

***CAMEROON COUNTRY
STUDY***

**Humanitarian Financing Task Team
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Introduction

This country case study report contributes to a wider policy study commissioned by the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Humanitarian Financing Task Team and contributes to their 2018-19 work plan objective to “Contribute to aid effectiveness through more effective humanitarian-development funding flows and mechanisms”. The study is co-led by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). An Advisory Committee also provides strategic guidance to the study and includes FAO, NRC, UNDP, OCHA, the World Bank, the OECD, ICVA and the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO).

The study documents the extent to which predictable, multi-year, flexible financing is made available at country level and seeks to understand the ways in which funding matches collective outcomes or Interoperable Humanitarian and Development Plan financial requirements (also referred to as ‘common planning priorities’) through a series of country studies in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Chad, the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Ukraine.

Cameroon was considered to be an interesting context for considering funding across the nexus in that it is an overall relatively stable lower middle-income country, but with a deteriorating economic and governance situation, and rapidly growing humanitarian crisis. In this context, opportunities exist for international actors to target interventions to prevent further deterioration of the situation, however, both domestic and international actors are currently struggling to adapt existing models and approaches, and to mobilise adequate resources.

A research mission was carried out in Yaoundé, Cameroon, from February 24th – March 1st 2019, hosted by UN OCHA and at the invitation of the UN Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator (RCHC). Semi-structured interviews were conducted with (see Annex 1 for a full list of actors consulted) in accordance with the agreed research methodology. It should be noted that a number of key donors to the context (including Korea and Germany) did not respond to requests for interviews and their perspectives therefore are not included. Documentary research and analysis of major public and private financing flows which could in principle contribute to Cameroon’s humanitarian, recovery, development and peacebuilding challenges supports the country-level qualitative interview research and is provided in Annex 2.


1. Key features of the context

Cameroon is a lower-middle-income country, which has a range of structural social, economic and governance challenges. However, it is only in the last five years that Cameroon has experienced large-scale humanitarian crises that required international response. Initially, these crises were external in origin. In 2014 and 2015, refugees from the Central African Republic (CAR) arrived into the Eastern and Adamawa regions in large numbers, triggering an international refugee response. There are currently 252,000 refugees from CAR in Cameroon, with little prospect of return (OCHA, 2019). Also in 2014 and 2015, attacks on civilian populations by armed groups operating out of Nigeria, notably Boko Haram, led to displacement of Nigerian refugees into the North and Far North regions of Cameroon, as well as internal displacement of Cameroonians fleeing cross-border attacks. Attacks and displacement have continued throughout the intervening years, and in 2019, 1.9 million people in the North and Far North regions are estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance (ibid.).

In addition to these two externally-driven crises, risk, fragility and social divisions within Cameroon have gathered pace in recent years, and a domestic crisis emerged in the North West and South West regions from 2017. Political protests at the perceived marginalization of the two Anglophone regions of Cameroon in 2016 and 2017 were quickly repressed by government forces. The situation rapidly deteriorated into widespread civil conflict as non-state armed groups proliferated and government forces deployed and responded. There is currently little indication of a viable political process to resolve the crisis and more than half a million Cameroonians are now estimated to be displaced both internally (437,500 people) and into neighbouring Nigeria (32,000) (ibid.). The civil conflict in the North West and South West is characterized by human rights abuses, movement restrictions, and denial of access to services and deliberate targeting and destruction of health and education infrastructure, in what was until recently, one of the more economically productive regions of the country.

OCHA estimates that in total, 4.3 million people in Cameroon are in need of humanitarian assistance across these three distinct crises in 2019. Of these, 2.3 million are targeted within the Humanitarian Response Plan (ibid.) (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Distribution of people in need of humanitarian assistance in 2019 in Cameroon



Source: UN OCHA, 2019

The established political and economic system is not currently equipped to address deepening economic, linguistic and regional inequality, the meet the demands of a growing population, or to address growing exposure to climate related risk.

Poverty reduction has been limited, and uneven, with the benefits of economic growth and development concentrated in the Central regions and in urban areas. The overall poverty rate in Cameroon declined slightly, from 40.2% in 2001 to 37.5% in 2014, however, the total population on poverty increased from 5.8 to 6.6 million (IMF, 2018a). Moreover, during this period Cameroon has become significantly more unequal. Urban poverty declined from 17.9% in 2001 to 8.9% in 2014 but rural poverty increased from 52.1% in 2001 to 56.8% in 2014. The poor are heavily concentrated in the three northern regions and in the North West, where 74% of Cameroon’s poor population are found (ibid.)

The poor are heavily concentrated in the most environmentally vulnerable areas. The four poorest regions (the Far-North, the North, the North-West and Adamawa) are part of the Sudan-Saharan, Western Highlands and Guinea Savannah zones, which are home to 80% of the country’s poor (World Bank, 2017). The Sudano-Saharan regions in particular are ecologically fragile and likely to be subject to increasing incidence of drought, high temperatures, water shortages and salinization of water and soil, owing to climate change

(ibid.) Cameroon faces multi climate-related risks in fact, including risk of drought, flooding, rising sea levels.

Cameroon is ethnically diverse, home to 250 groups, but linguistically divided, with two of the ten regions of Cameroon representing 14% of the total population, those bordering Nigeria, English-speaking, while the rest of the country, and the official language, is French. Political tensions have escalated in Anglophone regions with protests focused on lack of perceived respect for the Anglophone education and legal systems.

As inequality and risk deepen, frustration with the state had grown. Power is highly centralised and resources are distributed through patronage systems which support the political status quo,¹ rather than the needs and priorities of the population. This frustration is expressed not only in the political protests and armed insurgency in the Anglophone regions; but has also fueled popular opposition to the government, evidenced in protests around the recent elections; and a growing disenfranchised youth.

Meanwhile, Cameroon sits within an unstable region, which has had significant impacts on economic growth and stability. The Lake Chad Crisis and CAR crises have seriously disrupted regional markets, while the burden of hosting displaced populations and insecurity in the Far North, North West and South West regions, has significant local and macro-level economic impacts.

2. HDN policy and operational environment

2.1. Scope of the HDN

International engagement in Cameroon had until relatively recently focused on supporting the government's development agenda and only a limited number of donors were engaged with bilateral aid programmes. In the last five years international actors have been obliged to switch modes to simultaneously support humanitarian response and development programming however. Many organisations and coordination systems are therefore relatively new in Cameroon, and established actors have had to learn the language and ways of working of an international crisis response. Meanwhile, the crises, and growing acknowledgement of fragility in Cameroon, have given established development actors cause for reflection on the nature of their engagement and priorities.

There are three separate crisis contexts in Cameroon, each at different stages in their evolution, with different causes and political dynamics, and in geographical regions with different underlying socio-economic and environmental conditions. The configuration of international engagement in each of these contexts, is also quite distinct.

¹ The World Bank's 2017 Systematic Country Diagnostic study for example describes: "Political stability has come at a high price in terms of the development of political institutions, and of checks and balances. The SCD argues that the country's political and administrative system is an example of a 'limited access order', in which careful balance between multiple competing interests and factions, and personal allegiances, are the reality which holds the country together, rather than formal institutions. Such a system is also dependent on a powerful presidency, the powers of which are far-reaching."

