least half the families, has occurred in the areas of increased ability to deal with future crisis (80%), increased self-reliance in life in general (79%), reduced frequency of diseases (71%), increased safety from physical dangers (62%), increased security of property (62%) and debt reduction (54% reported it since they would otherwise have taken a loan to rebuild the house). On the other hand a quarter of the people in KP, mainly in Kohat reported that their debt had actually gone up since they had to contribute from their own pockets into the shelter construction. The biggest contributor to these improvements was generally identified as the shelter component during FGDs. With mud houses, people lose their houses and belongings, get displaced and do not have a place to stay even when they return to their villages until they rebuild the

mud house. With a concrete shelter, they will not lose their house at least in medium-intensity floods. They may still get displaced if the water submerges their whole village but will at least have a shelter available as soon as the floods recede while damage to household items may also be a bit less due to the concrete shelter. Thus, their ability to deal with future crisis, self-reliance, safety from physical dangers, and security of property has increased considerably not only in the short-term but also in the long-run. Integrating DRR work in flood-prone villages will help reduce flooding even further and make evacuation and return smoother. The hygiene promotion training has also made people less disease-prone immediately but also in the long-run by increasing people's knowledge permanently. It has also increased people's ability to maintain hygiene during future disasters when public health endemics are common. NFIs will also have had an immediate impact but will not have much long-term impact on their own. The impact of the ICLA work is less discernible as only a minority of people (25%) reported benefiting from that program under both projects since it was not a formal part of the first project and also unevenly delivered in the second project. Only 40% of the people reported that their access to official documents has increased due to NRC activities.

Impact of (% Yes)	Pr 1	Pr 2	KP	FATA	Total
Debt reduced	56	53	49	57	54
Self-reliance increased	100	72	60	92	79
Ability to deal with crisis increased	91	77	72	86	80
Income increased	38	11	10	22	17
Safety from physical dangers increased	58	72	82	60	70
Access to official documents increased	25	43	65	20	40
Security of property increased	56	65	70	56	62
ICLA training helped in solving family problems?	22	26	39	15	25
Diseases reduced in family due to hygiene training?	50	77	69	73	71

4. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

a. Gender sensitivity

As mentioned in the second chapter, NRC has a global gender policy which says that all country offices should develop a specific document/guideline on how to include gender in the project cycle management, impart gender-related useful training modules, increase participation in inter-agency gender networks and carry out an annual gender evaluation/review. However, none of these guidelines appear to have been followed in practice in relation to these two projects. There is no gender strategy for either project detailing how gender concerns will be incorporated in the two projects nor much gender training or participation in gender networks. Clearly, there are severe constraints with working with women in FATA, but in KP there are much more opportunity to do so. As the NRC's global gender policy also mentions, gender-sensitivity means developing programs according to the particular

concerns of both genders. However, none of the project documents reflect such a concern. The impact of this neglect is clear in the field as the programs seem to have been less suitable for women on a wide range of dimensions in comparison with men. We essentially looked at all dimensions where the performance of the project appeared better with one gender by 10 percentage points or more. While there were only 2 dimensions where the project seems to have done better with women (NFI package likeness and increase in access to documents), there are more than dozen dimensions where the reverse is true. 18% more female-headed households lost their houses fully in the floods. The NRC design as perceived as being good by only 70% of the women compared with 82% of the men. The most striking differences appear in terms of impact questions. Thus only 22% of women reported that their self-reliance increased due to NRC work compared with 93% of the men, while only 47% women reported that their ability to deal with crisis increased due to NRC work compared with 89% of men. Similarly, 61% of women had to contribute money from their own pocket compared with 44% of men. Consequently, 31% of women reported that their debt had increased due to NRC's work compared with only 6% men. Thus, there is a clear need for NRC to strengthen the gender-sensitivity of its work and pay more attention to addressing the unique problems of female-headed households.

Gender comparison (% saying yes)	Female	Male
Old house destroyed fully	83	65
NRC house design ok	70	82
Latrine design ok	83	96
Prefer NRC construct house	97	72
Had to put own cash for completing NRC house	61	44
Problem with house design	22	12
Faced long queue during NFI distribution	27	6
Diseases down due to hygiene training	52	77
Debt increased due to NRC work	31	6
Self-reliance increased due to NRC work	22	93
Ability to deal with crisis increased due to NRC work	47	89
NRC respected your work schedule during program delivery	75	87
NRC taught complain procedure	50	60
Liked NFI package	94	61
Access to documents increased due to NRC work	63	33

The lower level of consultation of women is one contributory factor to this outcome. Thus, women in Kohat especially felt that only males were consulted and that women had no say in major decisions. Some women were of the view that consultation was just a formality. The organization prepared design and the communities had acted on the set criteria, although the agency consulted them and respected


their views during the layout of the shelters provision. Women there also felt that the hygiene trainings could be improved with additional information on signs and symptoms and prevention and treatment related to various diseases. However, overall, women in KP reported during FGDs and household interviews that their quality of life has improved with the provision of shelter and hygiene kits. They are also determined to take care of cleanliness in the future because of the hygiene training, but are out of stock and need additional hygiene accessories.