1. **The Lake Chad Crisis related displacement in the North and Far North.** This is a mixed context where there is periodic insecurity, particularly in areas close to the border, as well as new internal displacement and arrivals of refugees. Access in these areas is limited. There are however, more stable areas where recovery and resilience programming is feasible. In addition to ongoing security, there a threat of radicalisation among refugee and host communities. There are multiple categories of affected persons, who each require somewhat different types of support, including recently internally displaced, refugees, those who have been internally displaced for some time, and internally displaced returning back to their areas of origin. There is currently a range of humanitarian, resilience, stabilisation, and development programming across these regions.

Vulnerability to climate-related risk in the North and Far North is significant and profound in terms of the implications for long-term development prospects in these regions. There is a compelling case therefore for the application of a 'quadri-nexus' approach in these regions.

2. **The CAR refugee situation in the East.** This is currently the most enabling situation for nexus approaches. There is widespread agreement that the crisis-stage of the refugee response is long passed. The majority of refugees are self-settled alongside the host population and see no immediate likelihood of return. Both the host population and refugees face similar challenges, and the disparity in conditions and assistance levels received by refugees has prompted resentment from host populations. There is a strong case therefore for an integrated approach to addressing the developmental challenges of the all those living in refugee hosting regions without distinction. Humanitarian donors to the crisis have significantly reduced funding to the humanitarian response, leading to scaling back of food assistance and other programmes targeting refugees only. Meanwhile, significant volumes of funding for resilience and development programming are starting to flow from development donors including AFD, the EU and the World Bank and efforts are being made to shift towards vulnerability-based rather than status-based targeting of assistance and locally-led prioritisation of development programming.
3. **The civil conflict in the North West and South West.** The nature of challenges in these regions are quite different. They are relatively well developed and agriculturally productive in comparison with the Far North for example, and developmental challenges are more centred on preventing harm to existing infrastructure and livelihoods. These regions are currently the least conducive settings for nexus approaches however, in large part owing to political sensitivities and the active nature of the conflict. Working with and through the government, the traditional modus operandi of many development actors, is extremely difficult in this setting since the government is party to the conflict. Development actors are therefore by association not considered neutral and because of insecurity, a number of existing internationally supported development programmes are on hold. Access even for humanitarian actors is extremely challenging, and humanitarian programming has not yet fully deployed and reached scale. UNDP is deploying an

early recovery advisor to assess possibilities for engaging in recovery, development and peacebuilding, however, the majority of development actors do not see opportunities to engage at this stage of the conflict.

The extent to which the root causes of conflict are considered in each of these nexus scenarios is somewhat limited and tends to find its expression in discrete programmes targeting communities (notably counter-radicalisation programming in the North and Far North) rather than addressing structural problems of unequal distribution and access to resources and power.² In particular, a number of international actors noted with dismay the lack of international political engagement in the rapidly deteriorating conflict situation in the North West and South West from respective governments and the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). Opportunities to engage in stabilisation and to arrest a deteriorating situation have not been pursued therefore leaving actors at country-level little scope to pursue more than a humanitarian response. A key element of a triple-nexus approach in the North West and South West therefore is currently missing.

2.2. Policy, planning and prioritisation environment

There are multiple planning frameworks in use in Cameroon. The government has a long-term national-level Growth and Employment Strategy ('DSCE', 'Document de Stratégie pour la Croissance et l'Emploi'), adopted in 2009 and which runs from 2010 to 2020, and supports the "Cameroon Vision 2035" aspiration to establish Cameroon as an emerging market by 2035. The government of Cameroon developed a further three-year Economic emergency Plan (PLANUT) in 2015 designed to accelerate progress towards the 2035 goal. PLANUT prioritises large public infrastructure projects that will promote private investment and growth (IMF, 2017).

There are several additional planning frameworks which specifically target the crisis-affected regions.

Recognising the unique vulnerabilities and challenges of the Northern and East regions of Cameroon (the Far North, North, Adamawa and East), the Government, through the ministry of the Economy, Planning and Territorial Administration (MINEPAT), requested assistance from the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and the World Bank Group (WB) to develop a Recovery and Peace Consolidation Strategy (RPC).

The RPC involved a long, participatory analysis and strategy development process between November 2016 and November 2017, that included extensive diagnostic work, including surveys and focus group discussions in the affected regions, and subsequent validation of the analysis and proposed strategies in the affected regions.

² The World Bank's 2017 Systematic Country Diagnostic for example identifies the need to simultaneously address both economic and power dynamics: "A critical first step is to find ways to engineer a rapid economic revival that can increase employment and economic opportunities. It requires improved collaboration between security, humanitarian and development actors and a greater focus on decentralized approaches. By involving local communities more actively and more directly, such approaches can play a key role by supporting poverty-reducing investments, avoiding elite capture and strengthening resilience." World Bank, 2017.

RPC 2018-22 overall objective: To decrease the risks of future crisis by addressing both structural causes of vulnerability and redress the impact of the current crises

Expected results:

- Sustainable solutions for forced displacement are in place
- Local governance is improved
- Delivery of basic social services is improved
- Economic recovery and socioeconomic opportunities and livelihoods are expanded
- Territorial and human security are improved

As well as a range of activities, the RCP identifies key policy reforms required by the government. These include the development and adoption of a comprehensive national multisectoral strategy and response plan for the management of forcibly displaced people; revision of Communal Development Plans and revision of the Public Investment Budget to include the needs of populations affected by crises. Commitments on the part of international partners include focussing investments on the most vulnerable areas and investing in building resilience; undertaking a mapping of interventions across government and international partners; and funding the steering and monitoring mechanism of the RCP.

A steering committee is envisaged to coordinate and monitor the RCP chaired by MINEPAT, MINATD and the Ministry of Finance, supported by a technical secretariat comprised of MINEPAT and key international partners, the UN, EU and World Bank. Resource tracking would be among the responsibilities of the Secretariat. Four regional platforms would oversee coordination and implementation at sub-national level, chaired by regional Governors with support from MINEPAT. A mutual accountability framework has also been developed, which includes indicators monitoring progress in government reforms and alignment of international support to identified priorities. The RPC was estimated to require USD 4.7 billion to implement for the period 2018 – 2022.

The RPC is considered by many stakeholders to be analytically robust and to have considerable buy-in, built through the extended development process and investment in consultation. The RPC accountability framework has yet to be officially signed off and adopted by the Presidency however and therefore budget allocations and accountability mechanisms to support implementation remain on hold.

The current UNDAF (2018-2020) is also geographically focussed on the four crisis affected regions of the Far North, North, Adamawa and the East. The UNDAF is structured around four strategic pillars, with the first three focussed on more traditional developmental priorities, and the fourth on 'resilience, food security, and early recovery' and is estimated to require USD 630 million in funding.

UNDAF 2018-22 Pillars:

- Development of decent job opportunities and social inclusion;
- Health and nutrition;
- Education and vocational training;
- Resilience, food security and early recovery.

Cameroon has a multi-year HRP (2017-2020) which has been aligned with the UNDAF (IASC, undated).³ The two frameworks also share the same geographical scope (the four priority regions) and thematic (notably education, health, resilience and food security). Although the HRP is framed as multi-year, fundraising remains annual and there is no multi-year funding strategy. The 2019 HRP has financing requirements of USD 299 million.

HRP 2019 Strategic Objectives

- Save lives and alleviate suffering
- Improve protection of civilians
- Use of data on risks and vulnerabilities
- Improve resilience

The Government agreed its own humanitarian response plan for the North West and South West covering the period 2018-19 with estimated financing requirements of CFA 12.7 billion (Government of Cameroon, 2017). Given that the government is party to the conflict, international actors maintain their own planning, prioritisation and coordination for the crisis in in the North West and South West and it is not clear the extent to which the government’s plan is functional.

None of these planning frameworks explicitly include peace and security beyond programmatic responses focussed on countering violent extremism in the North and Far North.

Cameroon has not developed Collective Outcomes to date, though is considering whether to embark on this process in 2019. A variety of opinions prevail on the appetite for and purpose of such an exercise. Several UN respondents questioned the value of developing additional targets and results, arguing that the SDGs and new generation UNDAF, which in principle “advances the ambition of more coherent programming approaches that bring together development, humanitarian, human rights and peacebuilding agendas.” are the logical conceptual and practical tools for the UN system to work more effectively across the nexus.⁴

Two key humanitarian donors note a preference for Collective Outcomes which focus not on additional programmatic outcomes, but which incentivise improved ways of working – for example, ensuring a robust evidence base, vulnerability-based targeting, and flexible ways of working. Former Special Representative for the SG on the rights of displaced persons undertook a mission to Cameroon in 2018 producing recommendations to address the immediate live-saving needs and long-term durable solutions for IDPs in Cameroon (IASC, undated; Kalin, 2018). Following the mission however, these recommendations have not been taken further.

³ “In the process of HRP revision for 2018, 6 sectoral working sessions were organized by OCHA to help humanitarian sectors studying the UNDAF to ensure the complementarity of their sectorial plans in both documents.”

⁴ <https://undg.org/programme/undaf-guidance/whats-new-in-this-guidance/>

There is no strongly expressed appetite for developing a further planning process and framework and many actors point to the existence of the RPC, which was a huge investment and achievement. Cameroon does not lack analysis and priorities to focus nexus approaches and investments, rather it lacks sufficient commitment to mobilise behind these.

2.3. Coordination, leadership and division of labour

Coordination of development is led by the government, through the “Comité Multi-partenaires” – CMP, a coordination platform chaired by the SG of the Ministry of Economy Planning and Territorial administration (MINEPAT) and the UN RC/HC with participation from bilateral and multilateral donors, representatives from the MINEPAT and Ministry of Finance. Sub-groups of the CMP are also co-chaired by development partners and sectoral ministries. Despite technical investments by development partners in UN-led coordination, the CMP and sectoral sub-committees were widely noted to meet infrequently and not to function effectively in providing prioritisation and coordination.

UN agencies plus the World Bank and IMF participate in the UN Country Team. Under the UNCT, the Programme Management Team oversees the implementation of the UNDAF, supported by UN working groups on gender, youth, stabilisation and preventing violent extremism, elections, HIV/AIDS and SDGs.

Informal coordination exists among major providers of budget support and programme-lending, including the IMF, AFD, World Bank and African Development Bank (AfDB), who share information on evidence of commitments to reforms provided by government as well as informal coordination on specific sectoral investments and programmatic design and in some cases co-financing of programmes.

Humanitarian donors also coordinate informally, though in practice this typically comprises just the UK, ECHO and US Food for Peace (FFP), the only donors with significant volumes of funding and who have regular country presence.

Operational coordination of the crisis response has evolved in a somewhat organic and complex fashion. At national-level, 13 UN agencies, 4 INGOs, 1 representative of national NGOS, and 5 donors participate in the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). At regional-level however coordination is organised differently for each crisis. As predominately refugee crises, UNHCR initially led the coordination of the CAR refugee response and the Lake Chad Basin crisis. UNHCR continues to coordinate the humanitarian response to the CAR refugee response. However, UNHCR now only leads the coordination of the refugee elements of the response in the North and far North, with wider coordination under government sector-led coordination, with co-leadership from UN agencies, and general coordination support from OCHA. The crisis in the North West and South West meanwhile is coordinated by OCHA, with clusters activated in late 2018 and cluster staff arriving in position in October/November 2018. Clusters have been operating in many cases with surge staffing, who are now reaching the end of their tenure. Coordination of the response to the crisis in the North West and South West therefore is still somewhat in start-up mode.

There are gaps in the evidence base which informs prioritisation, coordination and resource mobilisation. This is partly a function of the different character of the crises, with UNHCR registering and monitoring refugees, IOM monitoring internal displacement in the Far North, North West and South West, and a range of other organisations assessing on the basis of sectoral needs or household-level vulnerability, often on a geographically piecemeal basis. In the East, divergent interpretations of targeting criteria between WFP and UNHCR have resulted in tensions as both agencies sought to scale back their programming and move away from status-based targeting, and with the encouragement of donors, the American University of Beirut was commissioned to develop a statistically determined vulnerability assessment tool. The methodology and tool has yet to be agreed however and there remains no common approach to understanding and determining vulnerability that could support common prioritisation across humanitarian and development actors. Donors have also mooted the idea of establishing food security surveillance system equivalent to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification System (IPC) but this has yet to be taken forward.

In summary, despite the existence of multiple planning frameworks, the fragmented nature of coordination, and gaps in the evidence-base means that it remains extremely difficult to determine what the needs, priorities, coverage and gaps are across the nexus. Government-led coordination of development responses is considered to function only to a limited extent; humanitarian coordination is fragmented across multiple structures, and OCHA is under-resourced and over-stretched. Coordination of transitional activities, including resilience, countering violent extremism, and social cohesion activities, currently falls between the two stools of development and humanitarian coordination and is only understood to a limited extent. In 2018 OCHA led a mapping exercise of funding and activities across the nexus. However, this was a one-off exercise and has not been widely referred to. Both humanitarian and development donors consistently noted that due to their limited country presence, they struggle to participate in coordination forums and need to prioritise their engagement carefully. Many donors and operational actors noted difficulties understanding the 'bigger picture', which makes a coordinated response and indeed funding mobilisation, far more difficult.

3. Financing across the nexus

3.1. Wider funding environment⁵

Cameroon is the largest economy in the CEMAC region and has ambitious growth targets to achieve emerging market status by 2035. Cameroon faces a number of serious domestic and external challenges to these ambitions however.

Cameroon's economic growth has been impacted by an economic downturn in the region driven by depressed global oil prices, and regional conflict, which has disrupted regional markets. Cameroon also faces home-grown economic challenges. Notably, the conflict in the North West and South West, Cameroon's major cocoa and coffee producing regions, has


⁵ Note that section 2.1 is a precis of more detailed analysis and statistics contained in Annex X.

seen exports of these commodities drop by 28 percent and 26 percent respectively at the end of September 2018 (IMF, 2018b).

Government revenues have been impacted by these multiple economic challenges. Meanwhile, expenditure has been squeezed by the additional costs of military operations in the North and Far North and more recently in the North West and South West, as well as growing debt repayments. Cameroon’s public debt has grown significantly since it received debt relief under the HIPC initiative in 2009, which reduced its debt burden to 10% of GDP. Subsequent major investments in infrastructure development, driven in part by new borrowing to finance the acceleration of growth envisaged in the emergency PLANUT plan (IMF, 2017), have been largely financed with non-concessional debt, increasing Cameroon’s debt ratio to 33% of GDP in 2015 (IMF, 2018).