FGDs with women in KP

b. Incorporation of Protection Concerns and Rights-Based Approach

The ICLA component was the main vehicle for NRC to incorporate protection and rights-based concerns into the projects. However, as mentioned earlier, there are issues with the program's relevance and delivery. As such, the incorporation of such concerns has not been high. This low incorporation is also enhanced by the lack of training and empowerment of village committees to act as facilitating agents within communities (e.g., by organizing cleanliness campaigns) and with external stakeholders (e.g., by negotiating on behalf of the community with government and aid agencies). The lack of policy work on the problems faced by communities, e.g., access and compensation packages, has also reduced the incorporation of these concerns within program work. Finally, the lack of strong accountability measures, including participation and transparency, has also reduced a rights-based perspective within programs. However, protection issues have been addressed by some of the other components. Thus, shelter has clearly increased protection against physical dangers and future crises as has the hygiene training and to a lesser extent the NFI package. The incidence of diseases has gone down. However, there is a need for NRC to incorporate protection and rights-based concerns more systematically into program work in the future by strengthening its ICLA work, village committees, policy work and accountability measures.



CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings presented in chapters two and three, this chapter provides some overall recommendations for addressing the areas of improvement identified in the last two chapters related to both program processes and outcomes. The last two chapters have identified a wide range of issues with NRC program processes and outcomes. It may be useful to divide

these issues into two categories—those issues where we feel minimum standards were not met and those issues where things are reasonably good even now but could be made even better with some changes. In our opinion, there are only three issues which fall into the first category: NRC's assessment quality and documentation of evidence that it selected the most deserving geographies and households; gender sensitivity within projects; and incorporation of rights-based concerns within the programs. The rest of the issues identified earlier generally represent areas where good work could be made even better with some changes. In the next section, we provide some recommendations for addressing both types of issues.

1. RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Global Programming Resources

- Develop detailed guidelines to help country offices undertake thorough and rigorous needs assessments in the recovery phase
- Provide detailed guidelines on developing and implementing clear and comprehensive monitoring plans for each project (this is already under preparation and the Pakistan office should liaise closely with HO in adopting them once ready)
- Develop clearer guidelines on incorporating accountability issues in global programming

b. Country-Level Issues

i. Program Processes

- Develop more comprehensive and rigorous assessments processes for the recovery phase which provide clearer information for geographical, sectoral and delivery modality decisions
- **The distributions of goods and services geographically are financial transactions just like the procurements of goods and services by the agencies themselves and involve as much risk of wrong-doing as procurement itself.** Thus, properly document the basis on which decisions about provincial, district, sub-district and village selection are taken through collecting a reasonable amount of primary and secondary assessment information and taking the final decision in a well-documented committee meeting which analyzes the available information and the gaps their-in to ensure transparent and objective decisions

- Focus less on easily accessible and well-serviced districts like Nowshera and Charsadda and more on isolated and under-served places like FATA, Kohistan and Swat in future work which information provided by NRC shows to be as needy as Nowshera and Charsadda and less insecure than FATA where NRC already works
- Develop clearer and SMART criteria for selecting families within villages using criteria for which information can be easily collected and analyzed, and which include not only vulnerability dimensions such as disaster-related losses but also resilience factors like socio-economic status. The files should contain information about all households surveyed and their status on each selection criteria, so that outsiders can easily see why some people were rejected.
- Where differences in status among families are difficult to discern based on such criteria, consider the use of transparent draws at the village level or ensuring that each deserving extended family courtyard in a village receives equal services to reduce conflicts
- Post the provisional list of selected beneficiaries within each village and give people time to file objections at a subsequent meeting where the final decision is taken in the presence of village committees and the community
- Document the process of selection properly for future evaluations and audits
- Include the review of geographical and beneficiary selections in the job responsibilities of the internal auditor
- Develop clear monitoring plans which clearly lay out the dimensions, indicators, roles and responsibilities for everyone from CD down to the field workers and the modalities of monitoring
- Develop a strong MIS system which collects information from the monitoring and allows easy analysis and rapid decision-making and also collects information for the common evaluation criteria (e.g., DAC) so that the country SMT is reviewing the progress on each criteria and taking remedial action well before evaluators provide “break the news”. Analyze and write-up results of all internal impact surveys more promptly.
- Develop clear gender-sensitivity plans for each project and ensure that gender aggregated information is collected during assessments and guides the development of gender-differentiated delivery of services
- Improve communication with external stakeholders (which is largely good even now) further so that misunderstandings do not fester with government departments, coordination agencies and donors
- Ensure greater participation in gender networks as required by the NRC global gender policy and Islamabad-based critical meetings which are found to be very helpful by all INGOs in dealing with bureaucratic hassles