Expenditure on social sectors, which was already low by regional standards, has reportedly been further trimmed to accommodate these additional fiscal pressures.⁶ The fiscal gap has widened however (see Figure 2), and the IMF has embarked on a programme of support focusing on fiscal consolidation and debt management in order to reduce Cameroon’s current account deficit and reduce the risk of debt distress.

Figure 2: General government revenues and expenditure 2000-2017



Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2018

Cameroon’s medium-term economic outlook remains positive however but requires a range of government reforms and linked to this, successfully attracting international investment. Economic growth is predicted to improve, from 3.8 percent in 2018 to 4.4 percent in 2019 and 5-5.5 percent in the medium-term (IMF, 2018). However, this predicted growth will be driven by new natural gas production and new transport and energy projects (ibid.). Economic diversification, market reforms, and international investment will be required to ensure sustainable and broad-based growth. Despite substantial natural assets, and proximity to regional markets, Cameroon is not attractive for private sector investors, and domestic markets are often dominated by a small-number of large companies, which are often part-state owned. Cameroon has high trade tariffs, price controls, complex regulations

⁶ Based on research interviews with international partners undertaking public expenditure reviews.

and taxes, and inefficient and costly transport infrastructure (World Bank, 2017). Limited competition and constraints to growth mean that many areas of production, and markets, function well below their potential.

Cameroon could mobilise significantly greater revenues through improvement management of public finances (World Bank, 2016), also confirmed by UNDP's recent Development Financing Assessment (DFA). The DFA also identified a range of other potential resources for development, including climate finance and diaspora bonds. In order to stimulate further growth, attract investment, and increase government revenues, reduce exposure of public finances to risk, and improve the effectiveness of budget execution, a wide range of government-led reforms are required.

3.2. Funding across the HDN

The government of Cameroon has reportedly increased funding to crisis affected regions in the North and Far North in order to respond to the additional pressure hosting displaced populations has placed on public services, including health and education. Kalin (2018) reports for example investments of FCFA 5.3 billion to expand education provision for displaced children, and projects for hundreds of young entrepreneurs have reportedly been funded through the Young Special Triennial Plan (Kalin, 2018). The Government of has also mobilised funds for the crisis in the crisis response on the North West and South West, including through a donation drive, from private citizens and business.⁷ Apart from crisis response however, the government has yet to allocate significant budgetary resources towards crisis-affected regions to address longer-term structural under-development and vulnerability as recommended in the RCP. And as noted above, at the national-level, spending on social sectors have faced spending cuts.

Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Cameroon grew significantly in 2016 and 2017 and based on indications from the leading donors to Cameroon, notably France and the World Bank, and the IMF, which agreed a three-year Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, of around USD 668 million in July 2017, these levels are expected to remain stable in the next few years.⁸


There is evidence that development funding is increasingly targeting crisis-affected areas, though in what volumes and what proportion of the total this represents is unknown. It is worth noting however, that historically, a large proportion of ODA to Cameroon has flowed directly to the government. The 'public sector' (which includes both donor and recipient

⁷ However, the intended beneficiaries have reportedly been reluctant to receive this assistance, or unable to safely access collection points, highlighting the sensitivities of government-led response within the current conflict.

⁸ The Extended Credit Facility designed to enable the IMF to support low-income countries with protracted balance of payments problems to manage reform efforts and improve macroeconomic stability. The stated purpose is: "The ECF supports countries' economic programs aimed at moving toward a stable and sustainable macroeconomic position consistent with strong and durable poverty reduction and growth." Specific conditions and policy reforms are attached to the agreement and disbursements contingent on performance against these pre-agreed conditions. Funds provided are highly concessional ODA loans, with a zero interest rate (subject to review end 2018) and grace period of 5.5 years and a final maturity of 10 years. <https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/02/21/04/Extended-Credit-Facility>


governments and therefore includes funds directly executed by donor agencies) is the primary recipient of ODA funding, receiving 62% of ODA between 2015 and 2017, compared with just 9% via multilateral organisations and 7% via NGOs and civil society (see Annex X for more detailed analysis of ODA flows). A significant and growing proportion of ODA is provided in the form of ODA loans to government (58% in 2017, see Figure 4). Volumes and the share of the total that ODA loans comprise grew significantly in 2017; and it is also notable that although ODA overall grew significantly in 2017, country-programmable aid remained relatively flat with the largest increase in budget support (from USD 0.3 million in 2016, to USD 392 million in 2017, including USD 282 million from the IMF) (see Figure 4).

Figure 3: Grant and loan composition of total net ODA 2000-2017



Source: OECD DAC statistics

Figure 4: ODA contributions by sector 2013-2017



Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System. Note that Commodity Aid / General Programme Assistance contains budget support.

ODA financing to Cameroon is heavily concentrated among a relatively small group of donors, with the leading ten donors providing 91% of gross ODA flows between 2015 and 2017 (see Figure 5). This is highly relevant in understanding opportunities to influence prioritisation and targeting of development funding. Cameroon is a low priority for many bilateral development actors and many donors do not have a bilateral aid programme with Cameroon, others do not have regular presence in country. Both Canada and the UK for example ceased their bilateral aid programmes with Cameroon in 2011⁹ and while the US maintains a range of bilateral support, there is no formal USAID mission.¹⁰ The notable exception is former colonial power, France which provided 26% of total ODA between 2015 and 2017. Consistent with this low level of engagement from bilateral government donors, many of the leading donors are multilateral organisations and funds including the World Bank, IMF, Global Fund, African Development Bank, and UN. It is also worth noting that there are no specific country-level financing instruments for Cameroon.

Figure 5: Top ten donors of gross ODA to Cameroon 2015-2017 (USD million, constant 2016 prices)

	2015	2016	2017	Volume (2015-17)	Proportion (2015-17)	% change 2015-16	% change 2016-17
France	164.3	266.6	304.0	734.9	25.6%	62%	14%
World Bank	94.6	131.3	133.1	359.0	12.5%	39%	1%
IMF			282.2	282.2	9.8%		
Germany	73.9	88.5	101.2	263.6	9.2%	20%	14%
United States	82.4	79.3	87.1	248.8	8.7%	-4%	10%
EU Institutions	62.6	78.3	83.6	224.5	7.8%	25%	7%
Global Fund	62.2	35.0	76.2	173.3	6.0%	-44%	118%
African Development Bank	28.8	43.2	60.6	132.6	4.6%	50%	40%
United Nations	33.9	31.4	30.9	96.3	3.4%	-7%	-2%
Japan	37.2	23.7	30.2	91.1	3.2%	-36%	27%
Korea	16.6	11.3	24.4	52.2	1.8%	-32%	116%

Source: OECD DAC statistics.

In addition to their existing national-level programming, which in some cases already includes an emphasis on the North and Far North, a number of major development donors to Cameroon – notably France, the World Bank and the EU - have undertaken a range of measures to adapt their engagement to the changing context, recognising growing fragility and the need to target crisis-affected regions, and drawing on global-level instruments to leverage additional funding for crisis-affected areas (See Boxes 1, 2, and 3).

Box 1: AFD's changing approach to engagement in Cameroon

Cameroon is a major recipient of French aid. France funds activities across almost all sectors, with an emphasis on infrastructure, and roughly half of France's bilateral aid is comprised of loans. France also supports Cameroon through its Debt Reduction Development Contract (C2D),

⁹ <https://www.gov.uk/world/organisations/dfid-cameroon>

¹⁰ Elements of USAID's support are managed out of Accra; OFDA and FFP operations out of Dakar; and PRM out of Ndjamen.

designed to reduce recipient country external debt by converting completed repayments into the equivalent amount in ODA grants for mutually agreed poverty reduction programmes. In Cameroon, C2C funding typically targets activities in the health and education sectors.

France continues to channel the majority of its assistance through central government and to support the position that in order to address structural issues, sustained engagement with government is necessary. However, France has made efforts to develop fragility-sensitive programmes. For example, in 2014 France worked with the government to develop a special window within the Programme National de Développement Participatif (PNDP) to allow funding of community-identified micro projects and labour-intensive works in the Far North. France mobilised an additional EUR 10 million to finance these activities.

At head-quarters level, AFD has developed its institutional capacity to engage in fragile settings with new tools and financial instruments. In 2017, France launched the Minka peace and resilience fund, financed with EUR 100 million annually (expected to rise to EUR 200 million in 2019) mobilised through a financial transaction tax, and focussed on operations in the Sahel, Middle East, CAR and countries in the Lake Chad region. Cameroon currently draws funds from the Ga Songo initiative for CAR and the Kouri initiative for countries affected by the Boko Haram crisis.

The Ga Songo initiative targets a range of root causes of insecurity in CAR including social and geographic inequalities, corruption, diversion of natural resources and endemic insecurity. Ga Songo mobilised EUR 40 million for the 2017-2021 period. AFD contracts NGO consortia to deliver an integrated cross-border programme led by ACF.

The Kouri initiative for the Lake Chad crisis includes a focus on reducing inequality in affected regions, including provision of public services; strengthening food security and natural resource management; and supporting socio-economic integration of youth. In Cameroon, AFD funded an NGO led consortium to deliver an integrated programme including activities supporting local authorities, civil registration, land access, consultations between farmers and pastoralists, income generation in the Far North, with a value of EUR 12 million for four years starting in 2019.

AFD also receives funds through the EU regional RESILIAC programme and funds NGO consortia

Accessing the Minka fund and EU funds has crucially given AFD the opportunity to fund non-governmental partners in Cameroon and to contract and programme funds relatively quickly and to focus on community-level resilience and social cohesion activities.

Sources: Research interviews; <https://www.afd.fr/en/minka-peace-and-resilience-fund> ;

Box 2: The World Bank's changing approach to engaging in Cameroon

The World Bank's Group's (including the World Bank, International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)) country Systematic Country Diagnostic published in 2017 identifies addressing fragility, conflict and climate-related risk as key to the World Bank's strategy in Cameroon.

The World Bank Group's first focus under its 2017-21 Country Programme Framework (CPF) includes a strong emphasis on concrete programming at local level to "address multiple poverty traps in rural areas with a focus on northern regions". Within these national programmes, the poorest regions and vulnerable groups (including those displaced by violence, girls and youth) are

given particular emphasis. Results are focussed on “building resilience in the face of fragility, conflict, and changing climate conditions.” The World Bank Group has refocussed its programming accordingly towards the poorest regions and populations, with a focus on the Far North and has drawn on supplemental funding to address specific concerns in refugee hosting regions.

The World Bank team in Cameroon were the first to apply to the new global-level funding window created under IDA18 for refugees and host populations, and secured a substantial envelope of USD 130 million in grant funding for a large community-development programme in refugee hosting regions, implemented through the existing PNDP programme, which the World Bank had already invested years of development and support. The programme is in development stage but represents a significant shift towards inclusive and longer-term solutions for refugee hosting regions. Notably, the programme targets on the basis of vulnerability rather than status and works with local councils to develop participatory prioritisation processes, encouraging local authorities to consider inclusion of refugees in prioritisation and decision-making.

The IDA18 programme has forged new partnerships and approaches to ensuring principled response and UNHCR has been closely involved in technical and policy development of the programme. Disbursement of funds for example is contingent on the government agreeing a protection framework and providing a letter of commitment to a range of international laws, which will be assessed by UNHCR.

The World Bank has also experimented with new approaches to enable it to work in higher-risk high-priority settings. In particular, the World Bank has partnered with the government’s military engineer corps under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Works to rehabilitate the national road between **Moab and Kusine**, which forms part of the crucial CEMAC corridor with Ndjamena in Chad. The World Bank has put in place a range of monitoring mechanisms including third party monitoring and community grievance reporting mechanisms to manage potential risks associated with the project, supported by regular management scrutiny.

The World Bank is continuing its support to social safety nets and labour-intensive public works programmes in the Far North, North, Adamawa, North-West and East, plus 5,000 urban households in Yaoundé and Douala, with a view to scaling up after 2019.

The second and third priorities of the World Bank Group’s CPF focus on more typical national-level developmental priorities including “fostering infrastructure and private sector development” and “improving governance” including supporting reforms in public expenditure management. In support of the focus on supporting market creation in Cameroon, the IFC is eligible to apply to IDA18’s Private Sector Window for fragile and conflict affected regions.

Sources: Research interviews; World Bank Group (2017); World Bank (2018).

Box 3: Additional EU funds for Cameroon

The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF for Africa) was launched at the Valetta Summit on Migration in November 2015 with a primary focus on coordinating responses to “the diverse causes of instability, irregular migration and forced displacement.”

The EUTF for Africa currently funds a total of EUR 40.3 million across four projects in Cameroon. Of this, EUR 20 million is focussed on resilience activities; EUR 17 million on economic and employment opportunities; and EUR 3.3 million on improved migration management. Projects include:

EUR 10 million channelled through AFD to expand its pilot programme with the PNDP's intensive public works programme in 11 communes of the Far North for the period Sept 2016 – June 2019.

EUR 7 million to GIZ for resilience programming in Adamawa, the North and Far North for the period Sept 2016- Dec 2019. GIZ's programme targets 5,000 'vulnerable youth' with cash-for-work activities, training and start-up livelihoods activities through a range of partners, including international and national NGOs.

EUR 20 million for resilience programming for the period July 2017-July 2020 in Adamawa, the North and Far North, comprising funding of EUR 7.4 million to Dutch NGO SNV for its Projet de renforcement de la résilience des populations des régions septentrionales du Cameroun (PRESEC) and EUR 13 million to French NGO ACF for its Programme de Redressement Economique et Social Inclusif et de Lutte contre l'Insécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle des Territoires du nord Cameroun (RESILIAN).

EUR 3.3 million to IOM to strengthen the government's management and governance of migration, return and reintegration, for the period June 2017 – June 2020.


Source: Research interviews; https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/about_en ; <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/66884.html>

While these additional funds and new approaches to flexibility and risk appetite have significantly increased the availability and quality of development financing for crisis-affected regions, there are also risks and limitations associated with these developments. For AFD's Minka Fund and the EUTF for Africa, decision-making on funding allocations, contracting and management, takes place at the global rather than country-level and proposals are in competition with other countries, funds are strictly earmarked for pre-determined thematic priorities, and in some cases funds are part of cross-border envelopes, which are difficult to monitor. These alternate gravitational centres for decision-making and accountability run somewhat counter to commitments to supporting country-level decision-making and in practice and reduce incentives to participate in country-level processes. Donors at country-level often struggle to keep sight of projects which are managed out of head-quarters and have limited capacity to influence the priorities of global-level funds and initiatives. For example, at country level actors expressed concern that the EUTF for Africa might not continue after 2020 or might shift focus towards the Sahel. Funding recipients also have reduced incentives to participate in country-level coordination and prioritisation processes when their accountability lines and prospects of future funding lie outside the country. And funding recipients to date have been primarily government, donor agencies (notably AFD and GIZ), NGOs, and in some cases private contractors, such as USAID OTI contracted Chemonics. Only limited amounts of funding flow through the UN system.