ii. Program Technical Issues

- Drop kitchen from future housing designs or include as beneficiary contribution since it does not address any critical humanitarian needs and the current design is culturally and health-wise inappropriate while communities are capable of constructing traditional mud kitchens easily
- Detach latrines from the rooms in all designs since attached latrines are culturally and hygienically inappropriate (since germs can more easily travel to the bedroom) and reduce easy access for other extended family courtyard members
- Include wall plastering on all future designs since it increases shelter durability considerably. Review the possibility of using bamboos in roof instead of metal beams to increase earthquake safety.
- Share bills of quantities with beneficiaries so that they can monitor contractors adequately to ensure that the right quantities are used
- Sign three-way MOUs among contractors, beneficiary families (or at least village committees if individual contracts with families are difficult) and NRC which clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of each party to avoid misunderstandings
- Encourage contractors to use more local labour for unskilled work in order to increase local employment opportunities
- Persist with current contractor modality until the results of the self-build pilot projects are clear. However, if the experiment is successful, it is strongly recommended to move completely to the self-build model due to its manifold benefits, such as lower costs, flexibility and community participation
- Drop the convenience items for the NFI package completely or substitute a small cash grant in their place in the recovery phase while persisting with them in the relief phase
- Persist with the hygiene-related items in the NFI package in the recovery phase too but distribute them on the day of the hygiene promotion class to enhance synergies between the two activities
- Keep a larger quantity of tents in stock as they are a critical humanitarian input and much appreciated by communities
- Include nutritional awareness-raising (through local partners and even though it is normally not part of WASH), disease causation and control, and kitchen smoke hazards in the hygiene promotion classes

- Strengthen the role of the Village Committees in relationship to hygiene promotion so that they can organize village cleanliness campaigns with the help of villagers and negotiate the delivery of services from government departments
- Undertake DRR flood protection wall activities in more flood-prone areas, especially where shelters are provided so that there is mutual linkage among these activities and where each monetary unit of such work will protect much greater value than in FATA.
- Consider including CBDRM work which helps communities develop contingency plans in future projects in flood and earthquake prone areas.
- Undertake a proper assessment of ICLA needs and develop a clearer, coherent and clearly delivered ICLA program which also focuses on issues related to access to government compensation packages, and court and government department structures and procedures.
- Strengthen the role of Village Committees in negotiating with government departments on common ICLA-related issues affecting large number of families within villages
- Enhance the incorporation of protection and rights-based work by strengthening village committees, policy work, ICLA activities and accountability measures.
- Develop a strong accountability strategy encompassing stronger consultation, transparency and feedback mechanism in project work
- Supplement the hotline facility by pro-actively calling village committees and beneficiaries, especially during critical project phases, such as beneficiary selection and service delivery.
- Consider additional sectors, especially water and food security/livelihoods for future recovery-phase work (water work has already started in some project areas).

APPENDIX

1. WORKPLAN:

September 10	Contract signed by both parties
September 12	Basic project documents sent by NRC to consultant
September 22	First draft of inception report; request for additional documents/information from consultant
September 28	Feedback by NRC on inception report; additional documents/information sent by NRC
October 2	Final draft of inception report submitted by consultant
October 9-18	Field work/debrief in Pakistan
October 9	9am Arrive Peshawar airport 10:30-11:30am Security Advisor (Gabriele) 11:30-1pm Country Director (Saeed) 1-2pm Lunch 2:00-3:30pm PM ECHO (Barbara) 3:30-4:15pm PSM (Rokibul) 4:15-5:00pm Internal meeting between evaluators
October 10	9--9:45am FAM (Abdirahman Jama) 9:45-10:45 PM Shelter/NFI (Yodit) 11-4pm 45 minutes separate meetings with: UNHCR Peshawar; PDMA; FDMA 4:00-5:00pm Internal meeting between evaluators
October 11-17--Field visits	Dates, districts and villages October 11 Kohat (Suddal and Mandori) October 12 Nowshera (Choki Darab and Kandi Tazadin) October 13 Charsadda (Daagwaal and Sadran) October 14 Mohmand (Gharang and Bakmal Shah) October 15-17 Bajaur (Inayat Kallay, Mashkarno, Zorbander, Tangkhata)
October 18	9am—Debrief in Peshawar
October 18-30	Data entry, analysis and report writing
October 31	First draft of the report by consultant
November 9	Feedback by NRC
November 15	Final report by consultant

2. LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

- All relevant proposals (with budget and logframe) and progress reports (including financial) written by NRC to donor

- Global and country NRC policy documents and manuals for various aspects of emergency response, i.e., assessments, implementation, incorporation of international standards, gender issues, accountability, procurement for emergencies, emergency preparedness, coordination and with other relevant stakeholders and any other aspects
- NRC global Evaluation Guidelines
- NRC global shelter guidelines
- Reports of internal and external needs assessment, KAP and other baseline/endline surveys, evaluation and reviews done by NRC
- Formal monitoring plan for the projects as well as all monitoring reports
- Recent (6-8) minutes of coordination meetings that NRC attends
- The shelter inter-agency comparison undertaken by NRC (mentioned in country strategy)
- Summaries of how funds were spent during each month since start of operations and month-wide details of how different items and services were distributed/completed
- Shelter design and related engineering documents; results of quality checks done
- CAD and IVAP reports
- NRC Pakistan organization chart/list of employees
- UN/govt documents about priority needs, sectors and populations

3. SAMPLE SIZE (SS) CALCULATION FOR HH INTERVIEWS

The sample size was determined by the fact that there were two team members collecting data in the field and each person could do around 6 interviews in one hour. Thus, a total of 168 (2 interviewersX6 interviews per hourX2 locations in a dayX7days) randomly selected heads of households were interviewed. The sample size was stratified initially across the two projects according to the number of one-room shelters in each project (1st project—610; 2nd project---2000). Within each project, we stratified the sample further according to the number of shelters provided in each district as mentioned in the two project reports. The initial stratification of sample between the two projects is based on 610 shelters in the first project and 2000 shelters in the second one. The subsequent stratification across the districts did not include the 300 families in DI Khan. The figures for the number of households to be covered in each district were slightly adjusted from the raw numbers derived from the distribution of recipient households across the districts in line with time availability of 24 interviews possible during a day. The sample was also stratified (overall only) according to gender of the recipient head of household in proportion to the overall number of female-headed households provided with the one-room shelters in the two projects. However, due to cultural and security issues, women beneficiaries could not be interviewed in FATA.

	KP			FATA		
	Charsaddah	Nowshera	Kohat	Mohmand	Bajaur	Total
No. of shelters						
Project 1	0	0	0	187	423	610

Project 2	300	300	300	300	500	1700 ¹
Total	300	300	300	487	923	2310
HH to be covered						
Project 1	0	0	0	12	24	36
Project 2	24	24	24	24	36	132
Total	24	24	24	36	60	168
Field visit days						
Project 1	0	0	0	0.33	1	1.33
Project 2	1	1	1	0.67	2	5.67
Total	1	1	1	1	3	7

To draw the random sample, in the first stage, NRC provided the list of all locations where one-room shelters were provided in each of the five districts. Only those field sites were considered where at least 20 people were given shelters, which were within 1.5 hours of the base location and were safe to visit from a security point of view. Based on this information, the evaluators randomly select the locations to be visited in each district. Subsequently, NRC provided the list of one-room beneficiaries in the selected locations and the evaluation team randomly drew beneficiaries for the HH interviews in line with the table above. A replacement list of 4 back-up heads of households was prepared for each location. NRC then informed the selected people in advance so that they were available on the day of the field visit. In case, some beneficiaries were not available during the field work, additional beneficiaries available from the back-up list were substituted. This overall and stratified sample sizes provided the following margin of errors margin at a confidence interval of 95% (please see appendix for formula):

Overall	KP	FATA	Project 1	Project 2
7.5%	11.5%	9.95%	16.25%	8.5%

The sample size and MOEs were calculated using the finite population adjustment since the population size was small (2310).

Sample size for finite population = sample size / (1 + ((sample size - 1)/population))

Confidence Interval (m) for finite population = $\sqrt{(Z^2 * p * (1 - p)) / \text{sample size}}$

Where,

Z = Confidence Level (E.g. 1.96 for 95% Confidence Level),

¹ In addition, 300 shelters were constructed in DI Khan which were not covered in the fieldwork.

p = Worst case percent (Default value: 0.5),
m = Margin of error (or) Confidence Interval.

The overall sample size was calculated as 168, based on the time availability for two evaluators having around 5 hours of survey time each day. This sample size was distributed across the districts and the two projects in proportion to the number of one-room shelters in each district and project. The MOEs for FATA and KP and the two projects were worked out using the same formula above but with the sample size defined for them on the basis of the stratification explained earlier.