Cameroon has struggled to attract humanitarian funding. The 2019 HRP paradoxically registers a significant increase in the number of people affected (3.3 million in 2018 versus 4.3 million in 2019) and targeted (1.3 million in 2018 versus 2.3 million in 2019) (OCHA, 2019b), but at the same time has significantly reduced its funding request. This is in part a function of a more realistic prioritisation and assessment of the feasibility of response in the North West and South West. However, it is also a pragmatic response to the consistently poor funding response to the crisis – just 44% of funding requirements were met in 2018 for

example (see **Figure 6**). Notably, the Early Recovery Cluster, which had failed to attract funding in previous years was dropped from the 2019 HRP; and interview respondents noted some NGO partners indicated they saw no point in developing and submitting projects to the HRP in 2019 as they considered them unlikely to receive funding.

Figure 6: Funding contributions to Humanitarian Response Plans for Cameroon 2014-2018



Source: UN OCHA FTS. Accessed 18th March 2019.

All humanitarian actors consulted agreed that the humanitarian funding gap is real, and not an overstatement of requirements. Several donors indicated that advocating for funding for Cameroon is a ‘hard sell’ to headquarters since Cameroon is a middle-income country and could in principle meet many of the gaps should it choose to. In prioritising global funding envelopes, the Cameroon humanitarian crisis is also weighed against the connected and higher-profile crises in neighbouring countries including Nigeria and CAR. It was also noted that gaps and quality concerns around the evidence base to justify needs also made it harder to build a strong case for funding the crisis response, and in the case of the crisis in the NW and SW, the government of Cameroon is reluctant to promote a crisis narrative. There is also some reticence among operational agencies around fundraising for the crisis in the NW and SW at present. While they are certain that needs are significant, it is not yet clear how and whether agencies will be able to scale up and respond given current security and access constraints.

Very little of the humanitarian funding provided is multi-year. While the UK provides multi-year funding, it supports responses focussed on acute needs, rather than resilience or other longer-term outcome programmes. Cameroon is pilot country for Canada’s two-year funding agreements with NGOs. ECHO provides some funding from 18-20 months but given the emphasis on prioritising life-saving programming, the programmatic requirements for longer-term funding were not felt to be significant and the majority of funding is annual. Notably, the UN’s Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) has played a significant role in funding humanitarian response in Cameroon with allocations every year between 2012 and 2018. CERF funding is by nature short-term with implementation periods of up to 6 months for Rapid Response allocations and 9 months for Under-funded emergencies allocations. Given low levels of funding to the crisis, these funds have in some years represented a significant proportion of total funds received within the HRP (see Figure 7). The CERF was

cited by many UN agencies interviewed as playing an important role in enabling their scale-up to the evolving crisis in the North West and South West.

Figure 7: UN CERF allocations to Cameroon 2012-2018

Year	Amount allocated (USD million)	CERF Window*	Crisis focus	% of total HRP funding
2012	10.8	RR, UFE	Flooding in Far North; CAR refugees in East	
2013	4.2	RR	Nigerian refugees in Far North	
2014	18.3	RR	CAR refugees in East and Adamawa	25.0%
2015	14.1	RR	Conflict affected populations in Far North	10.9%
2016	4.2	RR	Conflict affected populations in Far North	2.6%
2017	10.0	UFE	Conflict affected populations in Far North	8.6%
2018	15.0	UFE, RR	Conflict affected populations in Far North; Conflict in North West and South West	10.7%

Source: UN CERF. * RR = Rapid Response; UFE = Under Funded Emergencies.

The extent to which individual organisations working across the nexus are able to derive predictability from funding is highly variable. ICRC for example receives largely annual funding mobilised through its headquarters level appeals and general resource mobilisation. However, these funds are relatively predictable and requirements are consistently close to being fully met. This provides ICRC with sufficient confidence to undertake longer-term programming such as multi-year vaccination programmes, despite the short-term nature of individual grant agreements. In contrast with other settings, some NGOs have been successful in securing relatively large volumes of multi-year resilience funding. ACF for example has several grant agreements with AFD and the EU TF for Africa, which provides overall a relatively high level of funding continuity at organisational and programme level. Some UN agencies in contrast have low levels of multi-year funding from humanitarian donors¹¹ and few have been successful in competing for multi-year resilience funding from development donors. For UN agencies whose programming portfolio does not include a significant proportion of development programming (notably WFP, IOM and UNHCR), it is far more difficult to achieve funding continuity at the organisational level.

In summary, the availability of funding across the nexus is somewhat opaque and variable across the three different crisis settings. Humanitarian funding is in short supply and typically short-term. Funding for longer-term programming, is available, but the extent to which this meets needs and priorities is currently impossible to determine. And funds drawn from regional or global thematic pots and funds is somewhat unpredictable and priorities difficult to influence. The allocation of government funding to the crisis regions does not appear to have increased as anticipated in the RCP, making the case for additional international resources significantly more difficult to argue.

¹¹ It is notable for example that major donors including DFID and ECHO provide very little humanitarian funding to UN agencies in Cameroon at all.

3.3. Other considerations in funding across the HDN

There is most likely a transition funding gap, but it is difficult to understand the extent of this. It is difficult to assess the extent of the transition funding gap since tracking against the RCP has not been operationalised and no other comprehensive costed plan is in effect, but many felt that a gap for funding activities in crisis-affected areas was a significant cause for concern. There are significant sources of funding, including most notably from the World Bank, AFD and the EU but the adequacy and coverage of this funding against needs, priorities and an assessment of geographical or population coverage cannot currently be assessed. There are also concerns that current sources of resilience funding – notably from the EU Trust Fund – might not be renewed after the current cycle.

It is worth bearing in mind that that perceptions of the gap may be somewhat different depending on who you talk to. Very little of the funding for resilience and development in the North, Far North, Adamawa and the East benefit UN agencies and these activities are not well captured and visible across the multiple coordination processes and structures in place in Cameroon. From the perception of UN agencies therefore, funding for resilience and development in these four regions looks particularly bad, whereas for some NGOs, it represents a significant volume and proportion of their revenue and programming.

Funding has played a role in disincentivising nexus approaches, but there are many other practical challenges. For a variety of reasons, both humanitarian and development actors have struggled to adapt their programming to a changing context. Some development actors have struggled to adapt to a context in which government priorities may be at odds with vulnerability-based prioritisation and principled approaches. And some humanitarian actors have struggled to shift modes from short-term status-based programming models towards vulnerability-based targeting and longer-term transformative programming. There are a variety of disincentives to change, including a lack of a clear vision and strategy for crisis affected regions while the RCP remains on hold, and a clear strategy for principled access and response to the North West and South West has not been agreed. Funding however has played a role in difficulties adapting. A number of donors noted that they had found resilience programmes they had supported or been requested to support, disappointing in design and results. This in turn informed the preference for humanitarian donors to focus on programming addressing acute needs. However, it is clear that for responding actors, if they only succeed in mobilising humanitarian funds, they cannot adapt. This is evidently the case for UN agencies more than NGOs who have been more successful in accessing funds from the EU and AFD. UN agencies can clearly demonstrate that within their country programme budgets, that even when they have invested in developing evidence, analysis and programming to deliver transformative outcomes, still their humanitarian activities are far more likely to receiving funding while their longer-term programming remains un-funded.