Bias in responses was minimized in several ways. Firstly, the interviews with external stakeholders and communities were held in the absence of NRC staff in order to ensure confidentiality and frank responses. Furthermore, all respondents were informed clearly at the beginning of the interviews about the guarantee of confidentiality. Finally, the random selection of locations and beneficiaries and the stratification according to project, location and gender also helped minimize bias. The fact that only two persons conduct the interviews in each location also helped increase consistency and reduce the chances of mistakes. Evaluation team members prepared thoroughly for the data collection exercise to reduce the chances of bias and other errors. Furthermore, findings were triangulated across all sources of information to enhance their reliability. Finally, focusing on families which received the high-value and durable shelters minimized recall issues compared with recipients of smaller-value NFI items. The evaluators used the principle of triangulation in reaching conclusions. Thus, the strongest validity of the findings occurred where all the different methods supported similar conclusions on any evaluation dimension. Where different sources of information gave conflicting findings, this fact is highlighted at the relevant place and an analysis is given of the evaluation team's opinion about what seems to be the best conclusion on that dimension.

4. NRC SHELTER AND GOVT. FLOOD-RESISTANT GUIDELINES

<u>Government guidelines</u>	<u>NRC shelter</u>
General:	
➤ Shelter is to be built on upper terrain of the plot.	Yes
➤ If there is no upper terrain available within the plot for shelter construction, filling is to be done to make a platform on higher level where the shelter is to be built.	Yes
➤ The distance between water source (hand pump/tube well/bore hole) and septic tank (dry pit) should be at least 30 ft.	Yes
➤ Proper cover should be provided over septic tank or dry pit.	Yes
➤ If the sub surface water level is near to the ground level, Toilet is to be constructed on higher level.	Yes
Foundation and Plinth:	
➤ Cement sand mortar is to be used in foundation for masonry work.	Yes
➤ Foundation is to be laid on hard and deep strata. In case of fill area or loose strata, proper compaction should be done.	Yes
➤ In case of loose strata; the depth of foundation should be 4 ft below the ground level	Yes

whereas in case of hard strata, the depth of foundation should be 2 ft.	
➤ The width/breadth of foundation should be at least 1.5 ft.	Yes
➤ Proper compaction should be done for foundation after excavation.	??
➤ The Finish Floor Level (FFL) should be 1.5 ft above the Ground Level (GL)	Yes
➤ 2 inch thick Damp Proof Course (DPC) is to be laid on FFL. Concrete is to be made of 1:2:4 mixtures. Polythene sheet should also be laid over DPC.	Yes
Masonry:	
➤ The thickness of wall should be at minimum 9 inches.	Yes
➤ 1:4 cement sand mortar is to be used in masonry work	Yes
➤ Plaster is to be done till High Flood Level (HFL).	In some cases
➤ Concrete band of 1:2:4 mixtures are to be provided either on lintel or roof level. It should be 3 to 4 inches thick. 2#3 longitudinal steel bars and #2 shear steel bars are to be placed at 6 inches intervals in concrete band.	Yes
➤ For areas which are prone to Earthquake as well, concrete band should be provided.	Yes
➤ Masonry is to be started from corners so that the walls are tied together in a better way.	Yes
Roofing:	
➤ There should be concrete or wooden pad below the place of girder.	Yes
➤ The bearing of girder should be at least $\frac{3}{4}$ times wall thickness.	Yes
➤ 2 inch (proper) slope should be provided at roof for proper drainage.	Yes
➤ The roofing should be composed of:	Yes
- 1 inch thick mud plaster over	Yes
- 4 inch thick mud over	Yes
- 2 layers of polythene sheets over	Yes
- Brick tiles/ chick over	Yes
- T-irons/ wooden planks/bamboos over	Yes
- Girder	Yes

5. NRC SHELTER COMPARISON WITH OTHER AGENCIES

Organiza tion	Shelter cost (PKR)	Shelter type with package	Remarks
Islamic Relief	152,000	Permanent Shelter (14'*14') with toilet (6'*4')	There is no provision of Kitchen in the package due to which the cost is lower than NRC. If the Kitchen cost is added with the shelter cost then the total cost would exceed 2 lacs.
NRC	170,000	Permanent (14'*14') with Kitchen (5'*8') and flush	keeping in view the comparison of specification with other NGO's design, NRC's design is more Safe, Sound and Cheaper. There is also the provision of kitchen and toilet in the package due to which the cost of shelter is high if compared with others