Recognising that agencies were stuck in an increasingly untenable programming model, with only marginal programmatic modifications, such as small scale livelihoods activities, and no clear strategy for change, donors used their funding leverage to create an ‘electroshock’ to drive a change in strategy and approach to the refugee response in the East. Humanitarian donors significantly scaled back their funding to WFP and UNHCR. They did not however

offer alternative funding for different approaches, and agencies employed narrower targeting criteria to adjust to funding constraints. Fortuitously, the World Bank had secured funding under the IDA18 Refugees and Host Populations sub-window for the region and is developing a comprehensive package of programming. However, there are likely to be sequential gaps and coordination challenges across these two different programming responses. For example, it has not yet been agreed how different approaches to supporting the provision of health services will be managed across the transition – currently UNHCR pays 70% of refugee user fees while the World Bank follows a facility-based performance based funding model. And since prioritisation of aspects of the World Bank’s programming is determined by local actors, it is not yet clear which projects and facilities are going to be supported. In practical terms, this means that humanitarian actors have not been able to provide a clear articulation of their strategy and financing requirements for supporting the transition.

4. Gaps and opportunities

The funding environment in Cameroon is certainly challenging, but the availability of funding is not the only, or the most obvious constraint to working more effectively across the nexus. The financing response is somewhat secondary to more fundamental commitment, leadership, and coordination challenges.

The three different crises situations require tailored ‘nexus’ approaches, nested within a coherent national strategy. Each of the crisis situations in Cameroon is quite distinct and offers different opportunities and challenges. There can be no one single nexus approach therefore and priorities, coordination and leadership, and financing response, are likely to remain different, and adapted to the local context and the presence of international actors.

In the North West and South West the ‘peace’ element of the nexus notably absent, which in turn constraints programming beyond humanitarian response. International actors at country-level expressed concern at the lack of political dialogue with parties to the conflict from the UN SRSG and member states, leaving them focussing on primarily humanitarian responses, within tactically negotiated operating spaces, in an active conflict. Opportunities to address root causes of the conflict, to build confidence, improve social cohesion, and to arrest further suffering, losses and accumulation of grievances, were felt to be passing by, while international actors wait out the crisis.

Insufficient government commitment and leadership is a real constraint to be acknowledged and engaged with. There is already a well elaborated framework in place to guide multi-layered responses across the nexus in Cameroon, which includes a detailed costing and allocation of responsibilities for financing the plan, but it is not being implemented. Adding another layer of priorities, and another financing strategy or plan, will not alter the fact that the RCP has not been fully adopted and operationalised by the government and budget allocations have not been adjusted. Programme-based responses which work around the political realities of the context are appealing for both implementers and donors. There are incentives baked into organisations dependent on project-based funding for their survival, to market these kinds of solutions, as well as incentives for donors, keen to demonstrate measurable results within short or medium-term timeframes,

to fund them. The longer-term impact of internationally financed and executed interventions, without the buy-in and support of national actors will be severely limited however. Ad hoc resilience programming cannot ultimately deliver transformative outcomes in the absence of structural political and economic reform investments in infrastructure and service provision, and of course resolution of conflict, and the legal and physical protection of citizens and refugees. These sorts of changes require long-term sustained engagement, leadership, principled advocacy, technical support and investment.

In focussing on project-based technical solutions to crises, there is a risk that international actors are provided an option to side-step strategic engagement with government on sensitive issues. In doing so, they also risk substituting for and undermining state responsibilities and capacities (Kalin, 2018). It is notable for example that the UNDAF focusses more on programming in the crisis-affected regions than on national-level governance and policy reform. The recent Development Financing Assessment (DFA) conducted by UNDP in contrast is a step towards re-engaging with influencing government commitment and capability to financing the SDGs with domestic public and private sector resources.

The influence of the UN system is currently limited, particularly the capacity of the UN to influence the calculations of bilateral donors. The UN system is a relatively small player in financial terms. The lion's share of ODA funding flows from bilateral donors and multilateral development financing institutions to government or is directly executed by bilateral donors. The UN has limited influence over or sometimes even understanding of the incentives and motivations for these agreements, particularly when decision are taken at regional or donor capital level. However, in the current context where bilateral donors may be re-evaluating their long-standing modus operandi and considering fragility, vulnerability-based targeting, and more principled engagement, there are opportunities for the UN to show leadership in developing and advocating for principled collective positions, vulnerability-based prioritisation, and in providing practical support to the work of coordination.

Development financing actors currently show a willingness to re-prioritise based on assessments of vulnerability and fragility. Recognition that inequality and fragility are deepening, that infrastructure-heavy development investment has not produced broad-based growth, and that the partnership with government is problematic in the North West and South West, has prompted donors to reflect on their relationships with government. The World Bank's 2017-2021 Country Programme Strategy for example clearly identifies Cameroon's increasing vulnerability to instability and violence, growing fragility in the North, Far North, East and Adamawa and the contribution of a 'limited access order' political system to the growth of a politically and economically disenfranchised youth (World Bank, 2017). It also identifies barriers the current political and economic system has created to private sector investment and growth and identifies lack of government ownership of earlier reforms and investments as a significant obstacle. In short, the World Bank's Systematic Country Diagnostic explicitly cites governance as "a critical constraint to eliminating poverty and boosting prosperity."

It was not clear based on the limited interviews conducted the extent to which major donors (particularly donors of budget support and programme loans) would be willing to use their collective financial leverage to influence government support to shared objectives over and above the specific objectives of their projects. It was also not possible to assess the coherence of policy reforms and investments across major bilateral and multilateral financing actors either with one another, or with collectively agreed priorities, notably the objectives of the RCP. Informally, a number of respondents expressed concern at the lack of conditions attached to budget support and misuse of these funds, though this was not verified. It is clear however that the major donors to Cameroon collectively have significant influence, and there would in principle be potential for linking funding to a set of coherent objectives, policies and principles. There is already one notable example of an individual donor using their influence to support a coherent and principled approach where the World Bank recently applied conditions to the disbursement of the IDA18 grant financing for refugee hosting regions requiring the government provide evidence and commitment to an adequate protection framework for refugees.

There is currently a structural coordination gap and an evidence gap which could lead to inefficient allocation of resources, and which negatively impacts resource mobilisation efforts. The coordination demands of the Cameroon context are complex, under-resourced, and as noted above, lack strong leadership from government. The three different crisis settings require different approaches and convene somewhat different constituencies of actors. In the North West and South West, increased support to impartial coordination and protection monitoring is required in line with the rapidly escalating scale of displacement and incidence of protection concerns. In other crisis-affected regions, support to government capacity to coordinate, as well as targeted investments in the evidence base and the practical work of activity mapping, information sharing, prioritisation and discussion on strategy and emerging issues is required. This extends beyond the remit of humanitarian actors and exceeds the current capacity of government-led coordination fora. At a very practical level, the coordination of response across the nexus falls between two stools of humanitarian and development coordination structures.