		latrine (5'x6')	
Relief International	120,000	Permanent Shelter only (16'x12')	There is no provision of Kitchen & Toilet in the package, if these facilities are included, the cost would exceed 2 lacs. Similarly, community also contributes in joinery work. This cost was for the fiscal year 2005 when RI used to provide shelters to the EQ affected people of Mansehra & AJK
CRS	140,000	Permanent shelter only (16'x14')	There is no provision of Kitchen & Toilet in the package, if these facilities are included, the cost would exceed 2 lacs. Similarly, community also contributes in joinery work.
UN Habitat	110,500	Permanent Shelter (14'x14') with toilet (4'x5')	There is no provision of Kitchen in the package, if these facilities are included, the cost would exceed 2 lacs. Similarly, community also contributes in joinery work.
Qatar Charity	62000	Semi Permanent Shelter 18'x15'	The cost of the shelter is less because community pay for wall construction from plinth to roof level and this cost is only for shelter. No kitchen & Toilet included, if the cost of these facilities are included then the total cost of the shelter would about 2 lacs.
Swiss Red Cross	3,09,000	Permanent two room structure (19.68'x13.12)	There is no provision of Kitchen and toilet in the package though the structure consists of two rooms with no kitchen and toilet inside. If the costs of toilet and kitchen are added then the cost of the package will exceed four lacs.
Relief International	120,000	Permanent Shelter only (16'x12')	There is no provision of Kitchen & Toilet in the package, if these facilities are included, the cost would exceed 2 lacs. Similarly, community also contributes in joinery work. This cost was for the fiscal year 2005 when RI used to provide shelters to the EQ affected people of Mansehra & AJK
UNOPS	73,100	Permanent Shelter (12'x14')	There is no provision of Kitchen & Toilet in the package, if these facilities are included, the cost would exceed 2 lacs.
Islamic Relief	65,000	Transitional Shelter (15'x17')	There is no provision of Kitchen in the package due to which the cost is lower than NRC. If the Kitchen cost is added with the shelter cost then the total cost would exceed 2 lacs.
UN-Habitat	91,000	Permanent (12'x14')	There is no provision of Kitchen and toilet in the package due to which the cost is lower than NRC. If the Kitchen and toilet cost is added with the shelter cost then the total cost would exceed 2 lacs.

6. SHELTER PHYSICAL INSPECTION CRITERIA

Attached separately

7. KPK - FLOOD AFFECTED POPULATION

Attached separately

8. TERMS OF REFERENCE***Project Background*****Project context and rationale:**

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) has been present in Pakistan since 2002, primarily assisting the earthquake and flood-affected population in Northern Pakistan while supporting the UNHCR in the voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees. In cooperation with UN agencies and other partners, NRC currently assists IDPs and Afghan refugees in two provinces: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan. Additionally, NRC assists the returnee and displaced populations in FATA, including Bajaur, Mohmand and Kurram districts. The Country Office is based in Peshawar, with field offices in Kohat, DI Khan, Nowshera, Charsadda, Bajaur, Mohmand, and Quetta. In the next phase of the program, NRC expand its capacity to respond to flood affected populations, conflict affected IDPs, and returnees in these districts. NRC receives funding for activities in Pakistan from the Government of Norway, ECHO and UNHCR, SIDA, and DFID.

Pakistan is facing multiple socio-economic, political, security, and climatic crises that has led to massive humanitarian disaster. Responding to large-scale internal displacement in KP due to military operations in FATA the Government of Pakistan in 2009, the UN and humanitarian organizations initiated emergency responses. In July 2010, Pakistan witnessed one of the worst floods in over 50 years, which affected 18 million countrywide. In August 2011, more devastating floods hit Pakistan, mainly in Sindh and Balochistan affecting 5.4 million people. This further weakened the coping mechanisms of the population and resulted in the depletion of already scarce resources amongst the country's most impoverished populations.

In KP, nearly 800,000 people are still displaced and vulnerable as a result of on-going hostilities in several areas of FATA and further displacement of civilians continues. The largest groups were from Bajaur (350,000), South Waziristan (273,000) and Mohmand (245,000), but large numbers of unregistered IDPs from Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, FR Kohat and FR Peshawar were also living either in KP or other parts of Pakistan.

In reference to conflict affected people, according to data from the Internally Displaced Persons Vulnerability Assessment and Profiling (IVAP) project, the largest populations of IDPs originate from Orakzai, Bajaur and South Waziristan. Almost all IDPs express a desire to eventually return to their areas of origin when security conditions permit.

The IVAP also found that most IDP families live in host communities, not camps, and are highly financially vulnerable. Nearly 70% live below the 2005-2006 national poverty line, and the vast majority living in host communities pay rent for their accommodation. Daily wage labor is the most common source of income. The IVAP also indicates that 36% of IDP families don't seem to exist legally as they have never been registered for assistance, and therefore don't qualify for most assistance programs. Nevertheless, there are large needs for food, income/livelihoods, water and shelter assistance.

Project objectives:

NRC activities in Pakistan have aimed at promoting the rights and improving the living conditions of conflict affected populations. In this capacity the major concentration of program activities are found in KP and agencies in FATA. Specific activities implemented with ECHO funding sought to provide shelter and provision of basic NFIs. This included winterizing shelters and bringing them to minimum standards through construction inputs, training community representatives on basic hygiene and sanitation practices, and providing NFIs and tents to vulnerable families.

Purpose of the evaluation and intended use

NRC strives for excellence and accountability in its delivery of humanitarian assistance. The planned evaluation should provide important lessons learned and clear recommendations that will enable NRC Pakistan to improve its program planning, design and implementation.

The main *purpose* of the evaluation is to:

- Assess the effect and relevance of the program on the lives of the beneficiaries in KP and FATA
- Analyze implementation strategies and efficiency based on the situation on the ground
- Identify best practices and areas of learning opportunities

Intended use of results: The evaluation is first and foremost an internal evaluation that will be used by NRC Pakistan and NRC HO to improve the implementation of the ECHO project for 2011/2012. However, the results of the evaluation should also be applicable for general program planning, design and implementation in Pakistan. Moreover, the findings will also contribute to informed decision-making, foster an environment of learning, promote greater understanding of humanitarian principled approaches in the project areas while contributing towards the development of more efficient and effective project development in the mission.

Scope of work and methods

The evaluation team will;

- Focus on the following implementation period: 2010-11.
- Cover the following geographic areas: KP and FATA (depending on security situation). It is important to note that 60-70% of project activities took place in FATA. This is therefore a highly prioritised area.

The methodology will include:

- Desk study/ literature review: As a general background, the evaluation team should study relevant material in NRC, such as report, situation reports on KP/FATA. In addition the evaluation team need to look at proposal, intermediate and final report, Country Strategy and other related documents. Complete list will be provided.
- Assess availability of quantitative data and its use in evaluating program effect and efficiency. This includes, but is not limited to, IVAP data, needs assessment reports, and census bureau data from the Government of Pakistan, NRC monitoring data.
- Field visits: The evaluation will include field visits to field sites (locations will depend on security. Access to field sites especially FATA remains limited due to security situation which would need to be considered in defining the methodology) to consult with staff, stakeholders and beneficiaries to collect information in accordance with the requirements stipulated in the evaluation work-plan.
- Interviews with stakeholders/ focus groups: Interviews with staff, beneficiaries, and other stakeholders will be undertaken in accordance to the sampling methodology presented in inception report and agreed upon by NRC.

Evaluation principles:

The evaluation will be guided by the following ethical rules/considerations:

- Openness – of information given, to the highest possible degree to all involved parties
- Publicity/public access – to the results when there are not special consideration against this
- Broad participation – the interest parties should be involved when relevant/ /possible
- Reliability and independence – the evaluation should be conducted so that findings and conclusions are correct and trustworthy.

Issues to be covered

The evaluation team will apply the following criteria, based on the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria and defined in the NRC Evaluation Policy. The question under each criterion is meant to guide the evaluation team in focusing on key issues for NRC.

Impact: To what extent did the project impact the lives of beneficiaries?

- Did the project decrease the vulnerabilities of the target population?
- To what extent has the project supported self-sufficiency?
- Are there any links between relief and recovery?

Relevance: To what extent has the interventions undertaken been relevant to the local needs and priorities of the beneficiaries?

- To what extent was NRC able to access the most vulnerable population?
- Were there any gaps in the selection criteria used?
- Did the target population use the services and materials offered as intended?
- Did the approach taken by NRC correspond to the needs of the target population?

Effectiveness: Were the targeted outputs attained as planned?

- Were there any gaps related to planning, management, monitoring and implementation that influenced the results?

- Was the assistance provided able to meet the needs of people in a timely manner?
- To what extent did NRC's acceptance strategies and approaches facilitate better access in reaching beneficiaries?

Efficiency: Could NRC have used a different approach and achieved the same results (qualitative and quantitative)?

- To what extent could program cost have been reduced/made more efficient without sacrificing the quality of the results?

Coordination:

- To what extent was the assistance provided undertaken in coordination with other stakeholders (ex cluster) to avoid duplication of activities?

Cross cutting issues:

- **Gender** – how has the ECHO project adapted a gender sensitive approach?
- **Protection** – how has the ECHO project ensured that protection concerns have been incorporated and rights based approach adopted?