Locally adapted solutions which support existing government capacities are being pursued in the North and Far North and in the East and Adamawa, but these are not yet clearly defined and functioning smoothly. The World Bank IDA18 support in the East and Adamawa for example envisages decentralised prioritisation and coordination led by local councils, with national-level oversight through a steering committee, which also includes UNHCR. Outside of this project however, UNHCR still officially leads coordination of the refugee response, and a number of area-based multi-sectoral resilience consortia are in operation, which do not clearly fall within the scope of existing coordination mechanisms. Plus of course there are a range of national-level development projects implemented in these regions. Prioritisation, coordination, targeting and monitoring in such a scenario is challenging. In 2018, OCHA led a labour-intensive exercise to map initiatives across the nexus in 2018 in these regions, which illustrated significant gaps in knowledge of projects and initiatives.

In addition to local-level and sectoral coordination gaps, without the activation of the technical secretariat envisaged in the RCP, higher-level policy issues which create an

enabling environment for economic and social development in crisis-affected regions are at risk of incoherence and omission. It is notable that despite the clear contribution of climate-related risk to vulnerability and fragility for example, that risk is not prominently featured in major planning frameworks. The recent case of the World Bank and UNHCR reacting to an unforeseen need to build protection safeguards into the IDA18 programme also highlights the importance of the capacity for dialogue and advocacy on protection and principles at the national-level. The RCO would be the logical locus for support to some of the practical daily work of relationship building and information management that would incentivise and enable more effective coordination across the nexus as well as engaging on behalf of the UN and its partners, on national-level policy, protection and principled engagement. However, this would require significant investments in the capacity of the RCO as well as additional investment in the generation of independent evidence on vulnerability and needs that could provide a common basis for prioritisation.

Delivering outcomes across the nexus requires substantial resource investment, potentially over extended periods. Shifting from status-based to community-wide, vulnerability-based approaches and seeking transformative outcomes requires a different order of resource investment and timeframes in comparison with targeted humanitarian response. The various resilience programmes supported by the EU and AFD are still in relatively early stages of development, but partners involved anticipate that significantly longer implementation periods would be required to enable experimentation, feedback, adaptation of approaches, and delivery of lasting change. Elsewhere, resilience consortia approaches have gone through several multi-year iterations before they start to deliver measurable outcomes. And it should be noted that these resilience programmes are tightly geographically circumscribed and therefore they can at best deliver islands of improvement without further investment in scaling.

The World Bank's support to the refugee hosting regions is a good example of investing a substantial sum to allow programmes a decent shot at success and it is notable that key elements of the programme build on existing programmes which have already benefitted from years of design, negotiation and refinement, including PNDR and the World Bank's performance based health programme. While planning frameworks and projects are often pegged to three to five-year periods, in reality, donors and implementers should expect to potentially remain engaged for several of these cycles if they are to deliver on aspirations to reduce vulnerability and end needs, and if they are to benefit from the return on investment in experimentation, learning and programmatic refinement that takes place within the ongoing resilience and system strengthening programming, which should inform replication and scale-up.

5. Conclusions

The principal challenges to financing nexus approaches in Cameroon may be traced back ultimately to a lack of willingness of the government to invest in these regions and priorities, which in turn influences international donor willingness to invest. There is already a robust and respected nexus planning framework for two crisis-affected regions of the country. It simply has not been implemented and therefore financing actors have not adjusted their investments in line with the RPC.

In addition, financing and operational actors in Cameroon have struggled to adapt to a context which has dramatically altered. Many development donors had already disengaged and are now unfamiliar with the context, and struggle to argue the case for prioritising a middle-income country. Cameroon is simply not a priority for many donors and the range of actors and scope of action in country therefore is limited. Donors and implementing organisations who remained had often developed close relationships with government, which now look somewhat different in light of the government's role in current conflict in the North West and South West and with acknowledgment of the role of government policies in deepening economic and political fragility. Major donors, notably AFD, the EU and World Bank have adapted their approaches and tapped into global crisis financing instruments which has enabled them to adapt to an extent. But without leadership and buy-in to support a coherent approach to the programming across the nexus, they are somewhat limited in their abilities to go further, and without investment from the government, the impact of international efforts will fall far short of what is required and outlined in the RPC.

The international community in Cameroon faces challenges on many fronts, across three distinct crises, with limited in-country capacity and major resource constraints, particularly for the humanitarian response. In such a scenario, without a significant investment of financial, technical and human resources the ability of international and national actors to deliver meaningful progress on nexus ambitions, will remain highly constrained.

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Annex 1. Mission schedule

SUNDAY 24 FEBRUARY		
7.15 PM	Flight SN 371	Nsimalen Airport
MONDAY 25 FEBRUARY		
9.30 AM	[C] Briefing session with the RC/HC - Ms. Allegra Baiocchi + OCHA Head of Office Mr. Modibo Traoré	Resident Coordinator Office
10.40 AM	[C] WFP Representative – Mr. Abdoulaye Balde	UNICEF
11.40 AM	[C] UNHCR Representative – Mr. Kouassi Etienne	UNHCR
12.40 AM	[C] UNICEF Representative – Mr. Jacques Boyer	UNICEF
Lunch time		
2.30 PM	[C] Discussion on CERF implementation with the Inter Sector	OCHA
4.15 PM	[C] World Bank Senior Operations Officer - Ms. Gina Bowen Operations Officer/Conflict & Fragility Mr. Nicolas Maistre	World Bank
TUESDAY 26 FEBRUARY		
9.30 AM	[C] Discussion on Cash-based transfers with key partners	OCHA
12.00 AM	[C] UNFPA Representative – Ms. Siti Oussein	UNFPA
Lunch time		
1.45 PM	[C] IOM Head of Mission – Boubacar Seybou	IOM Office
3.00 PM	[C] Participation to the HCT	OCHA
5.15 PM	[C] Director of Civil Protection - Ms. Yapp	DPC OFFICE
WEDNESDAY 27 FEBRUARY		
9.00 AM	[C] DFID Humanitarian Advisor – Mr. Stéphane Quinton	DFID
11.00 AM	[C] MSF	OCHA
12.15 AM	[C] ICRC	OCHA
Lunch time		

2.15 PM	[C] UNICEF Resilience Focal Point – Mr. Mohamed El Bechir	UNICEF
3.45 PM	[C] UNDP Resident Representative – Ms. Fenella Frost	UNDP
5.00 PM	[C] – EU Delegation – Ms. Céline CHOQUER	EU Office
THURSDAY 28 FEBRUARY		
08.30 AM	[C] Deputy Director of International Cooperation – Ministry of Economy, Planification and Local (MINEPAT) – Mr. Guemaleu	MINEPAT Door N°317
10.00 AM	[C] Canada – Head of mission	Canadian Embassy
11.30 AM	[C] DG ECHO – Technical Assistant – Ms. Delphine Buyse	ECHO
12.45 AM	[C] WHO – Program Manager – Dr. Douba Epée	WHO
Lunch time		
2.00 PM	[C] UNHCR Nexus/Development focal point – Mr. Leopold Kortekaas	OCHA
3.15 PM	[C] USAID / Food for Peace Emergency specialist- Mr. Stéphane Dufils	VIA PHONE
4.00 PM	[C] AFD – French Development Agency- Mr. Jean-Benoît Perrot-Minnot Chargé de mission Gouvernance	AFD
FRIDAY 1 MARCH		
10.00 AM	[C] Debriefing session with OCHA Head of Coordination Unit - Ms. Imane Cherif	OCHA
END OF MISSION		