Evaluation team

An evaluation team will be formed, composed of an expat consultant and a national consultant. The team leader will lead the work of the team and be responsible for completing the report. The Team Leader should have a proven background in humanitarian assistance evaluations and experience working in the Asian Context. She or he should have skills in quantitative and qualitative methodologies, including cost-efficiency analysis and household surveys.

The regional/national team member should have knowledge and expertise in evaluation techniques and knowledge of the local context.

There would be a requirement for the NRC Program and support team (Finance, Logs, Security) to be engaged in the process and provide support to the evaluation consultant. It is assumed that the evaluation team will have access to all relevant documentation and can take part in relevant meetings and field trips since this would be viewed as an opportunity for learning and performance improvement.

The evaluation will require interaction between NRC staff, partners and beneficiaries. Comprehensive meetings, briefing and debriefing sessions with the evaluation team would be an essential part of the process.

A Steering Committee will be established, with the following members:

- Saeed Ullah Khan, Program Director, Pakistan
- Adam Combs, Head of Asia Section, Oslo
- Cara Winters, Monitoring and Evaluation Adviser, Oslo
- Arild Karlsbakk, Program Advisor, Pakistan, Oslo

- Jake Zarins, Shelter Adviser, Oslo

Evaluation manager is Programme Advisor, Arild Karlsbakk. The main function of the Steering Committee will be to select the external evaluators (International and national), review preliminary findings and recommendations and establishing a dissemination and utilization strategy. The main function of the Evaluation Manager will be preparing the terms of reference (in close collaboration with the stakeholder and members of the steering committee), administration and over all co-ordination, including monitoring progress.

Timeframe

The whole process of the evaluation will have a time frame of 40 working days taking place during the months of October and November 2012. This includes the international consultant (30 days) and the national consultant (10 days).

The evaluation team is scheduled to start its work at the beginning of October 2012. The team leader should alert the Evaluation Manger at NRC immediately if serious problems or delays are encountered. Approval for any significant changes to the evaluation timetable will be referred to the Steering Committee.

Expression of interest should be forwarded to arild.karlsbakk@nrc.no no later than 27. July 2012. A maximum 5 page summary should be submitted with appendices of team members CVs (each CV maximum of 3 pages) and an indication of availability. NRC may wish to see substantive pieces of work or to take up reference of short-listed consultants.

The final decision will be taken by 17. August 2012.

For further information pls. contact the Evaluation Manager at; arild.karlsbakk@nrc.no or ph: +47 90 63 23 02.

Reporting

An inception report will be presented by the consultant for approval by the Steering Committee before the activities are initiated. The inception report will contain a conceptual framework the evaluator will use in undertaking the evaluation and would outline the evaluation methodology and work-plan. Methodology should include a brief literature review describing the type of data (e.g. IVAP data, focus group interviews, household survey of beneficiaries) and documentation (e.g. country strategy report, security reports) available for the evaluation, the analytical approach and how the data and documentation will be used, the sampling strategy and size for surveys and focus groups, and draft versions of the data collection tools (e.g. questionnaires).

At the end of the field research, the evaluation team will hold a workshop with the NRC team, main stakeholders and other relevant staff off the NRC office identified by the Steering Committee to discuss the preliminary findings of the evaluation exercise.

The draft and final reports should be submitted by the end of year, with final submission dates to be discussed and decided upon contract initiation.

Difference of opinion between team members regarding conclusions/recommendations will be reflected in the report.

The size of the report should be approximately 45 pages, clearly written in English, using Arial 11 point.

The evaluation report should consist of:

- Executive summary and recommendations not more than 5 pages.
- Main text, to include index, emergency context, NRC mandate, evaluation methodology, commentary and analysis addressing evaluation purpose and outputs to include a section dedicated to the issue of particular lessons-learning focus, conclusions (not more than 30 pages)
- Appendices, to include evaluation terms of reference, maps, sample framework, and bibliography)

All material collected in the undertaking of the evaluation process should be lodged with the Evaluation Manager prior to the termination of the contract.

Follow up

The final evaluation report will make the basis for a management response and an action plan to follow up recommendations provided by the evaluation team.

For the follow up of the evaluation the Program Advisor is the main responsible, involving the Steering Committee members where relevant. The management response, responding to the recommendations, including an action should be prepared by the NRC Pakistan Program no later than two months after receiving the final report. It is the responsibility of the HO Management Team to ensure that the realizations of these plans are monitored and documented.

The final evaluation report will be shared with all relevant staff in NRC and the donor.

Sincerely,
Norwegian Refugee Council

.....

Date:

The above conditions are hereby accepted:

Date:

.....